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Healthcare in the Spectrum 
of Human Rights. An Introduction 
HEINER BIELEFELDT, SABINE KLOTZ,  
MARTINA SCHMIDHUBER, ANDREAS FREWER 
 
 
 
The human right to the highest attainable standard of health1 frequently 
evokes skeptical reactions. After all, human rights differ from moral postu-
lates in that they impose binding obligations on the state, which under in-
ternational law figures as the formal guarantor of the rights of those living 
under its jurisdiction. If that is true, however, how can a certain standard of 
health become a legally binding entitlement? Obviously, efficient and com-
prehensive healthcare presupposes an expensive infrastructure, which not 
every state can afford.2 Even affluent states face the problem of increasing 
healthcare expenses, which they may feel unable fully to shoulder in the 
long run. For economically impoverished states in the global south, the sit-
uation is much more dramatic; scarcity of resources may even hamper the 
development of a minimum healthcare infrastructure. In the light of such 
obvious contingencies, how can the state »guarantee« a right to health for 
everyone? If the state promises what is beyond its control, such a promise 
                                                             
1  For an overview on the right to health see Mann et al. (1999); Toebes (1999); 
Riedel (2009); Tobin (2012); Wolff (2012); Saul et al. (2014). For basic issues 
regarding the right to health see WHO (2008); Clapham (2009); Grodin et al. 
(2012); San Giorgi (2012); Toebes et al. (2014); Kavanagh (2016); Yamin 
(2017).  
2  See Campbell et al. (1986); Beyrer/Pizer (2007); Gostin (2014); Harris et al. 
(2014); Cruft et al. (2015). 
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does not seem to be fully reliable. Do we have to conclude that the pro-
claimed human right to health is illusionary? Is it but an empty promise?3  
Radical critics of the right to health go a step farther by contending that 
the semantics of a right to health might in the long run weaken the validity 
claims of international human rights in general.4 Human rights are a partic-
ularly strong category of norms. Based on due respect for »the inherent 
dignity […] of all members of the human family«,5 they have the elevated 
status of »inalienable rights«. Accordingly, human rights claim priority 
over other legal norms. Now, by inserting an entitlement that in practice 
depends on the availability of adequate resources and other socio-economic 
contingencies, the framework of human rights may eventually lose much of 
its stability and reliability. This at least is what skeptical commentators 
have objected.6  
Such criticism has a long tradition, it sometimes culminates in a general 
juxtaposition of civil and political rights (CP rights), on the one hand, and 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights), on the other. While CP 
rights, like freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of expres-
sion etc. claim unconditional validity, ESC rights, like the rights to educa-
tion, housing or health remain merely conditional, given their resource-
dependency. This in turn implies that ESC rights do not have the same ele-
vated normative status as the »classical« CP rights – or so the critics would 
argue. They may go on to declare that CP rights chiefly impose negative 
duties on the state. For example, in order to do justice to freedom of expres-
sion or freedom of religion what the state has to do is merely refrain from 
exercising censorship or from harassing religious minorities, respectively. 
Not to do the wrong thing seems to be enough. By contrast, ESC rights re-
quire expensive infrastructural investments in schooling, housing or 
healthcare etc. They thus impose positive duties upon the state. This differ-
ence between negative and positive duties manifests itself also in the lan-
                                                             
3  »The Right to Health – an Empty Promise?« was the title of our conference at 
the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities (September 
2015).  
4  See Wolf (2012) for an overview on the human right to health and its critics.  
5  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), first sentence of the preamble. 
6  See Campbell et al. (1986); Beyrer/Pizer (2007); Harris et al. (2014); Cruft et al. 
(2015). 
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guage of »obligations to respect« versus »obligations to fulfil«. Whereas 
CP rights call for respect by the state, ESC rights postulate far-reaching 
state activities – or so is the assumption. Finally, by carving out a sphere 
free from undue state inferences, CP rights are rights to freedom. Many of 
those rights – like freedom of expression or freedom of assembly – actually 
carry »freedom« in their titles. By contrast, the heading of ESC rights is 
less clear. Assuming that they inter alia rectify the consequences of social 
inequalities, they sometimes figure under the title of rights to equality.  
The juxtaposition of CP rights and ESC rights may thus lead to the im-
pression that these two categories of rights are essentially different, perhaps 
even antagonistic, as illustrated in the following table:  
 
Table 1: Juxtaposition of CP rights and ESC rights 
CP rights ESC rights  
unconditional validity 
negative state obligation  
(to respect) 
rights to freedom 
merely conditional validity 
positive state obligations  
(to fulfil) 
rights to equality 
 
 
The consequences drawn from such an antagonistic conceptualization can 
be different. While radical critics of ESC rights reserve the title of human 
rights to CP rights, moderate critics push ESC rights to the margins of the 
human rights debate in order to keep the priority of the »classical« CP 
rights in place. This also manifests itself in different degrees of skepticism 
towards the right to health.  
However, the antagonistic conceptualization of CP versus ESC rights 
has come under increased pressure in recent decades. It no longer repre-
sents the state of the international debate.7 The UN committee in charge of 
monitoring the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR) played a leading role in the ongoing effort to devel-
op a more comprehensive normative framework. An important part of the 
work undertaken by the Committee was carving out »core elements« of the 
various ESC rights, including the right to health.8 It has become obvious 
                                                             
7  See Krennerich (2016). 
8  See Tobin (2012); Müller (2016). 
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that not all the elements of those rights are equally resource-dependent. 
Take the example of non-discrimination. Even an economically less devel-
oped country with a poor schooling infrastructure cannot give boys privi-
leged access to schools, to the detriment of girls. This would be a flagrant 
case of discrimination and a clear violation of the right to education. Invok-
ing limited resources would not justify such discrimination. Likewise, a 
country with scarce resources in healthcare cannot distribute those re-
sources in a discriminatory fashion, for instance, by prioritizing members of 
a particular ethnic group or social class. This is an obvious problem also in 
rich Western countries, as illustrated by the inevitable competition over 
scarce organs, which must meet criteria of transparency, fairness and non-
discrimination. With regard to such »formal« criteria, however, countries 
like Norway and Burkina Faso are ultimately on the same page. This is an 
important insight. In other words, the focus on core elements of ESC rights 
has contributed to the awareness that not all aspects of these rights are en-
tirely dependent on resources. Of course, the right to health covers many 
other aspects as well. It also includes an obligation for the state pro-actively 
to develop an appropriate health infrastructure, which naturally is a long-
term project. While core elements have an immediate obligatory nature, 
other aspects of the right to health accommodate more leeway. With regard 
to the latter aspects, the state has a broader degree of discretion for imple-
menting the right in a step-by-step fashion (progressive realization).9 
When looking again at the CP rights, we may realize that things are not 
entirely different there. Without denying remaining conceptual differences, 
CP rights, too, cover various aspects, which likewise can be differentiated 
according to the logic of core elements and broader areas. Take the exam-
ple of freedom of religion or belief. While the forum internum, i.e. the inner 
nucleus of a person’s faith formation, even enjoys absolute protection,10 ex-
ternal manifestations of one’s religious convictions can be limited, provided 
that all the criteria for such limitations are fully satisfied. Moreover, alt-
hough issues like the treatment of religious diversity in the school curricu-
                                                             
9  For an overview on state obligations and progressive realization see De Schutter 
(2014). 
10  See Article 18(2) ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
There are only few absolute norms in international human rights law. Examples 
include the probation of torture and prohibition of slavery.  
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lum have an impact on the general atmosphere in a society and thus fall 
within the scope of freedom of religion or belief, human rights law does not 
specify any detailed rules, which the state is supposed to follow in this 
field.  
Generally speaking, every human right – whether categorized as CP or 
as ESC right – is internally differentiated. While some aspects are immedi-
ately obligatory, other aspects allow for more leeway. Admitting this, how-
ever, must have consequences. It means to replace the antagonism of »un-
conditional« rights versus »conditional« rights by a more nuanced lan-
guage. The question where exactly to draw the line between unconditional 
and conditional elements of human rights guarantees runs across the entire 
spectrum of CP and ESC rights. At any rate, to assume a neatly ordered bi-
furcation, like in table 1, fails to capture the complexity of the problem.  
The same is true for the distinction between »negative« and »positive« 
state obligations. Let us start with CP rights. Not to do the wrong thing 
would certainly not be enough for a state to discharge its human rights ob-
ligations. In order to realize freedom of expression, for example, the state 
has to provide effective protection to journalists under threat. NGOs pro-
moting freedom of expression have furthermore demanded that the state fa-
cilitate the development of community radios for ethnic minorities and in-
digenous peoples, which requires far-reaching infrastructural investments. 
Likewise, to be able to enjoy their freedom of religion or belief, religious 
minorities may need an appropriate status position as a collective legal enti-
ty, which presupposes legislative efforts for that purpose. Finally, one 
should not forget human rights in general presuppose a functioning and in-
dependent judiciary, which one cannot take for granted. These examples 
may suffice to demonstrate that CP rights demand manifold state activities 
way beyond the proverbial »negative« duties of non-censorship and non-
oppression.  
Just as CP rights imply positive state obligations, i.e. obligations to pro-
tect and fulfil, ESC rights inter alia require of the state an attitude of re-
spect. The state cannot implement the right to food without respecting peo-
ple’s dietary customs, including dietary rules based on moral or religious 
convictions. This is part of the right to food itself. To give another example, 
the right to education presupposes respect for specific needs and vulnerabil-
ities of students from minorities and their parents. The right to health, in 
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turn, requires a respectful attitude towards patients. As the ESC Committee 
points out in its General Comment No. 14 (2000) on the right to health: 
»All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and 
culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples 
and communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, as well as being 
designed to respect confidentiality […].« 
 
These are very clear words. Many violations of ESC rights follow from a 
lack of due respect.11  
Again, the neatly applied differentiation between negative and positive 
duties and their location in the CP and ESC camps, as illustrated in table 1, 
fails to do justice to the complex tasks ahead. Since the late 1990s, the ESC 
Committee and other UN bodies have in fact used a more adequate scheme. 
It has become customary to distinguish between three main state obliga-
tions, i.e. obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.12 The decisive point 
is that these obligations apply to all human rights, across the whole range 
of CP and ESC rights. In other words, not a single right would flourish 
without due respect, without efficient protection and without a workable in-
frastructure provided by the state. In this regard, CP rights and ESC rights 
are again on the same page.  
Finally, one has also to overcome the ideological bifurcation of rights to 
freedom versus rights to equality. This opposition fails to make any sense. 
In the context of human rights, freedom and equality are two closely inter-
woven principles. Neither can exist without the other. Without a due ac-
count of equal implementation, freedom would end up as the privilege of 
the happy few, and without the spirit of freedom, equality could easily be 
mistaken for sameness, uniformity or homogeneity. Human rights in gen-
eral are rights of equal freedom specified for the various aspects of human 
life.13 Take, for example, the right to marry a spouse of one’s choice, which 
usually figures as a CP rights. It applies equally to men and women. More-
over, the equality principle has recently led to an opening up for same-sex 
couples as well. Freedom of religion or belief likewise has an equality di-
mension, because it challenges discriminatory practices and structures 
                                                             
11  E/C.12/2000/4, 11. August 2000, para. 12. 
12  See Krennerich (2016).  
13  See Bielefeldt (1998). 
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based on people’s religious or non-religious convictions. The right to fair 
trial – again a CP right – would amount to a mockery of human rights un-
less it is effectively open for everyone equally, including economically im-
poverished people. Indeed, no CP right can count as a human right unless it 
remains within a systematic framework of equality and non-discrimination. 
When turning back to ESC rights, we can correspondingly find the 
principle of freedom in all of them. Take the example of the right to hous-
ing. It inter alia serves as one of the most important safeguards of personal 
privacy (which itself counts as a CP right). »My home is my castle« is an 
early-modern slogan demanding respect for privacy. Moreover, without ad-
equate housing family life can hardly flourish in freedom. To give another 
example, the right to work includes the prohibition of forced labour, thus 
also contributing to the guarantees of human freedom. Finally, the right to 
health presupposes respect for the autonomy of patients.14 To quote again 
from the General Comment issued by the ESC Committee: 
 
»The freedoms [as contained in the right to health] include the right to control one’s 
health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free 
from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical 
treatment and experimentation.«15 
 
Informed consent of patients, which specifies the principle of autonomy, 
has become an international standard without which the right to health 
would be inconceivable. Incidentally, healthcare professionals, too, should 
experience respect for their rights to freedom, including their freedom of 
conscience.16  
We thus have good arguments to replace the bifurcation of CP and ESC 
rights, as contained in table 1 by a holistic paradigm, in which CP and ESC 
rights mutually reinforce each other, as illustrated in the following scheme:  
 
  
                                                             
14  See Weisstub et al. (2008).  
15  E/C.12/2000/4, 11. August 2000, para. 8. 
16  Bielefeldt (2016). 
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Table 2: CPESC-rights (mutually reinforcing rights) 
CPESC-rights 
Unconditional core elements + broader areas 
State obligations to respect, protect and fulfil 
Freedom and equality together defining the human rights approach 
 
The new paradigm is important for the interpretation of all human rights. It 
also provides guidance for the understanding of the right to health. This has 
a number of implications. It underlines the need of carving out core ele-
ments of the right to health, in particular core obligations falling upon the 
state. Some articles in this volume are dedicated to further clarifying this 
important task. While resource-dependency remains an undeniable feature 
of the right to health, even in rich countries, the human rights nature much 
rests on the possibility of identifying core elements that apply universally. 
Another important consequence is the obligation to respect, which deserves 
more attention. It is understandable that much academic work currently un-
dertaken deals with the obligation to fulfil, since this seems to be the area, 
where the right to health receives its practical contours. However, without 
due reflection on the obligation to respect, policies of implementing ESC 
rights could easily end up in mere cost analyses and utilitarian calculations 
of benefit distribution. It is worth highlighting in this regard that respect is 
more than a »negative duty« narrowly understood as merely refraining from 
doing harm. Respect presupposes a positive attitude of appreciating every 
human being as always »an end in itself«, to say it in Kantian terms. This 
respect also demands treating human beings as self-responsible subjects, 
which in turn requests rights to freedom for everyone equally.  
The articles put together in this volume stem from a conference held in 
September 2015 in Berlin. Its original title was »The Right to Health – an 
Empty Promise?« It took place as part of the »Emerging Fields Initiative« 
(EFI) Project »Human Rights in Healthcare« supported by the Friedrich-
Alexander-University (FAU) Erlangen-Nürnberg. This includes Prof. Dr. 
Markus Krajewski (Centre of Human Rights Erlangen-Nürnberg, CHREN), 
who spontaneously supported the conference in various ways. We would 
like to thank all those who have contributed to the conference. We are also 
indebted to the FAU, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Joachim Hornegger, president of the 
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FAU, and the team of the Emerging Fields Office (EFO) for the important 
support during our project »Human Rights in Healthcare« (2014-2017). 
We want to thank Silvia Krönig, Frauke Scheller, M.A., Kerstin Wag-
ner, M.A., Anja Koberg, M.A. and Cornelia Geisler, B.A. for their im-
portant editorial help. Many thanks to Diplom-Übersetzerin Carolyn Kenny 
and Francis Henry for parts of the translations.  
We are particularly indebted to the authors of this volume who have 
submitted valuable results of their intellectual investments concerning the 
right to health. The articles contained in this volume originate from presen-
tations first made in the above mentioned conference at the Berlin-Branden-
burg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. We would like to see this vol-
ume as part of an ongoing cooperation across the boundaries of various dis-
ciplines.  
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I.  NORMATIVE PROFILE  
OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
The Human Right to Health 
Fundamentals of a Complex Right 
MICHAEL KRENNERICH1 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights as they are enshrined in public international law concern 
primarily the relationship between the individuals as right holders and the 
state as the primary duty bearer. The underlying idea behind such a human 
right to health is that the state refrains from compromising the health of the 
people, protects them against interference, and undertakes measures to 
ensure that healthy living and working conditions are available to the peo-
ple and above all that they have access to appropriate healthcare.  
 
 
2. ENSHRINING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The article commences by embarking on a short trek through the jungle of 
international law documents and treaties in which the human right to health 
is set down. The starting point is the second half of the 1940s when follow-
ing the Second World War, building on corresponding historical forerun-
                                                             
1  This contribution is a slightly modified translation of a German article first 
published in: Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte (Journal for Human Rights) 9, 2 
(2015). Furthermore, see Krennerich (2016). 
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ners and contemporary preparatory work, modern-day human rights protec-
tion came into existence and the human right to health was incorporated 
within the United Nations framework. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) set out already in the preamble 
to its 1946 constitution that each individual person has a fundamental right 
to the »enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health«. In doing so 
the WHO defined health in a comprehensive and ambitious way as a »state 
of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the ab-
sence of disease or infirmity«.2 The WHO thereby detached itself from a 
purely biomedical understanding (and most everyday notions) of health as 
being the freedom from physical and mental illnesses and impairments3 and 
ignited a lively expert debate, and not only among medical professionals. 
On the one hand, the concept of health as complete wellbeing4 was often 
criticised as utopian,5 on the other hand it remained heavily disputed what 
exactly such wellbeing consisted of.6  
Although due to its non-binding character the WHO preamble does not 
strictly speaking amount to a source of law for the right to health,7 the 
WHO definition is frequently used in human rights discourse.8 Interesting 
issues arise not only because this approach emphasises the interconnected-
ness of physical, mental-psychological and social aspects of health. Also 
the subjective components of health inherent to wellbeing are emphasised. 
Understood in this way, defining health as wellbeing is no longer just a 
matter for experts. Nevertheless, not every person who feels well is healthy 
from a medical point of view, and not everybody who is feeling unwell is 
sick. As such the danger exists that the biomedical profile of health, which 
is imperative for healthcare in the strict sense (and which the WHO does 
not completely abandon) will become less selective. 
                                                             
2  Constitution of the World Health Organization: www.who.int/governance/eb/ 
who_constitution_en.pdf [01.03.2017]. 
3  Franke (2006), 32. 
4  It would possibly make more sense to understand »complete wellbeing« in the 
sense of a »comprehensive« rather than »total« wellbeing.  
5  Instead of many: Venkatapuram (2011), 66. 
6  For example Dodge et al. (2012).  
7  Hestermeyer (2007), 113.  
8  For example UNICEF (2002), 344; Freeman et al. (2012), 315. 
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As it is »only« a declaration of the UN General Assembly, also the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 1948 was originally not 
binding in public international law. However, in the course of time the 
UDHR, which has been translated into over 300 languages, has developed a 
large moral, political and at least indirectly a legal importance. Its legal 
effect is due to the fact that it contains general legal principles and human 
rights norms recognised by customary international law. Well justified is 
also the belief that the UDHR substantiates the purpose of the UN Charter – 
which is binding on all UN Member States – to promote and strengthen 
respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
people without discrimination.9  
The human right to health cannot, however, be found in the UDHR in a 
separate article as would be expected and as was discussed in the Human 
Rights Commission.10 Instead, in order to keep the UDHR short and con-
cise, it was enshrined as part of the right to an adequate standard of living 
which guarantees everyone health and wellbeing, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services (Article 25, pa-
ra. 1). Contrary to the preamble of the WHO constitution, the UDHR dif-
ferentiates in its wording between health and wellbeing, makes clear, how-
ever, that both are closely related. With regard to the right to health, which 
in the UDHR is not clearly differentiated from the other components of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, it should be noted that the UDHR 
identifies medical care as a central but not the only element of this right. 
Also social security, especially in cases of illness and invalidity, as well as 
access to healthy living conditions (food, housing, etc.) play an important 
role. 
The right to health was later enshrined separately and with binding ef-
fect in international (treaty) law in the International Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) from 1966 and which came into 
force in 1976. The ICESCR is the fundamental UN Human Rights Conven-
tion on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ESC rights) including the 
right to health. In the convention, the now 165 State Parties (as of 
                                                             
9  On the legal nature of the UDHR see, e.g. Nettelsheim (2009). 
10  Morsink (1999), 192–199. See also the collection of documents by Schabas 
(2013). 
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25.07.2017) recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health (Article 12, para. 1).  
Two aspects need to be emphasised here. Firstly, the ICESCR moves 
away from the notion of a right to be healthy.11 Such a right appears to still 
be laid down in the preamble to the WHO constitution which talks about a 
state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing. Secondly, in the 
ICESCR the highest attainable standard refers only to physical and mental 
health but not, for example, to »social wellbeing« (as intended in the origi-
nal draft of the commission) or even to »moral wellbeing« (as the delega-
tions from Afghanistan and the Philippines suggested at the time when the 
convention was being drawn up).12 The social conditions are consequently 
rather determinants for health than their defining component.  
Also, the measures stated in the non-conclusive list in the ICESCR for 
the realisation of the right focus on physical (and mental) health, naturally 
taking account of contextual conditions which can promote or impair 
health. The measures are aimed at reducing stillbirths and infant mortality, 
the healthy development of the child, environmental and industrial hygiene, 
the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases, as well as people’s access to medical facilities and med-
ical attention (Article 12, para. 2). There are overlaps with the right to just 
and favourable working conditions and the right to social security, both of 
which are enshrined in separate articles.  
Further UN human rights conventions also include the right to health or 
individual aspects of it in respect of particular problem areas or especially 
disadvantaged or needy population groups. The International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) from 
1966 (in force since 1969) enshrines the non-discriminatory right to public 
health, medical care, social security and social services (Article 5).  
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) from 1979 (in force since 1981), which until 
today 189 states have ratified provides in various parts of the convention 
for numerous measures to realise the right to health without discrimination, 
not only in the area of healthcare (Article 12), but also in the area of health- 
related education, in the workplace, in relation to family planning, in rural 
                                                             
11  See E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, paras. 4 and 8. 
12  Saul et al. (2014), 980. See also Tobin (2012), 125. 
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areas and during pregnancy, when giving birth and whilst breastfeeding.13 
Several other rights concern social determinants of health.14 By pointing 
out the gender dimensions of health, the convention enables human rights 
violations to be identified that would perhaps otherwise have remained 
undiscovered and to demand human rights policy measures which would 
possibly otherwise never have been taken (as comprehensively). This in-
cludes, for example, measures relating to reproductive and sexual health.15 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child from 1989 (in force 
since 1990), which now has 196 state parties and – with the exception of 
the USA – has been ratified by all states worldwide recognises the right of 
the child to the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the 
treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health (Article 24, para. 1). The 
convention names (not exhaustively) various measures for securing the 
complete realisation of the right to health, amongst other things the reduc-
tion of child and infant mortality, the securing of medical assistance and 
healthcare for children, the combatting of undernourishment and malnutri-
tion, healthcare for mothers as well as various aspects of health education, 
hygiene, breastfeeding, accident prevention and family planning (Arti-
cle 24). At the same time the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
provides for protective measures against the health-damaging economic 
exploitation of children and against the use of addictive drugs by children 
(Article 32, para. 1; Article 33). Particular obligations to protect arise in 
connection with the state accommodation of physically and/or mentally ill 
children (Article 25). Furthermore, the convention refers to the particular 
needs of children with disabilities, to whom the access to healthcare ser-
vices must be ensured (Article 23). 
The rights of persons with disabilities, including the right to health, 
were substantiated and differentiated in the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities from 2006 (in force since 2008). With this con-
vention now 174 state parties recognise the right of persons with disabilities 
to the highest attainable standard of health without discrimination due to 
their disabilities. Also, the convention names – again non-exhaustively – 
                                                             
13  CEDAW, Article 10(h), Article 11, para. 1(f) and para. 2(d), Article 14, para. 
2(b). 
14  CEDAW A/54/38/REV I., 2nd February 1999; see also WHO (2008).  
15  Freeman et al. (2012), 320–323. 
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numerous measures for the complete realisation of the right. These seek to 
remove discrimination when it comes to access to healthcare and also to 
health and life insurance – something which is often overlooked – and aims 
to take into consideration the specific health needs of people with disabili-
ties (Article 25). By taking a »diversity approach« which sees physical and 
mental disability as a part of normal human life, and by aiming at the »re-
moval of barriers« for those people who are confronted with various social 
barriers, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
impressively overcomes a purely medical »deficit approach« to disability. 
At the same time it takes physical and mental impairments seriously 
enough to constitute a particular need for action for an assisted autonomy16 
in the area of health and in other areas of life. No other convention is as 
strongly characterised by the understanding of health as »capability« as the 
UN Disability Rights Convention.17 
The conventions mentioned so far do not differentiate in their wording 
between persons of different nationalities. The practice of the respective 
states is, however, that foreigners sometimes do not enjoy the same enti-
tlement to healthcare as nationals. The problem becomes clear in the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families from 1990 (in force since 2003), notwithstand-
ing the fact that it has been ratified by only 51 mainly African and Latin-
American states, which deals with the rights of migrant workers and con-
tains corresponding restrictions.  
The treatment as equal to the citizens of the respective state is limited 
here to urgent medical treatment:  
 
»Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to receive any 
medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoid-
ance of irreparable harm to their health on the basis of equality of treatment with 
nationals of the State concerned (Article 28, sentence 1).« 
 
                                                             
16  On the concept of »assisted freedom« see the study by Graumann (2011).  
17  A capabilities approach, a view held, for example, by Venkatapuram inspired by 
Amartya Sen with regard to health conceptualizes health as »a meta-capability, 
the capability to achieve a cluster of basis capabilities to be and do things that 
reflect a life worthy of equal human dignity.« Cf. Venkatapuram (2011), 71. 
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Pursuant to the convention, migrant workers may not be denied urgent 
treatment even if there is any »irregularity« with regard to their stay or 
employment in the country (Article 28, sentence 2). Equal, general access 
to social and healthcare services is enjoyed by migrant workers and their 
families only »provided that the requirements for participation in the re-
spective schemes are met« (Article 43[e]). As such, the Migrant Workers 
Convention is an ambivalent document: on the one hand, it emphasises the 
important entitlement to the right of migrant workers to basic medical care, 
on the other hand it remains rooted in a legal practice, which makes com-
prehensive medical treatment dependent on residence status.  
What remains to be mentioned is the fact that also different regional 
human rights conventions contain the right to health. Within the scope of 
the Council of Europe, in particular the European Social Charter in its 
original (1961/1965) and revised (1996/1998) versions should be named, 
and which seeks to guarantee an effective exercising of the right to the 
protection of health (Article 11). The supplementary protocol to the Ameri-
can Human Rights Convention (Protocol of San Salvador) from 1988, in 
force since 1999, also contains the right to health which in terms of the 
WHO is defined there as the highest level of physical, mental and social 
well-being (Article 10, para. 1). The African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) from 1981, which came into force in 1986, 
guarantees the best attainable state of physical and mental health (Article 
16), whereas, for example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child from 1990, which came into force in 1999 provides for the 
right to »best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health« 
(Article 14, para. 1).  
 
 
3. FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
In light of the many sources of law, a general interpretation of the right to 
health is no easy task. A suitable starting point to record the fundamentals 
of this right is the CESCR which is the fundamental UN human rights 
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and is therefore the focal 
point of this article. Helpful in this respect are the comments from the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights founded in 1988, and 
which oversees the realisation of the CESCR. In 2000, the Committee 
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published a »General Comment« on the right to health18 and it regularly 
offers its views on the realisation of social human rights by the signatory 
member states within the framework of the state reporting procedures. 
Comments and recommendations by the Committee are of course not legal-
ly binding; they do, however, provide widely recognised guidance on the 
up-to-date interpretation of individual ESC rights. Also, other UN human 
rights treaty bodies as well as UN special rapporteurs refer to them.19  
The human right to health as it is enshrined in the CESCR entitles every 
person to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health in order to lead a life in human dignity. As already mentioned, this is 
not simply understood as being a legal guarantee to be healthy. No state 
could possibly provide such a guarantee on the grounds alone that health is 
dependent on factors which the state is unable to control or which it should 
not be controlling for good human rights reasons. An example here might 
be people’s genetic predisposition. Although the technical possibilities are 
already available to enable disease-preventing genetic correction, the (state) 
manipulation of genetic material has so far been taboo. Even a healthy life 
style can not be imposed on people, at least not in a way that takes account 
of human dignity and thereby also freedoms. Nevertheless, the state does 
have possibilities to shape the political, socio-economic and ecological 
conditions of health. In that sense, the human right to health stresses that 
people’s health is not adversely affected. On the other hand, the precondi-
tions must be created to allow everybody access to an appropriate level of 
healthcare and the ability to autonomously live and work healthily. This 
also includes information and education on matters relevant to health. 
The right to health incudes first of all the freedom to make decisions re-
lating to one’s own health and body as well as the right to be free of inter-
ference with one’s health. Here obvious overlaps come about with, amongst 
other things, the right to life,20 as well as with the prohibition of torture and 
                                                             
18  E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000.  
19  The corresponding documents are all available in the human rights portal of the 
UN High Commission for Human Rights: cf. www.ohchr.org [01.10.2015]. 
20  Following the decisions of the ECHR the right to privacy also encompasses 
physical and psychological integrity as well as individual self-determination as 
regards the right of disposition in respect of a person’s own body; cf. Kälin/ 
Künzli (2008), 437–439. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. At the same time a number 
of problem areas in healthcare stand out: what, for example is the situation 
as regards – from a medical or the state’s point of view – necessary com-
pulsory treatment against the patient’s will? Or: what could the – where 
necessary assisted – self-determination of those people be, who are signifi-
cantly restricted when it comes to making decisions and expressing their 
will, for example those suffering with the later stages of dementia? 21 The 
concept of autonomy is central to the discussion here.22  
The right to health further requires that conditions are established or 
maintained such that people can lead a healthy life. According to the UN 
Committee for ESC Rights this includes, for example, access to safe and 
potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, 
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, 
and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual 
and reproductive health, as well as the participation of the population in 
health-related decision-making.23 Whilst there is an overlap in this respect, 
amongst other things with the rights to adequate food and nutrition, safe 
and potable water and adequate working conditions, the right to health 
additionally includes the entitlement to preventive, curative and palliative24 
healthcare. Healthcare that should enable everybody to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. With regard to healthcare 
and medical care, the UN Committee for ESC Rights uses – similarly to 
other social human rights – the categories availability, accessibility, accept-
ability and quality in order to substantiate the right.25 Availability means the 
provision of functioning healthcare facilities and medical care. Although 
the actual conditions of these are dependent on many factors – in particular 
on the level of development and resources in the country – certain mini-
mum conditions are necessary, for example safe and potable water and 
                                                             
21  For example Schmidhuber (2013) and (2014). 
22  See also Bielefeldt (2016). 
23  E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, para. 11. 
24  The concept of palliative healthcare cannot yet be found in the CESCR. It is, 
however, to be seen as part of a comprehensive, also alleviating medical treat-
ment. However, in General Comment No. 14, E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, 
para. 34.  
25  E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, para. 12. 
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sanitation, hospitals and other healthcare facilities, trained and adequately 
remunerated personnel, as well as a basic supply of essential medicines in 
accordance with WHO standards. Everybody must also have access to 
medical facilities and treatment – in several respects: 
 
? without discrimination, also and in particular in the case of population 
groups which are especially in need of protection and marginalised. 
? physically, i.e. within easy reach and accessible – in particular to wom-
en, children, older people and people with chronic diseases or disabili-
ties; 
? economically – in such a way that public or private medical facilities 
and treatments are affordable for everybody, including poor and social-
ly disadvantaged people;  
? informed – in the sense that the people have the right to seek, receive 
and pass on health-relevant information as long as in doing so the per-
sonal protection of legitimate expectations is not affected. 
 
Acceptability means that medical facilities and medical care should be 
provided in accordance with the principles of medical ethics, in confidence 
and with the aim of improving the health of those concerned. The cultural 
backgrounds of the individuals, but also of minorities and communities are 
to be respected and gender or age-related characteristics are to be specifi-
cally taken into account. Furthermore, it is required that medical facilities 
and medical care are appropriate and of an adequate quality from a scien-
tific and medical point of view. The medical care must be provided by 
trained personnel and conform to medical standards for medicines, equip-
ment, facilities and hygiene.  
 
 
4. STATE OBLIGATIONS 
 
From an international law perspective, the main responsibility for the reali-
sation of human rights lies with the states. According to of international 
human rights conventions, the states are obliged to respect, protect and 
fulfil the human rights of individuals under their jurisdiction.26 From an 
                                                             
26  I will briefly mention extra-territorial obligations later. 
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international law perspective,27 the human rights are binding on all state 
powers, organs and institutions, irrespective of whether these are at the 
state, regional or local level or whether they are superordinate or subordi-
nate authorities. The obligation of states also extends to such private actors 
who have been tasked with carrying out public duties or who are acting on 
behalf of, on instruction of or under the control of the state.28 As a result of 
more recent dogmatic international law developments, the human rights 
thereby establish obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. 
 
4.1 State Obligations to Respect 
 
Obligations to respect form the core of a liberal human rights theory which 
protects the freedom of individuals from intervention by the state and in 
doing so places the defensive nature of human rights at the forefront. They 
oblige the states to not hinder individuals, either directly or indirectly, in 
the exercising of their human rights – and where they do so to remedy such 
interventions. This concerns above all obligations of omission. 
With regard to our topic, the obligations to respect require the states to 
refrain from infringing the right to health themselves. The states may not 
therefore undertake any actions which run contrary to the right to health 
and »which can result in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity and preventa-
ble mortality«.29 What could such actions be? With regard to healthcare this 
encompasses generally all state actions which impede the availability, 
access to or adequateness and quality of healthcare to such an extent that 
the health of the people is endangered or harmed.  
The UN Committee introduces in its General Comment as a key exam-
ple the denial of medical treatment, and thereby focuses on a 
non-discriminatory, open access to healthcare. Here it needs to be examined 
whether laws, regulations or just the practice in public health facilities deny 
or hinder open access to specific population groups or individuals. This 
could be, for example ethnic groups or national minorities, persons with 
disabilities, the psychologically ill or women, but also foreign nationals, 
                                                             
27  Nothing is said about the question of how the responsibilities, jurisdiction and 
competences are divided in national law.  
28  Kälin/Künzli (2008), 92. 
29  CESCR E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, para. 50. 
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refugees, »irregular« migrants or prisoners. Also sometimes problematic is 
the organisation of healthcare for lesbians, gays, bi-, trans-, and inter-
sexuals (in short: LGBTI persons) in particular where they must fear crimi-
nal sanctions, as is the case in many countries. 
However, also the way in which people are treated in state healthcare 
facilities is relevant with regard to the obligations to respect. Not only 
denied, but also incorrect or abusive treatments can amount to violations of 
the right to health. In this respect we are dealing here with the appropriate-
ness and quality of healthcare. It must be examined, for example, whether 
the available treatment possibilities are being exhausted and the medical 
standards are being adhered to. This is by no means always the case.30 At 
the same time there are enough past and present examples of specific ac-
tions in state healthcare facilities which are harmful to health: these range 
from medical experiments with patients who have not given their consent31 
to »inappropriate institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities in 
psychiatric hospitals«32 (or also, as is the case in China, for example, the 
misuse of psychiatric facilities as a place of custody for political dissidents) 
to the forced sterilisation of people with disabilities33 or women. In Peru, 
for example, during Alberto Fujimoris’ term in office (1990–2000), around 
300,000 women and approximately 22,000 men – above all indigenes and 
farmers – were subjected to forced sterilisation as part of birth control 
without their consent and without explanation.34 Until today there have 
been hardly any criminal prosecutions as demanded by those concerned.35 
Specifically, the state obligations to respect in healthcare throw up 
many questions, the already mentioned problem of discrimination to name 
just one example. Apart from the fact that medical care needs to be adapted 
to the individual patients, the question arises as to what health services the 
                                                             
30  For example the discussion surrounding mistakes and ethics in medicine, e.g. in 
Frewer et al. (2013). 
31  Relevant in this context are also the cross-border trials by western pharmaceuti-
cal companies in the GDR. cf. Erices et al. (2015).  
32  E/CN.4/2005/51, 11th February 2005, para.. 9. 
33  For example: www.enil.eu/news/sterilization-of-women-and-girls-with-disabil 
ities-a-briefing-paper-november-2011/ [25.07.2017].  
34  See on this Jaichand/O’Donnell (2010).  
35  For example the press reports by Anliker (2014); Cordier (2015). 
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human rights entitlement to equal treatment without discrimination refers 
to. Surely not only to the minimum provision! But what about our Asylum 
Seekers Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in Germany? As long as refugees, asylum 
seekers and people with precarious residence status obtain healthcare ser-
vices on the basis of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act,36 the corresponding 
service entitlement is limited to healthcare in cases of acute illnesses and 
pain, to the medical and nursing care of mothers and those who have re-
cently given birth, as well as to officially recommended vaccinations and 
medically necessary preventive examinations (section 4 AsylbLG). This 
excludes – at least in principle – the treatment of chronic illnesses, insofar 
as they are not linked to conditions of pain,37 often with serious conse-
quences for the persons concerned. The provision of dental care is com-
pletely inadequate as well.38 Also the psycho-social care of refugees has 
proven to be problematic – even before the enormous increase in the num-
ber of refugees in 2015.39  
Even in light of legitimate regulatory interests of the state, the de jure 
and de facto unequal treatment of people in the health sector dependent on 
their nationality or residence status is to be viewed critically from a human 
rights point of view, especially when the resulting healthcare provision is 
clearly insufficient and even emergency care is hindered due to bureaucrat-
ic hurdles.40 This is also true when it comes to migrants who are in the 
country »irregularly«. In principle, these people have a right to access 
healthcare services; in Germany, for example, by virtue of the Asylum 
Seekers Benefits Act. However, despite all the national peculiarities and 
isolated positive examples, Heinz-Jochen Zenker has determined that »eve-
rywhere there are people without papers at the lower end of access to ap-
                                                             
36  Up until the law reform which came into force on 1st March 2015, this applied 
for a period of 48 months following entry. The reform of the law saw this period 
reduced to 15 months’ residence in Germany. 
37  Kaltenborn (2015). 
38  Lindner (2015), 81. 
39  BAfF (2015). 
40  Cf. Lindner (2015); Misbach (2015). The federal government, however, consid-
ers the provision of healthcare to be adequate, cf. Bundestag printed paper 
18/4758, 27th April 2015. Informative is also the plenary debate in the Bundes-
tag, 115th meeting, 2nd July 2015, 11078–11093. 
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propriate medical care and this is inconsistent with the human rights con-
ventions and the European Social Charter«.41 What is more, the practice of 
tracing, reporting and detaining people often effectively discourages many 
undocumented persons from making use of healthcare services.42  
Acts of states which are harmful and dangerous to health can also affect 
those parameters which influence people’s health outside of the healthcare 
system. As already explained, the UN Committee for ESC Rights explicitly 
lists access to clean and potable water, adequate sanitation, safe food and 
accommodation, healthy working and environmental conditions and health-
related information. Against this background it must be assessed to what 
extent health risks and health damage arise from state measures in the dif-
ferent policy areas (economy, energy, defence, etc.) – for example in the 
form of human rights impact assessments. It is also possible for state-run 
businesses or public infrastructure measures to infringe the right to health if 
health protection is neglected in the workplace or if the environment is 
contaminated. Joint responsibility may also arise as a result of co-
operations with private companies. A landmark decision concerning this 
matter was passed by the African Human Rights Commission against the 
former military regime in Nigeria. Together with a large oil company, in 
the course of the national oil extraction, it had caused considerable envi-
ronmental and health damage in the Niger Delta. The Commission con-
cluded that the rights to health and to an appropriate – here: healthy – envi-
ronment guaranteed by the Banjul Charter had been infringed.43  
Also the retention or misrepresentation of health-related information 
can amount to a breach of state obligations to respect. The state may not 
hold back or falsify important or vital health information relating to the 
prevention of infection or epidemics or environmental disasters. From the 
perspective of the right to health, it was criticised, for example, that for a 
long time the government of Zimbabwe denied the outbreak of the cholera 
epidemic in 2008 and declared that it was over too early.44 Justified human 
                                                             
41  Zenker (2011), 96. 
42  For example Fundamental Rights Agency (2012); Mylius/Frewer (2015). 
43  Communication No. 155/2001, SERAC and CESR v Nigeria (2001), 15th Annu-
al Activity Report of ACHPR: 2000–2002. The case is also well-documented in 
the secondary literature, see for example Keetharuth (2009); Nolan (2009). 
44  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2009).  
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH | 37 
 
rights criticism was also directed at the South African government under 
Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) which trivialised the risk of infection from HIV 
and for a time even denied there was a link between HIV and AIDS.45 
Conversely, measures to contain epidemics such as mandatory quarantine 
in the case of Ebola patients in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia in 2014 
can lead to interventions in the freedom and participation rights of those 
concerned. It can be discussed to what extent such interventions are justi-
fied, for example, by means of the »Siracusa Principles« which deal with 
limitations or the derogation of civil and political rights in the case of such 
public emergencies.46 
 
4.2  State Obligations to Protect 
 
Obligations to protect consist of the state obligation to protect individuals 
from actual or impending infringements of their human rights by third 
party, normally private actors. Obligations to protect are not prohibitions to 
act but requirements to act. State decision-makers, however, have a wide-
reaching margin of discretion and freedom when it comes to the form of 
such measures. As such it is not always easy to determine possible in-
fringements of state obligations to protect. The can arise, for example, 
through a state’s omission to act where  
 
? public authorities have knowledge of a current or impending risk or 
could have done had they taken the necessary care,  
? despite having such knowledge, they fail to take appropriate protective 
measures within the scope of the means available to them and  
? at the same time countermeasures in conformity with human rights 
would have been possible.47  
 
With healthcare, such infringements can occur, for example, when the state 
allows private healthcare facilities to breach medical standards or when it 
fails to do something to prevent harmful or ineffective medicines being in 
                                                             
45  See in this context the measures of the »Treatment Action Campaign«; Hey-
wood (2009). 
46  E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985). 
47  Kälin/Künzli (2008), 126.  
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circulation (as is the case in several countries). In terms of the obligations 
to protect, the state must adequately regulate and control private healthcare 
facilities, services and products to ensure that people actually obtain medi-
cal assistance and that their health is not harmed. Here the same defects can 
arise in principle as with state-run healthcare facilities (see above), the 
difference being that here the harm originates from private actors. The state 
obligation to protect becomes particularly evident when avoidable deaths 
occur in private healthcare facilities and at the same time the state has 
failed to fulfil its monitoring and control obligations. In this regard, there is 
a series of relevant decisions, for example by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights48 or within the complaints procedure of the CEDAW.49 
Of great significance in terms of human rights is also the question how 
open the access to private healthcare services must be. It is largely undis-
puted that also private healthcare facilities may not deny emergency treat-
ment to anybody, but access to private services which go beyond this is 
commonly not possible or affordable for everybody. This is a problem 
particularly when at the same time there is no comprehensive public 
healthcare sector or where this is of a poor quality. In this case the state 
must ensure that a qualitatively adequate healthcare provision is accessible 
to everybody, either by way of respective regulation of private providers or 
by expanding the public healthcare sector, something which already refers 
to the obligations to fulfil (to be dealt with later). 
Just like the obligations to respect, the obligations to protect are not 
limited to healthcare provision in the narrow sense, but take in also working 
and living conditions which also determine people’s health. Here the obli-
gations to protect refer on the one hand to an appropriate regulation and 
control of health protection in the workplace and on the other hand they are 
concerned with the protection of an intact and healthy environment against 
private (economic) interferences, which is crucial for people’s health. 
Around the world harmful working conditions and cases of environmental 
pollution by private enterprises have been documented, be it the degrada-
tion of natural resources, in agriculture or in the manufacturing industry. 
Harmful working conditions in the textile industry in Southern Asia which 
                                                             
48  Ximenes-Lopes v. Brasil, Series C 149, 2006; see also Nolan (2009). 
49  Alyne Silva Pimentel v. Brazil, CEDAW, communication No. 17/2008, judg-
ment from 25th July 2011.  
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attracted public attention following the fires and factory collapses in Bang-
ladesh and Pakistan come to mind here.50 The problem is especially evident 
in developing countries and emerging markets. To make matters worse, 
largely informal employment relationships prevail there. 
State obligations to protect for the prevention of occupational accidents 
and illnesses and environmental pollution can be found not only in Arti-
cle 12, para. 2 (b) CESCR but also in conventions of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). Within the scope of the Council of Europe, 
also a claim based on an infringement of the European Social Charter can 
be asserted. In the case of collective complaints against Greece, for exam-
ple, the European Social Committee determined that the right to health had 
been infringed as – considering the scope for discretion and action allowed 
– the national authorities had done too little to protect residents from water 
and air pollution by private companies.51 A separate problem is the often-
privatised waste disposal.52  
Furthermore, the health protection of consumers is significant. The state 
must prevent the distribution of consumer goods which are heavily polluted 
or harmful to health. At the same time in the past few years smoking bans 
and demands for measures to combat alcohol and drug consumption have 
been justified with the right to health. Demands for protection against ex-
cess weight53 or for a »Global Convention to Protect and Promote Healthy 
Diets« go even further. The latter of these demands was made by the then 
Special Rapporteur for the right to food, Olivier de Schutter, and justified 
                                                             
50  Background information on the working conditions in the textile industry can be 
found, amongst other places, on the websites of »Clean Clothes Campaign« 
(www.cleanclothes.org), »Christliche Initiative Romero« (www.ci-romero.de), 
ECCHR (www.ecchr.eu), »medico international« (www.medico.de) and the 
»Fair Wear Foundation« (www.fairwear.org); see also Burckhardt (2014). 
51  See the judgments on the complaints No. 30/2005 and No. 72/2011.  
52  In the Southern Italian provinces of Naples and Caserta, for example, the crimi-
nal, illegal disposal of hazardous and poisonous waste was proven to have 
caused damage to the population’s health. Cf. Camera dei deputati: D.L. 
136/2013: Emergenze ambientali e industriali, 6th February 2014; Emergenze 
rifiuti, 21.11.2014; available at www.camera.it [01.06.2015]. 
53  For example the demand of the UN Committee for ESC Rights directed at 
Sweden: E/C.12/SWE/CO/5, 18th November 2008, para. 23. 
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on the basis that unhealthy diets amount to an even greater health risk than 
tobacco.54 Up to now hardly any state obligations have been derived from 
the right to health as regards eating habits and healthy diets. There would 
certainly be a need for in-depth discussion as to whether and to what extent 
intervention in the freedoms and sphere of responsibility of individuals 
above and beyond the information and education obligations is possible and 
desirable. 
The situation is different in the case of physical acts of violence. Here 
the UN Committee for ESC Rights obliges states – on the basis of the right 
to health – to combat private violence, in particular also domestic violence, 
and to prosecute offenders.55 The Committee emphasises time and again the 
obligation to protect women and girls from sexual or other violence in very 
different risk situations and also makes use of other human rights: on the 
way to school or work or in the workplace, in search of water or sanitary 
facilities or also in makeshift shelters and refugee camps. In addition, the 
state is obliged to prevent cultural practices harmful to health, above all 
female genital mutilation (in short FGM). Both the UN Committee for ESC 
Rights and the CEDAW Committee have identified female genital mutila-
tion as a human rights violation, although not always on the basis of the 
right to health.56  
 
4.3 State Obligations to Fulfil 
 
Obligations to fulfil are strictly speaking »positive rights«. They oblige the 
states to enable the most comprehensive exercising of human rights possi-
ble by way of active state action. It is about creating the prerequisites for 
the realisation of the right to health through respective statutes, institutions 
and procedures as well as by way of state provisions in the form of money, 
goods or services. 
                                                             
54  E.g., on 19th May 2014 in Geneva; cf. also his report on this topic: 
A/HRC/19/59, 26.12.2011. 
55  E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, para. 51. 
56  Cf. here for example the »Concluding remark« on Chad: E/C.12/TCD/CO/3, 
16th December 2009, para. 19; CEDAW/C/TCD/CO/1-4, 21st October 2011, 
paras. 22–23. See generally on FGM also Graf (2013). 
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As stated at the beginning of the article, the respective human rights 
conventions already provide for a variety of steps to realise the right to 
health.57 Accordingly, the obligations to fulfil in the area of health are 
diverse. They comprise initially the establishing and maintenance of medi-
cal and health-relevant infrastructures, whereby the states must ensure that 
necessary medical institutions, services and programmes with well-trained 
staff are available, accessible to everybody and that the people have access 
to adequate food and nutrition, accommodation, sanitation, drinking water 
and essential medicines. Furthermore, the human rights conventions pro-
vide for specific steps to be taken by the states to improve the health situa-
tion of the population in general and that of individual, particularly needy 
or vulnerable groups, for example children, mothers, the elderly or people 
with disabilities. It is normally not sufficient in this respect to only ensure 
access to medical provision. Often the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
conditions must be changed, which co-determine the state of health, for 
example poverty or social marginalisation and exclusion. 
The form of the healthcare systems, whether public and/or private, as 
well as specific health-related policy measures lie principally within the 
discretion of the respective states, at least as long as they respect these 
human rights principles (such as transparency, participation, non-discrimi-
nation) and guarantee the general availability, accessibility, acceptability 
and quality of the healthcare provision.58 Privatised or contractually out-
sourced healthcare services do not, however, relieve the states of their 
obligation to ensure this. The governments must, for example, prevent 
qualitatively appropriate healthcare provision from being available only to 
those patients who can afford it. However, according to the WHO, 100 
million people are driven into poverty every year because they have to pay 
                                                             
57  The various human rights-related measures in the area of healthcare are not 
mentioned here in detail. See on this the reports and recommendations of the 
UN human rights organs based on the charter and the convention which can be 
found on the website www.ohchr.org. It is also worth reading the WHO docu-
ments which deal with the human right to health: www.who.int/ 
topics/human_rights/en/ [01.03.2017]. 
58  For example Hunt/Backman (2013). 
42 | MICHAEL KRENNERICH 
for healthcare services themselves (out-of-pocket payments).59 This not 
only points to a strong link between the right to health and the right to 
social security,60 but also often to the problem of abominable public 
healthcare provision. For this reason, as is, for example, reported from 
India, sometimes even poor people opt for fee-based private healthcare 
services rather than free treatment in state-run hospitals, at the same time 
running up enormous debts.61  
As in the case of the right to health the realisation of the obligations to 
fulfil is linked with high costs, the realisation sees many countries reaching 
their limits. In particular, many developing countries have significant diffi-
culties when it comes to ensuring a comprehensive provision of medical 
care and overcoming the partly serious defects in the healthcare system. Let 
alone can they afford such a comprehensive and expensive healthcare sys-
tem as the developed countries. This does not though relieve developing 
countries of their obligation to take measures to realise the right to health 
progressively based on their available resources.62 
The obligation to progressively realise the right progressively as pro-
vided for by the CESCR (Article 2, para. 1) takes account of the fact that 
faced with social problems that are difficult to overcome and scarce re-
sources the social human rights cannot be realised overnight, especially 
those components of the right which require for their realisation extensive 
provisions of the state and long-term actions. With regard to the right to 
health (and other ESC rights), this applies especially to the obligations to 
fulfil.  
However, the obligation to undertake a progressive realisation cannot 
serve as an excuse for failing to act at all. On the contrary, the state has the 
procedural obligation to draft specific and effective policies and to under-
take measures, the result of which should be the goal to realise the right to 
health. As such, the states are obliged to develop a comprehensive national 
                                                             
59  See http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/universal_health_coverage/en/  [25.07.
2017]. See also Heinicke et al. (2016).  
60  Krennerich (2014). 
61  Shankar/Mehta (2008), 155.  
62  The German translation is based on a comprehensive concept of resources which 
is not limited to just financial resources, but includes all kinds of resources; cf. 
also Klee (2000), 122–129; Engbruch (2008), 108.  
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health strategy without delay by way of a participatory and transparent 
process in order to address the existing (and to be identified) healthcare 
problems in the respective country.  
Additionally, as far as possible, several core obligations must be real-
ised immediately.63 According to the UN Commission for ESC Rights this 
at least includes access to medical institutions and medical care without 
discrimination as well as access to a minimum amount of basic nutrition, to 
accommodation, sanitation and safe drinking water and provision of basic 
medicines. On top of this there is a fair distribution of medical facilities and 
medical care, with the particular problem of deficits in rural areas being the 
focus here.64 The Committee views the following aspects as having a simi-
lar priority: healthcare in relation to reproductive health, motherhood and 
children, vaccinations against infectious diseases, measures to prevent, treat 
and combat epidemic and endemic illnesses, education and information 
about essential health programmes in the community and an adequate train-
ing of healthcare personnel.65  
Building on this, measures must be taken to realise the right to health 
continually and comprehensively. The obligation of a progressive realisa-
tion – at the time enshrined with a considerable amount of progress-
oriented optimism – is not in conformity with an absolute prohibition of 
regression, however, unavoidable setbacks are in need of explanation. 
Ultimately it is of vital importance that the state actually uses its resources 
– and thereby an appropriate proportion of the state’s shares and possible 
international aid – for the realisation of the right to health. The view of the 
UN Committee for ESC Rights is that a state that is not willing to do this 
violates its obligations under Article 12 CESCR.66  
Of course it must always be established what constitutes appropriate re-
sources. The wording of the CESCR which obliges the respective state to 
exhaust the »maximum of its available resources« is not particularly help-
ful. It is clear that a state cannot utilise all of its resources for the realisation 
of individual human rights, however important these may be. The obliga-
tion to exhaust all resources exists based on the premise that the state is left 
                                                             
63  Müller (2016). 
64  E/C.12/2000/4, 11th August 2000, para. 43. 
65  Ibid., para. 44. 
66  Ibid., para. 47. 
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with sufficient means to undertake its various tasks (and also for the realisa-
tion of other human rights). Accordingly we are concerned here with the 
weighting of goals as well as the distribution and use of available re-
sources.67  
In practice, it quickly becomes apparent that the political setting of pri-
orities and the spending policy of many states urgently need human rights 
corrections. To put it casually, if we look at what the states spend money on 
whilst at the same times millions of people are dying of avoidable and 
treatable illnesses it is not difficult to see that from a human rights point of 
view many resources are being wrongly distributed, not used, and certainly 
not exhausted. There is much potential for criticism in the demand to make 
use of a maximum of available resources as faced with continuing social 
problems it obliges the states to mobilise more resources for the realisation 
of social human rights. Significantly, within the scope of the reporting 
procedures on the CESCR, the UN Committee for ESC Rights regularly 
requests states to make more resources available for health care provision. 
These discussions can be made more objective by way of national human 
rights budgeting and systematic country comparisons, even though the use 
of considerable means alone does not guarantee an appropriate realisation 
of the human right to health. 
The UN Committee for ESC Rights does not give a conclusive answer 
to the question at what point the human right to health has been completely 
realised. The demand for the »highest attainable level of health« leaves 
many questions unanswered. Since the health of an individual person is 
dependent on a variety of contingents and therefore factors which can be 
influenced, the conditions for a healthy life can, in principle, always be 
further improved. Pragmatically, one must therefore view the realisation of 
the human right to health as a continuous process which is based on the 
respective medical and health standards which are determined and further 
developed on a national or international level. It is, however, evident that 
the human right to health is not limited to basic levels of care. The right of 
every person to attain the highest level of health possible therefore serves as 
                                                             
67  The problem of »Prioritization of health interventions and respect of human 
rights« was addressed amongst other things by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food in his report to the UN General Assembly from 8th August 
2007. A/62/214, paras. 11–32. 
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a critical corrective so that comprehensive medical care and healthy work-
ing and living conditions are not reserved for certain groups within society. 
 
4.4 The International Dimensions of the Right to Health 
 
The realisation of the right to health within the respective states is heavily 
influenced on an international level – both positively and negatively. On the 
one hand, there are various endeavours in international health policy, in 
development cooperation and within the framework of humanitarian aid 
cooperation to improve the provision of healthcare to people particularly in 
developing countries and disaster areas. The CESCR in fact obliges the 
states to cooperate in this way. On the other hand, international policy and 
legal provisions can also affect the realisation of the right to health, for 
example in the form of credit terms or trade and patent regulations. The UN 
Committee for ESC Rights explicitly points to the international obligation 
of states to not compromise the right to health in other countries in the 
course of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The states are therefore 
also obliged to duly acknowledge the right to health when signing interna-
tional treaties and as members of international organisations.  
Legal requirements in respect of patents within the framework of the 
World Trade Organisation’s so-called TRIPS Agreement have, for exam-
ple, often been criticised in the past. For instance, Holger Hestermeyer 
stated that the legal entitlement to »access to medicine« is a component of 
the human right to health and life; that patent regulations – which WTO 
members are obliged to adhere to – have led to higher prices for new medi-
cines; that higher prices have made it more difficult for poorer population 
groups in particular in developing countries to gain access to medicines, 
therefore amounting also to a human rights infringement; that such an in-
tervention cannot be sufficiently justified, not even by way of the protection 
of moral and material interests of the authors of scientific works (within the 
meaning of Article 15, para. 1 CESCR), as this does not protect the patents 
of pharmaceutical companies.68 Corresponding flexible TRIPS regulations 
                                                             
68  Hestermeyer (2007). The UN Committee for ECS Rights has already clarified in 
its General Comment No. 17 on Article 15(1)c) of the CESCR that such patent 
rights are not human rights and that the state has an obligation to protect people 
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in the form of compulsory licenses and parallel imports in order to solve 
such conflicts (»health safeguards«) are effectively thwarted.69 
Also the subject of criticism are some savings measures by international 
lenders, as regarding the right to health cutbacks in the health and social 
sectors as foreseen by the internationally effected austerity programme in 
the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and other world regions can serious-
ly violate the »do not harm principle« and thereby also the lenders’ extra-
territorial obligations to respect. The main responsibility for the states’ 
financial misery commonly lies with the national governments which ulti-
mately also decide how much will be saved and in what areas; in many 
places, however, pressure from international lenders has aggravated the 
misery in the area of health. If the public healthcare system collapses alto-
gether then urgent countermeasures must be taken.  
Whilst the extra-territorial obligations to respect already throw up a 
number of questions, it is disputed to what extent the states are obliged 
above and beyond these to support other states in realising the human right 
to health (and other social human rights). Even governments which are 
heavily involved in development co-operations do not want to be obliged to 
do so under international law. We can therefore be curious as to what sig-
nificance the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will take on, 
that were formulated by around 40 experts on international law and human 
rights from all over the world on 28th September 2011 at the University of 
Maastricht.70 The principles take up guidelines which UN committees and 
UN Special Rapporteurs have already formulated without binding effect 
and acknowledge comprehensive extraterritorial obligations on the part of 
states to respect, protect and fulfil.71 Further reaching are calls for »global 
                                                                                                                          
from excessive prices for essential medicines; cf. E/C.12/GC/17, 12th January 
2006. See also Schneider (2006), 162–170.  
69  See for example People’s Health Movement et al. (2014), 288–299. 
70  The German translation can be found in Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 6, 2 
(2009), 184–195. 
71  Also Coomans/Künnemann (2012); de Schutter et al. (2012); Krennerich 
(2013), 124–128. 
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social rights« which should regulate international and transnational rela-
tions.72 
 
 
5. OUTLOOK 
 
If human rights are to have an effect, they have to be actively claimed. For 
this reason, human rights empowerment is necessary. This denotes a pro-
cess, in the course of which the right holders acquire the capacity to claim 
and assert human rights for themselves and others effectively. The main 
recipient of human rights claims are the respective states which are the 
primary duty bearers. Their readiness and ability to realise the human rights 
must be claimed and enhanced. However, also non-state actors such as 
commercial enterprises are noticeably being made accountable for human 
rights. Those concerned and their support groups generally have a wide 
range of possibilities to act available to them when it comes to asserting 
their human rights claims in the face of resistance. 
From a legal point of view the right is especially characterised by the 
fact that it can be asserted through the courts. With an increasing recogni-
tion of the for a long time contested justiciability of social human rights,73 
in the past few years an increasing number of possibilities to claim have 
become available. The amount of case law on social human rights in gen-
eral and in particular on the right to health has grown considerably. By now 
there are numerous judgments and decisions which either directly or indi-
rectly concern the right to health.74 Interestingly, these refer not only to 
obvious discrimination situations and the infringement of obligations to 
respect and protect, but sometimes also to the benefits entitlements of those 
concerned.75 Empirically it must also be examined who actually takes re-
                                                             
72  For example Fischer-Lescano/Möller (2012). 
73  Krennerich (2013), 116–123. 
74  Cf. the databases at www.globalhealthrights.org and www.escr-net.org. See also 
Gauri/Brinks (2008); Langford (2009); Yamin/Gloppen (2011); Hogerzeil et al. 
(2013) and the work with three volumes by Clérico et al. (2013).  
75  The German Federal Government is, however, sticking to the legal interpreta-
tion that no guarantee claims to specific benefits can be derived from the 
CESCR; cf. Bundestag printed paper 18/4758, 27th April 2015. 
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course to the courts, how the courts decide and whether the corresponding 
judgments are acted on appropriately and result in sustainable effects.  
It is almost as important that the human right to health is claimed and 
asserted by way of political means, for example through protests and cam-
paigns or through lobbying and advocacy work. Without underestimating 
the significance of influential landmark judgments, fundamental, structural 
reforms with the goal of achieving a better and more comprehensive re-
spect, protection and guarantee for the social human rights such as the right 
to health are primarily secured politically, and here it is mostly about con-
flicts of power and distribution. Ideally the (quasi-) judicial and the political 
enforceability of the right to health should complement each other. On the 
one hand, political demands to realise human rights gain in legitimacy and 
force as a result of the legal entitlements being positively enshrined in law 
and possibly subject to claims in the courts.76 For this, as a rule, an active 
civil society is of great significance. 
To what extent the possibilities of demanding and claiming the right to 
health are used depends first of all on the organisational potential and ca-
pacity to act of civic groups and social movements, however, also constitu-
tional structures and civic freedoms are necessary. Many governments 
restrict the scope of activity of the civil society and attempt to suppress 
human rights entitlements. The spectrum here ranges from complete repres-
sion to co-optation. Between these there are open and subtle forms of ob-
struction, for example legal and administrative restrictions on the freedom 
of assembly, association and opinion or also the targeted diffamation, stig-
matisation or criminalisation of persons and groups who promote human 
rights (in UN jargon: human rights defenders).77  
As such it is all the more important to organise and support civic com-
mitment and human rights empowerment with solidarity, which is why 
                                                             
76  The already mentioned Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in der Republic of 
South Africa demonstrates impressively how political and legal measures can 
complement each other in order to assert the right to a medical and medicinal 
treatment of HIV/AIDS patients despite considerable resistance; Heywood 
(2009).  
77  Forum Menschenrechte (2012) and the reports of the previous special rappor-
teurs on human rights defenders, available from the human rights portal: 
www.ohchr.org [01.07.2015]. 
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great significance is attached to transnational human rights networks which 
provide a link between the local and global levels. With regard to the right 
to health, for example the People’s Health Movement is one such global 
network.78 It is not, however, about »exporting« supposed western human 
rights into »foreign countries«. The starting point and point of reference for 
solidary support is always the struggles of the people locally and protest 
against injustice, oppression, exploitation and hardship they have suffered, 
and who – implicitly or explicitly – point to their right to live a humane, 
liberal and autonomous life in community with others. The human right to 
health is most certainly a part of this. 
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The Minimum Core Approach  
to the Right to Health 
Progress and Remaining Challenges  
AMREI MÜLLER 1 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The editors of this volume raise the question of whether the human right to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (the right to 
health) set out in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR or Covenant) remains an empty prom-
ise for a large majority of the world’s population. A 2015 joint World 
Health Organization (WHO) and World Bank Group report measuring the 
world population’s access to essential health services in 2013 concluded 
that »at least 400 million people do not have access to one or more essential 
health service and 6% of people in low- and middle-income countries are 
tipped into or pushed further into extreme poverty because of health spend-
ing.«2 This indicates that for these people, even the so-called minimum core 
right to health – a right to access essential health goods and services – in-
deed remains an empty promise. Many old and new, national and universal 
threats to the human right to health remain to be addressed through legal 
and other measures. 
                                                             
1  Parts of this chapter build on and develop the author’s previous work: Müller 
(2013), chapter 4 and Müller (2016a). 
2  WHO/World Bank Group (2015). 
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In this chapter, I would however like to present progress that has been 
made in conceptualising health as a human right, the implementation of 
which is increasingly monitored by domestic and international courts and 
quasi-judicial bodies. I would like to argue that international and national 
human rights law scholarship and practice has contributed greatly to clari-
fying the content of the right to health, as well as states’ dynamic obliga-
tions flowing from this right. In doing so, important steps have been taken 
to ensure that international and domestic law can effectively protect the 
fundamental human interest underlying the core right to health – the inter-
est to access at least essential health goods and services that enable human 
beings to lead a »good« life. The analysis focuses in particular on the con-
tribution of the minimum core approach to the right to health that has been 
introduced by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(CESCR) General Comment No. 14 on the Right to Health in 2000. It as-
sesses how far human rights law scholarship and practice have come in de-
veloping the minimum core approach so that it can achieve its designated 
purpose. It also discusses the next steps that should be taken towards this 
aim in light of the continuing challenges to securing everyone’s fundamen-
tal interest to have access to essential health goods and services through the 
effective implementation of the core right to health.  
To achieve this, part 2 sets out the purpose and potential of the mini-
mum core approach to the right to health and human rights in general. Part 
3 examines some of the open questions about the minimum core approach 
originating from the CESCR’s unclear and sometimes contradictory state-
ments about this approach; and briefly summarises the critique of the core 
approach in existing human rights (legal) literature. Part 4 then shows that 
some of the open questions have been answered and criticism voiced has 
been addressed through the collective practice of (democratic) states inter-
preting and applying the right to health. The Committee could consolidate 
this practice further in an (updated) statement about the universal minimum 
core content of the right to health. This process has inter alia been facilitat-
ed by the clarification of procedural obligations under the ICESCR. In addi-
tion, political philosophers have helped to justify the international-
ly-defined minimum core content of the right to health, and the absolute 
character of this and other core human rights. Part 5 turns to discuss wheth-
er the minimum core approach can help to meet one of the main challenges 
that we are facing with the realization of the minimum core right to health, 
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in particular in low-income countries: the fact that some states of jurisdic-
tion are unable to secure even the minimum core right to health of their 
population because the threats to the interests protected by this right origi-
nate from outside their jurisdiction and/or because they do not have suffi-
cient resources and capacities to realize minimum core rights. To address 
this, I tentatively examine how the minimum core approach could potential-
ly help with the further specification and allocation of states’ and interna-
tional organisations’ territorial or extra-territorial duties and responsibilities 
to cooperate and assist under the ICESCR, as well as with a better coordi-
nation of the implementation of these duties and responsibilities. The con-
cluding remarks (part 6) summarise the main findings.  
The method followed is that of legal interpretation of Articles 2(1) and 
12 ICESCR in light of subsequent state practice (including domestic court 
decisions) and the interpretation offered by the CESCR and other UN treaty 
bodies and organizations, as well as regional human rights courts and bod-
ies. Occasionally, the analysis will rely on arguments of political philoso-
phers to tentatively justify the understanding of the minimum core approach 
to the right to health advocated here. 
 
 
2. THE PURPOSE OF THE MINIMUM CORE  
APPROACH TO THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
IDENTIFIED BY THE CESCR 
 
At the start, the purpose of the minimum core approach to the right to 
health shall be recalled. What were the main reasons for the CESCR to 
adopt this approach to help interpreting the right to health in particular and 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) more generally? To an-
swer this question, we have to look at the Committee’s General Comment 
No. 3 of 1991. The Committee pronounced that the notion of »progressive 
realization« in accordance with »maximum available resources« set out in 
Article 2(1) ICESCR:   
 
»should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. 
[…] the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison 
d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in re-
spect of the full realization of the rights in question.«  
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It went on to observe that:  
 
»minimum core obligations to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for 
example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter or housing, or 
of the most basic form of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obliga-
tions under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to es-
tablish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison 
d’être.«3  
 
This, together with the CESCR’s pronouncements in its General Comment 
No. 14 4 that will be discussed in more detail below, indicates that the 
Committee’s main reason for adopting the minimum core approach was to 
give the notion of »progressive realization« a clearer direction.5 It did so by 
defining a minimum quantitative and qualitative threshold of enjoyment of 
the right to health that should be guaranteed to everyone in all circumstanc-
es as a matter of top priority,6 and by defining relatively detailed corre-
sponding (negative and positive) core obligations. It can strongly be as-
sumed that the Committee wished to counter the constantly repeated tradi-
tional arguments of some states and influential academic writers7 that the 
right to health and other ESC rights are not individual rights (despite the 
fact that they are recognised as such in the ICESCR, in other international 
and regional human rights treaties, as well as in domestic human rights law) 
but only general guidelines to lead domestic policies. Consequently, these 
states and academics argued that ESC rights do not give rise to concrete 
and legally binding obligations, primarily due to the notion of »progressive 
                                                             
3  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, paras. 9 and 10. 
4  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 43–44. 
5  See the reference to the raison d’être of the ICESCR in the quotes. See also: van 
Bueren (1999) 57; Wesson (2004), 299–300.  
6  See E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10; E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, 
para. 6; E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para. 60; E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 
2000, para. 47; E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 17. 
7  For an overview of relevant literature, a summary and critical discussion of the 
main arguments, see De Schutter (2010), 740–751. 
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realization« in accordance with »maximum available resources«. 8 These 
arguments have for very long undermined the effective protection of the 
right to health (and sometimes still do so9).  
Further reasons for the CESCR’s adoption of the minimum core ap-
proach can be inferred from other statements of the Committee. First, the 
minimum core approach promises to direct resources to where they are 
most needed, i.e. towards the implementation of ESC rights at a minimum 
level, benefitting those who have nothing or very little10 – in the words of 
the Committee to the realization of ESC rights of »marginalized and disad-
vantaged groups and individuals«.11 Second, the Committee has used the 
minimum core approach to comment on states’ individual and collective (as 
members of international organisations) activities outside their own borders 
that can pose threats to the fundamental interests protected by minimum 
core rights, and that allegedly violate (negative) responsibilities to respect 
at least minimum core human rights outside their own territories. It has 
done so for example in the context of global trade and development poli-
cies12 as well as security regimes.13 At the same time, in its Statement on 
Poverty and the ICESCR, the CESCR observed that minimum »core obli-
gations [rather: rights] give rise to […] international responsibilities for de-
veloped States«14 to provide »›international assistance and cooperation, es-
pecially economic and technical‹ to enable developing countries to fulfil 
                                                             
8  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 9. 
9  E.g. E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 12 June 2009, para. 13; and the strong reluctance of the 
US to ratify the ICESCR or back UN resolutions referring to ESC rights as hu-
man rights. 
10  E.g. Scott/Macklem (1992), 77; Bilchitz (2007), 189; Liebenberg (2002), 174. 
11  E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para. 59(e); E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, 
paras. 37(b) and (f); E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 43(a) and (f); 
E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 28. 
12  E.g. E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para. 61; E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, 
para. 30; E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para. 38; E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 
2000, para. 45; E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, paras. 16–17. 
13  E.g. E/C.12/1997/8, 12 December 1997, para. 7; E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 
2003, para. 32; E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 37. 
14  E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, para. 16. 
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their core obligations.«15 In other words, core rights also seem to trigger 
states’ (positive) responsibilities beyond their own territories to a particular 
degree. Thus, the minimum core approach promises to help delineating (na-
tional) obligations and (international) responsibilities for the implementa-
tion of the core right to health and other core human rights. This is based on 
the recognition that often the realization of even these core rights remains 
difficult in countries lacking relevant capacities and resources without in-
ternational assistance. This issue will be explored further in part 5. 
However, the usefulness of the minimum core approach has been ques-
tioned by some legal analysists16 and domestic courts,17 and the CESCR did 
not articulate and justify its understanding of the minimum core approach 
very clearly. The discussion now turns to some of the conceptual questions 
that have been raised about and criticism voiced of the minimum core ap-
proach.  
 
 
3. OPEN QUESTIONS ABOUT AND CRITIQUE 
OF MINIMUM CORE APPROACH TO THE  
RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
The main open questions about the minimum core approach are about the 
actual feasibility of determining a realistic minimum core content of the 
right to health, and at what level this content should be defined – the na-
tional or the international. These issues are related to the question of 
whether minimum core rights are absolute or relative, i.e. whether they are 
subject to progressive realization in accordance with maximum resources 
available to a particular state, or whether it is assumed that they are per se 
affordable for all countries and therefore not conditional on progressive re-
                                                             
15  E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, para. 16. 
16  E.g. Lehmann (2006); Kende (2003/2004); Porter (2005), 48–55. Note that this 
contribution cannot discuss political philosophy literature on socio-economic 
rights in detail.   
17  First and foremost by the South African Constitutional Court; see e.g. Minister 
of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Judgement of 5 July 2002.  
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alization. It is also unclear whether limitations to or retrogressive measures 
touching upon the minimum core right to health are permitted.18 
 
3.1 Questions Left Open by the CESCR 
 
The Committee’s position on these questions remains unclear. For example, 
in one statement the CESCR has held that »any assessment as to whether a 
state has discharged its minimum core obligations must take into account 
the resource constraints applying within a country concerned«.19 This is on-
ly explicable if one assumes that states only violate the minimum core right 
to health when they fail to take measures which could be expected given 
their available resources, and that therefore the minimum core content of 
the right to health and corresponding obligations are relative, are deter-
mined at the domestic level and are subject to progressive realization. Addi-
tionally, the Committee hardly ever finds violations of minimum core rights 
in its concluding observations, even in states where people starve and lack 
the most basic form of health care; nor does it rigorously ask states to prove 
that they did all they could, as a matter of priority, to remedy the situa-
tion. 20 This seems to indicate that minimum core obligations are state-
specific and their scope contingent upon available resources. 
Conversely, other statements of the Committee suggest that it under-
stands the minimum core right to health as an absolute internationally-
defined bottom-line, below which no individual should find him/herself, 
and which must be implemented regardless of a state party’s level of eco-
nomic development. For instance, in its General Comment No. 14 on the 
Right to Health, it held that »a state party cannot, under any circumstances 
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations [...]« [em-
                                                             
18  This question will not be discussed here in detail, but see Müller (2009). 
19  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10. 
20  E.g. E/C.12/1/Add.48, 1 September 2000, para. 25; similarly, E/C.12/1/Add.95, 
12 December 2003. Notable exceptions are E/C.12/COD/CO/4, 20 November 
2009, para. 16, where the Committee refers to ›serious breaches‹ of Article 2(1) 
ICESCR; and E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4, 9 December 2010, para. 28. 
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phasis added, A.M.]21 flowing from the minimum core content of the right 
to health that it had defined in the same General Comment.  
 
3.2 The Academic Debate of the Core Approach 
 
Human rights law scholarship has engaged with these questions and 
brought forward arguments for either defining relative state-specific mini-
mum cores that are subject to progressive realization; or absolute interna-
tional minimum cores the implementation of which is presumed to be per 
se affordable for all states, even low-income countries. 
The main arguments of those supporting a nationally-defined minimum 
core right to health are first that it is unrealistic to require all states to im-
plement the same minimum core, given the vast differences in levels of de-
velopment around the world.22 Low-income countries may not command 
sufficient resources to satisfy minimum essential levels of the right to 
health as defined in the CESCR general comments for everyone under their 
jurisdiction.23 This argument gains force with a glance at the Committee’s 
rather broad definition of the minimum core content of the right to health 
that comprises the provision of primary healthcare services, minimum es-
sential foodstuffs, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, essential drugs 
(as defined by the WHO), reproductive, maternal and child healthcare, im-
munisation against major infectious diseases and basic health education.24 
For high-income countries on the other hand, a universally-defined mini-
                                                             
21  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 47. The Committee seems to express this 
absolute understanding of minimum core rights also in: E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 
1999, para. 6; E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, paras. 40, 42 and 44(c); 
E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, para. 65. 
22  Craven (1995), 141; and Scott/Alston (2000), 250. 
23  The South African Constitutional Court has rejected the minimum core ap-
proach on that basis. It found that it would be impossible for the state to provide 
core services immediately, e.g. in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC), Judgement of 5 July 2002, paras. 34–37; see also Kende 
(2003/2004), 622; Chapman/Russell (2002), 10, who also recognise this danger. 
24  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 43–44. 
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mum core right to health may become a reason for inertia, as these coun-
tries could in fact implement more far-reaching obligations.25   
Second, a state-specific minimum core right to health is required be-
cause an internationally-defined minimum core would inevitably be ab-
stract, inflexible and a-contextual, dividing right to health theory from the 
real-life experience of individuals whose right to health remains unimple-
mented. This may result in the exclusion of some individuals from the pro-
tection of the right to health whose contextual experiences did not reflect an 
international standard.26 
Third, more support for the definition of a country-specific minimum 
core right comes from doubts over whether it is at all possible to determine 
a truly universal minimum core right to health, given that no convincing 
criteria have been developed that might distinguish elements of the right 
belonging to the minimum core from those belonging to the non-core, and 
that would justify a prioritisation of the former. Young, for example, re-
viewed the shared values or needs that have been suggested as a basis for 
the minimum cores of socio-economic rights (including the right to health), 
and concluded that there »are no axioms that can deliver an uncontested 
minimum core«.27  
Referring to various attempts to determine an essential minimum core 
through normative argument, she concludes that »the minimum core will 
look different to an advocate of human flourishing in comparison with an 
                                                             
25  Noted e.g. by van Bueren (1999), 59; Chapman/Russel (2002), 9; Ssenyonjo 
(2009), 66–67; Craven (1995), 144, who voiced the concern that when the 
CESCR focuses too much on minimum core obligations, it will necessarily di-
rect its attention to developing countries, which might open it to criticism. 
26  Porter (2005), 52. While Porter points to this danger in particular in the context 
of focusing adjudication of ESC rights on a universally-defined minimum core, 
it might be equally relevant for the development and adoption of other measures 
that aim at the implementation of minimum core obligations; see also Lehmann 
(2006), 188–189; this difficulty is also recognised by Liebenberg (2006), 31; 
Pieterse (2006), 491. 
27  Young (2008), 138. She reviews different needs-based (life, survival and basic 
needs) and value-based (dignity, equality and freedom) approaches that aim to 
determine the content of a universal minimum core. See also Kende 
(2003/2004), 624; Lehmann (2006), 191.?
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advocate of basic survival, just as the core will look different in various in-
stantiations of both survival and dignity«.28 
Other scholars argue that defining a minimum core of the right to health 
(and human rights in general) would only make sense if it were defined as 
an universal, absolute standard that has to be implemented in all states, in-
dependent of their level of development.29 First, they hold that only an in-
ternational standard can fulfil the promise to bring a degree of determinacy 
in the notion of progressive realization.30 There would be no difference be-
tween an obligation to define a minimum core nationally and the general 
obligation under Article 2(1) ICESCR to progressively realize ESC rights, 
as the scope of both would be dependent on available resources, and both 
would give states an excuse to postpone the implementation of ESC rights 
indefinitely.  
Second, most elements of minimum core contents of socio-economic 
rights defined by the CESCR in its general comments can be linked to sur-
vival interests of individuals that exist regardless of the availability of re-
sources,31 fulfilment of which is an essential precondition for human exist-
ence and development.32 This holds true also for the alleged minimum core 
content of the right to health – a right to access essential health goods and 
services. The implementation of minimum core rights should be part of 
                                                             
28  Young (2008); even Bilchitz (2007), 224, a strong advocate of a universal min-
imum core approach based on essential human interests (above all the interest  
to survive), submits that the survival interest is not suitable as a basis for deter-
mining a universal minimum core of the right to health. 
29  E.g. Bueren (2002), 184; Coomans (2002), 167; Bilchitz (2007), chapter 6; 
Arambulo (1999), 130–135; Scott/Alston (2000), 250; Scott/Macklem (1992), 
77; Ssenyonjo (2009), 66; Toebes (1999), 224; the?Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the ICESCR, June 1986, para. 25. 
30  Among others, van Bueren (2002), 184–185; Wesson (2004), 299. 
31  E.g. Bilchitz (2007), 222. 
32  This has been pointed out in a decision of the Swiss Federal Court, V v. Ein-
wohnergemeinde X und Regierungsrat des Kantons Bern, BGE/ATF 121 I 367, 
27 October 1995, Erwägung 2, para. (b): »Satisfying elementary human needs, 
such as food, clothing and shelter is a precondition for human existence and de-
velopment« [author’s translation]; see also Liebenberg? (2005), 22; Bilchitz 
(2007), 187. 
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fundamental governmental functions in all countries,33 and states – even 
poor states – »have to begin somewhere«.34 It is thus justified to assume 
that the implementation of universal minimum core rights is affordable 
even for low-income countries, if necessary through international coopera-
tion and assistance.35 Related to the last observation, advocates of an inter-
nationally-defined minimum core content of the right to health and other 
ESC rights thirdly note that only an internationally-defined minimum core 
right to health holds promise for delineating national obligations and inter-
national responsibilities under the right to health, and for coordinating their 
implementation.   
The summarised scholarly debate about these different understandings 
of the minimum core approach to the right to health has reached an im-
passe, and the CESCR’s more recent statements have not contributed to a 
clarification of the Committee’s understanding of the approach.36 To move 
forward in the process of developing the core approach further so that it can 
fulfil its purpose mentioned in part 2, the following section suggests to 
change perspective, utilising insights from the fast-growing field of com-
parative international human rights law:37 to focus on (democratic) states’ 
practice (unilateral and multilateral practice, the latter as members of inter-
national organisations) on the right to health to determine whether an inter-
national consensus can be established on the minimum core right to health, 
its (abstract) content and the (abstract) obligations flowing from it.38 This 
perspective recognises that international human rights law is best under-
stood together with domestic human rights law qua »transnational constitu-
                                                             
33  Noted by Chapman/Russell (2002), 11–12; see also Paschim Banga Khet Ma-
joor Samity v. State of West Bengal, Supreme Court of India, para. 16, reflecting 
the opinion that what is constitutionally necessary (in this case, the provision of 
emergency health services to the Indian population) has to be done, regardless of 
limited resources. 
34  As pointed out by COHRE (2003), 119; similarly, Wesson (2004), 299. 
35  See e.g. Ssenyonjo (2009), 68. 
36  E.g. E/C.12/2016/1, 24 June 2016. 
37  See e.g. Roberts et al. (2015) and other contributions to the Volume 109(3) of 
the American Journal of International Law. 
38  For a similar suggestion to proceed in this way, see Forman et al. (2013), 7–8. 
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tional law«;39 and that international human rights comparison has become 
one of the main methods of interpretation in human rights practice.40 This 
can be observed in international human rights courts and bodies which 
compare the practice of domestic courts and other authorities to establish 
the content of a common transnational standard and based on that, deter-
mine an international minimum human rights standard.41 And it can also be 
observed in domestic courts which often discuss and take on other states’ 
practice and common transnational human rights standards when they in-
terpret and apply international human rights treaties.  
It shall be argued that an initial search for such an international consen-
sus on the minimum core approach firstly indicates that this consensus ten-
tatively defines the international minimum core content of the right to 
health as a right to access essential health goods and services; and secondly, 
that this (and the core of other human rights) is to be understood as an abso-
lute standard (4.1). Moreover, it is argued that such an understanding of the 
minimum core is confirmed by the procedural obligations flowing from the 
ICESCR, which guide domestic authorities when translating the abstract in-
ternational core content of the right to health into a concrete domestic con-
tent and concrete obligations. The existence of these procedural obligations 
will in addition help to address many of the reasonable objections raised 
against an understanding of the minimum core as an universally-defined 
absolute standard that were summarised above (4.2). 
 
 
                                                             
39  For the full argument see Besson (2015a), 280–299.    
40  As analysed in many contributions to Müller (2017). 
41  This is most prominent in the ECtHR’s »European consensus« approach; but it 
is also clear from the CESCR’s statements, see e.g. E/1991/23, 14 December 
1990, para. 10. The practice is also in line with Article 31(3) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties concerning the use of »subsequent practice« in 
the interpretation of treaties; and public international methods for determining 
customary law through analysing state practice and opinio iuris. 
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4. ADVOCATING A UNIVERSAL AND ABSOLUTE 
MINIMUM CORE RIGHT TO HEALTH:  
A RIGHT TO ACCESS ESSENTIAL 
HEALTH GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
4.1 International Consensus 
 
There are many domestic courts which assume the existence of minimum 
core contents of socio-economic and other human rights in their jurispru-
dence. To name but a few examples, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
has defined »minimum conditions for a dignified life« based on the rights 
to life, health, work and social security that are part of the extensive fun-
damental rights catalogue of the Colombian Constitution.42 If this standard 
is not met through government social policy measures, Colombian courts 
intervene to order the immediate enforcement of relevant minimum core 
rights to remedy the situation, even if this results in a duty to give an indi-
vidual access to certain services, goods or programmes and even if this has 
resource implications.43 Similar jurisprudence is known from among others 
Argentina,44 Brazil,45 Finland,46 Germany,47 India,48 Portugal49 and Swit-
                                                             
42  Langford (2008), 22; Sepulveda (2008), 147–148; Landau (2014). 
43  Sepulveda (2008) cites many cases of the Colombian Constitutional Court. With 
regard to the right to health, the court has e.g. ordered state or private entities to 
provide individuals (in particular children) with medication or medical treatment 
necessary for the immediate protection of their right to health. It does so when 
this is necessary for the protection of the right to life, personal integrity, dignity 
or the minimum conditions for a dignified life of the person in question. 
44  The Argentine Supreme Court has for instance held that: »in light of the human 
right to health guaranteed by the [Argentine] Constitution and international hu-
man rights treaties, statutory regulations granting access to medical services 
should be read as requiring health care givers to fully provide essential medical 
services in case of need«; cited in: International Commission of Jurists (2008), 
25; similarly Courtis (2008), 163–181.  
45  International Commission of Jurists (2008), 25.? 
46  Scheinin (2001), 51–53.? 
47  In its Article 19(2), the German Constitution includes a direct reference to the 
inviolable core of all fundamental rights protected by it. In regard to the protec-
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zerland. 50  This trend in domestic courts’ socio-economic rights juris-
prudence is confirmed by comparative law literature. Drawing conclusions 
from a study of ESC rights jurisprudence of 13 domestic courts, Langford 
established that »in broad brush terms, many adjudicators tend to enforce 
[...] the implicit obligation to immediately achieve a minimum level of real-
ization [of ESC rights]«.51 States have also expressed their support for the 
minimum core approach during the drafting process of the Optional Proto-
col to the ICESCR.52 In addition, regional human rights courts and bodies 
have endorsed the minimum core approach, even if not as explicitly as the 
CESCR and some domestic courts. The pronouncements of the European 
Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) indicate that it supports the idea of a 
minimum core of each socio-economic right protected in the (Revised) Eu-
                                                                                                                          
tion of the core of socio-economic rights, see in particular, the decisions of the 
German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 February 2010 and 1 
BvL 10/10 of 18 July 2012 in which the Constitutional Court formulated in clear 
terms that the state has an obligation, deriving from the Article 1(1) (human 
dignity) read in conjunction with the »welfare-state principle« of Article 20(1) 
German Basic Law, to ensure that those in need have, as a minimum, their mate-
rial needs secured that are necessary for maintaining physical well-being and for 
enjoying minimal participation in the country’s social, cultural and political life 
(defining a minimum subsistence level). The German Constitutional Court’s ju-
risprudence is also discussed by O’Cinneide (2014), 175–176. 
48  See e.g. Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, Supreme 
Court of India, Judgment of 6 May 1996 (on minimum core right to health); and 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 
No. 196 of 2001, Interim Order of 2 May 2003, where the Indian Supreme Court 
held that the right to access government food supplies of those in danger of star-
vation forms part of the minimum core right to food; see also Muralidhar 
(2008), 117–118.  
49  See the analysis by O’Cinneide (2014), 176. 
50  Article 12 of the Swiss Constitution; and the discussion in Häfelin et al. (2012), 
294–296. 
51  Langford (2008), 22; similarly, see O’Cinneide (2014), 175. 
52  Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding the 
Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on its Third Session, 
E/CN.4/2006/47, 14 March 2006. 
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ropean Social Charter ([R]ESC);53 as do the pronouncements of the Inter-
American Commission of/Court on Human Rights;54 and also the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) refers to the minimum core or essence of 
rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).55 
Koch notices in addition that certain statements by the ECtHR can be inter-
preted as recognising the notion of a minimum core right to basic health 
services56 and social cash benefits57 under the ECHR. 
                                                             
53  For more details see Mikkola (2010) at 316–317; and ECSR, European Roma 
Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Bulgaria, complaint 48/2008, decision on the merits of 
18 February 2009, paras. 37–38; European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. 
Greece, decision on complaint 15/2003, para. 42: »a significant number of Ro-
ma are living in conditions that fail to meet minimum standards« in Greece »in 
breach of the obligation to promote the right of families to adequate housing laid 
down in Article 16« [emphasis added, A. M.]. 
54  See the analysis by Shelton (2010), 211 et seq. (referring to minimum thresholds 
that have to be guaranteed in every state regardless of the level of economic de-
velopment). 
55  E.g. Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, judgment (Grand Chamber), appl. no. 
44158/98, 17 February 2004, para. 105; John Murray v. UK, judgment (Grand 
Chamber), appl.no. 18731/91, 8 February 1996, para. 49; Ashingdane v. UK, 
judgment (Chamber), appl.no. 8225/78, 28 May 1985, para. 57; several dissent-
ing opinions criticising majority opinions for accepting limitations to rights that 
affect the core/essence of these rights, e.g.: dissenting opinion of judge 
Loucaides to McElhinney v. Ireland, judgement (Grand Chamber), appl. no. 
31253/96, 21 November 2001; and joint dissenting opinion of judges Wildhaber, 
Sir Nicolas Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens and Pellonpää 
to Odievre v. France, judgment (Grand Chamber), appl. no. 42326/98, 13 Feb-
ruary 2003, para. 11.  
56  Koch (2009), 63–64.  
57  Ibid., chapter 8. See also Clements/Simmons (2008), 426, concluding that »[I]n 
relation to complaints that disclose gross failures of the most basic so-
cio-economic support, the Court’s [ECtHR] starting point is now an unequivocal 
acceptance of the view that the Convention protects a core irreducible set of 
such rights«. This was confirmed in more recent judgments, such as MSS v. Bel-
gium and Greece, judgment (Grand Chamber), appl.no. 30696/09, 21 January 
2011, para. 263. However, the ECtHR remains reluctant to expand its jurispru-
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When it comes to the content of an internationally-defined minimum 
core right to health, developments point into the direction of accepting the 
right to access to essential health goods and services, also referred to as ac-
cess to primary healthcare, as the minimum core content of the right to 
health. Leaving aside the so-called »underlying determinants of health«,58 
the following health goods and services seem to make up the international 
core content of the right to health:   
 
? Access to reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and 
child healthcare;  
? Access to immunisation against the major infectious diseases occurring 
in the community;  
? Access to services for the prevention, treatment and control of most 
prevalent epidemic and endemic diseases;  
? Access to essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO 
Action Programme on Essential Drugs; and  
? Access to education and information concerning the main health prob-
lems in the community, including methods of preventing and control-
ling them.  
 
An emerging consensus reflecting this is based on a number of international 
declarations, among them the Declaration of Alma-Ata,59 the Programme of 
Action of the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD)60 which are both referred to in the CESCR’s General Comment 
                                                                                                                          
dence further into the socio-economic field, see e.g. Koufaki and Adedy v. 
Greece, decision (Chamber), appl. nos. 576657/12 and 557657/12, 7 May 2013. 
58  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, denotes that these underlying determinants are 
part of the minimum core content of the right to health (para. 43). The present 
author thinks that these »underlying determinants of health« are protected by the 
minimum core content of other human rights, e.g. the rights to food, water, 
housing, a clean environment and work-related rights. They should therefore not 
form part of the minimum core content of the right to health. 
59  Declaration of Alma-Ata, 6–12 September 1978, section VII (3). 
60  Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Devel-
opment, contained in the Report of the International Conference on Population 
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No. 14; and the more recent initiative of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) on National Floors of Social Protection, among which is the ac-
cess to essential healthcare;61 as well as domestic practice commented on 
by the CESCR,62 and the CESCR’s General Comment No. 14.63 The WHO 
has also refocused its work on supporting the provision of primary 
healthcare, likely to reflect a consensus of its member states.64 A more sys-
tematic analysis of domestically defined minimum core contents of the 
right to health, e.g. in domestic law and in national courts’ jurisprudence, 
could help to confirm (or refute) a consensus on the suggested international 
content of the minimum core right to health. Such a comparative analysis 
could be conducted by the CESCR in its review of domestic practice which 
it is presented with in the state reporting process. The Committee could 
more explicitly consolidate this practice into an updated statement on the 
minimum core content of the internationally-defined minimum core right to 
health.65 The CESCR could also rely on possible regional consensuses on 
the minimum core content of the right to health.66 The Committee’s deter-
mination of an abstract universally-defined minimum core right to health 
based on domestic human rights practice and regional consensuses would 
                                                                                                                          
and Development, Cairo, 5–13 September 1994, A/CONF.171/13, Chapter VIII, 
paras. 8.4 and 8.5.  
61  International Labour Conference, Recommendation 202 Concerning National 
Floors of Social Protection, 14 June 2012, paras. 4 and 5(a). See also the sum-
mary of the wide-ranging consensus on social protection floor in ILO (2011), 
16–18.  
62  See the review conducted by San Giorgio (2012), 25–28. 
63  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 43 and 44; Declaration of Alma-Ata,  
6–12 September 1978, VII (3). 
64  See e.g. WHO (2008) and (2013). 
65  By doing this, the CESCR might also address criticism to the CESCR’s current 
definition of the minimum core right to health set out in its General Comment 
No. 14, which has been criticised for its broadness and the unclear distinction it 
draws between »core obligations« (para. 43) and »obligations of comparable 
priority« (para. 44). 
66  For an innovative discussion of the role of regional consensuses, see Besson 
(2017); Neuman (2008). 
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also ensure the practicality67 of this internationally-defined core right as a 
guideline for its implementation in particular domestic circumstances.68 
Understanding the minimum core right to health as a right to access es-
sential health goods and services (primary healthcare) is also supported by 
strong normative arguments. As noted above, the interest shared by every 
human being to have access to at least essential health goods and services is 
inherently connected to the particularly urgent broader human interest to 
survive.69 However, due to the nature of the right to health, using the inter-
est to survive as a basis for the minimum core content of this right in par-
ticular raises problems. Securing the interest to survive of every individual 
would require individualised minimum cores, given the differing health 
conditions of many people; and some individuals might require access to 
services that are hugely expensive to ensure their survival. 70 Therefore, 
                                                             
67  States’ have recognised the CESCR’s unique overview of ESC rights implemen-
tation in different countries around the world. More recently they named the 
Committee’s expertise as one of the reasons why the CESCR should receive the 
mandate to review individual complaints under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR. See the Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Consider Op-
tions Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on its 
Third Session, E/CN.4/2006/47, 14 March 2006, para. 91. 
68  The need to specify minimum core duties flowing from the (abstractly) defined 
international minimum core right to health in light of particular domestic con-
texts is discussed in more detail in section 4.2 below. 
69  For the full argument see Bilchitz (2007), 222, linking minimum core socio-
economic rights to the essential human interest to survive and to enjoy a mini-
mum level of well-being which are essential preconditions for human beings to 
have positive experiences and to pursue their purposes. See also Pogge (2002), 
who refers to preconditions to lead a »flourishing life«. 
70  This difficulty is also recognised by Bilchitz (2007), 220–225. It should be not-
ed that access to (expensive) secondary and primary health services are not ex-
cluded from the scope of the right to health. However, they will regularly be part 
of the non-core content of the right and their availability will thus be dependent 
on resources. Moreover, states are obliged under the ICESCR to also plan the 
progressive extension of health services to non-core services. For details on the 
relationship between core and non-core obligations flowing from the right to 
health, see Müller (2013), 96–99.    
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identifying a universal minimum core right to health in a reality of limited 
resources and capacities that will have practical relevance also for low-
income countries will necessarily involve some utilitarian considerations 
and contain the basic health goods and services that will enable the vast 
majority of individuals to have their basic survival interest secured through 
such access.71 Understanding the international minimum core content of the 
right to health as a right to access primary health goods and services seems 
justified on this basis.  
Last but not least, there are indications in state practice as well as in in-
ternational declarations that minimum cores constitute absolute minimum 
thresholds of each human right that must be respected, protected and ful-
filled at all times.72 In the drafting process of the OP-ICESCR, delegations 
participating in the consultations were of the opinion that allocating suffi-
cient resources to the implementation of minimum core rights is an imme-
diate obligation on states under the ICESCR;73 and an introduction to the 
2012 ILO strategy paper »Social Security for All – Building Social Protec-
tion Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems« indicates a con-
sensus on the assumption that the implementation of these protection floors, 
including access to essential healthcare, is affordable for every country.74 
As will be elaborated further below, the resources for the immediate reali-
zation of minimum core rights can be made available as a result of interna-
tional cooperation and assistance.75 Domestic human rights jurisprudence 
also points towards the understanding of the minimum core of human rights 
                                                             
71  As highlighted in particular by Lehmann (2006), 190.  
72  Some core rights can still be derogated from temporarily »in time of war or oth-
er public emergency threatening the life of the nation« (see e.g. Article 15 
ECHR; Article 4 ICCPR). 
73  Report of the Open-ended Working Group, first session, E/CN.4/2004/44, 15 
March 2004, para. 56. The report does not, however, reveal how many delega-
tions shared this opinion. 
74  ILO (2012). 
75  See the pronouncements of the CESCR in that regard in its General Comments 
cited, infra ns. 112 and 119. 
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as an absolute standard76 which has also been called the »limits of limits«77 
to human rights, i.e. a brake to a balancing of different rights or a right 
against a public interest that result in the complete extinction of a human 
right.78 This understanding of the absolute character of the »essence« of a 
human right also seems to underlie ECtHR jurisprudence when the Court 
observes that »limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the [right to] 
access [in this case: to a court] left to the individual in such a way or to 
such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired«.79 The abso-
lute character of the minimum core right to health and other socio-
economic rights is moreover strengthened by the above-mentioned urgent 
survival interest that underlies this right: its implementation (securing eve-
ryone’s access to basic health goods and services) is urgent to avoid wide-
spread tragic consequences.  
Furthermore, not understanding the minimum core of each human right 
as an absolute standard would undermine the function that human rights 
should have in a democracy. Human rights function as egalitarian limits on 
democracy. Together with non-discrimination rights, the minimum core of 
each human right protects the basic equality of individuals against re-
strictions through democratic decisions.80 This recognition also implies that 
the right to access essential health goods and services as the minimum core 
content of the right to health should be protected against governmental 
claims of resource scarcity, even claims of democratically elected govern-
ments. As mentioned by the supporters of a universally-defined minimum 
core right to health, the implementation of minimum core rights should be 
                                                             
76  E.g. the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court points into this direc-
tion, see the analysis by Schaks (2015); see also, for the context of Switzerland, 
the discussion in Häfelin et al. (2012), 296. 
77  Örücü (1986), 36–59.  
78  On this, see Müller (2009).  
79  ECtHR, Ashingdane v. UK, judgment (Chamber), appl.no. 8225/78, 28 May 
1985, para. 57. The Court has also argued this in the context of other rights pro-
tected by the ECHR. See the judgments cited supra n. 55. 
80  For a full analysis of the inherent relationship between human rights, equality 
and democracy that also justifies the understanding of the minimum core of each 
human right as absolute, see the work of Samantha Besson, in particular: Besson 
(2011) and (2012a). 
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part of fundamental governmental functions in all countries.81 This also fits 
with the overarching obligation to fulfil human rights that requires the 
building of (democratic) institutions which are able to discharge the many 
negative and positive human rights duties flowing from international trea-
ties, including institutions that can devise and implement health policies re-
quired for the implementation of the minimum core right to health.82   
 
4.2 Domestic Specification of the Minimum Core  
Right to Health and the Importance of  
Procedural Obligations 
 
Understanding the international minimum core content of the right to health 
as the right to access essential health goods and services, and understanding 
this core as an absolute right, does not yet address all the above-summa-
rised objections that have been raised against the adoption of the minimum 
core approach. To do this, the discussion now turns to some of the proce-
dural obligations that flow from the minimum core right to health in partic-
ular and the ICESCR in general.   
One of the aforementioned main objections against the minimum core 
approach is that an internationally-defined minimum core right to health, 
e.g. in the shape set out under 4.1, would inevitably be abstract and inflexi-
ble. It would not cover the vastly differing health experiences of individuals 
around the world, and would thus be ineffective in changing the life to the 
better of human beings whose individual experiences do not resonate with 
the internationally-defined minimum core right to health.  
Addressing this objection, it can be recalled that international human 
rights and corresponding obligations are regularly phrased in the abstract. 
Practically, in its interpretation of the international minimum core right to 
health and other ESC rights, the CESCR can neither cover the experiences 
                                                             
81  See supra ns. 33–34. 
82  In practice, this implies the building of an effective health system that provides 
at least basic health goods and services to everyone under the jurisdiction of the 
state. See the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul 
Hunt, A/HRC/7/11, 31 January 2008. Note that this does not mean that the 
health system has to be fully run by the government.  
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of all individuals whose ESC rights are not met,83 nor the political, eco-
nomic, cultural, social and other characteristics of each and every country. 
It is thus states that have to concretize and detail the abstract content and 
duties flowing from the international core right to health for their particular 
domestic context, through discharging their general ICESCR obligation of 
reception and enforcement of ESC rights within national law. In that pro-
cess, domestic conditions have to be taken into account, and concrete legal 
and other measures suitable for the implementation of the minimum core 
right to health in the particular domestic context can be determined. For ex-
ample, guided by the abstract minimum core right to health set out above, 
states have to establish what the major infectious diseases affecting the lo-
cal population actually are against which immunisation shall be provided; 
what the most prevalent epidemic and endemic diseases are against which 
preventive and curative health services shall be made accessible and con-
trolling measures be taken; and what the most essential drugs are to which 
everyone shall have access to in a particular country.84 Moreover, states 
need to determine concrete domestic duty-bearers – in the context of the 
implementation of the minimum core right to health these can include gen-
eral practitioners, hospitals, medical centres, rehabilitation centres, pharma-
cies, pharmaceutical companies and relevant administrative bodies – allo-
cate the duties to them, and coordinate the discharging of these duties.   
The ICESCR and the Committee’s interpretation of the Covenant define 
a number of procedural obligations which guide states in this domestic con-
cretisation process and thus in the implementation of the minimum core 
right to health in practice.  
First, the Committee regularly emphasises that the »participation of the 
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national 
                                                             
83  This is reflected in the »jurisprudence« of the ECSR, in e.g., European Roma 
Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Greece, complaint 15/20038, decision on the merits in 
December 2003, paras. 21 and 25. 
84  This is reflected in the CESCR’s »jurisprudence«: e.g. E/C.12/1/Add.13, 20 
May 1997, where the CESCR called on Russia to address the »eightfold in-
crease in HIV-infection in 1996 as a health question of the utmost importance« 
(para. 40).   
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and [even at85] international levels«86 is an important aspect of the right to 
health [emphasis added, A.M.]. This is linked to the obligation of states to 
protect human rights set out in the ICESCR (and the ICCPR) in democratic 
systems.87 The ICESCR’s reference to a »democratic society«88 and the 
link between ESC rights and political rights highlighted in Article 6(2) 
ICESCR reinforce this. This means that states should provide for a mecha-
nism that allows for »participation in political decisions relating to the right 
to health taken at both the community and national levels«, 89 including 
when it comes to the concretisation of the international minimum core right 
to health at the domestic level, i.e. the determination of the concrete health 
goods and services every individual should have immediate access to with-
in the respective states’ jurisdiction. Usually, this mechanism is established 
in the shape of an elected parliament in line with the political participation 
rights of the ICCPR,90 a fact that once more highlights the strong connec-
tion between ESC rights and political rights.  
Second and relatedly, the ICESCR obliges states to adopt domestic law 
to concretise the minimum core right and corresponding duties at the do-
mestic level. Article 2(1) ICESCR refers to »particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures« to achieve the progressive realization of the right to 
health.91 This also highlights that the legislature is explicitly addressed by 
the ICESCR. 
                                                             
85  In reality, participation at international level remains difficult given the 
non-existence of relevant (democratic) international institutions. 
86  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 11. The importance of participatory 
health-decision-making is also recognised by the European Committee of Social 
Rights, e.g. Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, 
complaint no. 30/2005, decision on the merits of 6 December 2006, paras. 216 
and 219.  
87  On obligations to realize human rights in a democratic system see Steiner 
(2008); Besson (2010).    
88  Articles 4, 8(1)(a) and (c) ICESCR. 
89  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 17. 
90  In particular Article 25 ICCPR; see also Article 3 Protocol I to the ECHR. 
91  The CESCR has explained this obligation in particular in its General Comment 
No. 9 (E/C.12/1998/24, 1 December 1998). This can happen (but does not have 
to) through the incorporation of the ICESCR into domestic law.   
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Third, in the specification process, including the adoption of legislative 
measures, states need to pay particular attention to the health needs of vul-
nerable and marginalised members of society.92 This could imply a proce-
dural obligation addressed to e.g. national parliaments to consult these 
groups about their most urgent health needs when the substantive minimum 
core content of the right to health is specified domestically. Even in well-
established democratic systems so-called vulnerable and marginalised 
groups might not be represented sufficiently through the legislature,93 and it 
might therefore be necessary that they are consulted explicitly in the pro-
cess of specifying the core content to ensure that their voices are heard and 
their primary health needs met.     
Fourth, the CESCR and national courts have established that decision-
making processes about the scope of the right to healthcare and other social 
services needs to be transparent and based on reliable data.94 The German 
Constitutional Court has, for example, determined such procedural obliga-
tions in detail addressing the legislature when it comes to the determination 
of the exact scope of social benefits that ensure everyone’s subsistence lev-
el: the scope should be determined in a transparent and objective procedure, 
based on reliable data and apply a comprehensible and realistic calculation 
method.95 These procedural requirements are also relevant for the determi-
nation of the substance of a domestically-concretised minimum core right 
to health. In the context of the right to health, this might imply consulta-
tions with public health experts to get hold of ›reliable data‹. 
Fifth, states’ procedural obligations include the provision of effective 
remedies for alleged violations of the (minimum core) right to health. Un-
like the ICCPR,96 the ICESCR does not explicitly establish a duty on state 
parties to provide judicial, administrative or other remedies. However, it 
can well be argued that such an obligation is implied also in the ICESCR: 
                                                             
92  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43(a) and (f).? 
93  See e.g. a report from Germany concerning political influence of persons with 
low incomes, Elsässer et al. (2017). 
94   E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 43(f), 55 and 36; this has also been rec-
ognised by the European Committee of Social Rights: Conclusions XV-2, Unit-
ed Kingdom, 599.  
95  See the judgments of the German Constitutional Court, supra n. 47. 
96  As in Article 2(3) ICCPR. 
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remedies are required to ensure the effective enforcement of the domesti-
cally concretised minimum core obligations flowing from the minimum 
core right to health; and the democratic system in which human rights are 
to be realized implies the existence of an executive, legislative and judicial 
power, structured inter alia by the separation of powers doctrine.97 Among 
other, the latter suggests some judicial (or administrative) control over 
whether the legislature and executive comply with their obligations under 
the ICESCR – this can happen through enabling domestic courts and/or 
administrative review bodies to enforce the ICESCR directly and/or the 
domestic laws adopted to concretise core (and non-core) obligations flow-
ing from Article 12 ICESCR. Such review can furthermore finetune the 
concretisation and contextualisation of the abstract international core right 
to health, as domestic courts and other review bodies can decide on a case-
by-case basis whether the concretisation by the legislature/executive proves 
sufficient to guarantee effective access to primary healthcare services in a 
particular case.98 Moreover, even when sufficiently specified through do-
mestic law and other policy measures, this specification requires constant 
up-dating in line with changing socio-economic circumstances, technologi-
cal and medical developments and shifting major health threats that a socie-
ty is facing.99 This reflects the dynamic character of human rights obliga-
                                                             
97  This is most prominently developed in ECtHR jurisprudence. See e.g. Van de 
Hurk v. Netherlands, judgment (Chamber), appl.no. 16034/90, 19 April 1994, 
paras. 44–55 
98  The decision by the German Constitutional Court, 1 BvL 1/09 vom 09.02.2010, 
reflects this. It inter alia highlights the need for taking into account the specific 
circumstances and unique interests of different groups (in this case children) 
when the amount of social cash benefits is determined allowing individuals in 
need to live in accordance with the national minimum subsistence level; see also 
Pieterse (2006), 491; Bilchitz (2007), 224–225.  
99  As observed by the CESCR (E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43[f]) and 
recognised in the »jurisprudence« of the European Committee on Social Rights, 
see e.g. Conclusions I, Statement of interpretation on Article 1(1), 13; Conclu-
sions XIII-5, Statement of Interpretation on Article 23, at 455 and Conclusions 
XV-2, Belgium, 99 (referring to the right to health education as set out in 
Art.11(2) of the ESC); and the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court, as clearly formulated judgment 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 February 2010. 
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tions.100 This character indeed requires constant monitoring of the situation 
by domestic authorities (and, subsidiarily, by regional or international 
courts or quasi-judicial bodies).101 This can regularly be done by domestic 
courts that, if they are given the power to review individual complaints, 
might become aware of changing circumstances that bring about new 
threats to individuals’ abilities to enjoy their (minimum core) right to 
health. They may then interpret domestic law and/or the ICESCR dyna-
mically to capture these changing circumstances, or call on the legislature 
and executive to adopt new or adapt existing laws and policy measures to 
this end.  
In summary, these procedural obligations which guide states in the con-
cretisation of the abstractly defined international minimum core right to 
health will ensure that minimum health needs of individuals are met in all 
countries around the world in a way that takes account of the local context. 
This ensures that even if it is (necessarily) defined in the abstract, the uni-
versal minimum core content of the right to health can make a difference 
for individuals who have varying health problems that shall be addressed 
urgently. At the same time, the abstract, internationally-defined minimum 
core can prevent arbitrariness in the domestic concretisation process, guid-
ing the priorities of this concretisation process so that the national legal and 
other measures for the implementation of the minimum core right to health 
benefit everyone under the jurisdiction of a particular state.102     
 
 
 
                                                             
100  This has been clearly developed in the ECtHR’s »evolutionary or dynamic in-
terpretation« doctrine. For an overview, see Harris et al. (2014), 8–10. 
101  Parallels can be drawn to the cooperation required by domestic authorities (the 
executive, legislature and judiciary) under the ECHR to secure the effective 
implementation of the ECHR in changing circumstances. For details see Müller 
(2016b).   
102  This is based on the assumption that the internationally defined minimum core 
right to health as set out in section 4.1 above ensures access to health services 
that address most common health threats, and thus benefit a great number of 
people.   
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5. UTILISING THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH  
TO DETERMINE, ALLOCATE AND COORDINATE 
DOMESTIC DUTIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES?  
 
It can still be reasonably objected that the internationally-defined minimum 
core right to health as defined in section 4.1 and its domestic concretisation 
and implementation is unaffordable for low-income countries. Relatedly, 
there might be threats and obstacles to a state’s ability to protect its popula-
tion’s minimum core right to health which originate from beyond the state’s 
borders. Such threats may come from another state or states, international 
organisations and international law, or from private actors based in another 
state. The inability of a state to ensure universal access to primary 
healthcare of individuals under its jurisdiction because of structural adjust-
ment policies pushed for by international organisations (e.g. the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) or the EU) is one example in this context. An-
other is the state duty to ensure its population’s access to essential medi-
cines as required under the minimum core right to health which might be 
impossible because of high prices that pharmaceutical companies charge 
for essential drugs. These corporations may also invoke commercial and in-
tellectual property rights when they decide which drugs to produce or to 
protect from generic production.103 International organisations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the IMF or the EU have worked to de-
velop and embed the law protecting commercial and intellectual property 
rights as well as international trade law that can hinder a state to protect its 
population’s access to essential health goods and services as required under 
the ICESCR. To remedy this, not only other states will usually need to be 
involved but also the involvement of international organisations and private 
(pharmaceutical) corporations may be required.    
In the following, it shall be argued that the minimum core approach 
could help to address these challenges to some extent by concretising both 
duties under the ICESCR that states have as members of international or-
                                                             
103  The conflicts between the right to health and international law protecting intel-
lectual property rights have been discussed in great detail, e.g. by Steffen Guise 
Rosina et al. (2010); Helfer (2016); A/63/263, 11 August 2008. Despite this, 
these conflicts have not been solved. 
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ganisations and (international) responsibilities to cooperate and assist in the 
realization of ESC rights, something which has been indicated by the 
statements of the CESCR.  
First on states’ duties as members of international organisations: Inter-
national human rights law includes an obligation of states to protect indi-
viduals under their jurisdiction against human rights violations caused by 
international organisations of which they are members. This duty can be 
deduced from the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Or-
ganizations.104 In their Article 61, the Draft Articles indicate that interna-
tional responsibility can be attributed to states when they intentionally cir-
cumvent their human rights duties under the ICESCR (and other human 
rights treaties) through membership in an international organisation and 
through conduct of the latter. This means that states have an obligation to 
ensure that their membership in an international organisation and the activi-
ties undertaken by this organisation do not prevent them from protecting 
the rights of individuals under their jurisdiction.105 The minimum core ap-
proach calls on states to be particularly alert when joining an international 
organisation whose objectives and purposes might conflict with their mini-
mum core obligations; or when they approve activities or the adoption of 
legal measures by an organisation to which they are already a member, that 
can undermine their ability to secure minimum core rights in particular 
within their jurisdiction.106 This can be relevant when it comes to measures 
taken for the protection of intellectual property rights as well as free trade. 
A heightened alertness of states when it comes to their ability to protect 
minimum core rights is justified by the particularly urgent human interest 
that underlies minimum core rights, as has been argued above.  
In its current shape, international law does not include an obligation on 
states to ensure that international organisations do not adopt measures that 
                                                             
104  Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), 
A/RES/66/100, 9 December 2011. 
105  E/C.12/2016/1, 24 June 2016, para. 5; this is clear also from the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR as summarised in the commentary to Article 61 DARIO, 93–95, 
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf 
[14.06.2017]. 
106  The CESCR has reminded states of this obligation frequently, e.g. E/C.12/ 
2016/1, 24 June 2016, paras. 4 and 5. 
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prevent other states from protecting the human rights of individuals under 
these other states’ jurisdiction; or more generally, a duty not to create ob-
stacles, including through the activities of private actors (e.g. multinational 
corporations), for other states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights of 
individuals under the jurisdiction of these other states.107 The reason for this 
is that normally108 the jurisdictional link between a state and individuals 
under the jurisdiction of another state is missing.109 A jurisdictional link is, 
however, required to pose human rights obligations on a state (or on inter-
national organisation).110  
But states, international organisations, private corporations and even in-
dividuals have responsibilities for the protection of human rights in all 
states, and, as shall be argued in the following, in particular when it comes 
to the protection of minimum core rights, including the minimum core right 
to health. The legal basis for these responsibilities are Articles 2(1), 11(2), 
15(4), 22 and 23 ICESCR, all referring to the importance of international 
cooperation and assistance for the realization of the rights set out in the 
Covenant. Unfortunately, as pointed out by political philosophers, there are 
»few concepts in moral and political philosophy that are more slippery than 
that of responsibility«.111 This is also reflected in international human rights 
law, where no satisfying answer has been found yet as to how the responsi-
bility to cooperate and assist in the implementation of human rights (in par-
ticular ESC rights) which is diffusely addressed to the ›international com-
                                                             
107  See A/RES/66/100, 9 December 2011; and A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. 
See also the analysis by Besson (2015b), 482–484.  
108  There are rare cases where jurisdiction is shared among two states, as recog-
nised e.g. by the ECtHR in Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, judgment 
(Grand Chamber), appl. nos. 43370/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05, 19 October 
2012, paras. 110 and 122. 
109  The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2011, aim to close this gap, see e.g. 
principles 13, 21 and 23. Note, however, that the Maastricht Principles do not 
make a distinction between duties of states (and international organisations) of 
jurisdiction, and responsibilities of states, international organisations, private 
actors and individuals’ to cooperate and assist in the realization of ESC rights.   
110  Besson (2012b) and (2015b), 468-470.  
111  Miller (2001), 455. 
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munity‹, can be made more concrete and assigned to one or more states 
(that do not have jurisdiction), international/regional organisations, private 
actors or individuals that make up the ›international community‹ in con-
crete cases. The statements of the Committee on these responsibilities re-
main very general, calling on states and »others in a position to help«112 to 
cooperate and assist each other in the realization of ESC rights. 113 The 
Maastricht Principles go further by establishing that »states should coordi-
nate with each other, including in the allocation of responsibilities, in order 
to cooperate effectively in the universal fulfilment of economic, social and 
cultural rights« [emphasis added, A.M.].114 A Commentary to the Maas-
tricht Principles moreover suggests criteria which should guide this alloca-
tion of responsibilities to different actors, among them capacity (economi-
cal, financial, technical, technological and in form of influence in interna-
tional decision-making processes115), causality and historical ties.116  
In addition, it can be suggested that a focus on the minimum core con-
tent of the right to health (and other ESC rights) could help to give these re-
sponsibilities a clearer direction and to allocate them more effectively to 
different actors, including when it comes to the coordination of the imple-
mentation of (international) responsibilities with the implementation of (na-
tional) minimum core obligations flowing from the right to health that are 
addressed to the state of jurisdiction. This has been suggested by the 
CESCR in several statements, and it has been taken up by the Maastricht 
Principles. The Committee observed that internationally-defined minimum 
                                                             
112  E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, para. 16; and E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, 
para. 45. 
113  E.g. E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, paras. 52–58; E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 
2006, paras. 36–38; E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, paras. 30–36; 
E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 38–42; and E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 
1999, para. 38.  
114  Maastricht Principles, 2011, principle 30.  
115  This includes capacity to influence the development and entrenchment of inter-
national law that obstructs the implementation of ESC rights, like intellectual 
property law, trade law or law protecting foreign investments. See also 
E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 39. 
116  Maastricht Principles, 2011, principle 31; De Schutter et al. (2012), 1152–1153; 
Besson (2015b), 484–485. 
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core content of ESC rights »give rise to national responsibilities [rather: ob-
ligations] for all States [of jurisdiction], and international responsibilities 
for developed States, as well as others that are in a ›position to help‹«.117 
This suggests that the universal minimum core right to health as defined in 
section 4.1 above can guide states, international organizations and other ac-
tors with the capacity to help as to when their responsibility to offer assis-
tance is clearly triggered:118 when the minimum core right to health of »any 
significant number of individuals«119 is not implemented in another coun-
try.120 Complementing this, the Committee has frequently called on states 
of jurisdiction who lack the capacity and resources to implement the mini-
mum core right to health to appeal to other states, international organisa-
tions and other actors for the assistance that is needed for the implementa-
tion of minimum core obligations under the right to health.121 The particu-
larly urgent human (survival) interests which are underlying the minimum 
core content of the right to health and the related fact that minimum core 
obligations should not be limited even by a majority decision of a demo-
cratically elected parliament make the implementation of minimum cores a 
legitimate focus for cooperation between domestic and foreign and/or in-
ternational actors. The latter could potentially contribute to avoid the prob-
lem of possible conflict between the democratically determined health pri-
orities in the state of jurisdiction with health priorities determined in third 
states which wish to discharge their international responsibilities flowing 
from the right to health to assist with the implementation of the right to 
health in another country.  
                                                             
117  E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, para. 16. 
118  This does not mean that the responsibility to cooperate and assist is irrelevant in 
situations where non-core ESC rights are involved. For further elaboration, see 
De Schutter et al. (2012), 1156.  
119  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10; and E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001, 
para. 17.  
120  The role of the minimum core is recognised also Maastricht Principles, 2011, 
principle 32. 
121  E.g. E/C.12/2007/1, 21 September 2007, paras. 5 and 10(f); and E/1991/23, 14 
December 1990, para. 42. See also the Maastricht Principles, 2011, principle 
34. 
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To end on a critical note: Despite the progress that has been made to-
wards both understanding the need to allocate responsibilities to different 
actors more clearly and to coordinate their implementation (including with 
the implementation of duties of states of jurisdiction) and the potential role 
that the minimum core approach could play in this context, many challeng-
es remain. It is not clear precisely where national obligations end and inter-
national responsibilities begin for the implementation of the minimum core 
right to health. Nor are the criteria particularly well-defined which states, 
international organisations and other actors should follow when making de-
cisions about how, when and to whom they offer assistance in respecting, 
protecting and fulfilling the right to health when discharging their (interna-
tional) responsibilities. Last, there is no reliable institutional framework 
through which responsibilities can be allocated fairly and their implementa-
tion coordinated122 – something that would be needed to avoid that none of 
the potentially responsible actors will step in to actually discharge their re-
sponsibility when minimum core rights remain unprotected in a particular 
country.123 Human rights law scholarship will need to address these ques-
tions to ensure the implementation of the right to health in all countries 
around the world, in particular when it comes to aspects of this right that 
cannot be realized in one state without the assistance of another state, inter-
national organisations or private actors – e.g. when a low-income country 
lacks the resources and capacities to produce essential drugs; or is pushed 
by international organizations to introduce structural adjustment measures 
that interfere with the provision of primary healthcare.     
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The chapter sketched out the progress which human rights law scholarship 
and practice has made in developing and operationalising the minimum 
core approach to the right to health so that this approach can achieve its aim 
to give the right to health a meaningful content despite the »mere« obliga-
tion of states to »progressively realize« the rights of the ICESCR. While the 
Committee’s understanding of the approach remains unclear, it has been 
                                                             
122  Besson (2015b), 477 and 483–484. 
123  David Miller has identified this as a »protection gap«, cf. Miller (2009), 246. 
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argued that an emerging transnational consensus on the content and charac-
ter of the minimum core right can be identified from the practice of domes-
tic courts, domestic law as well as regional and international human rights 
courts and bodies. This consensus points into a direction of understanding 
the minimum core right to health as an absolute right to access essential 
health goods and services. More comparative research will be needed to 
consolidate this consensus (or refute its existence).  
The discussion also shed light on the procedural obligations under the 
ICESCR that guide states when concretising the abstract internationally-
defined content of the minimum core right to health at the domestic level, 
taking into account local circumstances. This concretisation process should 
take place within a democratic system, and material obligations flowing 
from the minimum core right to health have to be allocated to various do-
mestic actors and their implementation has to be coordinated.  
Last, I argued that a focus on the minimum core approach could (to-
gether with other principles and criteria) guide the specification and alloca-
tion of states’, international organisations’ and private entities’ responsibili-
ties to cooperate and assist in the realization of the right to health; and in 
the coordination of the implementation of these responsibilities of different 
actors, and the coordination of the implementation of responsibilities and 
duties of the state of jurisdiction. Such specification, allocation and coordi-
nation is urgently required to effectively realize the minimum core right to 
health of everyone, including those who live under a state’s jurisdiction that 
cannot secure minimum core rights without international assistance and co-
operation. 
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Conceptualising Minimum Core  
Obligations under the Right to Health. 
How Should We Define and Implement  
the ›Morality of the Depths‹?1 
LISA FORMAN, LULJETA CARAOSHI,  
AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, EVERALDO LAMPREA2 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his seminal book on basic rights, subsistence and affluence, Henry Shue 
characterized basic rights as »the morality of the depths […] [in that they] 
specify the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink«.3 In the last 
two decades, the notion that economic, social and cultural rights offer simi-
lar minimum substantive guarantees has entered international human rights 
law in the form of minimum core obligations that delimit permissible re-
strictions of economic, social and cultural rights. The imperative for such 
demarcations is stark given that the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) formulation of economic, social and 
cultural rights like the right to the highest attainable standard of physical 
                                                             
1  Henry Shue uses this phrase in Shue (1996), 18: »Basic rights are the morality 
of the depths. They specify the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to 
sink«. 
2  This article was originally published as Forman et al. (2016). It is reprinted by 
permission of Taylor and Francis Ltd., see http://www.tandfonline.com.  
3  Shue (1996), 18.  
96 | LISA FORMAN ET AL.  
and mental health (›the right to health‹) limits state duties to progressive re-
alization within maximum available resources. To prevent progressive real-
ization within resources from undermining both domestic and international 
responsibilities towards health, international human rights law institutions 
developed the idea that these rights hold an inviolable »core« equivalent to 
essential health needs. Yet few aspects of this right and indeed of economic 
social and cultural rights more generally have generated greater debate and 
unresolved questions than the core concept: Is the core fixed or moveable, 
non-derogable or restrictable, universal or country-specific? Is its function 
to guarantee specified bundles of the most essential health facilities, goods 
and services, or is it to require governments to act reasonably to progres-
sively realize these minimal health entitlements? Is the concept a legitimate 
interpretation in terms of international law rules of treaty interpretation? 
And what are acceptable methods to further develop the content of these 
entitlements and duties? Indeed the relatively open nature of many of these 
questions suggests that the core concept as defined does not resolve in-
commensurable conflicts between fixity and movement, actions and out-
comes, and needs and resources.  
This paper seeks to examine several of these questions in light of the 
evolution of this concept in international law and human rights scholarship, 
focusing in particular on the development of core obligations in relation to 
the right to health. In this paper, and for reasons of scope alone, we restrict 
our attention to relevant international human rights law interpretations and 
to relevant global scholarship in this domain, leaving aside deep analysis of 
crucial cognate areas such as global economic, social and cultural rights ju-
risprudence and philosophical justifications of core obligations.4 Accord-
ingly, our paper focuses first on the evolution of this concept in internation-
al human rights law. We then analyse key questions about the intended 
purpose, function, legitimacy and development of the core concept. We ar-
gue that greater conceptual clarity on the core concept is an essential pre-
condition to constructing a feasible, principled and grounded conceptualiza-
                                                             
4  We are co-investigators on a larger project on minimum core obligations funded 
through the Canadian Institutes for Health Research and the European Commis-
sion, which will devote significant attention to the jurisprudential development 
of this concept. 
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tion of the minimum core of the right to health more likely to meet its con-
ceptual and material ambitions.  
 
 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CORE CONCEPT  
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
A significant motivator for the genesis of the core is the dilemma created 
by article 2.1 of the ICESCR, which limits state duties to  
 
»taking steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, es-
pecially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.« 
 
The duty to progressively realize ICESCR rights within financial resources 
was introduced into the Covenant to acknowledge that the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights depends upon the availability of re-
sources. Yet even at drafting, this article was critiqued for providing a weak 
guarantee of Covenant rights that provided »too many loop-holes for States 
Parties wishing to evade their obligations« by pleading a lack of resources 
and permitting indefinite delays.5 The risk of evasive state action under ar-
ticle 2.1 is exacerbated by the vagueness of Covenant rights: For example, 
the generality of article 12.1’s entitlement to the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health is only partially offset by the specification in 
article 12.2 of steps states must take to fully realize this right.6 Anticipating 
unjustifiably stagnant or retrogressive action, other parts of the Covenant 
specify that its rights can only be limited insofar as is compatible with their 
nature (article 4), and that acts aimed at destroying or limiting rights to a 
                                                             
5  A/2929, 1 July 1955, para. 23; See also Alston/Quinn (1987), analysing the 
drafting history of articles 2.1, 4 and 5.  
6  Article 12.2 requires states to take steps to reduce stillbirth rate and infant mor-
tality, improve environmental and industrial hygiene, prevent, treat, and control 
epidemic, endemic, occupational diseases, and create conditions that assure 
medical services to all. 
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greater extent than provided for in the Covenant are not permitted (article 
5.1). Indeed the drafting history of the Covenant indicates explicit acknowl-
edgement that article 4 in particular was deemed necessary to mediate the 
risk posed by article 2 since it »did not indicate when limitations could be 
legitimate and it was necessary to state clearly that limitations would be 
permissible only in certain circumstances and under certain conditions.«7 
In an effort to address the challenges posed by progressive realization 
within resources and delimited restrictions of rights, the idea that economic, 
social and cultural rights have core components not subject to such limita-
tions was introduced into human rights debates by the 1980’s.8 While arti-
cles 4 and 5 of ICESCR provided some textual justification for introducing 
the core concept, its origins are commonly ascribed to the convergence be-
tween scholarship on philosophy, development and human rights, and do-
mestic constitutional laws in Germany and Turkey.9  
Henry Shue’s concept of basic rights to subsistence that imposed cor-
relative duties on multiple actors played a significant generative role in the 
emergence of the core concept.10 Shue conceived of basic rights as »every-
one’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity«,11 which 
would include »unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate 
clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventive public health care.«12 A 
second key influence came in a 1987 article by Bård-Anders Andreassen et 
al., who argued for a »practicable (ultimately even an area-specific) mini-
mal floor of well-being as a standard for distributive analyses of each of the 
key economic, social and cultural rights.«13 Andreassen et al. saw a mini-
malist approach as a necessary counterpoint to demands for unrealistic lev-
els of redistribution via economic, social and cultural rights, and a neces-
sary stage in the progressive realization of Covenant rights.14 A third major 
                                                             
7  A/2929, 1 July 1955, para. 50, quoted in Alston/Quinn (1987), 205. 
8  Toebes (1999), 277. 
9  See for example, Toebes (1999), 277–278; Young, 121; Bilchitz (2007), 186. 
10  While the first edition was printed in 1980, this article references the second edi-
tion printed in 1996, identical but for its preface and afterword. 
11  Shue (1996), 19. 
12  Ibid., 23. 
13  Andreassen et al. (1987/1988), 334, emphasis in the original removed. 
14  Ibid., 342. 
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influence came from scholarship explicitly promoting the idea that all hu-
man rights hold a ›core‹,15 with its most influential exploration by Esin 
Örücü in a 1986 chapter on human rights.16 Örücü drew from German and 
Turkish law which entrenched ›core‹ and ›essential‹ rights,17 to suggest that 
rights should be understood to encompass a »normative scope with three 
distinct parts: a core, a circumjacence, and an outer edge, the core being 
that part of a right which is essential to its definition.«18 Örücü asked 
whether in a world of qualified rights, the concept of the core could indicate 
the one area within a right’s normative scope which should be protected ab-
solutely.19  
By the late 1980’s, ideas similar to those proposed by Shue, Andreassen 
and Örücü began to enter international discourse around economic, social 
and cultural rights. The 1986 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pro-
pose that States Parties are »obligated regardless of their level of economic 
development to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all«, and 
that available resources should be »mindful of the need to assure to every-
one the satisfaction of subsistence requirements as well as the provision of 
essential services.«20 A State Party would be in violation of the Covenant if 
»it wilfully fails to meet a generally accepted international minimum stand-
ard of achievement, which is within its powers to meet.«21 In 1987, in an 
article in Human Rights Quarterly, Phillip Alston, the rapporteur of the 
newly created Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                             
15  The idea of a core of rights corresponding to its essential content had been pro-
posed in earlier scholarship: see for example, Wellman (1978), 53: »What uni-
fied any right is its core. At the centre of any legal right stand one or more legal 
advantages that define the essential content of the right. Change the core and 
any remaining right would no longer be the same right.« 
16  Örücü (1986), 47. 
17  Ibid.  
18  Ibid., 38. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, 2–6 June 1986, paras. 25 and 
28. 
21  Ibid., para. 72. 
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(CESCR or ›the Committee‹), signalled the Committee’s intention to adopt 
and develop the concept of the minimum core in its clarification of Cove-
nant norms. Alston argued that each right must »give rise to an absolute 
minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a State Party is to be consid-
ered to be in violation of [its] obligations.«22  
In the following years, the concept and related terms began to appear in 
international human rights reports and resolutions,23 with a definitive entry 
into the Committee’s jurisprudence in its 1990 General Comment No. 3 
which interprets the nature of State Party obligations under article 2.1.24 
Here the Committee suggests that every State Party holds »a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each right.«25 In one of the most quoted provisions of this Com-
ment, the Committee suggests that  
 
»a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the 
most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations un-
der the Covenant.«26  
 
A state could rebut this presumption of failure due to a lack of available re-
sources by demonstrating »that every effort has been made to use all re-
sources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priori-
ty, those minimum obligations.«27   
Over the next seven years, the Committee investigated the suggestion in 
General Comment No. 3 that a state’s core obligations under the right to 
health extend to essential primary healthcare, particularly at a day of gen-
eral discussion on the right to health in 1993 which was intended to serve as 
the basis for a general comment on health. Speakers were urged to pay spe-
cial attention to core content, with proposals for conceptualizing the core of 
                                                             
22  Alston (1987), 352–353. 
23  See for example E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16, 3 July 1992; E/CN.4/RES/1994/20, 1 
March 1994, para. 11.  
24  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990. 
25  Ibid., paras. 1 and 10. 
26  Ibid., para. 10. 
27  Ibid. 
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the right to health including identification of its key principles, specifica-
tion of its content (and equivalence with primary healthcare), and specifica-
tion in some detail of minimum core obligations.28 The latter proposal by 
Audrey Chapman, then Director of the Science and Human Rights Pro-
gramme of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and 
a co-author of the current paper, provided a detailed account of minimum 
core obligations utilizing the then novel notion of first defining violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights. Indeed, Chapman’s ›violations ap-
proach‹ explicated at the day of discussion and in subsequent scholarship29 
provided foundational incentives for the development of the 1997 Maas-
tricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and for subsequent interpretations of the right to health by the CESCR.30 
The Maastricht Guidelines suggest that despite the margin of discretion 
states enjoyed in choosing the means of implementing Covenant rights, 
»universal minimum standards« for economic, social and cultural rights had 
been developed through state practice and »the application of legal norms 
to concrete cases and situations by international treaty monitoring bodies as 
well as by domestic courts.«31 In contrast to General Comment No. 3 which 
made minimum core obligations generally limitable by resource con-
straints, Maastricht suggests that »[s]uch minimum core obligations apply 
irrespective of the national availability of resources or other factors or diffi-
culties.«32  
These developments laid the foundation for the authoritative interpreta-
tion of core obligations under the right to health in the seminal General 
Comment No. 14 on the right to health issued by the Committee in 2000, 
which advances several novel components of core obligations. In defining 
core obligations, the Committee restates General Comment No. 3’s confir-
mation that states have core obligations to ensure minimum essential levels 
of rights including essential primary healthcare. It suggests that it had found 
compelling guidance on core obligations under article 12 by reading the 
                                                             
28  E/C.12/1993/SR.42, 6 December 1993, paras. 62 and 63.  
29  For example, Chapman (1996) and (1998).  
30  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
22–26 January 1997, para. 8. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid., para. 9. 
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1978 Alma Ata Declaration together with contemporary instruments like 
the 1994 Programme of Action of the International Conference on Popula-
tion and Development (ICPD).33 Accordingly the Committee proposes that 
a state’s core obligations under the right to health would include at least: 
(1) ensuring non-discriminatory access to health facilities, goods and ser-
vices, especially for vulnerable or marginalized people, (2) ensuring access 
to food, basic shelter, housing, sanitation and water, (3) providing essential 
drugs as defined by WHO, (4) ensuring equitable distribution of all health 
facilities, goods and services and (5) adopting a national public health strat-
egy and plan of action addressing the concerns of all.34 While this list pro-
vided very little indication of the nature of health goods and services to be 
provided beyond essential medicines, the Committee proceeded to identify 
what it called »obligations of comparable priority« to ensure reproductive, 
maternal and child healthcare, provide immunization against major infec-
tious diseases, take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and en-
demic diseases, provide education and access to information on the main 
health problems in the community, and provide appropriate training for 
health personnel.35 It is presumably these obligations that are drawn from 
the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the ICPD Programme of Action. 
The Committee’s approach to the limitability of core obligations is 
markedly different from General Comment No. 3. In General Comment 
No. 14, the Committee holds that »a State party cannot, under any circum-
stances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations 
[…] which are non-derogable.«36 Despite positing core obligations as 
non-derogable, the Committee only identifies one explicit violation of a 
core obligation: »The adoption of any retrogressive measures incompatible 
with the core obligations under the right to health.«37 This terseness may be 
explained by the fact that several of the violations identified under a state’s 
positive obligation to fulfil relate to core and comparable priority obliga-
                                                             
33  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid., para. 44. 
36  Ibid., para. 47.  
37  Ibid., para. 48. 
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tions.38 The implication is that a state’s primary positive obligations to ful-
fil the right to health are equivalent for the most part to its core and compa-
rable obligations. 
 
 
3. DEBATES OVER THE CORE 
 
The evolution of the core concept in international human rights law reflects 
changing ideas about its intended purpose, function, legitimacy and devel-
opment. The remainder of this paper focuses on an expanded analysis of 
key conceptual questions in this regard. We believe that these definitions of 
the core and consequent scholarly analyses provide important guidance for 
advancing towards a more conceptually sound approach to core obligations 
in relation to the right to health. 
 
3.1 The Purpose of the Core  
 
As indicated above, the primary impetus for the development of the core 
concept was to respond to the problem created by progressive realization 
within resources. The need to protect against the corrosive properties of 
progressive realization within resources is exacerbated by the historically 
limited jurisprudential development of economic, social and cultural rights 
given ideological opposition and their categorization as second generation/ 
positive rights less conducive to legal and judicial enforcement than the os-
tensibly first generation/negative rights categorization of civil and political 
rights. Indeed the introduction of the core concept forms part of a larger ef-
fort to advance the jurisprudential interpretation and enforcement of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights more generally.  
                                                             
38  Thus, primary violations of the obligation to fulfill would occur through state 
failures to take all necessary steps to realize the right to health, including fail-
ures to adopt or implement a national health policy designed to ensure the right 
to health for everyone; failure to monitor the realization of the right to health at 
the national level, for example by identifying right to health indicators and 
benchmarks; and failure to take measures to reduce the inequitable distribution 
of health facilities, goods and services. Ibid., para. 42. 
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The metaphor of the core and its usage are instructive in illustrating its 
intended purpose. The plain language meaning of ›core‹ denotes on the one 
hand a central location (as in the core of an apple or the earth), which may 
have different properties to the periphery (as do the fibrous parts of fruit 
and the molten center of the earth).39 These different properties might see 
the core playing vital functional roles in the broader structure (as do core 
reactors of a nuclear plant or core computer memory). This foundational 
role is reflected in the secondary meaning of the core as a ›basic, essential 
or enduring part‹ of something larger.40 These meanings of the core as both 
location and function within economic, social and cultural rights are evi-
dent in the core’s dual role in ›structuring‹ economic, social and cultural 
rights by defining essential components with different properties from the 
periphery. This structuring function is evident in scholarship which sees the 
core assisting in delineating the scope of economic, social and cultural 
rights, as indicated above when Örücü defines rights as comprising »a core, 
a circumjacence, and an outer edge.«41 A similar conception is apparent in 
Brigit Toebes’ suggestion that the scope of the right to health is comprised 
by all elements entrenched in international treaties that stipulate rights to 
health, with core content constituting the inner circle of this scope.42  
This view of the core as a scoping tool suggests on the other hand, that 
its desired function is to assist in clarifying the ›range of operation‹ of 
rights. From this perspective, like Hart’s notion that legal rules hold a core 
of certainty and a penumbra of doubt,43 the core assists in defining a hierar-
chical structure within economic, social and cultural rights, with priority 
radiating outwards in diminishing degrees from essentialia to incidentalia. 
This hierarchy is apparent in how the core concept is intended to denote 
those aspects of the right to health so essential that they constitute an »irre-
ducible minimum«44 without which the right »loses its value«.45 This view 
                                                             
39  Merriam Webster online, ›core‹. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Örücü (1986), 38. 
42  Toebes (1999), 243–244. 
43  Hart (1958), 607: When it comes to legal rules »[t]here must be a core of settled 
meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which 
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.« 
44  Örücü (1986), 45. 
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of diminishing priority suggests that core aspects of rights like health pro-
vide a temporal starting point for state action. This view of the core as a 
foundation of action is evident in its common description as a »floor« – 
quite literally, the lower limit of the right to health.46 This is the same lan-
guage used by the Committee in its first conceptualizations of the concept: 
for example, its call for input to its 1993 general day of discussion on the 
right to health was to »the concept that there is a minimum core content of 
each right which constitutes a »floor« below which the conditions should 
not be permitted to fall in any State Party.«47 Metaphors of floors and ceil-
ings are evocative of at least some of the intent behind the core: to on one 
hand, ›ground‹ and ›concretize‹ economic, social and cultural rights, on the 
other, to ›house‹ the various entitlements within rights in a feasible struc-
ture.48  
Yet the danger of understanding the core as a ›floor‹ is that those as-
pects of the right to health falling outside the scope of the core are depriori-
tized, thereby restricting the scope of the right to health rather than usefully 
structuring and developing it. As Chapman and Russell suggest, this is »the 
risk […] that the ›floor‹ will become a ›ceiling‹.«49 Moreover, that which is 
most essential and therefore important, seems to conflict with that which is 
minimum, by definition, the very least a state should do. In this light it is 
not surprising that the word »minimum« ultimately drops out of the Com-
mittee’s discourse on the core, as it shifts away from discussions of mini-
mum core content to an exclusive focus on core obligations. Nor is this 
shift away from content to obligations surprising given the Committee’s in-
                                                                                                                          
45  Toebes (1999), 276. 
46  Merriam Webster online, ›floor‹. 
47  E/C.12/1993/11, 22 November – 10 December 1993, para. 5. See also van 
Bueren (2002); Coomans (2002). 
48  A similar metaphor was influential at the drafting of the UDHR, where Rene 
Cassin’s draft conceived of the UDHR rights as a Greek temple ›portico‹, with 
various rights serving as foundation, columns and roof. It is significant in this 
regard, that Cassin considered the Preamble and articles 1 and 2 (equality, digni-
ty, non-discrimination) to constitute this foundation. See Swanson Gold-
berg/Schultheis Moore (2012), 5. 
49  Chapman/Russell (2002a), 9. 
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sistence that the »raison d’être« of the Covenant is to »establish clear obli-
gations for States Parties« to fully realize Covenant rights.50 
These terminological shifts are themselves instructive, with the core de-
scribed over time as »minimum subsistence rights,«51 »minimum essential 
levels,«52 »international minimum threshold,«53 »core content,«54 »mini-
mum core obligations«55 and »core obligations«.56 These changing terms 
reflect the shift in the Committee’s approach from articulating the core as 
an entitlement to a level, threshold or content, to describing the core as an 
obligation with very little explicated content. While these shifts in termi-
nology show the evolution of the concept, they also suggest that at different 
points there have been efforts to develop constituent and equally important 
parts of the core. It is arguable that entitlements, content and duties are each 
essential elements of the right to health, and that without clarity on each 
component part, there is no meaningful way to construct this right. As Shue 
suggests, without spelling out the duties, one has not really spelled out the 
rights, and spelling out the substance of rights is essential to defining its en-
titlements.57 Thus, rather than reflecting confusion about the role of the 
core, the shifting institutional focus from entitlements and content to duties 
might simply reflect a deeper recognition that each component is necessary 
to identify the structural conditions, actions and outcomes necessary for 
their realization. In this light, the debate over whether to approach the core 
as an entitlement, content or obligation calls to mind the parable of people 
                                                             
50  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10: »[i]f the Covenant were to be read in 
such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be 
largely deprived of its raison d’être.« 
51  Limburg Principles, paras. 25 and 72; Maastricht Principles, paras. 10, 11 and 
15. 
52  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10. 
53  A/Conf.191/BP/7, 13 May 2001, para. 17. 
54  E/C.12/1997/8, 12 December 1997, para. 7; E/C.12/1993/SR.41, 9 December 
1993, para. 2; E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, paras. 6 and 8. 
55  Maastricht Principles, paras. 10, 11 and 15. 
56  E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 200, para. 37. 
57  Shue (1996), ix and 15. 
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in the dark touching different parts of an elephant and believing that they 
are describing different animals.58  
Yet these variations also illustrate some of the challenges in conceptual-
izing the core, since defining an entitlement is different from defining a 
level of socioeconomic provision, and in turn different from defining an ob-
ligation cognizant of progressive realization within resources. Similarly 
contrasting views of the core as the essence (importance), the floor (the be-
ginning point or the foundation), and the minimum (the very least) various-
ly posit its operation as a beginning point for action, a fixed barrier to lim-
its, and a realm of priority. These contrasting interpretations may be re-
sponsible for some disagreements over how the core is intended to function. 
Yet if entitlements, content and obligations are equally important constitu-
ent parts of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to health, then 
the Committee’s decision to describe core obligations alone cannot be a 
sufficient way to enable the intended operation of the core. However, if 
more fully elaborated entitlements and core content are required, who 
should define these aspects and how?  
 
3.2 The Function of the Core  
 
Scholarly debate over how the core is intended to function has mapped 
closely onto the shifting function ascribed to the core in international hu-
man rights law. These debates coalesce around whether the core refers to 
absolute or relative content (in relation to resources and national needs), or 
rather to state obligations in relation to such content? And if it refers to ob-
ligations, should these be of result or of conduct?59 These arguments are 
prompted by the apparent contradiction created by proposing a fixed set of 
outcomes within a right defined by progressive realization within resources. 
Viewed in this light, the core concept appears to set up irresolvable con-
flicts between entitlements and duties, actions and outcomes, and needs and 
resources.  
                                                             
58  Again, Shue presciently suggests as much: »the mere core of the right indicates 
little about the social institutions needed to secure it, and the core of the right 
does not contain its whole structure.« Shue (1996), 39. 
59  The Committee introduced the distinction between obligations of conduct and 
result in General Comment No. 3, see: E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 1. 
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The Committee’s changing interpretations over time have not resolved 
these questions. Whereas in General Comment No. 3 the Committee delin-
eated derogable core obligations to provide core content (defined as essen-
tial foodstuffs, essential primary healthcare, basic shelter and housing, or 
the most basic forms of education), in General Comment No. 14 it shifted 
to non-derogable core obligations to assure the structural aspects of health 
(non-discrimination, access to food, shelter, water and drugs, equitable dis-
tributions of health facilities, goods and services, and a national public 
health strategy). This shift from weaker to stronger duties may attempt to 
respond to criticisms of the lack of financial feasibility of the core for low 
and middle-income countries (critiques that not coincidentally map closely 
onto long-standing critiques of economic, social and cultural rights). This 
analysis is implied by Paul Hunt’s indication as Rapporteur for the Com-
mittee that it took a pragmatic decision to define obligations rather than 
content in General Comment No. 14.60 Yet shifting from core entitlements 
to obligations has not resolved debates over whether core obligations re-
quire a fixed set of outcomes or simply action reasonably capable of 
achieving such outcomes. Instead the debate has shifted to whether core ob-
ligations should incorporate both conduct and result-based duties, which to 
some extent simply relocates (without resolution) earlier discussions about 
the relationship between core content and obligations.  
Yet the Committee has been ambiguous about the relationship between 
core content and obligations of conduct and result. While General Com-
ment No. 3 introduces the distinction between obligations of conduct and 
result,61 the Committee never indicates explicitly where core obligations 
fall in this framework. For example, while the Committee defines minimum 
essential levels of economic, social and cultural rights, the correlative du-
ties it outlines suggest obligations of conduct rather than result. This inter-
pretation is implicit in the Committee’s suggestion that presumptions of vi-
olation (suggested if significant numbers are deprived of essential food, 
                                                             
60  E/C.12/2000/SR.10, 4 May 2000, para 27. (In a previous comment on education 
the Committee had struggled with how to incorporate core content, eventually 
taking »the pragmatic approach of defining not the core content but the core ob-
ligations incumbent upon States Parties«, an approach it had decided to adopt in 
the general comment on health). 
61  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 1. 
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housing, healthcare and education) can be discharged if states can demon-
strate every effort to use resources at their disposal to satisfy these obliga-
tions as a matter of priority.62 In contrast, in General Comment No. 14, the 
Committee appears to have shifted definitively towards non-derogable core 
obligations of result, which include largely structural outcomes as well as 
essential medicines, minimum essential food, basic shelter, housing, sanita-
tion, and safe and potable water.63  
Many scholars view the Committee’s shift to non-derogable duties as 
unfeasible and impractical. Indeed, debates over the relationship between 
core content and duties of result and conduct have riven scholarship. Some 
like Young reject the notion of fixed core entitlements or core obligations 
of result. A strong critic of the minimum core concept in general, Katherine 
Young argues instead for an approach to economic, social and cultural 
rights that »establishes processes of value-based, deliberative problem-
solving, rather than one which sets out the minimum bundles of commodi-
ties or entitlements.«64 Young argues that the practical constraints of lim-
ited judicial and CESCR competence ultimately carry the core concept too 
far from its normative ambitions, which should be transferred to other areas 
of rights like benchmarks and indicators and assessments of causality and 
responsibility.65 In relation to the right to health, Audrey Chapman is the 
strongest proponent of a primarily conduct-based interpretation of the core 
(albeit that she does not reject fixed core entitlements per se). She argues 
that rather than seeing the core as a ›floor‹ below which health conditions 
must not in any circumstances fall, the core should rather describe »the 
minimum duties all States Parties set for themselves regardless of the re-
sources available.«66 With Russell, Chapman argues that doing so shifts fo-
cus to a more temporal consideration of what a state must do immediately 
on ratifying the Covenant to realize the right,67 and proposes conduct-
oriented core obligations in the respect, protect and fulfil categories.68 
                                                             
62  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 10.  
63  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43. 
64  Young (2012), 6. 
65  Young (2008), 117–118. 
66  E/C.12/1993/SR.42, 23 November 1994, para. 62. 
67  Chapman/Russell (2002a), 9. 
68  Chapman (2002).  
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Chapman argues against an approach based primarily on obligations of re-
sult given the absence of reliable data for most countries, the absence of 
means to carefully measure progress, and the potential impossibility of in-
corporating all measures necessary to achieve particular health outcomes 
into a minimum applicable to all countries.69  
At the other extreme, Maite San Giorgi eliminates obligations entirely 
and exclusively defines the core content of a right to healthcare, which en-
compasses primary healthcare and access to essential medicines.70 She de-
fines these components by drawing upon treaty text in a range of fora and 
from the Alma Ata Declaration and ICPD program referenced in General 
Comment No. 14. Others argue for an approach that combines core content 
with core obligations of conduct and result. For example, Toebes sees the 
need to define core content as well as obligations, and defines core obliga-
tions to respect, protect and fulfil that are both conduct and result orient-
ed.71 To define the core content of the right to health, Toebes combines el-
ements of the scope of the right to health constituted by treaty provisions 
relevant to health with reference to WHO policies like Health for All.72 Ac-
cordingly, Toebes characterizes what she terms ›core elements of the right 
to health‹ incorporating healthcare and underlying preconditions for 
health.73 Toebes defines core obligations under the respect, protect and ful-
fil paradigm, which include primarily conduct obligations and limited du-
ties in relation to result.74 She defines a single obligation of result as a fulfil 
                                                             
69  Chapman (2002), 202–203. 
70  San Giorgi (2012).  
71  Toebes (1999). 
72  Which she suggest »identify the core content of the right to health from a policy 
perspective, cf. Toebes (1999), 283, citing WHO Global Strategy for Health for 
All by the Year 2000, 1981, chapter 3, 31, para.1. 
73  The former include maternal and child healthcare, including family planning; 
immunization against major infectious diseases; appropriate treatment of com-
mon diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs. The latter include an 
adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; freedom from serious envi-
ronmental health freedoms, cf. Toebes (1999), 284. 
74  Thus, core obligations of conduct include duties to respect equal access to basic 
healthcare services, refrain from acts that seriously encroach upon people’s 
health, take legislative and other measures to assure that people have equal ac-
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duty to provide basic health services or create conditions under which indi-
viduals have adequate and sufficient access to health services.75 
David Bilchitz also proposes core content and obligations (what he calls 
a principled minimum core), since content (what he terms ›practical mini-
mum standards‹) would allow for government action to be measured.76 
Bilchitz argues that defining practical minimum standards would require 
consideration of the minimum core and other theoretical considerations, to-
gether with the resources and capacity available in a particular society.77 In 
the case of the right to health, these considerations would include treatment 
costs, resource availability, balancing preventing and curative strategies, 
ensuring equal opportunity for treatment, and considering the impact of 
such a pragmatic minimum on meeting other social needs.78 Bilchitz there-
fore foresees that the core of the right to healthcare would require govern-
ment policy goal setting (a task not necessarily done by the courts), specifi-
cation of a minimum level of services, and detailed government plans and 
programmes for improving healthcare with measurable indicators, targets, 
and deadlines.79 
Bilchitz’s conception follows closely from the South African Constitu-
tional Court’s rejection of the core concept on the basis that it was »impos-
sible to give everyone access even to a ›core‹ service immediately« and that 
»[a]ll that is possible, and all that can expected of the state, is that it act rea-
sonably to provide access to the [Constitution’s socio-economic rights] on a 
progressive basis.«80 Yet the South African Constitutional Court’s deci-
sions also suggest that the Court’s rejection of the core is rooted in part in a 
sense of the institutional inadequacy of a judicial definition of core content. 
For example, in an extra curial statement, Justice Richard J. Goldstone ar-
                                                                                                                          
cess to basic health services provided by third parties, and adopt a national 
health policy and devote a sufficient percentage of budget to health, cf. Toebes 
(1999), 337–338. 
75  Ibid., 338. 
76  Bilchitz (2007), 223. 
77  Ibid., 224. 
78  Ibid., 223. 
79  Ibid., 225. 
80  Minister of Health and another v. Treatment Action Campaign and others (2002) 
5 S.Afr.L.R. 721 (S.Afr.Const.Ct) (TAC decision), para. 35.   
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gues that the South African Constitutional Court decisions should be con-
sidered as a challenge to provide more information/data on the concept of 
the minimum core and not to abandon any future reliance on it.81 He argues 
that there is need for adoption of ›Brandeis Briefs‹, which could provide the 
court with factual data and information in addition to the legal aspect, in 
order to enable the court to effectively implement the minimum core stand-
ard.82 This judicial approach stands in stark contradiction to that adopted in 
many Latin American countries, such as in Colombia where the idea of 
»minimo vital« – a set of minimum conditions for a dignified life – has 
been the basis for key right to health decisions.83 These contrasting judicial 
approaches to core obligations provide important illustrations of the practi-
cal implications and outcomes of an applied perspective, and are important 
for the continued conceptualization of core obligations. As indicated above, 
for questions of scope alone, in this paper we do not more deeply engage 
this fundamental area of legal practice. 
In contrast to Bilchitz, John Tobin argues for a far narrower set of obli-
gations of conduct and result. Tobin is deeply critical of the Committee’s 
definition of the core, which he views as unjustified and impractical, and 
argues for a ›modest and practical‹ vision of the core of right to health.84 
Tobin suggests a far more minimal list of minimum core obligations of re-
sult than in General Comment No. 14 given resource constraints and the 
fact that local conditions will determine definitive lists applicable in partic-
ular countries.85 He also argues against importing obligations on shelter and 
housing into minimum core obligations under the right to health, given the 
interdependence of human rights and the fact the realization of obligations 
under the right to health must be accompanied by efforts to secure the min-
imum core obligations of other relevant rights.86 Instead Tobin argues for 
the development of a »presumptive list of result obligations«87 focused on 
the provision of selective and integrated primary healthcare and the provi-
                                                             
81  Gauri/Brinks (2010), xii. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Arango (2003). 
84  Tobin (2012), 243. 
85  Ibid., 247. 
86  Tobin (2012), 247. 
87  Ibid. 
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sion of food and water necessary to survive.88 Tobin foresees a core obliga-
tion to provide essential elements of primary healthcare developed through 
participatory processes to produce a widely accepted model that all states 
should be capable of adopting with appropriate assistance.89 
A related debate over the fixed or relative nature of the core extends to 
whether there should be a common universal definition of the core or 
whether such definitions should be country-specific. Andreassen and his 
colleagues foresaw country-specific thresholds measured by various indica-
tors as necessary to create a minimum threshold for realization of rights.90 
Similarly, Asbjørn Eide viewed Andreassen’s minimum threshold approach 
as requiring governments to establish national systems to identify local 
needs and opportunities for economic and social rights, as well as identify-
ing the needs of groups with the greatest difficulties in enjoying such 
rights.91 Eide did not foresee that this approach would generate universal 
models: »different governments may find different approaches most suita-
ble to deal with the vulnerability thus identified. No blueprint, no general 
model will be applicable in all settings.«92 Indeed, Eide saw such variability 
as an intrinsic implication of ›progressive realization‹ and ›immediate obli-
gations‹, which meant that states with higher resources have a higher level 
of core content or immediate duties than those with limited resources.93  
In contrast, Toebes saw Andreassen’s idea of formulating country based 
minimum thresholds as »almost an impossible task« given the resources 
needed to establish such benchmarks and the unlikelihood of states setting 
their own benchmarks and thereby voluntarily hold themselves accounta-
ble.94 Instead Toebes saw value in an approach which defined general uni-
versal core contents, distinguishing thresholds for countries at different lev-
els of development.95 Similarly, Danie Brand argues that understanding the 
minimum core as a general standard is suitable for the international en-
                                                             
88  Tobin (2012), 247. 
89  Ibid., 251. 
90  Bård-Anders (1987/1988), 341, emphasis in the original removed. 
91  Eide (1989), 46. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Eide (1995). 
94  Toebes (1999), 279. 
95  Ibid., 279–280. 
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forcement of economic, social and cultural rights, but it is not that useful 
for the domestic context where we must be »far more specific, particular, 
concrete, context-sensitive and flexible in our thinking about basic stand-
ards, core entitlements and minimum obligations.«96 Others saw the possi-
bility of both international and domestic cores: for example, Craven argued 
that while the universal nature of Covenant rights suggests that a common 
core should be developed to apply internationally, given the Committee’s 
practice of requiring states to establish benchmarks of poverty, »in the short 
term at least, state-specific minima are the only viable options.«97 Craven 
believed however that there was evidence that the Committee planned to 
establish international standards.98 
As the foregoing indicates, neither international interpretation nor 
scholarly debate has resolved key questions about the function of the core, 
the relationship (if any) between core content and obligations, and the rela-
tionship between the core and progressive realization and resources. If con-
tent is an important component of the core, what methods should be used to 
define it, and by whom? And to what extent can obligations of conduct 
and/or result guide appropriate action in the absence of defined content? 
 
3.3 Methods of Developing the Core of  
the Right to Health  
 
The final area of contention we will explore concerns the legitimacy of the 
concept from an international law perspective, and by implication, what 
might constitute appropriate methods for its further development. Efforts to 
forestall critiques on the grounds of legitimacy appear in every international 
interpretation, which suggests that the concept is justified for a range of 
reasons, all of which are implicitly grounded within accepted sources of in-
ternational law and methods of treaty interpretation. Thus, when scholars 
suggest that the core is justified by treaty text, jurisprudence and scholar-
ship, they are implicitly referencing the accepted sources of international 
law defined in the Statute of the International Court of Justice to include 
                                                             
96  Brand (2002). 
97  Craven (1995), 142. 
98  He cites Sparsis, E/C.12/1990/SR.146, at para. 43, as providing this evidence, 
cf. ibid., 142. 
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treaties, custom and judicial decisions and teachings as subsidiary means of 
determining legal rules.99 When scholars cite drafter’s intention, treaty pur-
pose and state practice, they are relying on the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) which requires interpreting treaties in good faith 
according to the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in light of the treaty’s ob-
ject and purpose, and their context (ascertained from treaty text, agreements 
between parties, subsequent state agreement and practice and relevant rules 
of applicable international law).100 The broader intent of the VCLT rules is 
to give meaning to treaties that accords with that agreed to during the draft-
ing of a treaty and in subsequent practice.101  
Reliance on treaty text, Committee jurisprudence, rights scholarship, 
drafter’s intention, treaty purpose and state practice pervades elaborations 
of the core in international human rights documents. For example, in his 
1987 article signalling the Committee’s intention to introduce the core con-
cept, Alston argues that acknowledgement that there might be reasonable 
differences of opinion on the extent of state responsibility for the material 
welfare of its citizens, reflected drafters’ intention that the Committee 
should identify »some minimum core content of each right that cannot be 
diminished under the pretext of permitted ›reasonable differences‹.«102 Al-
ston also suggests that the existence of a core subject to limited derogations 
was a »logical implication of the use of the terminology of rights,« since 
there »would be no justification for elevating a ›claim‹ to the status of a 
right […] if its normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for 
the possibility that the rightsholders possess no particular entitlement to an-
ything.«103 Similarly, Alston indicates that core entitlements would be iden-
tified through interpretation by States Parties, by the Committee through 
systematic examination of state reports, and through detailed studies by the 
Committee and groups acting on its behest of the normative implications of 
                                                             
99   Statute of the International Court of Justice (entry into force 24 October 1945) 
(3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945), article 
38(1).  
100  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
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101  Forman (2011), 163. 
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103  Ibid., 352–353. 
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Covenant rights,104 methods consistent with accepted international law 
practice. Alston, nonetheless, defends a bolder approach when he suggests 
that the Committee has the authority to unilaterally develop the core 
through the preparation of »draft issue outlines speculating as to the possi-
ble core content of each right«.105 
These former approaches foreshadow those adopted in General Com-
ment 3 when the Committee justified the introduction of the core concept 
on the basis of Committee and state practice as well as treaty purpose. Thus 
the Committee indicates that it introduced the core concept on »the basis of 
the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body 
that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States 
Parties’ reports.«106 Treaty purpose is argued to support this interpretation: 
the Committee suggests that »[i]f the Covenant were to be read in such a 
way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d’être.«107 This raison d’être, or overall objective is 
explicated elsewhere in the Comment, as being to »establish clear obliga-
tions for States Parties in respect of the full realization of the rights ques-
tion.«108 
Similar justifications appear in the Maastricht Guidelines, which argue 
that »universal minimum standards« for economic, social and cultural 
rights had been developed through state practice under the Committee’s re-
porting process and domestic court decisions.109 They argue that the earlier 
Limburg principles and the Committee’s developing jurisprudence confirm 
»resource scarcity does not relieve states of certain minimum obligations in 
respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.«110 
Reliance on state practice appears again in General Comment No. 14, when 
the Committee suggests that the entire Comment is »based on the Commit-
tee’s experience in examining States Parties’ reports over many years.«111 
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The argument that contemporary global health declarations and programs 
like the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of 
the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) guide 
elaboration of core content, similarly locate this interpretation within state 
practice.112 
This kind of justification was explicitly required since the core concept 
is only implicitly suggested in the Covenant’s text in articles 2.1, 4 and 5. 
Yet these justifications have not convinced scholars in the field of its legit-
imacy within international law. David Fidler argues that the framework of 
progressive realization does not allow for a minimum core concept and that 
the concept cannot have any impact on treaty and customary law.113 While 
John Tobin does not reject the concept in totality, he critiques the Commit-
tee’s suggestion that cumulative state reports enable it to develop minimum 
core obligations, arguing that state practice cannot provide consensus on 
the Committee’s list of core obligations since states don’t refer to minimum 
core obligations in the CESCR reports in any uniform way, and only a 
handful of judicial systems apply minimum core obligations.114 Nonethe-
less, Tobin see treaty interpretation rules as providing a  
 
»strong argument that the concept of a minimum core obligation is essential to guide 
states in their efforts to realize economic and social rights and give effect to the ob-
ject and purpose of treaties such as the ICESCR and the CRC.«115  
 
In this light, Tobin views the minimum core concept as a modest attempt to 
develop a necessary interpretive tool to guide states to fulfil treaty obliga-
tions in good faith.116 Yet while Tobin argues that one can make a princi-
pled defence of minimum core obligations, he also acknowledges that there 
is no consensus on how to determine the content of minimum core obliga-
tions.117 
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In this regard, scholars have not moved far afield from the Committee’s 
approach in suggesting that new core content and obligations can be devel-
oped from state practice, judicial decisions, academic scholarship and treaty 
text. Thus, Toebes sees the development of rights through judicial applica-
tion, assisted in cases of limited applications such as the right to health by 
academic reflections.118 Donna Sullivan argues that some minimum core 
obligations can be derived from the practice of regional and international 
human rights bodies, goals endorsed by government in the UN Confer-
ences, legislation and jurisprudence at the national level.119 San Giorgi de-
fines core content of the right to healthcare by looking at the interpretive 
documents including the Committee’s concluding observations, European 
Committee of Social Rights conclusions, ILO conventions and recommen-
dations, the Council of Europe European Code of Social Security, and the 
Declaration of Alma Ata and ICPD Program of Action.120  
Yet Young cautions against an overreliance on what she terms a con-
sensus approach in ascertaining the settled and therefore legitimate mean-
ing of the core of economic, social and cultural rights.121 Young sees a 
purely consensus based approach to defining core economic, social and cul-
tural rights as threatening to set a lowest common denominator biased »to-
wards the status quo, as well as to deliberately vague, uncontroversial, and 
unimaginative expressions.«122  
While Young’s critique of consensus as a basis for interpreting core ob-
ligations highlights the limitations of this approach, we argue that consen-
sus, nonetheless, provides an important starting point for advancing the 
conceptualization of core obligations through other legal, political and so-
cial means. Questions about the legitimacy of the core concept are particu-
larly cogent given the South Africa Constitutional Court’s rejection of its 
domestic application, and the Committee’s own indication that it will adopt 
an approach to adjudicating Optional Protocol complaints in line with the 
                                                             
118  Tobin (2012), 288. 
119  Sullivan (1995).  
120  San Giorgi (2012), 21–26. 
121  Young (2008), 141–144. 
122  Ibid., 145–148. 
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South African Constitutional Court’s reasonableness approach.123 The 
Committee’s inclination towards a reasonableness approach to adjudicating 
economic, social and cultural rights raises questions about the role that core 
obligations will play in this framework. Moreover, if core content is to be 
developed as an adjunct and necessary component of a fuller core concept, 
then the processes of development must accord with international legal the-
ory and practice if they are to have legitimacy and relevance. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have argued that much debate over the core derives from 
contrasting notions of how it should function. We argue further that to build 
a more workable concept requires greater clarity about its intended role in 
concretizing, clarifying, enforcing and realizing the right to health. We be-
lieve that this clarity is an essential precondition for constructing a feasible, 
principled and grounded conceptualization of the minimum core of the right 
to health. We conclude that the concept is essential and justified both by 
ICESCR text in article 4 and 5 and by recognized rules of treaty interpreta-
tion. However we believe that further development of the core concept re-
quires going considerably beyond the status quo to develop each constituent 
component of entitlements, content and duties. If these components of the 
core are appropriately developed by the Committee and judicial authorities, 
then additional core content could be developed by social and political ac-
tors from a variety of health and human rights related domains. An aug-
mented core concept of this sort could remedy some of the deficits of its 
current formulation and feasibly advance towards achieving some of the 
concept’s normative ambitions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
123  A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, article 8.4: »When examining communica-
tions under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the reasonable-
ness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the 
Covenant.« 
120 | LISA FORMAN ET AL.  
REFERENCES 
 
Alston, Philip/Quinn, Gerad (1987): »The nature and scope of states par-
ties’ obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights«, in: Human Rights Quarterly 9 (287), 156–229. 
Alston, Philip (1987): »Out of the abyss: The challenges confronting the 
new U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights«, in: 
Human Rights Quarterly 9 (1987), 332–381. 
Andreassen, Bård-Anders/Skålnes, Tor/Smith, Alan G./Stokke, Hugo 
(1987/1988): »Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing 
Countries: The Case for a Minimal Threshold Approach to the Econom-
ic and Social Rights«, in: Human Rights in Developing Countries 
(1987/1988), 333–355.  
Arango, Rodolfo (2003): »Basic Social Rights, Constitutional Justice, and 
Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 16, 2 (2003), 141–154. 
Bilchitz, David (2007): Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification 
and enforcement of socio-economic rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Brand, Danie (2002): »The minimum core content of the right to food in 
context: A response to Rolf Kunnemann«, in: Brand/Russell (2002), 
99–110. 
Brand, Danie/Russell, Sage (Eds.) (2002): Exploring the core content of  
socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives, 
Pretoria: Protea Book House. 
van Bueren, Geraldine (2002): »Of Floors and Ceilings: Minimum Core 
Obligations and Children«, in: Brand/Russell (2002), 183–200. 
Campbell, Tom/Goldberg, David/Mclean, Sheila/Mullen, Tom (Eds.) 
(1986): Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality, New York: Black-
well. 
Chapman, Audrey R. (1996): »A ›violations approach‹ for monitoring the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights«, in: 
Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996), 23–66. 
Chapman, Audrey R. (1998): »Conceptualizing the right to health: A viola-
tions approach«, in: Tennessee Law Review 65 (1998), 389–418. 
Chapman, Audrey R. (2002): »Core Obligations Related to the Right to 
Health«, in: Chapman/Russell (2002a), 185–215. 
CONCEPTUALIZING MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS | 121 
Chapman, Audrey R./Russell, Sage (2002a): »Introduction«, in: Chap-
man/Russell (2002), 1–20. 
Chapman, Audrey R./Russell, Sage (Eds.) (2002b): Core Obligations: 
Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Ant-
werp: Intersentia. 
Coomans, Fons (2002): »In search of the core content of the right to educa-
tion«, in: Chapman/Russell (2002), 217–246. 
Craven, Matthew (1995): The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Eide, Asbjørn (1989): »Realization of social and economic rights and the 
minimum threshold approach«, in: Human Rights Law Journal 10, 1/2 
(1989), 35–51. 
Eide, Asbjørn (1995): »Economic, social and cultural rights as human 
rights«, in: Krause et al. (1995), 21–40. 
Fidler, David (2001): »Geographical Morality revisited: International Law, 
international relations and the controversy of the Placebo Controlled 
HIV clinical trials in developing countries«, in: Harvard International 
Law Journal 42, 2 (2001), 299–355. 
Forman, Lisa (2011): »An Elementary Consideration of Humanity? Linking 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights to the Human Right to 
Health in International Law«, in: Journal of World Intellectual Property 
14, 2 (2011), 155–175. 
Forman, Lisa/Caraoshi, Luljeta/Chapma, Audrey/Lamprea, Everaldo 
(2016): »Conceptualizing the ›morality of the depths‹: How should we 
define and implement core obligations under the right to health?«, in: 
International Journal of Human Rights 20, 4 (2016), 531–548. 
Gauri, Varun/Brinks, Daniel M. (Eds.) (2010): Courting Social Justice – 
Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in Developing 
World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gauri, Varun/Brinks, Daniel M. (2010): »Foreword«, in: Gauri/Brinks 
(2002), vii–xiii. 
Hart, H. L. A. (1958): »Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals«, 
in: Harvard Law Review 71, 4 (1958), 593–629.  
Kemenka, Eugene/Erh-Soon Tay, Alice (Eds.) (1978): Human rights, Lon-
don: E. Arnold.  
122 | LISA FORMAN ET AL.  
Krause, Catarina/Eide, Asbjørn/Rosas, Allan (Eds.) (1995): Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights: A textbook, Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff Publishers).  
Örücü, Esin (1986): »The Core of Rights and Freedoms: the Limits of Lim-
its«, in: Campbell et al. (1986), 37–59.  
San Giorgi, Maite (2012): The human rights to equal access to healthcare, 
Cambridge: Intersentia Publishing Ltd. 
Shue, Henry (1996): Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence and US foreign 
policy, Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press [2nd edition].  
Sullivan, Donna J. (1995): »The nature and scope of human rights obliga-
tions concerning women’s right to Health«, in: Health and Human 
Rights 1, 4 (1995), 368–398. 
Swanson Goldberg, Elizabeth/Schultheis Moore, Alexandra (Eds.) (2012): 
Theoretical Perspectives on Human Rights and Literature, New York: 
Routledge. 
Tobin, John (2012): The right to health in international law, Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
Toebes, Brigit (1999): The Right to Health as a Human Right in Interna-
tional Law, Antwerp: Intersentia.  
Wellman, Carl (1978): »A new conception of human rights«, in: Kemen-
ka/Erh-Soon Tay (1978), 48–58.  
Young, Katharine G. (2008): »The Minimum Core of Economic and Social 
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content«, in: The Yale Journal of Inter-
national Law 33 (2008), 113–175. 
Young, Katharine G. (2012): Constituting Economic and Social Rights,  
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
The Right to Health and the Global Rise 
of Non-Communicable Diseases 
BRIGIT TOEBES 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to global changes in lifestyle, the world is facing a dramatic change in 
disease incidence and patterns. Chronic or ›non-communicable‹ diseases 
(NCDs), including diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases 
are currently responsible for two thirds of the world’s yearly deaths, more 
than 40% of which were premature deaths under the age of 70 years.1 
Almost three quarters of all NCD deaths occur in low- and middle-income 
countries, which could lose $500 billion per year over the period 2011-2025 
due to NCD morbidity and mortality.2 NCDs are, therefore, not only a 
health challenge but also a most important development challenge, both in 
terms of the human suffering they cause and the harm they inflict on the so-
cio-economic position of countries.3 In 2015 all UN Member States agreed 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to »[b]y 2030, reduce by one 
third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through pre-
vention and treatment […]«.4  
                                                             
1  WHO (2015). 
2  WHO (2014), ix and xi; Magnussen/Patterson (2014), 1; referring to the report 
by the World Economic Forum/Harvard School of Public Health (2011).  
3  WHO (2014), ix and xi.  
4  UN Sustainable Development Goals, available https://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/?menu=1300 [13.03.2016]. See also WHO (2013). 
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While NCDs have now gradually emerged onto the global health and 
development agenda,5 there is still very little shared understanding of how 
NCDs can best be prevented and reduced through international and domes-
tic law, including human rights law.6 Human rights play an increasingly 
important role in other global health areas, including in the field of 
HIV/AIDS,7 however their contribution to NCD prevention and control is 
still ill-understood and limited in practice.8 More specifically, little atten-
tion has been paid to how the concepts as developed under the right to 
health framework can be applied in the context of the NCD pandemic. 
To address this gap, this contribution analyses whether the tools devel-
oped under the right to health framework offer any support and guidance in 
curbing the NCD pandemic. Important notions that are discussed in the 
context of the right to health include the so-called ›AAAQ‹ (availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and quality), the concept of progressive realiza-
tion, and the social determinants of health. Before addressing these matters, 
this contribution will briefly outline the current NCD pandemic and the in-
ternational response to this new development in global health.  
 
 
2. THE NATURE OF THE NCD PANDEMIC 
AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
NCDs were responsible for 38 million (68%) of the world’s 56 million 
deaths in 2012, more than 40% of which were premature deaths under the 
age of 70 years. As mentioned, almost three quarters of all NCD deaths oc-
cur in low- and middle-income countries.9 According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), NCDs are particularly devastating in poor and vul-
nerable populations.10 We can speak of a vicious circle where NCDs wors-
                                                             
5  Gruskin et al. (2014), 773. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Magnusson/Patterson (2014), 3. 
8  Ibid. 
9  WHO (2014), ix and xi. 
10  Ibid., 1. 
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en poverty, while poverty contributes to rising rates of NCDs, thus posing a 
threat to public health and economic and social development.11 
Four types of NCDs make the largest contribution to morbidity and 
mortality: cardiovascular diseases, cancer, chronic respiratory diseases and 
diabetes.12 They can be linked to four shared so-called ›behavioural risk 
factors‹ that enhance the incidence of these diseases: tobacco use, un-
healthy diet, physical inactivity and harmful use of alcohol.13 
The international public health community, including the WHO, have 
slowly but increasingly engaged with this matter over the past two decen-
nia. In 1998 the World Health Assembly14 adopted a resolution calling on 
WHO member states to develop a global strategy for the prevention and 
control of NCDs.15 This led to the adoption of the Global Strategy for the 
Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases in 2000 and subse-
quent action plans for the periods of 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2020.16 To 
give an idea of what the Strategy aims to achieve, the latter contains the fol-
lowing nine voluntary targets:17 
 
Box 1: WHO’s Action Plan 2013–2020 
A 25% reduction in the overall mortality from cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory diseases 
At least 10% relative reduction in the harmful use of alcohol, as 
appropriate, within the national context 
A 10% relative reduction in prevalence of insufficient physical activity 
A 30% relative reduction in mean population intake of salt/sodium 
A 30% relative reduction in prevalence of current tobacco use 
A 25% relative reduction in the prevalence of raised blood pressure or 
contain the prevalence of raised blood pressure, according to national 
circumstances 
                                                             
11  A/66/L.1, 16 September 2011, para. 4. 
12  Sixty-Sixth World Health Assembly, WHA 66,10, 27 May 2013, para. 6. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Decision-making body of the WHO. 
15  World Health Assembly, WHA 53, 17, 11–16 May 1998. 
16  WHA 53.14, March 2000; WHO (2008a) and (2013).  
17  WHO (2013). 
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Halt the rise in diabetes and obesity 
At least 50% of eligible people receive drug therapy and counselling 
(including glycaemic control) to prevent heart attacks and strokes 
An 80% availability of the affordable basic technologies and essential 
medicines, including generics, required to treat major non-communicable 
diseases in both public and private facilities. 
 
In the interim, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (2011) 
which encourages UN member states to implement cost-effective popu-
lation-wide interventions to address the NCD risk factors, including 
through regulatory and legislative actions.18 Four years later, it adopted the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its 70th Session to be held from 
25 to 27 September 2015. As mentioned above, in these SDGs all UN 
Member States have pledged to reduce premature mortality from NCDs 
through prevention and treatment by one-third in 2030.19  
 
 
3. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND NCDS 
 
The above illustrates that there is an increasing political commitment to 
stem the global increase in NCDs. The question arises, how do human 
rights and the right to health in particular respond to this development? 
Given that human rights law is aimed at protecting the human dignity and 
social well-being of individuals – how can it serve as a suitable framework 
for advancing NCD prevention and reduction as the current most pressing 
threat to global health? And what is the role of the right to health more spe-
cifically, as a human right that aims to protect the health of individuals 
worldwide?  
Many rights are implicated in NCDs, including a range of economic and 
social rights such as the rights to health, food, education and development, 
as well as civil and political such as rights to privacy, freedom of expres-
sion and ultimately the right to life. As Baytor and Cabrera explain, human 
rights have been used to both to attack and to advocate for NCD reduction, 
                                                             
18  A/66/L.1, 16 September 2011. 
19  UN Sustainable Development Goals, available: https://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/?menu=1300 [13.03.2016]. 
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in particular when it comes to the regulation of tobacco, alcohol and 
healthy foods as so-called ›behavioural risk factors‹.20 Opponents of such 
regulation have argued that regulation of these products is paternalistic and 
interferes with personal autonomy.21 Along these lines, the tobacco industry 
has claimed a ›right to smoke‹.22 Proponents of addressing NCDs through 
regulation, on the other hand, have argued that the incidence of NCDs im-
pacts on human rights, in particular the rights to health and food.23 The 
analysis below will focus mostly on how human rights standards offer pro-
tection against the NCD pandemic, and will thus be more in line with the 
arguments of the proponents. 
While the right to health is set forth in a range of international and 
regional human rights treaties, most emphasis will be placed in this contri-
bution on the right to health in Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) as the most authori-
tative international expression of the right to health. In this context, elabo-
rate attention will be paid to General Comment No. 14 on the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health,24 which provides a comprehensive 
explanation of Article 12 ICESCR. By way of background information, it 
may be important to explain that general comments are authoritative yet 
non-binding documents adopted by the human rights treaty-monitoring 
bodies providing an explanation of a wide range of subjects, including on 
the nature of the substantive rights. 
It should be noted that General Comment No. 14 was adopted in 2000 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and drafted at a 
time that there was not yet much awareness about the global NCD pandem-
ic. While the term non-communicable or chronic diseases does not appear 
in this General Comment, the text more generally refers to ›formerly un-
known diseases‹ such as HIV/AIDS and cancer, and recognizes that these 
create new obstacles for the realization of the right to health which need to 
be taken into account.25 More recent documents reflect the contemporary 
                                                             
20  Baytor/Cabrera (2015), 69. 
21  Ibid., 78. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Inter alia, Human Rights Council (2011). 
24  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000. 
25  Ibid., para. 10. 
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developments and insights in the field and are, therefore, more specific in 
regulating NCDs. General Comment No. 15 on the right to health of the 
child in Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
adopted thirteen years later by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC Committee), is more explicit on NCDs and also refers to, for exam-
ple, obesity and fast food.26 
Returning to General Comment No. 14, while it does not elaborate on 
NCDs, it does offer a suitable set of tools for addressing NCDs. Important-
ly, the document explains that the right to health is a broad human right ex-
tending not only to access to healthcare services but also to the underlying 
determinants of health, including access to safe and potable water and ade-
quate sanitation, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and 
access to health-related education and information.27 As such, the right to 
health has two dimensions: a right to healthcare services and a right to the 
above-mentioned broad set of underlying conditions or determinants.28 
Given its broad scope it has many cross-connections with the other existing 
human rights standards (indirectly) aimed at protecting health, including the 
right to education, housing, and (health-related) information.29 This broad 
approach towards protecting health is an important starting point for the 
analysis in relation to NCDs, as it underlines that laws and policies address-
ing NCDs should focus not only on regulating access to healthcare, but also 
on securing the underlying determinants to health (Box 2):  
 
Box 2: The right to health: two dimensions 
Access to healthcare: laws and 
policies regulating access to 
healthcare and medicines for 
NCDs 
Underlying determinants to 
health: creating the conditions 
under which people are less 
vulnerable to NCDs  
 
This overview shows that a balance needs to be drawn between the delivery 
of healthcare services to persons with an NCD and attention to preventive 
                                                             
26  CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, inter alia, paras. 5 and 47. 
27  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 8 and 11. 
28  Ibid., para. 4. 
29  Ibid., para. 3.  
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policies for the wider population and for future generations.30 Below, these 
two dimensions in the right to health are taken as a starting point for a fur-
ther discussion of the implications of right to health in relation to NCD pre-
vention and control (sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively).  
 
 
4. NCDS AND THE TWO DIMENSIONS 
IN THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
4.1  Securing Fair Access to Healthcare: 
The ›AAAQ‹ and ›Progressive Realization‹ 
 
The so-called ›AAAQ‹ as recognized under General Comment No. 14 sets 
an authoritative standard for ensuring equitable access to healthcare ser-
vices in relation to NCDs.31 It requires that health-related services are 
available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality for everyone.32 Acces-
sibility has four overlapping dimensions, i.e. non-discrimination, physical 
accessibility, economic accessibility (affordability) and information acces-
sibility (Box 3).33 These or comparable principles are also mentioned in the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comments on 
the rights to water, food, and education.34 The broad acknowledgment of 
these principles is also evidenced by state practice. To quote from the ex-
planatory memorandum of the Dutch Health Insurance Act (Zvw):  
 
»The Constitution of the Netherlands and international treaties require that the Dutch 
government establishes a health care system that provides the Dutch population with 
access to necessary and good quality medical services.«35 
Along similar lines, the Australian and Danish National Human Rights In-
stitutions have applied the AAAQ in their policies,36 while the Colombian 
                                                             
30  Magnusson/Patterson (2014), 3. 
31  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12.  
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Hesselman (2017). 
35  The Dutch House of Representatives, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003–
2004, Explanatory memorandum Health Insurance Act., No. 29 763, 2. 
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Constitutional Court has applied the AAAQ in a case concerning the right 
to water.37  
 
Box 3: The AAAQ 
Principle Health facilities, goods and services must 
Availability […] be available in sufficient quantity 
within the State party […]. 
Accessibility […] be accessible to everyone […]. 
Non-discrimination 
 
[…] be accessible to all, especially the most 
vulnerable sections of the population […]. 
Physical accessibility 
 
[…] be within safe physical reach for all 
sections of the population […]. 
Economic accessibility 
 
[…] be affordable to all […]. 
Information accessibility […] include the right to seek, receive and 
impart information […]. 
Acceptability […] be respectful of medical ethics […] and 
of the culture of individuals […]. 
Quality […] be scientifically and medically 
appropriate and of good quality […]. 
Source: E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12 
 
In the context of this contribution, the question arises: what are the conse-
quences of the AAAQ for NCD treatment and care? In terms of availability, 
adequate treatment for NCDs requires that NCD services and drugs are 
available in a sufficient quantity to service the entire population within a 
State.38 It should be noted that securing ›availability‹ in this context is not 
an easy challenge, as treatment for cancer and other NCDs is often complex 
and costly, often going far beyond offering primary care. The global rise in 
NCDs exerts a heavy strain on domestic health budgets, as a result of which 
                                                                                                                          
36  Australian Human Rights Commission (2012); Danish Institute for Human 
Rights (2014).  
37  Colombian Constitutional Court, T-916 of 2011, Judge Rapporteur: Jorge Igna-
cio Pretelt Chaljub, 7 December 2011, para. 6.3.2, in: Murillo Chávarro (2016). 
38  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12. 
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countries struggle to ensure that health-related services are sufficiently 
available.39 So how does the principle of ›availability‹ apply in this con-
text? 
San Giorgi, in her study on the human right to access to healthcare, 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the AAAQ in relation to access to 
healthcare.40 According to San Giorgi, criteria adopted by the CESCR for 
the assessment of the availability of healthcare comprise, for example, the 
amount of resources allocated to healthcare, and the length of waiting time 
for admission to healthcare services.41 This author explains that although 
these criteria are applied as indicators to evaluate the available healthcare in 
a specific State, such assessments remain dependent on various factors, 
amongst which the developmental level of a State and the demand for 
healthcare within that State.42 As such, States parties to the ICESCR can 
realize the right to health ›progressively‹ and ›to the maximum of their 
available resources‹.43  
The term ›progressive realization‹ potentially leaves States with a wide 
margin to decide when and how to ensure the availability of health-related 
services.44 Based on human rights law there are, nonetheless, certain com-
mitments that have to be guaranteed immediately (Box 4):45  
 
Box 4: Immediate obligations under human rights law 
? States should use the maximum of their available resources;46 
? States should move as expeditiously and effectively as possible 
towards the realization of the rights;47 
? States should take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps towards 
the full realization of the right to health;48 and 
                                                             
39  For the African perspective see also Aantjes et al. (2014). 
40  San Giorgi (2012). See also Toebes/San Giorgi (2014). 
41  San Giorgi (2012), 52.  
42  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12. 
43  See Article 2(1) ICESCR. 
44  See Saul et al. (2014), 133–172. 
45  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 31 (see also para. 30); E/1991/23, 14 De-
cember 1990, paras. 1 and 2. 
46  Article 2(1) ICESCR. 
47  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 9. 
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? States should guarantee that the right to health is exercised without 
discrimination of any kind.49 
 
While it goes beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss all these ele-
ments elaborately, some attention is paid here to the key notion of ›maxi-
mum of available resources‹. The CESCR does not provide for concrete 
yardsticks or benchmarks on how this obligation is to be met, yet we may 
assess this target in light of international statistics on domestic health ex-
penditures.50 
In fact, WHO statistics indicate that some countries have a relatively 
low health expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure 
(less than 10%, as compared to a global average of 14%).51 Along similar 
lines, the European Committee on Social Rights (Council of Europe) con-
cluded that where States spent less than 5% of their gross domestic product 
(GDP) on healthcare, the situation in that specific State was not in conform-
ity with the right to protection of health in Article 11, para. 1 of the Euro-
pean Social Charter.52 However, health expenditure does not tell the whole 
story. The WHO estimates that 20–40% of all health spending is currently 
wasted through inefficiency.53 It observes that:  
 
»[…] national wealth is not a prerequisite for moving closer to universal coverage. 
Countries with similar levels of health expenditure achieve strikingly different 
health outcomes from their investments. Policy decisions help explain much of this 
difference […].« 54 
 
Hence, while States have considerable leeway to realize the right to health 
›to the maximum of their available resources‹, insufficient health expendi-
                                                                                                                          
48  E/C.12/2000/4. 11 August 2000, para. 30. 
49  Ibid.  
50  E/C12/2007/1, 10 May 2007. 
51  Gostin (2012), 2088, referring to WHO (2011). 
52  San Giorgi (2012), 53, inter alia referring to the Conclusions of the European 
Committee of Social Rights with regard to: XVII-2Turkey: 2,43% of GDP in 
2003 and XVII-2 Poland, 3.96 in 2002. 
53  WHO (2010).  
54  Ibid.  
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ture, health sector inefficiency and corruption can be signs that the State is 
not meeting its obligations under the right to health. 
Another important human rights term is the notion of ›retrogressive 
steps‹. When entering a financial crisis or situation of emergency, States 
may consider the taking of ›retrogressive measures‹, i.e. diminishing the 
level of essential services provided. If such measures are taken, the State 
has the duty to prove that they have been taken »after the most careful con-
sideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified […] in the con-
text of the full use of the State party's maximum available resources.«55 
Should the state use ›resource constraints‹ as an explanation for retrogres-
sive steps, according to the CESCR they should be considered in light of: 
 
Box 5: States’ retrogressive measures under human rights law 
? The country’s level of development; 
? The severity of the alleged breach; 
? The country’s economic situation; 
? The existing of other serious claims on the state’s budget  
? (e.g. natural disasters); 
? Whether the country had identified low-cost options; and 
? Whether the state had sought cooperation and assistance.56 
 
As mentioned, accessibility implies non-discrimination, financial accessi-
bility (affordability), and physical accessibility.57 Firstly and as mentioned, 
non-discrimination is a key obligation of immediate effect when it comes to 
providing access to NCD services. San Giorgi describes how the criterion 
of non-discrimination is considered of great importance by various human 
rights committees, institutions and organisations. In addition to the CESCR, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe argued in its recom-
mendation The reform of health care systems in Europe: reconciling equity, 
quality and efficiency that: 
 
»[…] [T]he main criterion for judging the success of health system reforms should 
be effective access to health care for all without discrimination, which is a basic hu-
                                                             
55  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 32. 
56  E/C12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, para. 10. 
57  San Giorgi (2012), 54. 
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man right. This also has the consequence of improving the general standard of health 
and welfare of the entire population.«58  
 
This implies, according to the Parliamentary Assembly, that the pursuit of 
cost containment and maximizing efficiency should not go at the expense 
of equality in access to healthcare.59  
As explained by San Giorgi, there should be no discrimination on the 
grounds of any of the prohibited grounds, and healthcare organizations 
should be responsive to the needs of the recipients.60 There should be no 
discrimination in access to healthcare which has the intention or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of the right to 
healthcare.61 Unequal enjoyment of the right to health is at stake when an 
apparently equal treatment in obtaining access to healthcare results in un-
equal access to healthcare. This can, for example, be the case when the per-
sonal characteristics of a patient or group of patients, such as healthcare 
needs and financial possibilities, are not sufficiently taken into account, i.e. 
they are treated the same as others.62 When it comes to NCD treatment, the 
principle of non-discrimination plays a key role in making fair decisions in 
the allocation of scarce resources. From a different perspective, there is also 
a need to address discrimination and stigma around obesity, diabetes, and 
alcoholism.63  
In the context of NCD treatment, thorny questions arise when it comes 
to reimbursing expensive new medicines, some targeting only small patient 
populations. While the principle of non-discrimination implies that every-
one’s needs should be taken into account, difficult choices arise when an 
expensive medicine potentially eats up a considerable portion of the overall 
health budget. As argued by Perehudoff et al., the human rights approach 
                                                             
58  Council of Europe (2003), para. 4.  
59  Ibid., paras. 2 and 5.  
60  San Giorgi (2012), 55.  
61  San Giorgi (2012), 55, referring to Concluding Observations of the CESCR with 
regard to India, E/C.12/IND/CO/5, para. 52; E/CN.4/2003/58, 13 February 
2003, para. 61.  
62  San Giorgi (2012), 16. 
63  Magnusson/Patterson (2014), 7. 
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does not automatically create an immediate right for treatment at any cost.64 
In light of the principle of progressive realization that was discussed above, 
the order and timing of the fulfilment of the right to services can only be 
gradual. Thus, progressive realization justifies ranking treatments for reim-
bursement, with more cost-effective treatment being included first. This 
ranking system ensures that available resources are used as effectively as 
possible.65  
Financial accessibility, thirdly, requires that healthcare, including 
drugs, are affordable for everyone.66 The costs of healthcare should, there-
fore, not place an excessive financial burden on individuals as access to 
healthcare should be based on need and not on ability to pay.67 If necessary, 
steps must be taken to reduce the financial burden on patients.68 NCD treat-
ment often requires a costly combination of drugs, as a result of which large 
segments of the population in low and middle income countries are pushed 
into poverty.69 
Fourthly, physical accessibility implies that healthcare has to be within 
safe reach and physically accessible for everyone.70 NCD treatment often 
requires complex interventions, thus the need to offer specialist care. This 
may lead to a concentration of hospitals, which may affect the physical ac-
cessibility of NCD treatment and care. Although not an explicit element of 
the AAAQ, timely accessibility is also an important component of the right 
to health. General Comment No. 14 stresses in para. 17 that the right to 
health facilities, goods and services includes timely access to basic preven-
tive, curative or rehabilitative health services.71  
                                                             
64  Perehudoff et al. (2016). 
65  Ibid. 
66  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12(b); E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, 
paras. 56(b) and 57(f). 
67  Council of Europe, Digest of case law of the European Committee of Social 
Rights, September 2008, 83.  
68  San Giorgi (2012), 57. 
69  Magnusson/Patterson (2014), 5.  
70  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12(b); E/C.12/2008/2, para. 56(a). See al-
so Toebes/San Giorgi (2014), 409. 
71  Toebes/San Giorgi (2014), 11. 
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According to General Comment No. 14 acceptable healthcare signifies 
that it must be »culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of indi-
viduals, minorities, peoples and communities, sensitive to gender and life-
cycle requirements.«72 This means that the cultural tradition of persons may 
have to be respected. When it comes to NCD treatment and control, what 
could be discussed in this context is whether alternative treatments and 
medicines should be reimbursed. 
Lastly, quality requires that health services are scientifically and medi-
cally appropriate and of good quality.73 As San Giorgi explains, this re-
quires scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and up-to-date hospital 
equipment and an adequate training of healthcare personnel, including as 
regards health and human rights.74 Other elements that are of importance in 
order to obtain an impression of the level of quality of the healthcare pro-
vided and of the healthcare system, is life expectancy, infant mortality 
rates, the number of healthcare professionals with secondary or higher edu-
cation, waiting lists, and waiting times.75  
 
4.2 Underlying or ›Social Determinants‹ – 
and Regulating Lifestyle 
 
As pointed out above, from a human rights perspective there is a need to 
ensure equitable and inclusive access to health services. But it is also im-
portant to address the socio-economic conditions which enhance NCD inci-
dence. In the well-known ›Whitehall study‹, conducted in the UK in the 
1960s, civil service clerks were four times more likely to die young than 
civil servants with higher positions but with the same access to healthcare 
services.76 It is widely acknowledged that the causes of ill health and health 
inequalities go far beyond the possibility to access healthcare services, 
which affirms the need to address the ›underlying determinants of health‹ in 
                                                             
72  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12(c). 
73  Ibid., para. 12(d). 
74  San Giorgi (2012), 57; E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12(d); 
E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, para. 56(c) and 56(d).  
75  San Giorgi (2012), 60, referring to Council of Europe/Committee of Ministers 
(1999), para. 3.  
76  As quoted in, inter alia, Marmot (2004), 38–39; Gostin (2014), 24. 
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the context of the right to health. Public health experts use the broader term 
›social determinants of health‹, which go as far as to include our general 
living environment and the structures of society at large as decisive condi-
tions to our health. 77 
This raises the difficult question of how the social determinants of 
health can be addressed from the perspective of human rights and interna-
tional law more generally. After all, the social determinants are very broad, 
which may lead to a very complex human rights analysis. Part of the solu-
tion may lie in connecting the different human rights together. Knowing 
that the ways we are raised, educated and work are decisive to our health 
implies looking into how the right to health is connected to other health-
related rights, including the rights to education, housing and work, which 
reflect the need to provide good quality education and to guarantee healthy 
working conditions. This approach is very much in keeping with the notion 
of the ›indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness‹ of all human 
rights, as was affirmed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion, adopted in 1993.78  
So what does all this mean for NCD prevention and control? In this 
context, it is key that attention be paid more specifically to lifestyle, given 
that the most prominent NCDs have been linked by WHO to four risk fac-
tors, i.e. tobacco use, harmful use of alcohol, unhealthy diets, and lack of 
physical activity.79 While the right to health provides a general framework 
for addressing such issues, more specific regulation could be provided 
through specific treaties under international law. However, so far tobacco is 
the only risk factor that is addressed through a legally binding international 
treaty. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, adopted by 
the WHO in 2005), was the first global health treaty adopted by the WHO 
and is now adopted by 180 countries. The Preamble of the FCTC mentions 
the right to health, thus building a bridge between this treaty and human 
rights law. The FCTC is an authoritative treaty in the field of tobacco con-
trol which has a strong impact on domestic tobacco control regulation. But 
                                                             
77  WHO (2008b). 
78  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/Conf.157/23, 12 July 1993, 
para. 5. See also Marmot et al. (2012).  
79  WHO (2015). 
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it also sets an important standard and example for potential new standard 
setting instruments regulating food, alcohol and other beverages.80  
Clearly, there is a need to develop more domestic and international in-
struments regulating lifestyle. Yet regulating lifestyle choices raises the dif-
ficult question if, and if so how, international and domestic authorities 
should attempt to influence the behavioural and consumption patterns of 
individuals.81 Due to an emphasis on autonomy and ›personal response-
bility‹ in many high-income countries there is a certain resistance to the 
implementation of such preventive measures.82  
Influencing consumer behaviour can be done, for example, through the 
regulation of consumer information, the taxation of unhealthy products, but 
more broadly also through the creation of healthy living environments, 
which may include tobacco free school yards and the banning of soda ma-
chines from schools. So far, Governments have attempted to regulate cer-
tain aspects of tobacco, food and beverages, such as the advertisement, 
number of sale points, packaging, size and salt, sugar and (trans) fat con-
tent.83  
 
5. NON-STATE ACTORS, NCDS AND  
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH  
 
Health insurance companies, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, the 
pharmaceutical industry as well as the tobacco, food and beverage indus-
tries all exert a tremendous influence and power over our health and well-
being. This is why there has been an increasing call on governments to 
submit these actors to tighter rules. To bring this back to human rights law: 
under the right to health, States are under a ›duty to protect‹ the health and 
well-being of individuals against the human rights violations of non-state 
actors. General Comment No. 14 provides many important examples of 
when the State violates the right to health when failing to regulate private 
actors:  
 
                                                             
80  Consumers International/World Obesity Forum (2014).  
81 Sunstein (2014).  
82 Magnusson/Patterson (2014). 
83 Taylor (2015). 
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»[…] failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to 
prevent them from violating the right to health of others; the failure to protect con-
sumers and workers from practices detrimental to health, e.g. by employers and 
manufacturers of medicines or food; the failure to discourage production, marketing 
and consumption of tobacco, narcotics and other harmful substances; the failure to 
protect women against violence or to prosecute perpetrators; the failure to discour-
age the continued observance of harmful traditional medical or cultural practices; 
and the failure to enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil 
by extractive and manufacturing industries.«84  
 
Subsequently, the question arises whether private actors also carry moral or 
even legal responsibilities under human rights law. Whilst recognizing the 
primary obligation to protect of States, the human rights framework recog-
nizes that the protection and promotion of health involves a shared respon-
sibility, requiring a multi-stakeholder approach. General Comment No. 14 
recognizes that: 
 
»[…] all members of society – individuals, including health professionals, families, 
local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil so-
ciety organizations, as well as the private business sector – have responsibilities re-
garding the realization of the right to health […].«85 [emphasis added, B.T.] 
 
Hence, many different actors have responsibilities under the right to health 
– setting aside the question of whether such responsibilities are legal or 
moral in character. Potentially thus, the food and beverage producers them-
selves, although strictly speaking not legally bound by the human rights 
treaties, have indirect responsibilities under human rights law to ensure the 
quality and healthiness of their products.86  
 
 
 
                                                             
84  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 51. 
85  Ibid., para. 42. 
86  See, for example, Corporations in the Global Food System and Human Rights 
(2014). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The broad understanding of the right to health is important when it comes 
to NCD prevention and control. It mandates that attention should be di-
rected not only at providing equitable and inclusive access to healthcare 
and medicines, but also at securing a range of determinants to health. In-
vestments in treatment should be matched by laws and policies targeting 
the whole population, aimed at empowering individuals to lead healthier 
lives.87  
While the right to health framework is not very specific in regulating 
NCDs, it offers a set of principles or guideposts that may guide the field, 
that have been discussed in this contribution. Given the striking nature of 
the NCD pandemic, it is worth paying more attention to this framework. 
Potentially, it offers a robust set of norms and standards that define the le-
gal obligations of governments, while adding accountability mechanisms to 
traditional public health strategies.88  
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The Human Right to Health and  
Primary Health Care (PHC) Policies 
WALTER BRUCHHAUSEN 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Due to its position between legal systems, politics, socio-economic condi-
tions and the health sector, the human right to health has to accommodate, 
among others, institutions and persons commissioned and dedicated to 
healthcare. This necessary »structural coupling« of different functional sys-
tems (in the sense of Luhmann’s social theory)1 may cause friction in the 
competition for supremacy as well as giving rise to synergies and thus co-
operation in pursuing common goals. Even agencies and experts in the 
health sector do not speak with a single voice, since bodies such as the 
WHO on the one hand and the World Medical Association (WMA) on the 
other, or professional groups such as public health officials and medical 
doctors, are especially and deeply divided on several issues pertaining to 
the right to health. Low-cost care vs. professionalism, prevention vs. cure 
and public vs. private organization of services are some of the most im-
portant lines of conflict between the various interests. These multiple con-
flicts became especially evident in the debates around the WHO policy of 
Primary Health Care (PHC) adopted in 1978 at the international conference 
of the WHO und UNICEF at Alma-Ata, now Almaty, in Kazakhstan. The 
aim of this new strategy was to improve the health of all human beings 
                                                             
1  Meyer et al. (2015), 349–351. 
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worldwide by concentrating on essential areas, favouring prevention and 
those curative interventions where importance and effectiveness were well 
known. Thus its elements, listed in the order of their supposed impact, were 
health education, water and sanitation, nutrition, vaccination, mother and 
child health services, control of the most common diseases and basic treat-
ment of common conditions. 
Although intended as a new approach for the whole world, PHC be-
came a policy especially for Low Income Countries (LICs) and less privi-
leged regions and groups in Middle Income Countries (MICs). PHC did not 
change the health policies of industrialized countries in either the West or 
the East. Powerful groups in market economies in the West felt their ap-
proach of consumer-friendly healthcare provision to be superior where re-
sources were sufficient, and official socialism in the East claimed to have 
already implemented the program for a long time. Therefore the most im-
portant institutional context for PHC turned out to be development coopera-
tion and health planning in the countries receiving »development aid«. 
Among those countries where PHC became the official health policy for the 
whole (biomedical)2 healthcare system were even some of the failing or al-
ready failed states of Africa. Thus the standards of many Upper Mid-
Income Countries (UMICs), like the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), where civil society organizations and sometimes 
even individuals go to court to claim the right to health, do not concern the 
situation PHC was most vigorously applied to. This uneven pattern of 
health policies in the Global South requires that any examination of PHC 
needs to integrate not only a strong public health and partly medical per-
spective into the debate on the right to health, but also that of LICs, espe-
cially the formerly so-called Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
Such an introduction of the perspective of healthcare policies into the 
discourse on the human right to health means reversing the common ap-
proach of activism, i.e. the legal or moral way of looking at the questions: 
Not only does the human right to health inform health policy, but this also 
applies the other way round, i.e. health policy informs human rights poli-
                                                             
2  Although the author has also extensively worked on so called ›Traditional Med-
icine‹ this contribution focusses for various reasons the science-based type of 
medicine developed in 19th century Europe and globalized since then, simplify-
ing called ›biomedicine‹; cf. Bruchhausen (2011). 
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cies. Such a shift can serve three important aspects: It may explain a certain 
common uneasiness among health experts and within health policy con-
cerning the human right to health; it can help to overcome this unsatisfacto-
ry divide; and it demonstrates the previous as well as the current role 
played by human rights language within and regarding healthcare in LICs. 
All these issues primarily concern empirical questions of practicability and 
usefulness in pursuing common aims rather than normative or theoretical 
debates. The theoretical discussion on the »conceptional soundness« of 
human rights, »in particular the so-called economic and social rights, or 
welfare rights« or »second generation rights«, is therefore rarely touched 
upon in this contribution.3 But theoretical implications cannot be avoided 
completely, e.g. when looking at the relationship between social and indi-
vidual aspects of health. Such a distinction between an individualizing and 
a socially integrating understanding of claims is also a frequent issue in 
other areas of human rights. In the present paper, however, there will be no 
discussion of a fundamental clash between the individual and the social di-
mension, as human rights are – following Amartya Sen – understood here 
as »pronouncements in social ethics«.4  
 
 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PHC – AN ISSUE AT ALL? 
 
Just looking into the official documents seems to render the topic of ten-
sions between the right to health and PHC a »non-issue«. Neither of the au-
thoritative texts – the Declaration of Alma-Ata in 1978 and the previous 
resolution on »Health for All by the Year 2000« of the World Health As-
sembly (WHA) in 19775, which together form the foundation of PHC as an 
official policy of the WHO – lacks clarity of expression in this regard: The 
first article of the declaration »strongly« reaffirms that health, in the defini-
tion of the WHO constitution’s preamble, »is a fundamental human right«, 
in the introducing participle clauses the second declared motivation behind 
the WHA resolution states it to be »a basic human right«. 
                                                             
3  Sen (2004), 316. 
4  Ibid., 355. 
5  Res. WHA30.43, 19 May 1977.  
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Thus from this official point of view the case is clear: PHC is based on 
the human right to health, and PHC strives to fulfil what this right requires. 
Yet there were already certain occurrences during the conference of Al-
ma-Ata that may cast doubt on the perception of a completely easy relation-
ship between the two: 
 
1. The accompanying WHO program was called »health for all«, no long-
er health for everyone, as the Preamble of the WHO constitution of 
1946 would have wished and the Norwegian co-founder of WHO Karl 
Evang had formulated in his retrospective dating from 1973.6 The rea-
sons do not seem to be merely linguistic. 
2. As medical historian Michael Knipper has established, Director-General 
Halfdan Mahler had the term »human right« in the manuscript for his 
speech in Alma-Ata but left it out in the spoken version.7 Therefore it is 
missing in the protocol. We can only speculate whether this omission 
stemmed from the strategic consideration of avoiding resistance or from 
other reasons. 
3. Backstage, conflicts between an individualistic and a collectivistic un-
derstanding of rights and duties persisted between the US and Soviet 
delegations in particular. These conflicts left traces in the declaration, 
e.g. when the only other use of the word »right« in the whole declara-
tion said in Article IV: »The people have the right and duty to partici-
pate individually and collectively in the planning and implementation of 
their health care.« Combining right and duty in this manner indicates a 
certain uneasiness with an exclusive reference to a right. 
4. The human right to health itself was not an explicit point of discussion 
at the conference. It seems to have entered the first article undebated, 
just from the preamble of the WHO’s already accepted constitution. 
The conclusion regarding PHC put forward by Alison Lakin in a British 
dissertation in 2001 is that »the approach was developed without any 
consideration of human rights.«8 And two lawyers, US-American Ben-
jamin Mason Meier and the former WHO legal advisor, now UK-based 
African scholar William Onzivu, saw in 2013 a »failed effort to employ 
                                                             
6  Evang (1973). 
7  Personal communication on unpublished research. 
8  Lakin (2010), 10. 
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rights-based language for primary health care«.9 There is no reference 
to PHC in the short version of the WHO genealogy of the human right 
to health.10 
5. The first article of the Alma-Ata Declaration, quoted in part above, con-
tinues – similar to the resolution of 1977: »and that the attainment of 
the highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide so-
cial goal.« By the very wording, the »attainment of the highest possible 
level of health« is no longer a human right itself, unlike as stated in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
1966,11 but »a most important world-wide social goal«. This is a very 
telling shift or difference, and the possible underlying tensions and their 
solution will be the central question of this paper. 
 
What the paper does not want to discuss in detail are two further areas that 
might also be expected, i.e. the role of human rights other than the right to 
health, especially civil and political rights, in the field of health. The ques-
tion as to how such rights may be limited by public health considerations is 
already specifically dealt with in the Siracusa principles 25 and 26 of 
1985.12 And the opposite question regarding how civil and political human 
rights guide and limit the action of healthcare providers touches on much of 
the enormous field of professional, biomedical and clinical ethics and can-
not therefore be tackled here. The paper will confine itself to the right to 
                                                             
9  Meier/Onzivu (2013). 
10  WHO (2015); it is only briefly mentioned in the 51 pages of the complete fact 
sheet. 
11  ICESCR, Article 12. 
12  E/CN.4/1985/4, 28 September 1984: (besides the areas »law«, »democracy«, 
»public order«, »public morals« etc.) »iv. public health 
 25.  Public health may be invoked as a reason for limiting certain rights in order 
to allow a state to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the 
population or individual members of the population. These measures must be 
specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick 
and injured. 
 26.  Due regard shall be had to the international health regulations of the World 
Health Organization.« 
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health itself, without ignoring its necessary place in the net or fabric of all 
human rights, or to put it another way: the indivisibility of rights. 
 
 
3. THE AMBIGUITY AND DECLINE OF THE  
HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH IN WHO 
 
An ambiguous position towards the right to health is not only characteristic 
of Alma-Ata, but is part of the whole history of the WHO up to about the 
year 2000. Even in the constitution of the WHO of 1946, there was already 
tension between an individual and a collective understanding: Showing an 
ambivalence between »human right« and »social goal« similar to that evi-
dent in the later WHA resolution of 1977 and the Declaration of Alma-Ata, 
the preamble of the WHO constitution spoke of a right of »every human be-
ing« whereas its Article 1 referred to an »attainment by all peoples« as the 
objective. Since many – wrongly, as current majority opinion says – re-
garded the articles of the constitution as the only binding part and the pre-
amble with its principles as a mere declaration of good will, there was not 
much resistance against the later focus on peoples rather than on individual 
people. 
The ensuing development of WHO activities clearly favoured the health 
of populations over that of each individual. Eradication campaigns against 
malaria, yaws or polio dominated when compared to individual care. The 
growing Cold War and a new Director-General supported this change. Be-
tween the options of policy-setting and operational activities, the WHO 
moved – incentivised by additional funds for such work by the UN Extend-
ed Program on Technical Assistance (EPTA) and by earmarked funding 
from individual member countries as well as on request of receiving mem-
ber countries – to the latter, i.e. to field operations in the control of single 
diseases.13 In 1963, even a legal advisor to the WHO expressed it as fol-
lows: 
 
                                                             
13  van Zile Hyde (1953). 
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»a programme based on the notion of priorities has given way to one based on the 
needs of the countries themselves, expressed through their requests for advice and 
assistance.«14  
 
The WHO was transformed from what had been a partly political agency 
into a mostly technical one. It therefore withdrew its co-operation from the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
– as seen – paid only lip-service to the right to health in its declaration on 
PHC in 1978. Meier has demonstrated this in much detail with new histori-
cal evidence and argues therefore that the WHO became apolitical.15 Ac-
cording to Meier, it was the HIV/AIDS activism of Jonathan Mann that re-
introduced a major political and human rights perspective into WHO work. 
 
 
4. POLITICAL VS. TECHNICAL OR INDIVIDUAL- 
VS. POPULATION-CENTERED POLICIES? 
 
Meier’s two major hypotheses, first, that the WHO was turned from a polit-
ical into a technical agency in the 1950s and why this was so, and second, 
that the practice of PHC is notorious for not incorporating a human rights 
approach, are certainly correct.16 His claim, however, that the former is the 
main cause or even the only explanation for the latter has to be doubted 
profoundly. Several of the debates on the tensions between an individual 
                                                             
14  Gutteridge (1963). 
15  Meier (2010). 
16  Meier’s attempt to contrast the normative and the factual is not convincing. In 
his argument that – without practical success – the WHO intended a return to a 
human rights base, Meier (2010) saw in the »Health for All« strategy of the 
WHA und WHO (that both rather avoided the language of rights) a »rights-
based policy«. For this argument, he uses a series of re-interpretations of para-
graphs that is not backed by the document of Alma-Ata itself. The right to health 
is mentioned a single time only, in the first paragraph, but Meier calls the eight 
elements of PHC listed in para. VII »rights-based government obligations« 
(ibid., 178), turns the definition of PHC into a »collective right« to health care 
(ibid., 177) and maintains – referring to MacDonald – that Alma-Ata put »public 
health under the aegis of the right to health« (ibid., 178). 
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right and very limited resources provide a better explanation than this al-
leged causality. The optimism around 1950 that science would soon enable 
the world to grant all human beings maximum health had disappeared by 
the early 1970s. The apparent victory over infectious diseases prompted 
health experts to look at other problems. The already mentioned physician 
and health politician Dr. Karl Evang wrote in the WHO Journal in 1973 that 
the greatest limitations in health are no longer the lack of scientific 
knowledge: 
 
»Now we have reached the point where the limiting factor is not knowledge but re-
sources. Even the richest countries cannot offer optimum health services to individ-
uals and communities in prevention, cure and rehabilitation in the combined field of 
somatic, mental and social disease. We are faced with the unpleasant, for psycholog-
ical as well as political reasons perhaps insurmountable, task of stating priorities 
which would automatically exclude certain types of patients from an optimum type 
of service.«17 
 
This tension between individual claims and limited resources extends well 
into the recent debates on the relationship between the human right to 
health and public health ethics.18 These debates have often taken the form 
of a basic conflict between a purely individualistic (mis)understanding and 
a social or collective perspective on health – the well-known conflict that 
has to be overcome in other areas of human rights as well. Considering this 
conflict, the simplistic attribution of roles alleged by Meier and others that 
the later WHO was more technical and the view of the individual human 
right to health was more political can even be partially reversed: An indi-
vidualistic view of health tends to technical solutions of biomedicine such 
as treatment and secondary prevention whereas a collective understanding 
of health favours political decisions on social measures such as the im-
provement of housing, nutrition, water supply, sanitation and education. 
Evang saw the new challenges in »man-made pathogenic agents«, and 
the resulting long list includes cardio-vascular diseases, road traffic acci-
dents, »dependence-producing drugs«, environmental pollution and urbani-
zation with »muscular immobilization and various forms of social maladap-
                                                             
17  Evang (1973), 6. 
18  Nixon/Foreman (2008); Steinmetz-Wood (2014). 
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tation«, »population explosion« and even infectious diseases by the refer-
ence to »venereal disease«.19 The present UN concern for »non-communi-
cable diseases« on a global scale was already previewed in the early 1970s, 
but did not receive much attention at that time. 
The common fundamental conflicts between individual rights and social 
interests are more than obvious in the case of health:  
 
? Individual rights demand e.g. freedom from coercion (such as quaran-
tine, isolation or compulsory vaccination), even very expensive medical 
care and protection if urgently needed, and protection or care even for 
»unproductive« individuals (the unborn/children, disabled, retired, care-
dependent).  
? Crude social interest, however, would want collective protection against 
infectious individuals, cost-efficient healthcare for as many as possible 
and the survival of economically productive individuals only. Com-
pared to this, public health with an egalitarian understanding is already 
more normatively charged than pure common interest as it also has ob-
ligations towards the health of the unproductive members of society. In 
a utilitarian understanding, however, it would value the health interests 
of the vast majority more highly than those of individuals or minorities. 
 
Precisely these debates were the background when PHC was developed in 
the early 1970s: development workers and public health experts, especially 
in the Christian Medical Commission (CMC) of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) in Geneva,20 protested against the dominant position of 
the hospital and the medical profession, which favoured expensive care for 
individuals rather than more cost-efficient and socially just preventive med-
icine and »medicine des masses« (mass medicine). Although many doctors 
and nurses feared that the new focus on prevention and low-cost treatment 
would disadvantage patients in need of hospital care (and were proven to be 
right), most Northern and Southern governments and NGOs followed the 
new paradigm of PHC in their development policies. Forcing the govern-
ments of some »developing countries« to give up their preference for hospi-
tals in the cities in favour of preventive and rural healthcare was highly po-
                                                             
19  Evang (1973), 6. 
20  Taylor (1969). 
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litical. This political decision, however, was rather justified by social jus-
tice or national interest and not by the human right to health. 
This ambiguity had continued in the WHO, e.g. when the 1977 resolu-
tion of the WHA reaffirmed the declaration of the WHO constitution that 
»health is a basic human right and a worldwide social goal«.21 Today, the 
WHO still seems to be cautious: As late as 2013 it treated in a discussion 
paper the human right to health and health equity as separate goals.22 This 
hints at their necessarily complementary character rather than subsuming 
one under the other. 
Thus the debates on the relationship between the rights approach and 
public health, between individualistic and collectivist views, stem from the 
profound fears and mistrust developed among proponents of public health 
and PHC. Many of the provisions in the authoritative General Comment 
(GC) No. 14 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) of 2000, i.e. after the end of the East-West-conflict, reflect 
these fears. The principle of »progressive realization« and the attempt to 
limit it by »minimum core« obligations are all expressions of these ten-
sions.23 
 
 
5. HOW THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 
INFRINGES PHC IN THE ALLOCATION 
OF SCARCE RESOURCES 
 
I will now discuss three necessary restrictions to unquestioned advocacy of 
the right to health from a PHC perspective, starting each time from personal 
experiences or involvements and concerning different levels of decision-
making. Two of the examples started years before GC No. 14, one even af-
ter. The background to this perspective is formed by philosophical and the-
ological healthcare ethics, medical work and responsibility for a health dis-
trict in Rwanda in the 1990s, field research in medical anthropology in East 
Africa in the 2000s as well as teaching and research on global health since 
2009. A medical and empirical perspective of this kind is certainly different 
                                                             
21  Res. WHA30.43, 19 May 1977. 
22  WHO (2013), 2. 
23  Forman et al. (2013).  
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from that of human rights work in legal or political action. It has the inten-
tion of informing the latter since the empirical dimension needs to be re-
spected in normative approaches more than has been the case to date.  
 
5.1  The Privileged Urban Elite vs. the Rural Poor:  
The Responsibility of National Governments 
 
The following example illustrates how a right to healthcare accessible only 
to a privileged few might even infringe on the health of many others. I re-
member a young patient in our hospital in Rwanda in 1995 who had a heart 
condition that required life-saving open heart surgery. This could not be 
done in the country, and I inquired into chances for surgery abroad. I was 
told by the Rwandese hospital staff that there was a passage in the law 
guaranteeing the right to all necessary medical care even abroad – but that 
only politicians and higher civil servants had so far got this opportunity for 
expensive treatment in Nairobi or South Africa paid by the Ministry of 
Health. Thus the right to maximum care, in this case at the price of several 
ten thousand dollars, clearly drew on resources that were urgently needed 
for quite basic healthcare for the rural population, where people died every 
day because some cents for transport, medicines or vaccines were lacking.  
This is a major reason why public health experts and PHC protagonists 
before GC No. 14 refrained from always unambiguously emphasizing the 
right to medical care or health. They wanted it to be applied for the benefit 
of as many disadvantaged people as possible, not as a further possible privi-
lege for those already better off. And as my story shows, this risk was and 
remains very real. GC No. 14 therefore needed to emphasize non-discrim-
ination.24  
This risk is especially great in highly centralized states with low civil 
society control of the government and with weak legal systems. Thus, con-
trary to the former Soviet claim at and after the conference of Alma-Ata 
that only a tightly state controlled system could guarantee the right to 
health,25 it seems to be clear that decentralization and the strengthening of 
civil society are preconditions for the implementation of rather than the 
misuse of an (individual) right to health. The declaration of Alma-Ata had 
                                                             
24  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 12, 18 and 19. 
25  Venediktov (1998). 
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acknowledged this in its principles of community participation. And GC 
No. 14 therefore also made this requirement explicit when it mentioned »in 
particular, participation in political decisions relating to the right to health 
taken at both the community and national levels«.26 Legislation and juris-
diction alone are not sufficient to safeguard the right to health against mis-
uses. The importance of monitoring is paramount. Several civil and politi-
cal rights must be implemented as well, otherwise justifying a particular 
treatment by referring to the right to health could diminish health equity in-
stead of promoting it. 
 
5.2 The Bread Earners vs. the »Unproductive«:  
Options for International Donors 
 
The second, somehow similar conflict of interests that I personally ob-
served arose in the late 1990s in the context of the availability of anti-
retroviral therapy (ART) against HIV/AIDS. Initially in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, the men who were affected above average by AIDS were those who had 
money, who could afford more women than others: the rich, those in public 
service like teachers, and thus the more articulate and powerful. Their mass 
dying, their loss was rightly regarded as a threat to the socioeconomic de-
velopment achieved up to that point, and this prompted economically moti-
vated international concern. Later, the even higher burden for women and 
the poor became obvious. Withholding possible ART for AIDS patients 
was then seen as a violating the human right to health.27 Therefore there 
was a widespread fear among PHC adherents that a massive diversion of 
funds from established and urgently needed programs such as mother and 
child health or vaccination services in favour of fighting and treating AIDS 
would deprive the most vulnerable of already achieved standards of 
healthcare.  
The only solution to this threat was that all the resources for AIDS pro-
grammes had to come from additional, new sources, and should not be tak-
en from existing PHC programmes. This did not seem likely to many, as 
the consistent message of the neoliberal approaches since the 1980s with 
their enormous cuts in health budget by the Structural Adjustment Pro-
                                                             
26  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 17. 
27  Stemple (2008). 
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grams (SAPs) had been that more funding for health was out of the ques-
tion.28 Two unexpected developments prevented the AIDS programmes 
from squeezing out other health programs: the production and use of ART 
medicines without license (especially through the courage of South Africa 
as a major user and India as a producer) and the enormous external funding 
for these drugs. We do not know what would have happened without the 
astonishing, unprecedented extra donations by governments and »philan-
thropocapitalists« like Bill Gates, which were certainly facilitated by the 
new economic approach to health in the World Bank and WHO reports.  
The condition that resources for countering such new »violations« of 
the right to health must be additional to existing PHC funding should be the 
consequence of this example. This corresponds with the concept of the min-
imum core obligations which demands some basic health services in any 
case and with General Comment No. 3 of 1990 (GC No. 3) which already 
stated that »even in times of severe resource constraints […] the vulnerable 
members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of 
relatively low-cost targeted programmes.«29 
 
5.3 Lifestyle vs. Living Conditions:  
NCDs vs. Communicable Diseases  
in Current UN Programmes 
 
The third example showing necessary precautions against the unwanted ef-
fects of an isolated implementation of the right to health concerns the recent 
shift of international attention to non-communicable diseases (NCDs), i.e. 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, diabetes and cancer. This new ini-
tiative is located at UN level as well as at the WHO and is contained in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as 3.4: »By 2030 reduce by one-
third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 
through prevention and treatment […]«. The hitherto common combination 
of prevention and best therapy in WHO programmes, e.g. for malaria (bed-
nets and the medication co-artem), HIV/AIDS (safe sex and ART) and 
worms (sanitation and pharmaceutical de-worming), would be disastrous 
                                                             
28  Turshen (1999). 
29  E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 12, referred to also in E/C.12/2000/4, 
11 August 2000, para. 18. 
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for the resources of most healthcare systems in the case of NCDs. The as-
sessment of the increasing problem is certainly correct. The rise of these 
diseases, which are often or mostly life-style related – caused by too much 
sugar, fat, salt or harmful substances like tobacco and alcohol, low intake of 
fibres or vitamins and lack of physical exercise – and a decrease in several 
infectious diseases caused by poor living conditions has been almost uni-
versally observed, notably more in MICs than in LICs. Yet again, if the 
right to health and its therapeutic requirements were applied to NCDs with-
out any conditionality, a further threat to health equity could arise. I vividly 
remember the question posed by an expert in international health when the 
NCDs concept was presented: »Does it mean that Siemens [the German 
manufacturer of radiography equipment] can now approach the BMZ 
[German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development] demand-
ing that equipment for heart catheterization has to be supplied all over the 
world?« The question, of course, was polemical, and the NCDs programme 
was clearly aimed at prevention, as increasing treatment of NCDs was pre-
cisely seen as overburdening most healthcare systems. But the fear and the 
danger are obvious: Treating all common life-saving therapies alike as 
would be required by an undifferentiated human right to medical care 
would be the end of PHC and the striving for more health equity. Consider-
ations of comparative costs and equity cannot be excluded. The prioritiza-
tion of cheap or cost-effective measures is an indispensable constituent of 
PHC. This is reflected in the warning in GC No. 14:  
 
»investments should not disproportionately favour expensive curative health ser-
vices which are often accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of the popula-
tion, rather than primary and preventive health care benefiting a far larger part of the 
population.«30 
 
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that some cost-effective preventive and 
curative measures, especially those requiring access to biomedical services, 
might still benefit the better-off more than the already marginalized and 
thus further increase health inequity.31 
 
                                                             
30  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 19. 
31  Schmidt/Barnhill (2015). 
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6.  THE RECONCILIATION OF PHC AND  
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
It is obvious that PHC today can take account of human rights approaches 
more than ever before. But it is also true that there were historically contin-
gent as well as argumentatively plausible reasons for cautioning against an 
insufficiently reflected and undifferentiated incorporation of the right to 
health into policies and laws before GC No. 14 in 2000. Even after this wa-
tershed in the history of the right to health, the scarcity of resources remains 
the major constraint. The social and economic realities cannot be excluded 
in normative discourses. The question remains one of distributive justice or 
equity, not primarily of law. For many decades it has been discussed under 
this heading of justice within the context of ethics – including biomedical 
and public health ethics – as a question of allocation which cannot simply 
be solved by referring to equal rights. Unlike civil and political rights, 
where fulfilling the rights of one group does not for the most part violate 
and often even promotes the same rights of others, completely fulfilling the 
right to healthcare for one group of patients may principally diminish the 
enjoyment of this very right for others quite substantially. The statement of 
the WHO constitution’s preamble in 1946 that the »achievement of any 
State in the promotion and protection of health is of value to all« may be 
true for the preventive aspects but it is certainly not so for medical care 
where the level of treatment in the richest countries depends on economic 
means and on staff lacking in others. The »brain drain« of health workers 
into stronger national economies has caused a human resources crisis that 
the WHO has described as one of the major global health problems.32 And 
some types of highly sophisticated treatment demand financial means that 
are increasingly far from imaginable in terms of global availability: Certain 
cancer therapies cost more per year than many people in the world earn 
during their whole lives – and in countries like the USA half of the popula-
tion will be diagnosed with cancer during their lives.33 Clearly some health 
achievements are not of value to all states. 
GC No. 14 is proof that a reconciliation of individual and collective in-
terest in healthcare can be attempted. The greatest part of its content is ob-
                                                             
32  WHO (2006), 8–12. 
33  Lochlann Jain (2013), I. 
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viously a result of PHC experiences and thus of Alma-Ata. For someone 
familiar with PHC since the late 1980s, the five core obligations and the 
AAAQ (Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality) approach 
are just an extension of what Alma Ata already aimed at under the frame-
work of health policy. Instead of complaining that PHC did not take up the 
right to health, one could also argue the other way round - that before GC 
No. 14 the rights approach was not sufficiently mature for PHC and that it 
needed these two decades as a learning process. 
The human rights discourse is not the only one relevant to health for all. 
Quite similar discussions on negotiating individual and social interest were 
and are found in many other disciplines. It is a question of more and new 
interdisciplinary cooperation. In a similar way, the diverse processes of 
mainstreaming in health attempt to reconcile access for the hitherto disad-
vantaged with majority perspectives. Think tanks with advisory functions in 
drawing up the SDGs of 2015 demanded fewer top-down and fewer hierar-
chical approaches, favouring »Multi-stakeholder decision-making process-
es«34 instead. The future will show whether this can be realized for health 
or whether we will have a struggle for power between the WHO fighting 
for governing global health and the UN claiming supremacy for rights is-
sues. The last years have demonstrated that human rights are a powerful 
contribution to health for all if interpreted and applied in the spirit of PHC. 
But if used in the highly individualistic and legalistic way feared in the 
USA (where e.g. the enormous sums for compensation for malpractice 
threaten obstetric coverage), they could actually embody the enemy PHC 
was set out to fight at its very beginning.  
 
 
7.  HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE  
AND ITS IMPACT IN OR ON PHC IN  
»LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES« 
 
The human right to health is mentioned more often in programmes from the 
Global North, e.g. of development co-operation, than in the countries that 
have the most pressing health problems. It appears as self-commitment on 
the part of donor countries or aid organizations and as a moral or political 
                                                             
34  Independent Research Forum (2013), 2. 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE POLICIES | 161 
appeal rather than in legislation. In such Northern programmes, human 
rights language is clearly invoked against specific and generally undesira-
ble developments: 
 
? The Humanitarian Charter of 1998 and the ongoing Sphere Project, a 
joint initiative of the major players in humanitarian assistance, referred 
to human rights in the case of humanitarian emergency aid (including 
PHC) – mostly without emphasizing a special human right to health – in 
order to avoid unprofessional philanthropy as well as undue foreign po-
litical interest.35 The quality and quantity of humanitarian aid has to be 
based on the rights of the individuals, not on the preferences or even ar-
bitrary decisions of the donors or providers, which might be influenced 
by the favouring of certain groups, countries or measures to others. The 
main references for the right to health are Jonathan Mann’s reader of 
1999,36 GC No. 14 of 2000 and a WHO »Questions and Answers« of 
2002,37 but the scope of the Charter und the Sphere Project is purposely 
confined to emergency situations. The double character of rights be-
tween social appeal and law is clearly reflected in the second edition of 
the Sphere handbook: »The Charter is based on both ethical and legal 
foundations and refers to ›moral and legal rights‹.«38 
? The German Government and its Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development have in various documents explicitly based 
their development policy in health on the human right to health, e.g. in a 
publication on health and human rights of 2009,39 in the sector paper for 
development policies on health a month later40 and in the global health 
policy paper of 2013.41 The aim here is to support the long-standing 
major focus on strengthening health systems against purely economic 
                                                             
35  Sphere Project (2011); in the text, the right to health is explicitly mentioned on 
pages 83 and 291 only, in the bibliography pages 348 and 351. 
36  Mann et al. (1999). 
37  WHO (2002). 
38  Sphere Project (2012), 3. 
39  Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(2009a).  
40  Ibid., (2009b) 4, 7–8 and 20–23. 
41  Bundesregierung (2013), 2 and 19. 
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arguments and against the dominance of vertical health programmes. 
The reference to the right to health has become an important argument 
in German development politics, with the purpose of avoiding inappro-
priate approaches of the past, i.e. the focus on foreign political interest 
so dominant in the 1950s and 1960s, on social utility in the 1970s, on 
austerity in the 1980s, on economic gain in the 1990s and on the feasi-
bility of campaigns in the 2000s.  
? In the advocacy by NGOs for health equity, promoted in Germany by 
medico international and the Aktionsbündnis gegen AIDS in particular, 
the human right to health has a very prominent place in the titles of ac-
tions and publications.42 It is, however, above all a strong moral appeal 
to politics and individual conscience that is addressed in these uses of 
the word »right«, not a legally binding framework. Legal action by civil 
society organizations in partner countries is supported against both gov-
ernments and companies, but has not usually been attempted to date by 
German NGOs in German courts for populations abroad. 
 
The major field where the right to health is invoked for people living in 
countries of the Global North is that of the legal restrictions in healthcare 
for refugees and asylum-seekers. Withholding necessary treatment for those 
with a limited period of residence is interpreted as »human rights viola-
tion«.43 
In comparison, the right to health is not or is just rarely mentioned in 
the health policies and debates in LDCs/LICs in Africa and by Africans. 
This at least is the impression gained from publications and from my own 
experience at a series of conferences on healthcare in Eastern, Southern, 
Central and West African capitals, including a session with the high court 
of Mali. African states and governments would be the first address to which 
claims to the right to health would be directed. It therefore seems that these 
institutions are not interested in raising this issue themselves. If civil socie-
ty and its media are rather weak, a major debate on the right to health will 
be unlikely. In the more democratic of the BRICS states, by contrast, civil 
society organizations such as the Treatment Action Campaign in South Af-
                                                             
42  Medico (2013); Aktionsbündnis gegen AIDS (2016). 
43  Ärzte der Welt (2015); Mylius (2016). 
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rica are able to force the government into a public debate and some initia-
tives. 
There are several international initiatives that promise to considerably 
improve the attainment of health in LICs, such as Universal Health Cover-
age (UHC), which is also part of the SDGs. These initiatives are certainly 
strengthened by being able to refer to and apply the right to health. Howev-
er, doubts remain as to whether the legal framework of human rights will be 
the most important contribution to better health or health for all over the 
next few years, at least in those places where improvement is most needed 
and would be the greatest. Even the current concept of the human right to 
health, i.e. that of GC No. 14, cannot replace relevant policies, but can only 
inform some important aspects of these that derive from a common learning 
experience over the last decades. 
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II.  EMPIRICAL VULNERABILITIES  
AND CONFLICTS 
 
Using EquiFrame and EquIPP to Support 
and Evaluate the Implementation of  
the Sustainable Development Goals 
TESSY HUSS, MALCOLM MACLACHLAN  
 
 
 
1. HEALTH INEQUALITIES, SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
AND POLICY 
 
The impact of globalization, economic, and financial crises has led to a 
deepening and expansion of inequalities across many dimensions of human 
well-being, within and between societies.1 Individuals and groups experien-
cing multiple deprivations (i.e. low-income, poor nutrition, bad housing 
etc.) are disproportionately more exposed to economic shocks, more affect-
ed by cuts in services and benefits, and often vulnerable to ill-health and 
disease.2 Identity-based forms of disadvantage pervade most societies and 
manifest as arbitrary social hierarchies.3 No society is truly egalitarian; dif-
ferent levels of status and power are assigned to different identity cate-
gories.4 In terms of population health, these dynamics manifest as the social 
gradient in health.5 The global burden of disease and injury predominantly 
                                                             
1  Lombe/Sherraden (2008); MacLachlan/O’Connell (2000); OECD (2013b). 
2  Mannan et al. (2011); Mathieson et al. (2008). 
3  Kabeer (2005); Pratto et al. (2013). 
4  MacLachlan (2014); Pratto et al. (2013). 
5  Marmot et al. (2008). 
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befalls the poor, the vulnerable and the most excluded.6 As a result, these 
individuals and groups are even further restricted to participate in society. 
Poor health jeopardizes their ability to generate income, reinforcing or con-
tributing to their financial fragility.7 The Commission on the Social Deter-
minants of Health (CSDH)8 attributes the unequal distribution of disease 
and injury amongst vulnerable groups to the Social Determinants of Health 
(SDH).9 Explained through an SDH lens, health is as much a manifestation 
as it is a determinant of social exclusion.10 Social exclusion is the product 
of unequal power relationships in society; between an individual’s or a 
group’s relationships and social entities such as institutions, organizations, 
spaces (social or physical) or individuals.11 These relational dynamics in-
tersect with deprivation to affect a wide array of social determinants of 
health.12 
Complex and multidimensional phenomena such as social exclusion 
must be addressed through a holistic and joined-up response, and must in-
volve a variety of actors.13 Such interventions should seek to empower vul-
nerable groups in the process by improving the terms of their engagement 
with society at large.14 Multi-sectoral and multi-agency approaches are be-
ing advocated to meet Goal Number 3 of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) which urges governments to ensure »healthy lives and pro-
mote well-being for all at all ages« by 2030.15 The complex relationship be-
tween health and socioeconomic development necessitates coherent inter-
sectoral action, capable of addressing multiple health determinants simulta-
neously.16  
                                                             
6  Marmot et al. (2008); Mathieson et al. (2008). 
7  Ibid. 
8  CSDH (2008). 
9  Labonté/Schrecker (2007). 
10  Mathieson et al. (2008). 
11  Popay et al. (2008); Kronauer (1998) as cited in Mathieson et al. (2008), 12. 
12  Mathieson et al. (2008). 
13  Guy et al. (2010); World Bank (2013). 
14  Fraser (1998); Silver (2015); World Bank (2013), 3. 
15  A/Res/70/1, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015. 
16  CSDH (2008); Leppo et al. (2013), 43; McQueen et al. (2012).  
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The »Health in All Policies« (HiAP) philosophy recognizes, for exam-
ple, that virtually every sector (i.e. finance, education, housing, employ-
ment, transport, and health) affects population health.17 It also recognizes 
that reducing health inequalities and social exclusion demands a change in 
agency, particularly in the political realm. Vulnerable groups and their rep-
resentatives must not just be included, but also empowered in policy formu-
lation and decision-making processes that affect their lives.18 If inclusive, 
such processes may challenge prevailing power structures that undermine 
the political participation of those most vulnerable in society.19 Political 
participation is crucial to realizing a comprehensive set of socio-economic 
rights premised upon a fair distribution of resources.20 In order to achieve 
social inclusion and health equity, policy makers and institutional actors 
must also demonstrate a commitment to human rights and equity.21  
Public policies are important instruments in the creation of socially in-
clusive societies.22 They set out courses of action and determine the wider 
framework within which inclusion or exclusion occurs.23 To this end, poli-
cies must confer entitlements, protect the human rights of vulnerable 
groups, whilst aligning actions and objectives with the global vision of sus-
tainable development. Commitments to human rights and social inclusion 
are unlikely to be enacted unless they are explicitly outlined in policy docu-
ments.24 Similarly, policies are more likely to achieve equitable and inclu-
sive outcomes if an equitable and inclusive policy process supports them.25 
The operationalization of global approaches, ambitious goals and their 
guiding principles, do however pose difficulties for policy makers. We re-
view two methodologies, EquiFrame and EquIPP, which have been specif-
ically designed to render public policies and processes more equitable and 
inclusive, and we discuss these in the context of health inequalities. 
                                                             
17  CSDH (2008). 
18  Dani/de Haan (2008); Lavalle et al. (2005); UNDESA (2009). 
19  Huss/MacLachlan (2016). 
20  CSDH (2008), 18. 
21  Braveman/Gruskin (2003); Mannan et al. (2011). 
22  Ahmimed et al. (2014). 
23  Anderson (2015), 3; Cocozzelli (2014). 
24  Ahmimed et al. (2014). 
25  Huss/MacLachlan (2016); OECD (2015). 
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EquiFrame and EquIPP are systematic methodologies to analyse the con-
tent of, as well as the wider process of development, implementation and 
evaluation of public policies. We highlight their potential for policy dia-
logue and review their application to date. We argue that these tools are 
useful for policy makers and civil society organizations to guide and moni-
tor progress in achieving social inclusion. 
 
 
2. GETTING THE CONTENT RIGHT: INCLUSION  
OF VULNERABLE GROUPS AND CORE HUMAN 
RIGHTS CONCEPTS IN POLICY DOCUMENTS 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights imposes a duty on 
each state to take the required steps to certify that each person has access to 
health facilities, goods, and services through the adoption of a national 
strategy to ensure the enjoyment of the right to health for all citizens.26 The 
content of national health strategies or policies sets out what the policy 
hopes to achieve, whom it is supposed to benefit, as well as any future ac-
tions by the government to achieve the objectives outlined. The content of 
such documents therefore functions as a point of reference. To minimize 
the gap between intention and the delivery of a policy, the language of doc-
uments and the normative values upon which they are premised must be 
supportive of social inclusion.27 Mannan et al. developed a policy assess-
ment and formulation tool, EquiFrame, which provides a standardized for-
mulation and measurement instrument to develop and analyse public poli-
cies within a human rights framework.28 EquiFrame outlines 21 core con-
cepts of human rights (Table 1) and twelve vulnerable groups (Table 3), 
identified in a series of consultation workshops in four African countries – 
Malawi, Namibia, Sudan and South Africa. The core concepts were derived 
from United Nations declarations, literature and research evidence relating 
to human rights and well-being.29 Core concepts of human rights are con-
cepts that relate »to principles underlying the provision of universal, equi-
                                                             
26  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000. 
27  Amin et al. (2011). 
28  Mannan et al. (2011). See also MacLachlan et al. (2012); O’Dowd et al. (2013). 
29  Ahmimed et al. (2014). 
USING EQUIFRAME AND EQUIPP | 173 
table and accessible health services«.30 These concepts are evidence-based 
in terms of being empirically linked to inclusion/exclusion and health status 
in the research literature and they align with fundamental human rights dec-
larations and concepts. They do not, however, claim to be exhaustive and 
may vary in their relevance across different contexts. 
EquiFrame employs »a structured content analysis of policies« to 
measure the commitment to social inclusion and human rights.31 As such, it 
identifies which human rights are accorded to which vulnerable groups.32 It 
is premised upon the assumption that the content of a policy must reference 
the specific vulnerable groups it seeks to protect and the human rights it 
seeks to safeguard, for the policy to contribute to equity and inclusion in 
any meaningful way.33 The inclusion of vulnerable groups and core con-
cepts of human rights in policy documents, or policy on »the books«, 
allows us to discern the level of commitment to equity in the context of ser-
vice provision, particularly for those facing the most difficulties in 
accessing services.34 
 
Table 1: EquiFrame core concepts and key language  
No. Core concept Key language 
1. Non-discrimination  Vulnerable groups are not discriminated 
against on the basis of their 
distinguishing characteristics (i.e. living 
away from services; persons with 
disabilities; ethnic minority or aged).  
2. Individualized ser-
vices  
Vulnerable groups receive appropriate, 
effective and understandable services.  
3. Entitlement  People with limited resources are entitled 
to some services free of charge or 
persons with disabilities may be entitled 
to respite grants.  
                                                             
30  Mannan et al. (2011), 13. 
31  Ahmimed et al. (2014), 13. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Huss/MacLachlan (2016). 
34  Mannan et al. (2011). 
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4. Capability-based 
services  
For instance, peer-to-peer support among 
women-headed households or shared  
cultural values among ethnic minorities.  
5. Participation  Vulnerable groups can exercise choices 
and influence decisions affecting their 
life. Such consultation may include 
planning, development, implementation 
and evaluation.  
6. Coordination of 
services  
Vulnerable groups know how services 
should interact where inter-agency, 
intra-agency and intersectoral 
collaboration is required.  
7. Protection from 
harm  
Vulnerable groups are protected from 
harm during their interaction with health 
and related systems. 
8. Liberty  Vulnerable groups are protected from 
unwarranted physical or other 
confinement while in the custody of the 
service system/provider.  
9. Autonomy  Vulnerable groups can express 
»independence« or »self-determination«. 
For instance, persons with an intellectual 
disability will have recourse to an 
independent third party regarding issues 
of consent and choice.  
10. Privacy  Information regarding vulnerable groups 
need not be shared among others.  
11. Integration  Vulnerable groups are not barred from 
participation in services that are provided 
for the general population.  
12. Contribution  Vulnerable groups make a meaningful 
contribution to society.  
13. Family resource  The policy recognizes the value of 
family members of vulnerable groups as 
a resource for addressing health needs.  
14. Family support  Persons with chronic illness may have 
mental health effects on other family 
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members, such that these family 
members themselves require support.  
15. Cultural  
responsiveness  
i) Vulnerable groups are consulted on the 
acceptability of the service provided; ii) 
Health facilities, goods and services must 
be respectful of ethical principles and 
culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of 
the culture of vulnerable groups  
16. Accountability  Vulnerable groups have access?to 
internal and independent professional 
evaluation or procedural safeguard.  
17. Prevention   
18. Capacity building   
19. Access  Vulnerable groups have accessible health 
facilities (i.e., transportation; physical 
structure of the facilities; affordability 
and understandable information in an 
appropriate format).  
20. Quality  Vulnerable groups are assured of the 
quality of the clinically appropriate 
services.  
21. Efficiency  
Source: Mannan et al. (2011) 
 
In order to evaluate public policies within a human rights framework, 
Mannan et al.35 developed a scoring system measuring vulnerable group 
coverage, core concept coverage and core concept quality. Depending on 
the number of vulnerable groups and core concepts of human rights men-
tioned in a policy document, percentages are calculated to reflect the level 
of concept coverage. Core concepts referenced within policy documents are 
rated on scale from 1 to 4. The score indicates the quality of commitment to 
individual core concepts. A score of four indicates that the policy specifies 
an intention to monitor a core concept. An overall summary ranking is then 
calculated which qualifies a policy as low, moderate or high in terms of its 
                                                             
35  Mannan et al. (2011). 
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intention to promote human rights and social inclusion. A policy qualifies 
as high if it achieves ??????????????????????????????? outlined above.36 
A variety of policy documents and revision processes have been under-
taken using EquiFrame. A full review of these is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, and so we simply indicate its range of uses here. Ivanova et al.37 
conducted an EquiFrame analysis on the Sexual and Reproductive Health 
policies of Ukraine, Scotland, Moldova, and Spain. EquiFrame has also 
been used to assess regional policies on health priorities in Africa;38 a va-
riety of international health documents;39 international donor policies; Eu-
ropean Policies on Disability and Development Cooperation;40 India’s Dis-
ability Policy41 and three South African policies on Black economic em-
powerment, employment and cooperation.42 It has also been applied to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD).43 EquiFrame has been or is currently being applied to develop 
new, or revise existing policies in South Africa (disability and rehabilitation 
policies), Malawi (National Health Policy and National Health Research 
Policy) and Sudan (to guide the future development of all health policies). 
In Laos Democratic Republic, Handicap International has used EquiFrame 
to support the process of developing a Policy/Strategy/Action Plan process 
on disability. EquiFrame has also been employed outside the strict policy 
evaluation context; to identify the use of disability inclusive good practice 
behaviours across 24 countries worldwide.44 
To promote Health for All, there is a need to focus on equitable, rather 
than equal healthcare. Policies should strive to promote well-being for all; 
yet, they must also be sensitive to differential needs. In order to ensure eq-
uitable healthcare, special provisions need to be written into public policies 
to ensure that those most marginalized – politically, socially, culturally or 
                                                             
36  Mannan et al. (2011). 
37  Ivanova et al. (2015).  
38  Eide et al. (2013). 
39  Schneider et al. (2013). 
40  Andersen/Mannan (2012). 
41  O’Dowd et al. (2013). 
42  O’Donnell (2008). 
43  Mannan et al. (2012). 
44  Emms (2014). 
USING EQUIFRAME AND EQUIPP | 177 
economically – are not left out. This is arguably even more important in 
low-income contexts, where vulnerability may be more pervasive, and re-
sources even more limited.45 An inclusive policy content, however, does 
not guarantee that policies accurately reflect the needs and demands of vul-
nerable groups or that designated policy benefits accrue to such groups.46 It 
is not sufficient to reference vulnerable groups and core concepts of human 
rights in policy documents; rather considerations of equity and inclusion 
must shape the entire policy process – from formulation, through to imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation.47  
 
 
3. EQUALITY AS AN OUTCOME REQUIRES  
EQUITY IN THE PROCESS 
 
EquIPP (Equity and Inclusion in Policy Processes) seeks to complement 
EquiFrame by proposing a series of key actions (KAs) to support the devel-
opment, implementation and evaluation of inclusive policies. Whereas 
EquiFrame is concerned with the quality of policy content, EquIPP is con-
cerned with the wider processes of policy development and imple-
mentation. This relationship is outlined in Figure 1. EquIPP is a framework 
for an inclusive policy process to support public policies promoting equity 
and inclusion. An inclusive policy process creates experiences of inclusion 
for vulnerable groups who often remain marginalized in policy processes; it 
does this by according them a more central role in policy development, im-
plementation and evaluation. 48  EquIPP is an inventory of 17 KAs and 
forms a blueprint for an equitable and inclusive policy process (Table 2). 
The higher the commitment to equity and inclusion is, the greater the de-
gree to which policy makers and stakeholders will afford thorough consid-
eration to these KAs; and be able to point to the evidence of having done 
so. These actions, if executed in a comprehensive manner have the potential 
to further the needs and interests of excluded groups and actively involve 
them in shaping decisions that affect their lives. Like EquiFrame, EquIPP 
                                                             
45  Mannan et al. (2011). 
46  MacLachlan et al. (2016).  
47  MacLachlan et al. (2015). 
48  Huss/MacLachlan (2016). 
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measures the extent to which social inclusion is enacted equitably, and it 
provides a score and a mapping of the strengths and weaknesses of the pro-
cess of inclusion in policy development and implementation. EquIPP was 
developed in partnership with several United Nations agencies; and in par-
ticular the Knowledge Management Programme of the United Nations 
Partnerships on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (KnowUNPRPD).49 
It was developed through a literature review of stakeholder approaches to 
equity and social inclusion and several iterations of stakeholder consulta-
tions with representatives of more than twenty countries. Draft versions of 
the framework were also presented at conferences, meetings and workshops 
across a number of countries representing a range of high-, middle and low-
income contexts, as well as cultural and religious differences (for instance, 
it has been presented in Ireland, Malaysia, Panama, Thailand and Timor-
Leste). 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between and functions of EquiFrame and 
EquIPP 
 
Conceptually, EquIPP draws on Walt and Gilson’s50 policy triangle, which 
attributes equal importance to the content of policies, the actors involved in 
such processes, and the wider processes surrounding policies, as well as the 
context within which these elements are embedded. EquIPP promotes a 
participatory, equitable and inclusive policy process in which the needs and 
interests of vulnerable and excluded populations are prioritized and which 
supports the formulation of an inclusive policy content as well as its trans-
lation into practice.51 Bureaucrats and civil servants are often too far re-
                                                             
49  UNDP (2016). 
50  Walt/Gilson (1994). 
51  Huss/MacLachlan (2016); MacLachlan et al. (2015). 
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moved from actual experiences of marginalization and exclusion and 
should therefore not be the exclusive designers of policies.52  
Public policies should be designed and implemented in a collaborative 
and not in a top-down manner.53 The value of the EquIPP framework is that 
it seeks to render the entire policy process equitable, inclusive and meas-
ureable. While development, implementation, and evaluation are standard 
components of a policy cycle, budgeting and dissemination intersect with 
the aforementioned components in important ways but are often not em-
braced in policy analysis. Budget analyses can draw attention to issues of 
resource generation and redistribution in matters of health and social poli-
cy.54 Similarly, an emphasis on dissemination shifts the focus to how gov-
ernment communicates information to its citizen, particularly vulnerable 
groups. Equitable access to information is of course crucial in the creation 
of equal opportunities within policy processes.55 
 
 
Table 2: EquIPP key actions and definitions  
Key action Definition 
Key action 1:  
Set up inclusive and 
participatory 
mechanisms 
This key action involves detailing a public 
engagement strategy for the purpose of 
policy development/revision. 
Key action 2: 
Ensure the highest level 
of participation 
This key action involves maximizing the 
quality of participation and ensuring that all 
relevant stakeholders participate directly or 
are adequately represented in policy 
deliberations. 
Key action 3:  
Strengthen cross-
sectoral cooperation 
This key action involves strengthening 
communication and the flow of information 
across government departments and the 
integration of plans and policies. 
                                                             
52  OECD (2013a).  
53  Carey et al. (2015); Rittel/Weber (1973); Roberts (2000). 
54  Bonner et al. (2005); Holmes (1998); OECD (1996). 
55  OECD (2013a), 7. 
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Key action 4:  
Strengthen 
intergovernmental 
cooperation 
This key action involves the harmonization 
of national and local level initiatives 
through the creation of an overarching 
policy framework.  
Key action 5:  
Plan according to need 
This key action involves the adoption of 
participatory planning techniques to tailor 
policy provisions to local complexity of 
needs.  
Key action 6:  
Specify actions by 
which social needs will 
be addressed 
This key action involves the identification 
of explicit projects, programmes, and 
interventions to address social needs and 
level the playing field and promote social 
inclusion.  
Key action 7:  
Build equity 
considerations into 
budgets 
This key action involves the prioritization 
and funding of programmes, projects and 
interventions specifically designed to 
benefit vulnerable groups in government 
budgets.  
Key action 8:  
Minimise gaps between 
real and planned 
budgets 
This key action involves creating a 
favourable and participatory oversight 
environment to monitor anticipated and 
actual expenditure.  
Key action 9:  
Devise a responsive and 
flexible implementation 
plan 
This key action involves developing a 
detailed and overarching implementation 
plan in a participatory manner, and which 
should involve key stakeholders, including 
relevant government sectors, local 
governments, service users and service 
providers.  
Key action 10:  
Adopt the most 
inclusive selection 
methodology 
This key action involves taking necessary 
steps to ensure that beneficiaries are 
identified in the most inclusive manner to 
yield a maximum of policy coverage. 
Key action 11:  
Select the most 
appropriate 
implementation partners 
This key action involves mobilizing the 
non-governmental, civil society and private 
sector for the operationalization of social 
inclusion policies.  
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Key action 12:  
Encourage cooperation 
between agencies and 
service providers 
This key action involves strengthening the 
links between implementers on the ground 
to deliver a more tailored and holistic 
response to social inclusion. 
Key action 13:  
Collect qualitative and 
quantitative data 
This key action involves setting up mixed 
and multi-methods monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks in a participatory 
manner.  
Key action?14:  
Integrate, aggregate, 
disaggregate and share 
data 
This key action involves integrating, 
aggregating, disaggregating and sharing 
data to monitor and evaluate policies across 
multiple domains and over time. 
Key action 15:  
Select appropriate 
indicator dimensions 
This key action involves the participatory 
design of an indicator framework to 
measure appropriate social outcomes.  
Key action 16:  
Share information with 
policy beneficiaries 
This key action involves taking steps to 
ensuring equitable access to all information 
relating to policy benefits.  
Key action 17:  
Share information with 
the policy community 
This key action involves taking steps to 
ensuring equitable access to all information 
relating to the policy more broadly.  
Source: Huss/MacLachlan (2016) 
 
A policy process qualifies as inclusive and equitable if evidence can be 
gathered from documents or stakeholder testimonials to demonstrate 
engagement with the key actions outlined in EquIPP. An assessment ma-
trix, comprising a 7-point scale was developed to assess the level of pro-
spective or retrospective engagement with the 17 key actions. Higher-level 
ratings are awarded for Process and Outcome criteria and can only be 
achieved if stakeholders indicate satisfaction with the process and outcomes 
of engagement. Scores for individual key actions are plotted on a spider di-
agram to visualize the inclusiveness of policy processes.  
To date EquIPP has been used in conjunction with EquiFrame across a 
number of diverse contexts. EquIPP is currently being used in a two-year 
project to promote social inclusion in South-East Asia as part of 
UNESCO’s Management of Social Transformation (MOST) programme. 
More specifically, EquIPP has been used in an assessment of the National 
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Disability Policy in Timor-Leste.56 The findings from the evaluation were 
presented at a National Dialogue in Dili, Timor-Leste and will be presented 
to the Council of Ministers to inform the revision of the document. 
EquiFrame and EquIPP are also being used to guide assessments and sub-
sequent policy revisions in Cambodia (National Disability Policy) and in 
Malaysia (Science and Technology Funding Policy). Both instruments have 
been used to assess the National HIV/AIDS strategy in Malawi.57 Both in-
struments have also formed an important part of training and capacity 
building for policy development, revision and analysis for staff from the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as part of the United Nations 
Partnership to Promote the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UNPRPD).58 
 
 
4. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN USING 
EQUIFRAME AND EQUIPP 
 
This overview of various applications of both EquiFrame and EquIPP 
demonstrates the usefulness of these tools in a range of countries with 
greatly different cultures, contexts and political systems. This is largely as a 
result of the flexibility and adaptability of both methodologies; users of 
these tools are encouraged to adapt the methodologies to suit their contex-
tual needs. Insights and findings from the application of both tools will feed 
into future revisions of the instruments. Users may find certain core con-
cepts, vulnerable groups or KAs more salient than others. We recognise 
that EquiFrame’s twelve vulnerable groups, or 21 core concepts, are not 
exhaustive and may also be influenced by the nature of different policy are-
as. We encourage therefore, the identification of additional vulnerable 
groups and core concepts as they pertain to specific contexts.  
                                                             
56  Timor-Leste National Commission for UNESCO (2016). 
57  Chinyama et al. (2016). 
58  UNDP (2016). 
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In relation to vulnerable groups in particular, we believe that processes 
of identification must be evidence-based to ensure that the groups in ques-
tion are in actual fact particularly disadvantaged with regard to the relevant 
policy area.59 As noted earlier, while each of the vulnerable groups and 
core concepts outlined is supported by a significant evidence base and in-
ternational resolution or conventions, 60  the identification of vulnerable 
groups was also constrained by the political context of the countries in-
volved. For instance, while we would have liked to recognise the need to 
promote inclusion of LGBTI persons, in some of the countries involved in 
the development of EquiFrame, such activities were legally prohibited, and 
indeed punishable by death. Clearly inclusion works within political con-
texts that mediate what is legally permissible in society. However, we are 
painfully aware that promoting inclusion for some marginalized groups, 
while ignoring it for others, is morally problematic, even given the con-
straints of what is practically possible in different jurisdictions. 
We would encourage others to adopt, add to or subtract from our core 
concepts or vulnerable group categories; but crucially, to do so on the basis 
of an explicit and evidence-based rationale. Ivanova et al., in their analysis 
of Sexual and Reproductive Health policies from the Ukraine, Scotland, 
Moldova and Spain, argued for the inclusion of four additional vulnerable 
groups: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT), people living with 
HIV, sex workers and victims of sexual abuse, gender violence and human 
trafficking.61 At a workshop on social inclusion in Malaysia participants 
representing government, academia and civil society identified the addi-
tional vulnerable groups of street children, prisoners and indigenous com-
munities.62  
As already noted, the inclusion of some groups can be contentious in 
countries, where the legal environment discriminates against or criminaliz-
es their very existence.63 However, even within such constricting contexts 
the rights of those marginalized by national laws, may still be considered in 
national policy. An example can be found in the recently completed analy-
                                                             
59  MacLachlan et al. (2015). 
60  Mannan et al. (2012). 
61  Ivanova et al. (2015). 
62  National Working Group (2016). 
63  MacLachlan et al. (2015). 
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sis of the National HIV/AIDS Policy of Malawi using EquiFrame and 
EquIPP. The policy is a notable example of an inclusive policy for men 
who have sex with men (MSM). In Malawi, the law criminalizes same-sex 
practices, yet as a vulnerable group, MSM are included as a priority group 
in the country’s public health response in recognition of the significant bar-
riers faced by them in accessing health care.64 Often disconnected from the 
pragmatics of need, policy makers can benefit greatly from involving 
groups or representatives of groups who are marginalized, and therefore 
best positioned to enrich policies with lived experiences of exclusionary 
processes. This argument chimes with the Jakarta Declaration on Health 
Promotion, which states that »people have to be at the centre of health pro-
motion action and decision-making processes«.65 
While there may be situations where certain core concepts are less rele-
vant in some policy documents, we would expect the empirical evidence for 
this to be presented by way of justification for their omission. The final 21 
core concepts in EquiFrame were deemed to represent a broad range of sa-
lient concerns central in achieving equitable, accessible and universal 
healthcare.66 We have applied these concepts well beyond health and wel-
fare and found most of them to be salient in others areas too. The core con-
cepts of human rights were not positioned in terms of relative importance 
but are presented as a generally coherent ›gestalt‹. We note that any omis-
sion of a core concept within a policy assessment therefore automatically 
assigns differential importance to individual concepts.  
 
 
Table 3: Vulnerable groups outlined in EquiFrame  
1 Limited Resources Referring to poor people or people 
living in poverty 
2 Increased Relative Risk 
For Morbidity 
Referring to people with one of the 
top 10 illnesses, identified by WHO, 
as occurring within the relevant 
country 
                                                             
64  Chinyama et al. (2016). 
65  Keygnaert (2016); WHO (2009). 
66  Mannan et al. (2011), 13. 
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3 Mother Child Mortality Referring to factors affecting  
maternal and child health (0–5 years) 
4 Women Headed  
Household 
Referring to households headed  
by a woman 
5 Children  
(with special needs) 
Referring to children marginalized 
by special contexts, such as orphans 
or street children 
6 Aged Referring to older age 
7 Youth Referring to younger age without 
identifying gender 
8 Ethnic Minorities Referring to non-majority groups in 
terms of culture, race or ethnic iden-
tity 
9 Displaced Populations Referring to people who, because of 
civil unrest or unsustainable liveli-
hoods, have been displaced from 
their previous residence 
10 Living Away  
from Services 
Referring to people living far from 
health services, either in time or 
distance 
11 Suffering from  
Chronic Illness 
Referring to people who have an  
illness which requires continuing 
need for care 
12 Disabled Referring to persons with 
disabilities, including physical, 
sensory, intellectual or mental health 
conditions, and including synonyms 
of disability 
Source: Mannan et al. (2011) 
 
Grounded in the United Nations declarations and resolutions, we are fully 
cognizant that the values and philosophy of inclusion, fairness and human 
rights espoused by these methodologies are a reflection of the dominance of 
some socio-political thinking and philosophical paradigms over others. 
Nonetheless, we contend that our approach is justifiable in light of the ex-
istence of ill-suited models of social cooperation and unjust societies. Fol-
186 | TESSY HUSS, MALCOLM MACLACHLAN 
 
lowing Braveman and Gruskin,67 we insist that reductions in health dispari-
ties can only be achieved if governments explicitly commit to equity and 
human rights by according equal opportunities for health for the most vul-
nerable and excluded groups in society.68 Government has a legal obliga-
tion and society must accept its moral duty to alleviate health disparities. 
By combining the two, EquiFrame and EquIPP can support States in mov-
ing beyond the rhetoric and towards the operationalization of the principles 
of equity and inclusion. 
 
 
5. USING EQUIFRAME AND EQUIPP TO  
GUIDE, MONITOR AND EVALUATE THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) 
 
The Post 2015 Sustainable Development Agenda constitutes a unique 
opportunity for countries and the wider global community to realise the 
right to health for all. As Hawkes and Buse69 point out, the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs) represent an attempt by the global community to 
move beyond a narrow conceptualisation of health in a biomedical sense 
and to promote a more holistic approach to health and well-being. SDG 
No. 3 encourages governments to implement Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC), including financial risk protection, to ensure access to health ser-
vices, medicines and vaccines for all (target 3.8). While the provision of 
UHC has been equated to the practical expression of the right to health,70 
SDG No. 3 also promotes action to curb current and future threats of com-
municable and non-communicable diseases (targets 3.1–3.6). 71  These 
health related targets must be situated within the broader development 
agenda, which promotes action on the underlying social, economic, cultur-
al, political and structural determinants of ill-health and social exclusion.72 
                                                             
67  Braveman/Gruskin (2003). 
68  Ahmimed et al. (2014). 
69  Hawkes/Buse (2016). 
70  Ooms et al. (2014); Tangcharoensathien et al. (2015). 
71  WHO (2016). 
72  Buse/Hawkes (2015); Hawkes/Buse (2016), 337. 
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Health inequity is often referred to as a »wicked problem«, presenting com-
plexities difficult to resolve using siloed policy responses. Kickbush and 
Gleicher argue that  
 
»successfully solving or at least managing wicked policy problems requires reas-
sessing some traditional ways of working and solving problems, challenging gov-
ernance structures, skill bases and organizational capacity.«73  
 
To this end, working arrangements and relationships amongst different pol-
icy actors, across government sectors and levels must be re-oriented to-
wards more collaboration and better coordination.74 According to Hawkes 
and Buse, achieving the SDGs require new forms of inter-sectoral coordi-
nation as well as new partnership frameworks with an increased emphasis 
on accountability. Similarly, policy processes must be inclusive, with 
mechanisms for monitoring and review. 75 Policies promoting health and 
well-being must be guided by principles of equity and respect for human 
rights.76 The methodologies reviewed in this chapter lend themselves par-
ticularly well to guide, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the right 
to health.  
In order to promote healthy lives and well-being for all, at all ages, 
whilst reducing existing health disparities, it is vital to address and rectify 
fundamental inequalities among different groups in society. The Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the WHO 
specified that the application of the right to health for specific groups de-
mands that countries  
 
»disaggregate their health laws and policies and tailor them to those most in need of 
assistance rather than passively allowing seemingly neutral laws and policies to ben-
efit mainly the majority groups.«77  
 
                                                             
73  Kickbusch/Gleicher (2012), 93. 
74  Huss/MacLachlan (2016). 
75  Hawkes/Buse (2016). 
76  Ibid.; Kickbush/Gleicher (2012); MacLachlan (2014). 
77  WHO (2008), 24; see also MacLachlan (2016b); Mji et al. (2009). 
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Explicitly mentioning vulnerable groups, as they exist in a particular con-
text and in relation to a specific issue area, strengthens their claims to enti-
tlements and nominally commits governments to act on their obligation to 
secure access to services, goods and facilities for them. Similarly, an em-
phasis on core concepts of human rights within a policy document commits 
governments to implement policies in line with such principles. By promot-
ing overt references to core concepts of human rights, EquiFrame can guide 
policy makers in strengthening the human rights language in their policies.  
While the content of such documents constitutes a crucial point of ref-
erence, the manner in which they are developed, implemented, evaluated 
and disseminated presents ubiquitous opportunities to create experiences of 
inclusion.78 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) contends that »the nature of the policymaking process matters [...] 
for the quality of policies, and thus their outputs«.79 Ideally, inclusive poli-
cies are the outcome of a participatory development process. Key actions 1 
and 2 in EquIPP focus on the creation of inclusive engagement strategies, 
which would allow vulnerable groups and their representatives to partake in 
the decision-making processes at the highest level possible. EquIPP also 
encourages the continuous involvement of vulnerable groups and/or their 
representatives throughout the policy life cycle, from the design phase 
through to implementation and evaluation, ensuring that policies address 
priority needs of such groups (key action 5). It does so in recognition of the 
fact that participation has the potential to improve the design and deliver-
ance of better public services.80 Moreover, continued inclusion creates new 
partnerships and collaborations between issue areas and in which, govern-
ments, providers and »consumers« of services co-produce the process and 
content of decision-making.81  
Inter-sectoral approaches have been deemed most appropriate to ad-
dress socially determined phenomena such as health inequities and social 
exclusion. The remit for population health goes beyond responsibility of the 
health sector; efforts to address particular instances of exclusion thus neces-
                                                             
78  Huss/MacLachlan (2016). 
79  OECD (2013a), 5. 
80  UNDESA et al. (2013); Speer (2012). 
81  Quick/Feldman (2011). 
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sitate the coordinated intervention of a variety of stakeholders.82 Key ac-
tions 3 and 4 in EquIPP detail how the strengthening of cross-sectoral and 
inter-governmental cooperation and coordination promotes equity and so-
cial inclusion at an organizational and institutional level. If located within a 
whole-of-government approach, they can foster critical linkages across pre-
viously disconnected silos and levels of operation. Additional avenues for 
equity and inclusion exist at various junctures of the policy process. Moni-
toring and evaluation frameworks, for example, should employ a com-
bination of quantitative and qualitative appraisals. Evaluations involving 
vulnerable groups (as service users or beneficiaries more broadly) display 
transformative potential, for they seek out the knowledge and experiences 
of vulnerable groups, which can influence the future course of policies and 
programmes.83 Braveman and Gruskin contend that qualitative information 
collected from vulnerable groups and their representatives is important for 
it allows the documentation of »unmet need, perceptions of service quality, 
and obstacles to receiving recommended services in any sector influencing 
health«.84 Quantitative data collected should be amenable to disaggregation 
for different vulnerable groups, to establish differential impact to feed back 
into the policy cycle and inform the adaptation of policy designs.85 More-
over, equity and human rights principles require that quantitative data be 
disaggregated for vulnerable groups and by variables such as age, sex,  
ethnicity, disability, migratory status, income and geographic location.86 
Key actions 13, 14 and 15 emphasize the importance of routine data collec-
tion of quantitative and qualitative information to monitor progress towards  
social inclusion. EquIPP also addresses information poverty (key actions 16 
and 17), which has been recognized as a significant barrier to healthcare 
access and as a manifestation of social exclusion.87 The failure to translate 
policies into local languages, for example, constitutes a prime example of 
exclusion. Limited access to policy relevant information prevents individu-
                                                             
82  Hawkes/Buse (2016); Kickbusch/Gleicher (2012).  
83  Mertens (2012); Samson et al. (2015). 
84  Braveman/Gruskin (2003), 542.  
85  Open Society Foundation (2010). 
86  Piron/Curran (2005); UNFPA (2016). 
87  Britz (2004); Ensor/Cooper (2004); Kennan et al. (2011), 193. 
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als and groups from fully participating in society.88 To ensure equitable ac-
cess to all information relating to benefits a policy has to offer (i.e. entitle-
ments, goods and services, specific provisions), governments must improve 
how it communicates with citizen.89 Inclusive dissemination strategies en-
gage in extensive distribution of information in a culturally appropriate 
manner.90 
EquiFrame and EquIPP both permit quantitative assessments of the ex-
tent to which policy makers are engaging with principles of equity, inclu-
sion and human rights. In EquIPP, for example, evaluators are encouraged 
to seek out evidence from vulnerable groups or their representatives on 
their satisfaction with the process and the outcome of inclusion. If vulnera-
ble groups or their representatives state ›satisfaction‹ with the process and 
outcomes of engagement, this is likely to be indicative of a genuine gov-
ernment commitment towards equity and inclusion.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: WHAT GET’S MEASURED,  
GET’S DONE! 
 
We argue that in order to address exclusion most effectively, the content of 
policies as well as the overall policy process must be inclusive. Govern-
ments are uniquely positioned to reverse processes of exclusion. Policy 
makers are interested in quantitative evidence-based evaluations of their 
work, as it permits them to demonstrate a clear commitment to promoting 
social inclusion and human rights in their policies. The advent of the SDGs, 
with their much stronger commitment to social inclusion, means that finan-
cial and technical support for the development plans produced by low- and 
middle-income countries will require governments to clearly demonstrate a 
strong commitment to promoting social inclusion and equity. The extent of 
inclusion in such processes has proven difficult to encourage and to evalu-
ate, at least for some marginalized groups.91 EquiFrame and EquIPP both 
offer flexible methodologies that allow for quantitative comparison and 
                                                             
88  Kennan et al. (2011). 
89  Britz (2004); WHO (2008). 
90  Kennan et al. (2011); WHO (2008). 
91  MacLachlan et al. (2014). 
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demonstration of the extent to which policy content and policy processes 
are inclusive. These instruments seek to encourage and to evaluate; and we 
encourage others to build on our own work and that of others by using these 
›free to use and free to access‹ instruments in new ways and new places to 
promote social inclusion and human rights in health, welfare and other po-
lices.  
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Conscientious Objection  
in the Medical Sector 
Towards a Holistic Human Rights Approach 
HEINER BIELEFELDT 1  
 
 
 
1. A HIGHLY CONTESTED THEME  
 
On 7 October 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) adopted resolution 1763 on »the right to conscientious objection in 
lawful medical care«. The resolution inter alia demands that  
 
»[n]o person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated 
against in any manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or sub-
mit to an abortion, the performance of human miscarriage or euthanasia or any act 
which could cause the death of a human fetus or embryo, for any reason.«2  
 
While 56 PACE members voted in favour of the resolution, 51 rejected the 
text and four abstained from the vote. When adding the abstentions to the 
                                                   
1  An earlier version of this article was published in Frewer et al. (2016b).  
The present version has been updated and further complemented. 
2  PACE resolution 1763 (2010), para. 1. It is worth noting that the resolution goes 
beyond the issue of conscientious objection by also including hospitals and oth-
er institutions. However, freedom of conscience – as well as the right to consci-
entious objection as its necessary implication – applies to individuals only. 
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no-votes, the resolution received the smallest majority imaginable, i.e. by 
one vote. This narrow outcome testifies to the highly controversial nature of 
the subject, which had been a matter of fierce and emotional controversies 
in the weeks preceding the vote. A few months after the adoption, the Swe-
dish Parliament explicitly distanced itself from the PACE resolution and 
called upon Swedish PACE members to try to change the text.3 This un-
precedented move likewise illustrates the degree of contestation that the 
theme can trigger. It polarizes legislators and judiciaries, and it has even led 
to splits within the human rights community.  
Conscientious objection in the medical sector is a thorny issue, because 
it may cause tensions or even direct collisions between two fundamental 
human rights: freedom of conscience, which is part of freedom of religion 
or belief,4 and the right to the highest attainable standard to health,5 which 
includes the availability and accessibility to reproductive health services. 
Both rights are enshrined in international conventions; and they both have 
received broad endorsement by states as well as civil society organisations 
and other stakeholders. Qua their nature as human rights they are further-
more considered »inalienable«. This precludes simplistic solutions, such as 
the idea that one of the two rights could just »trump« the other.6 Just as it 
would be irresponsible to endorse an unqualified right to conscientious ob-
jection without considering the possible consequences for the right to 
health, it would likewise be problematic simply to dismiss conscientious 
objection in healthcare by giving a general priority to the right to health. 
Setting up a clear and simple normative hierarchy, as envisaged by some 
commentators, would be at variance with the invisibility, interrelatedness 
and interdependency of all human rights, as corroborated by the 1993 Vi-
                                                   
3  See Astra Network (2011). Sweden does not accommodate any conscientious 
objection by health professionals when requested to perform abortions.  
4  For references see below, under section 2.  
5  The right to health has inter alia been enshrined in Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Krennerich (2016), 57–
92. 
6  This seems to be the predominant understanding in Sweden. The Swedish mid-
wife Ellinor Grimmark, who refuses to participate in abortions, cannot work in 
her country and has lodged a complaint against Sweden with the Committee 
overseeing the implementation of the European Social Charter.   
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enna World Conference.7 Hence, any viable coping strategy for conflict sit-
uations must do justice to both human rights at issue – or at least try to do 
so to the maximum degree possible in a given context.  
In this article,8 I try to shed some light on the complex and prima facie 
uneasy relationship between the two rights at stake: the right to freedom of 
conscience and the right to health. I start by exploring the normative signif-
icance of respecting the conscience within the system of human rights pro-
tection. As we will see, due respect for the inner nucleus of a person’s mor-
al identity confronts us with the ultimate foundations as well as the insuper-
able limits of any legal order. Assuming that in many cases it will be im-
possible to reach fully-fledged »solutions« that would easily satisfy the in-
terests of all involved parties, it will be all the more necessary to develop 
criteria on how to cope with remaining conflicts occurring in healthcare in a 
fair, consistent and manageable way. My conclusion is that for all the diffi-
culties that doubtless arise in this area, respecting the right to conscientious 
objection in the medical sector is ultimately also in the interest of the right 
to health, which – qua its nature as a human right – presupposes responsible 
agency, in particular also on the side of doctors and nurses.  
 
 
2. THE CONSCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Freedom of conscience constitutes a strangely underexplored component 
within a comprehensive human right that is usually summarized under the 
heading of »freedom of religion or belief« – or even more succinctly: »reli-
gious freedom«. The full title »freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief« is rarely cited. This comprehensive right has been enshrined in Arti-
cle 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 18 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Arti-
cle 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and other hu-
                                                   
7  See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 
chap. III, sect. I, para. 5: »All human rights are universal, indivisible and interre-
lated and interdependent.« 
8  This article is based in parts on chapter 1.3.11 of the book by Bielefeldt et al. 
(2016), 258–305. 
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man rights instruments. Its purpose is to protect the existential self-
understanding of human beings with regard to their profound convictions 
and the ways in which they lead their lives, individually and together with 
others, in conformity with those convictions.9 In this context, the con-
science represents a person’s moral identity, often, albeit not always, origi-
nating from a particular religion or belief. While other aspects of freedom 
of religion or belief also cover institutional aspects of community life, free-
dom of conscience is a right held by individuals, strictly speaking.10 Its ex-
ercise remain limited to human beings and does not include institutions or 
organizations, whose representatives when wishing to uphold a certain 
moral policy have to resort to other normative titles.  
A famous metaphor describing the moral authority exercised by the 
conscience is the person’s »inner court« – in Latin: the »forum internum«. 
Mahatma Gandhi, who often referred to his conscientious convictions when 
opposing British colonial rule in South Africa and later in India, underlined 
the specific rank of the conscience by declaring: »There is a higher court 
than the courts of justice and that is the court of conscience. It supersedes 
all other courts.«11 When dealing with this theme, Gandhi inter alia liked to 
cite Socrates. He apparently saw his own political fight in analogy to the 
Socratic search for justice. Gandhi even translated Socrates’ famous 
»Apology« into his native language Gujarati. In that Apology, Socrates de-
fended himself before a criminal court in Athens. When addressing his jury 
he invoked an inner moral voice from which he had found guidance from 
childhood onwards. Using religious language, Socrates circumscribed that 
peculiar inner voice as a »divine« command or »the daimónion«. Interest-
ingly, the commands issued by the daimónion, he said, were usually nega-
                                                   
9  The preamble of the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief stresses: »reli-
gion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental ele-
ments of his conception of life«. 
10  The PACE resolution cited at the beginning mixed freedom of conscience with 
the autonomy of religious or belief-related institutions. Although both derive 
from freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, these two aspects must 
be kept distinct.  
11  Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, 15 December 1921, quoted from the compila-
tion by Mishra/Gupta (2008), 23.  
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tive commands in the sense of moral vetoes.12 By insisting on the superior 
authority of his inner voice, Socrates ultimately went as far as to accept the 
death penalty, thus bearing witness to the apodictic force of his conscience.  
Another famous notion illustrating the peculiar authority attributed to 
the person’s conscience is the »categorical imperative«. According to Kant, 
»the moral law within me« arouses an admiration akin to the majesty of 
»the starry heavens above« me.13 Similar concepts, metaphors, images and 
proverbs exist in most different religious, cultural and philosophical tradi-
tions. They reflect the basic insight that normative obligations among hu-
man beings ultimately derive from profound moral convictions whose inner 
personal nucleus commands respect.  
Before turning to a brief analysis of the human right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief, as it has been enshrined internation-
al human rights law, it is worth noting that this specific right is not the only 
place within human rights documents where the term conscience occurs. 
The preamble of the 1948 UDHR invokes »barbarous acts which have out-
raged the conscience of mankind« thereby coining a metaphor (»conscience 
of mankind«) which is historically located in the world community’s neces-
sary response to crimes of unprecedented dimensions (»crimes against hu-
manity«).14 In a non-metaphorical meaning, the term conscience further-
more occurs in Article 1 of the UDHR. The first sentence of that article 
may be the most-frequently cited sentence of any human rights document: 
»All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.« By con-
trast, the rest of the same article receives much less attention. It reads: 
»They [i.e. human beings] are endowed with reasons and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.« The term 
»brotherhood« sounds somewhat anachronistic, which may give a partial 
explanation why the whole sentence is not very popular nowadays. On top 
of that, everyone’s »endowment with reason and conscience« is certainly 
not self-explanatory and thus may warrant a short interpretation.  
                                                   
12  See Plato, The Apology of Socrates: »This sign I have had ever since I was a 
child he sign is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do some-
thing which I am going to do […]«, quoted from Plato (2002), 36.  
13  Kant (1996), 269. 
14  See Morsink (2009). 
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What does it mean that all human beings are »endowed with reason and 
conscience«? What is the epistemological quality of that participular propo-
sition? Obviously, the assumed »endowment« does not describe any partic-
ular empirical talents, skills or gifts. Article 1 makes an all-inclusive, uni-
versalistic claim by covering no less than »all human beings«. Hence, the 
sentence cannot refer to particular empirical qualities that different individ-
uals may possess in different measures. However, if the proposition cannot 
be read as a description – certainly not as an empirical description – would 
it make more sense to understand it as a prescriptive proposition, e.g. as a 
moral appeal? Actually, such an interpretation may lead to even bigger 
problems, since any moral appeal (e.g. the subsequent request that human 
beings »should act in a spirit of brotherhood«) already presupposes that the 
addressees of that appeal possess reason and conscience. Moral appeals 
would be impossible without the underlying assumption that the addressed 
individuals are receptive to moral considerations and demands. It is this 
very receptiveness that the formula »endowed with reason and conscience« 
tries to capture. 
I would suggest that the formula »endowed with reason and con-
science« makes more sense as an »ascriptive« (rather than »descriptive« or 
»prescriptive«) proposition, i.e. a quality we have to ascribe to all human 
beings. The assumption that human beings are endowed with reason and 
conscience has the status of a necessary presupposition without which 
normative interaction in human society would simply be inconceivable. 
Whatever example of normative interaction we may have in mind, the po-
tential of human beings to act responsibly is always presupposed. Binding 
promises, contracts, normative standards or institutions from the local to the 
global level would not even be conceivable without the assumption that 
human beings have the potential of responsible agency for which they – 
and indeed all of them – deserve an elementary respect.15 Even if a person 
actually does not live up to that expectation, the presupposition as such re-
mains meaningful. In some cases this may manifest itself as a (moral or le-
gal) reproach. Blaming a certain individual for not acting responsibly cor-
roborates counterfactually the necessity to stick to the assumption that hu-
man beings deserve respectful treatment as persons endowed with reason 
and conscience. Indeed, this presupposition has an axiomatic status for any 
                                                   
15  See Bielefeldt (2011), 31–41. 
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normative interaction. As the wording of Article 1 of the UDHR further-
more testifies, this basic respect is closely associated with respect for hu-
man dignity, i.e. the foundational normative insight underpinning human 
rights in general.16 
 
 
3. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AS A  
SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIM 
 
The following interpretation of freedom of conscience mainly refers to Ar-
ticle 18 of the ICCPR, which is the most important relevant norm in inter-
national human rights protection. However, the wording used in Article 9 
of the ECHR is very similar. The general insights derived from the follow-
ing observations thus also apply to the European system of human rights 
protection.  
 
3.1 Absolute Protection of the Person’s Inner 
Moral Nucleus  
 
As one of the few absolute formulations of the ICCPR, Article 18 para-
graph 2 rejects any coercive interference with the inner nucleus of a per-
son’s existential conviction: »No one shall be subject to coercion which 
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice«.17 Although the term »conscience« does not occur in this sentence, 
it is implicitly included as the moral corollary of a person’s religion or be-
lief. The strict rejection of any coercive interference positively means to re-
                                                   
16  By presupposing a potential of responsible agency, recognition of human digni-
ty does not depend on a person’s any actual positive performance. It precedes 
any concrete normative actions, efforts, accomplishments, laws or institutions to 
which it relates as their implicit sine qua non. In other words, human dignity is 
not a meritocratic concept.  
17  See also CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993, para. 3: The Covenant »does 
not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience 
or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. These 
freedoms are protected unconditionally […]«  
208 | HEINER BIELEFELDT 
spect an internal sphere of personal freedom in questions of thought, con-
science, religion or belief, which therefore enjoy unconditional legal pro-
tection.18 Article 18 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR belongs to those few inter-
national human rights norms, which do not allow for any »balancing« with 
conflicting norms or interests, not even in situations of emergency. The 
prohibition of coercive interferences can neither be limited, nor balanced 
against other consideration, nor be derogated, whatever situation of conflict 
may occur. The UN Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR, corroborates this apodictic understanding in 
its General Comment No. 22 by emphasizing that Article 18 paragraph 2  
 
»does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and con-
science or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. These 
freedoms are protected unconditionally. […].«19   
 
It is worth noting that the Human Rights Committee expressis verbis lists 
freedom of conscience as part of the unconditional prohibition of coercion. 
                                                   
18  It should be noted in passing that the term »choice« can lead to misunderstand-
ings. In the context of Article 18 para. 1 and 2 of the ICCPR »choice« is used 
only as a legal term. The existential experience of a person in questions of con-
scientious position may be they have in fact »no choice«. For instance, consci-
entious objectors to military service may claim that they obey the »dictates of 
their conscience«, which seems to be the opposite of »choice« in the everyday 
understanding of the word. In order to avoid confusion around the term choice it 
is important not to mistake the legal concept of freedom of choice as represent-
ing the existential experiences in the area of conscience. In other words, legal 
terminology and legal languages have its specific functions and concomitant 
limitations which one should bear in mind.  
19  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993, para. 3. Incidentally, the same holds 
true for Article 19 para. 1 of the ICCPR which concerns the forum internum of 
freedom of opinion and expression. Here again, the Human Rights Committee 
points out in a more recent General Comment that »[t]his is a right to which the 
Covenant permits no exception or restriction« (CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 
2011, para. 9). Both norms jointly protect human beings in their freedom to de-
velop their own independent thinking, to form their own personal opinions and 
to build their own identity-shaping religious or non-religious convictions.  
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Other examples of apodictic human rights norms not permitting any 
limitations on whatever grounds are the prohibition of slavery and the pro-
hibition of torture.20 The rejection of coercion in the person’s forum inter-
num has a similarly elevated normative status, because coercive interfer-
ences with the inner nucleus of an identity-shaping existential conviction 
would directly collide with the due respect for human dignity.  Being 
forced to conceal one’s profound moral or religious conviction or to feign a 
conviction that is not authentic ultimately means no less than to betray one-
self, which can undermine the preconditions for developing a stable sense 
of self-respect. This justifies the analogy of the unconditional prohibition 
formulated in Article 18 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR to the equally uncondi-
tional bans on slavery and torture.21  
Against a possible misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize that re-
specting conscience as the inner core of a person’s moral identity does not 
mean to turn it into a fortress immune to any societal influences. Conscien-
tious positions held by a person usually reflect socialization processes with-
in the family, community norms and practices, existing religious or non-
religious values in the society and other moral factors to which that person 
has been exposed. In short, conscientious positions presuppose human in-
teraction and communication; they can never develop in isolation. Although 
in this sense always influenced and informed by fellow-humans and the 
broader social environment, however, there remains a decisive element of 
active identification or »adoption« of a position by the individual person. A 
genuine moral conviction is more than the merely passive reception of 
normative ideas that happen to exist in a society. In responding to norma-
tive positions of others, existing community practices, values and belief 
systems etc., which he or she encounters, the human being actively devel-
ops conscientious convictions.  
Such moral development can never finish as long as the person lives. 
Driven by new insights, ideas and experiences, individuals can also change 
their conscientious positions. Fundamental changes in this regard are never 
easy and typically proceed in complicated and sometimes painful learning 
processes. The formulation of Article 18 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR reflects 
and explicitly protects that possibility. Thus, the freedom to »have or 
                                                   
20  See Article 7 and 8 of the ICCPR.  
21  For a detailed discussion see Bielefeldt et al. (2016), 77–82. 
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adopt« a religion or belief of one’s choice also includes respect for an indi-
vidual’s freedom to change a conscientious position and adopt a new posi-
tion.22  
 
3.2 The Right to Act in Accordance with  
One’s Conscientious Position 
 
Representing the inner moral »court«, the conscience is inherently linked to 
a person’s moral identity – and frequently also to their religious or belief-
related identity. In this sense, the conscience is a highly personal and even 
»intimate« dimension of human existence. At the same time, the conscience 
drives the person to take actions in the external world, in accordance with 
his or her moral convictions. A conscientious position can hardly be serious 
without practical consequences taken by the individual, often together with 
fellow-humans who share the same moral intuition.  
Thus, freedom of conscience would be pointless without the right to 
take actions in conformity with one’s conscientious positions. However, 
since the results of conscientious actions may directly affect the rights and 
freedoms of others and/or important interests of public order, the right to 
act upon one’s conscience is not without possible limitations. It falls within 
Article 18 paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, which deals with external »manifesta-
tions« of a religious, philosophical or conscientious conviction in »worship, 
observance, practice and teaching«. The term »practice« must be broadly 
interpreted so as to also include conscientious actions originating from a 
person’s identity-shaping profound moral convictions.  
Whereas Article 18 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR provides an uncondition-
al protection of the forum internum and precludes any coercive interfer-
ences in this sphere for whatever reasons, external manifestations in the un-
derstanding of Article 18 paragraph 3 of the ICCPR can be limited under 
certain conditions. For limitations to be justifiable, however, they have to 
meet all the criteria set out in that paragraph. Accordingly, limitations must 
be legally prescribed and they must be obviously needed to pursue a legiti-
mate aim – the protection of »public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others«. In addition, restrictions must 
remain with the realm of proportionality, which inter alia means they must 
                                                   
22  For details see Bielefeldt et al. (2016), 55–69. 
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be limited to a minimum degree of interference needed to pursue one of the 
said legitimate purposes. In General Comment No. 22, the Human Rights 
Committee insists  
 
»that paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not al-
lowed on grounds not specified there […]. Limitations may be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and propor-
tionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions may not be 
imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.«23  
 
These strict conditions for setting limitations are intended to protect free-
dom of thought, conscience, religion or belief also in the external sphere. 
While this protection – unlike in the forum internum – cannot be absolute, 
it is still quite strong.  
Although »internal« conscientious convictions and their »external« 
manifestations in conscientious actions enjoy different degrees of legal pro-
tection,24 these two dimensions are typically closely intertwined. A consci-
entious conviction must be more than just wishful thinking with no conse-
quences in the real world; it can only demonstrate its seriousness by mani-
festing itself in real actions. Vice versa, a moral action receives its moral 
quality by originating from a genuine conviction, which has taken shape in 
the forum internum. The internal and external dimensions protected under 
Article 18 of the ICCPR should therefore be viewed in their interrelated-
ness, since neither of these dimensions could even hypothetically exist in 
isolation. Hence, the unconditional protection accorded to the person’s fo-
rum internum strengthens his or her conscientious agency in general, in-
cluding in the area of practical actions deriving from a conscientious posi-
tion in the person’s social environment. These external actions themselves, 
however, are not beyond possible limitations, but can be limited in accord-
ance with the criteria set out in Article 18 paragraph 3 of the ICCPR.  
Conscientious actions also include »negative« actions in terms of refus-
als or objections. As already evidenced by the testimony of Socrates, the 
commands of the conscience are often particularly clear and strong when 
assuming a veto function. Dictates of the conscience frequently take shape 
                                                   
23  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993, para. 8.  
24  See also Bielefeldt et al. (2016), 82–85. 
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as a categorical »no«. It thus may be more than a coincidence that issues of 
conscience have typically been treated under the heading of »conscientious 
objections«. Recent years have seen an increasingly broad endorsement of 
conscientious objection, which – at least when concerning compulsory mili-
tary service – now has been accorded the status of an international human 
right. Hallmark decisions within that development are the views expressed 
by the UN Human Rights Committee on a number of South Korean cases 
of objection to performing compulsory military service in 201125 and the 
European Court’s 2011 judgment on Bayatyan versus Armenia, which 
equally dealt with military service.26   
There have been discussions, including within the UN Human Rights 
Committee, as to whether conscientious objection falls within the forum in-
ternum or the forum externum of freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
or belief.27 Given the different degrees of legal protection accorded to the 
forum internum and the forum externum, this is not a merely academic 
question. In my view, conscientious objections constitute a subcategory of 
external actions broadly speaking, thus falling within external manifesta-
tions of freedom of conscience as enshrined in Article 18 paragraph 3 of the 
ICCPR. This means that acts of conscientious objections are not without 
possible limitations. Locating conscientious objection within the forum ex-
ternum, does not amount to denying the seriousness of conscientious 
claims, which of course will be ultimately rooted in the forum internum – 
where else should they originate? But the point is that an act of objection is 
a »manifestation« that may have – and often is intended to have – an impact 
on the person’s social environment. In other words, it is an action with con-
sequences for others as well. That is why the rights and freedoms of others, 
too, warrant systematic attention. The right to health, including the availa-
bility and accessibility of reproductive health, is a prominent example.   
 
 
 
 
                                                   
25  See CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/2007, 24 March 2011. 
26  See Bayatyan v. Armenia, Application No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011. 
27  For details see Bielefeldt et al. (2016), 264–275 and 289–290.   
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4. GENERAL CRITERIA FOR CONSCIENCE-BASED 
EXEMPTIONS FROM LAWFUL OBLIGATIONS 
 
The issue of conscientious objection confronts us not only with the very 
foundations of any legal order (and even of any normative interaction what-
soever); it likewise pushes us to the insuperable limits of what a legal order 
can provide. Laws governing societal coexistence in a pluralistic society 
usually are not – and cannot be – fully in line with every individual’s con-
scientious convictions. Why is that so? The reason simply is that conscien-
tious positions may point in different and often irreconcilably conflicting 
directions, while the legal order claims binding force upon all members of a 
society.28 Taking the conscience seriously requires becoming aware of a 
broad range of sometimes irreconcilable moral positions held by people 
who often live closely together. Strict pacifists live alongside people who 
strongly believe that the military plays an indispensable role in upholding 
peace and defending human rights. Vegetarians objecting to the slaughter 
of animals sometimes cannot avoid sharing their kitchen with meat-eaters. 
While some people abhor stem-cell research as an act of human hubris, 
others appreciate such research as an important step towards enhancing 
human life expectancy. Issues like abortion or euthanasia have triggered 
moral wars in some societies, and they are typically controversial among 
professionals working in healthcare, too.  
Given the wide range of irreconcilable moral positions in modern socie-
ty, the legal order will never be identical with every individual’s moral 
convictions.29 Whoever expects that all existing legal obligations harmoni-
ously correspond with their own conscientious convictions would be either 
naïve or arrogant – or even both. Obviously, obedience towards legitimate-
ly enacted laws cannot generally hinge on every individual’s full moral ap-
proval of those laws; otherwise laws would from the outset lose their bind-
ing force in a morally pluralistic society. Thus, conflicts between one’s 
deeply held moral convictions on the one hand and lawful obligations on 
the other are to be expected. Indeed, such conflicts are just normal in a 
morally pluralistic society.  
                                                   
28  See also Maclure/Taylor (2011), 100–105.  
29  In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant therefore conceptually differentiates be-
tween morality and law.  
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Conscientious objection cannot provide the general recipe for coping 
with discrepancies between existing laws and one’s own moral conviction. 
A democratic society offers numerous possibilities to tackle such discrep-
ancies. For instance, people are free to voice their opposition in public dis-
course, they can appeal to their fellow citizens and hold public demonstra-
tions, and they can try to put their moral convictions on political agendas 
that might even become binding for their political representatives. Issues of 
profound moral concern can thus enter public discourse, where the bounda-
ries between majorities and minorities remain fluid. Moral dissenters from 
mainstream politics always have a chance to make their conscientious con-
victions heard in public, with a view to changing public opinion and even-
tually creating new laws.  
Conscientious objection is not part of the general arsenal of voicing 
moral dissent. It must remain an exception reserved for specific dilemma 
situations when a person would otherwise feel torn between feelings of 
moral self-betrayal and the requirement to honour lawful obligations. I 
would like to propose a combination of five criteria for qualifying consci-
entious objections that may warrant exemptions from lawful obligations:  
 
? the gravity of the moral concern,  
? the situation of a conscientious veto, 
? the connectedness to an identity-shaping principled conviction,  
? immediacy of involvement in the requested action and  
? the willingness to perform an alternative service.30 
 
4.1  Gravity of the Moral Concern 
 
The urgency of a conscientious objection naturally depends on the gravity 
of the moral issue that has caused the conflict. Although it may be difficult 
and ultimately impossible to reach a consensus in a morally pluralistic soci-
                                                   
30  In order to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to reiterate that such qualifica-
tions can merely concern the forum externum dimension of freedom of con-
science, i.e. actions deriving from a conscientious position which itself – as be-
longing to the forum internum dimension of Article 18 of the ICCPR – remains 
beyond any legitimate restrictions, limitations or qualifications for whatever 
grounds. 
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ety on how to measure »gravity« in this regard, it remains important to un-
derstand that the objected action would run counter to profound moral con-
cerns of the objecting person. In other words, the moral pathos of conscien-
tious objections should not be wasted for minor issues. In fact, in most (al-
beit not all) of the cases in which the right to conscientious objection has 
been claimed human life seems to be at stake. Even those who finally do 
not share the conscientious position based on which an objection is made 
should thus be able to at least understand the moral seriousness of the issue. 
 
4.2  Situation of a Conscientious Veto 
 
Conscientious objection goes beyond moral criticism in that it presupposes 
the experience of an existential moral conflict. Many people may have crit-
ical reservations against certain laws, often based on moral grounds. As 
pointed out, this is a normal situation, even more so in a pluralistic society 
in which everyone can actively voice their criticism and publicly campaign 
for legislative changes. Conscientious objection differs from mere criticism 
voiced on moral grounds. It represents the situation of a direct conflict, in 
which the individual’s conscience strictly vetoes any personal involvement, 
as it were. As the only way to avoid an existential moral dilemma, which 
would otherwise occur, conscientious objection concerns situations of such 
a direct conscientious veto and it should be limited to such situations.   
 
4.3  Connectedness to an Identity-shaping  
Principled Conviction 
 
Conscientious objection presupposes profound convictions, which differ 
from ad-hoc opinions that a person may have on this or that moral question. 
This does not mean that conscientious positions are unchangeable. As em-
phasized earlier, conscientious convictions always develop; they can even 
change fundamentally. What counts is the identity-shaping quality of reli-
gious and/or moral convictions, which the concerned individual cannot 
waive without thereby betraying himself or herself. The right to conscien-
tious objection is a way to avoid such situations of threatened betrayal of 
one’s identity-shaping principles, i.e. the nucleus of the moral self. 
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4.4  Immediate Involvement in the Requested Action 
 
Many people are somehow involved in practices that run counter to their 
conscientious convictions of a religious and/or moral nature. Usually, such 
involvement is an indirect one. For instance, citizens must pay taxes alt-
hough the tax money supports projects they may disapprove on moral 
grounds. The classical paradigm is the pacifist who pays taxes thereby co-
financing the military that he morally rejects. People may also oppose stem-
cell research and nonetheless contribute to the public budget, thereby indi-
rectly supporting such research. This kind of indirect involvement is una-
voidable in a morally pluralistic society.31 Conscientious objection there-
fore presupposes a certain degree of »immediacy« of the requested in-
volvement. 
  
4.5  Willingness to Perform an Alternative Service  
 
Conscientious objection is not a »privilege« some individuals request for 
themselves. Rather, it reflects an existential predicament in which a person 
seems to be caught between conflicting normative requirements. The guid-
ing idea must be to do justice to both the imperative of one’s conscience 
and the requirement to uphold the lawful order in general – or at least to try 
to do so to the maximum degree possible. Insistence on the supremacy of 
the conscience in a particular case should therefore go together with a will-
ingness to honour the lawful public order by performing an alternative ser-
vice to society whenever this seems possible. The meanwhile classical par-
adigm is the alternative civilian service replacing mandatory military ser-
vice.  
The proposed five criteria should be seen and applied in combination. 
Although their application to concrete cases may still be difficult and lead 
to controversial assessments, the criteria may help to determine those con-
scientious objections that warrant exemptions from lawful obligations. In 
order to apply them in practice, claims of conscientious objection require a 
                                                   
31  The appropriate way to resolve the resulting moral conflicts is by campaigning 
publicly for a change of the respective policies and law. By contrast, refusal to 
pay taxes would qualify as »civil disobedience«, which includes the willingness 
to accept the prescribed penalties for such acts. See Thoreau (2003). 
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willingness on all sides to communicate in a spirit of mutual respect. On the 
one hand, those who claim an exemption based on their conscientious posi-
tion face legitimate expectations to explain such a demand to the broader 
society. They may point to the gravity of their concerns and the existential 
dilemma they would otherwise face, since these concerns may follow from 
an identity-shaping profound moral conviction. The idea cannot be that ob-
jectors have to be successful in »persuading« others that their position is 
right or plausible, but they should be willing credibly to declare that their 
concerns are of a serious, existential nature. On the other hand, the state has 
a responsibility to try the utmost to avoid situations of an existential moral 
dilemma, which would tear some people apart, as it were.32 This inter alia 
requires the availability of alternative options whenever and wherever pos-
sible. Such options must not be connected with undue burdens, and above 
all, they should not be based on any disrespectful interrogations. Bearing in 
mind the criterion of immediacy of involvement, alternative options are 
particularly important in situations in which people may be forced to get di-
rectly involved in practices that would run counter to their deeply held con-
scientious positions.  
Hence, conscientious objection is a morally demanding concept based 
on the due respect for everyone’s human dignity. Above all, it requires sen-
sitivity within society for the moral convictions of fellow-humans whose 
concerns may substantially differ from one’s own moral positions. In other 
words, it means to take diversity in moral questions seriously and seek for 
ways to do justice to all parties concerned, to the maximum degree possi-
ble. Particular attention must be given to the moral concerns of religious or 
other minorities who may be particularly vulnerable to manifestations of 
disrespect or ridicule. Here, the state has a responsibility to promote a cli-
mate in which moral pluralism – alongside other forms of pluralism – can 
unfold without fear and without discrimination.   
 
 
 
                                                   
32  Admittedly, there may be situation in which a tragic conflict cannot be solved. 
However, this possible experience cannot justify policies of indifference to re-
quests of conscientious objection.  
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5. THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
IN HEALTHCARE 
 
International, regional and national jurisdiction on conscientious objection 
has by and large developed in the context of compulsory military service. It 
is mainly with regard to the refusal to take arms that the right to objection 
has taken shape. Many objections within the medical sectors likewise relate 
to situations where human life is at stake, e.g. issues like abortion or eutha-
nasia. Nonetheless, there is one obvious difference that warrants further 
analysis: no one is drafted to the medical sector. People working in 
healthcare usually do so based on their own decision. Doctors or nurses 
voluntarily undertake obligations stemming from an employment contract 
that they have signed up to as result of their personal choice. Analogously, 
this is also applies to pharmacists or other positions in the medical sector.  
Obviously, individuals cannot take employment in an institution whose 
core functions they reject on conscientious grounds. A conscientious objec-
tor to military service cannot keep his or her employment as a paid sol-
dier.33 Likewise, a person rejecting stem-cell research on conscientious 
ground, will not be able work in an institute specialized on exactly that sort 
of research. It would be utterly absurd for a nurse refusing to being in-
volved in abortions to seek employment in an abortion clinic. In such situa-
tions, the only viable solution would be for the concerned person to look for 
another professional activity. However, in most cases the situation is more 
complex. Hospitals usually offer a broad variety of services. A doctor or 
nurse may be able and willing to fulfil the expected professional duties in 
general with enthusiasm, while at the same time objecting to direct personal 
involvement concerning a few specific functions. To insist that the person 
nonetheless carry out the objected functions or, alternatively, leave the em-
ployment, may amount to an illegitimate limitation of their freedom of con-
science, depending on the specific situation. This is likely the case if there 
is enough staff available and willing to guarantee the full functioning of the 
institution, so that pragmatic options to prevent a conflict would be possible 
and manageable.  
                                                   
33  This does not mean that soldiers are excluded from the right to conscientious 
objection. For details see Bielefeldt et al. (2016), 277–278.  
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It is worth emphasizing in this regard that by signing an employment 
contract, employees do not waive their freedom of thought, conscience, re-
ligion or belief. This freedom has the status of an »inalienable« human 
right, after all, and thus cannot be simply superseded by an employment 
contract. Moreover, Article 4 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
(of November 1981) clarifies that freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
or belief applies to »all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cul-
tural life« – and hence also to professional employment in whatever sector. 
If limitations and stipulations are deemed necessary, they must thus meet 
the criteria listed in Article 18 paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, as elaborated 
above. Although mainly addressing the state, they analogously also apply to 
limitations or stipulations imposed by an employment contract, which itself 
fall within the general regulations imposed by labour laws. Limitations of 
freedom of conscience, as stipulated in employment contracts, must be spe-
cific rather than general; they must relate to legitimate purpose and should 
be proportionate to the pursuance of such a purpose; and they should not 
discriminate people based on their religion or belief. Whenever there is a 
reasonable way to avoid conscientious conflicts in the running of an institu-
tions, those in charge have a responsibility to find practical solutions – or at 
least to try the utmost to do so. The state bears the overarching responsibil-
ity to ensure that freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief receives 
respect – not only in state institutions but also in the larger society.34  
 
 
6. ADDITIONAL STIPULATIONS FOR  
OBJECTIONS IN HEALTHCARE  
 
As previously emphasized, the right to conscientious objection can be lim-
ited inter alia in the interest of securing the rights and freedom of others, 
provided the criteria for justifying limitations are fully satisfied. Obviously, 
people working in healthcare directly impact on a number of human rights, 
including the right to life, the right to health, the right to physical, psycho-
logical and mental integrity, the right not to suffer unnecessary pain, the 
                                                   
34  See interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief to 
the General Assembly 2014, A/69/261, para. 26–41. 
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right to reproductive self-determination, the right not to be discriminated 
against on the basis of sex/gender etc. Given this broad range of human 
rights issues that may be at stake, there are good reasons to complement the 
above general criteria for claiming conscience-based exemptions from law-
ful obligations by adding some further stipulations. Beside the criteria al-
ready mentioned for conscientious objection in general (gravity of the con-
cern, situation of a direct conscientious veto, connectedness to an identity-
shaping principled conviction, immediacy of requested involvement, will-
ingness to offer some alternative) the following additional stipulations seem 
reasonable and indeed necessary.  
 
6.1  Primacy of Professional Duties in Risk Situations  
 
No health professional can invoke conscientious objection in situations 
when they are needed to save another person from serious risks of life or 
physical integrity. Of course, whenever possible, such functions should be 
performed by a colleague who has no conscientious objection to tackling 
the task ahead. But maybe this will not be possible in all circumstances. 
Although legislators or those administering the respective institutions 
should to do the utmost to prevent moral dilemma situations and avoid exis-
tential conflicts of that nature, there can be no ultimate guarantee of success 
in all cases. Tragic predicaments remain a possibility. In such situations, the 
right to health of patients must prevail.  
 
6.2  No Imposition on One’s Moral Convictions  
on Others, in Particular Patients 
 
Accommodating conscientious objection can provide a way out of a situa-
tion of an existential dilemma. However, conscientious objection can never 
become an excuse for medical professionals to impose their views on oth-
ers, in particular patients, by exploiting their vulnerable situation. In its 
judgment on P. and S. versus Poland, the European Court of Human Rights 
dealt with the case of a teenage girl who had been raped and was effectively 
denied an abortion by the personnel of a hospital. The Court found that the 
behaviour of the health professionals in that case, whatever their motiva-
tion, led to a violation of the patient’s human rights, including the prohibi-
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tion of cruel and inhumane treatment.35 Generally speaking, conscientious 
objectors should inform patients from early on clearly about the objections 
and about possible consequences arising from that situation so that patients 
have time to find alternative solutions.  
 
6.3  In-advance Information of Employers or Other  
Relevant Institutions 
 
As part of their positive cooperation duties, conscientious objectors must 
furthermore notify in advance their employers or health institutions about 
possible conflicts. This may help to provide alternatives, before complicat-
ed situations arise. The various parties involved – objectors, healthcare in-
stitution, oversight bodies and ultimately the state – have a shared responsi-
bility to seek for adequate ways of preventing dilemma situations. This pre-
supposes an active communication not least by objectors in order to facili-
tate timely activities.  
 
6.4  Cooperation in Finding Alternatives 
 
Conscientious objectors must actively support patients in finding alternative 
solutions, including by referring them to colleagues willing to perform the 
requested treatment. Refusal to refer to colleagues would amount to active 
obstruction, which cannot be acceptable. In its General Recommendation 
on women and health (1999), the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) pointed out that whenever health 
service providers refuse to perform certain functions based on conscien-
tious objection, »measures should be introduced to ensure that women are 
referred to alternative health providers«”36 Conscientious objectors working 
in healthcare institutions can be legitimately requested to generally cooper-
ate within such a referral system.  
 
 
                                                   
35  See P. and S. versus Poland, Application No. 57375/08, 30 October 2012. Gré-
gor Puppinck (2017) correctly points out that having an abortion is not in itself a 
human right (see ibid., 62). 
36  CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24 (1999) on Article 12, para. 11. 
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7. CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO UPHOLD A  
HOLISTIC HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
 
Conscientious objection is a right with a number of qualifications. Alt-
hough originating from the person’s forum internum, conscientious objec-
tion nonetheless falls within the forum externum dimension of freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief, since is amounts to an external 
»manifestation« of a conscientious position that may impact on other peo-
ple’s rights as well. This is particularly obvious in the medical sector where 
a number of other rights – right to life, right to physical integrity, right to 
health, including access to reproductive health services etc. – may be at 
stake. Hence, the general criteria for exempting objectors from lawful obli-
gations on conscientious grounds must be complemented by a number of 
specific stipulations that aim to secure the rights of other people, in particu-
lar patients.  
In light of numerous complications that may arise, some commentators 
have proposed generally to dismiss claims of conscientious objection in 
healthcare. For example, Julian Savulescu opines: »If people are not pre-
pared to offer legally permitted, efficient and beneficial care to a patient 
because it conflicts with their values, they should not be doctors.«37 How-
ever, not only would such a simple take-it-or-leave-it-position be at odds 
with the right to freedom of conscience; it would also undermine a holistic 
understanding of human rights in general, as proclaimed in the formula 
coined by the Vienna World Conference that all human rights are »univer-
sal, indivisible and interrelated and interdependent«. 
What worries me more is that even some UN human rights bodies have 
at times employed a wording that does not seem to acknowledge the human 
rights dimension of conscientious objection. When referring to conscien-
tious objection concerning reproductive health care, the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
seems to consciously avoid the term »right«. For example, in its concluding 
observations on Hungary, the CEDAW Committee recommends to the state 
party:  
 
                                                   
37  Julian Savulescu, quoted in Winclair (2010), 33. 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE MEDICAL SECTOR | 223 
»Establish and adequate regulatory framework and a mechanism for monitoring the 
practice of conscientious objection by health professionals and ensure that conscien-
tious objection is accompanied by information to women about existing alternatives 
and that it remains a personal decision rather than an institutionalized practice.«38  
[emphasis added, H.B.] 
 
A similar tendency exists in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights. In its concluding observations on Poland, the Committee  
 
»calls upon the State party to take all effective measures to ensure that women enjoy 
their right to sexual and reproductive health, including by […] implementing a 
mechanism of timely and systematic referral in the event of conscientious objec-
tion.«39 [emphasis added, H.B.] 
 
In its recently adopted General Comment on the right to sexual and repro-
ductive health, the same Committee points out:  
 
»Where health care providers are allowed to invoke conscientious objection, States 
must appropriately regulate this practice to ensure that it does not inhibit anyone’s 
access to sexual and reproductive health care, including by requiring referrals to an 
accessible provider capable of and willing to provide the services being sought, and 
the performance of services or emergency situations.«40 [emphasis added, H.B.] 
 
The various formulations just cited merely acknowledge conscientious ob-
jection as a reality – i.e. as a »practice«, an »event« to be taken into account 
or something »allowed« by the state – without clearly appreciating its status 
as a human right. While the Human Rights Committee, tasked with the 
monitoring of the ICCPR, does acknowledge the human rights dimension 
of conscientious objection, it so far has limited its jurisdiction on cases 
concerning objection to military service.  
Anand Grover, former Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest at-
tainable standard of health (2008–2014), went a step farther by acknowl-
                                                   
38  CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8, 26 March 2013, para. 31(d). 
39  E/C.12/POL/CO/5, 2 December 2009, para. 28. 
40  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, para. 43. 
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edging »legitimate concerns« on both sides. For example, in his mission re-
port on Poland, he pointed out  
 
»that there is a need for decisive action in this regard: such action should reconcile 
the legitimate concerns of health providers exercising their right to conscientious ob-
jection with the legitimate and pressing interests of patients«.41 [emphasis added, 
H.B.] 
 
Unlike the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the former Rapporteur on the right to health remarka-
bly used the language of »right« when referring to conscientious objection. 
Some years ago, the former E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fun-
damental Rights likewise used the term »right« when requesting member 
states to issue clear and comprehensive legislative regulations in order to 
reconcile the various human rights at issue in healthcare. The Experts pos-
tulated:  
 
»Such a regulation should thus accommodate the right to religious conscientious ob-
jection, which is derived from the freedom of religion, while ensuring that the exer-
cise of this right will not lead to others either being deprived of access to certain ser-
vices in principle available to all in the State concerned, or being treated in a dis-
criminatory fashion.«42  
 
According to the Experts of the Network, what remains to be done is the 
tiresome business of searching for adequate solutions in view of all the hu-
man rights at issue. With specific regard to reproductive health Christina 
Zampa and Ximena Andión-Ibanez, too, see a lot of work ahead in Europe: 
»The law and practice in European countries is peppered with differences, 
indicating a great need to develop comprehensive standards in this area.«43 
The two authors refer to Norway as a positive example demonstrating that 
                                                   
41  A/HRC/14/20/Add.3, 20 May 2010, para. 55. 
42  E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (2005), 20. 
43  Zampa/Andión-Ibanez (2012), 232. 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE MEDICAL SECTOR | 225 
viable solutions, including systematic oversight with a view to guaranteeing 
transparent and efficient referral, can successfully be elaborated.44  
Admittedly, conscientious objection in the medical sector is a thorny is-
sue and can lead to numerous complications, especially in morally plural-
istic societies. Simplistic slogans cannot do justice to the various human 
rights at stake in this area. Whereas I have so far argued from the specific 
angle of freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, I would like to 
conclude by claiming that respect for the right to conscientious objection 
may also strengthen the human rights nature of the right to health. Like oth-
er human rights, the right to health facilitates and shapes human interaction. 
While obviously strengthening the position of patients, the right to health 
also presupposes responsible agency on the side of doctors and nurses. This 
responsibility, however, is never only a professional one; it is at the same 
time a moral one, deriving from moral concerns, positions and ultimately 
convictions. Healthcare is not a service we would like to delegate to robots 
without moral convictions. Thus, the right to health would cease to make 
sense without recognizing that all those interacting in healthcare are human 
beings who deserve respect for their moral convictions – even at the price 
of complications that may arise from such respect. 
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The Implications of the Right to  
Health for Border Management  
Emergency Assistance and Medical Screenings 
in the Context of Forced Migration  
VERONIKA FLEGAR, MARIE-NOËLLE VEYS 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Currently, about 300 land borders and numerous sea borders divide states 
worldwide from one another.1 These borders are not necessarily permanent 
as a changing domestic, regional or global political climate can lead to bor-
ders which are softer (e.g. the internal borders of the EU) or harder (e.g. the 
border between Mexico and the United States). In all circumstances, how-
ever, these borders are governed by national legislation aiming to construct 
»the limits of nationality, citizenship and identity« as well as by interna-
tional human rights law which aims to curtail the power of this inherently 
exclusionary character of borders.2 
In this context, border management has gained increased attention 
throughout the last years, not lastly because of the war in Syria and the high 
number of people seeking asylum in Europe.3 People want to cross borders, 
                                                   
1  Paasi (2010), 13.  
2  Ibid., 13–16. 
3  For the purpose of this study, border management is understood broadly, includ-
ing not only the physical border context but also border procedures which might 
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even if there is no legal way to do so. This is not only taking place in the 
context of war or violent conflict. Rather, individuals might also be traf-
ficked, flee persecution or try to escape environmental hazards, poverty or 
other life-threatening conditions. It is these irregular and mass migratory 
movements and their management at the border which the present study is 
concerned with.4 For the purpose of this study, these movements are re-
ferred to as forced migration.5 
Previous authors have argued that border management traditionally fo-
cused almost exclusively on security concerns.6 However, calls for hu-
manitarian border management are increasing, especially in light of the 
number of persons who fall within the scope of the abovementioned forced 
migration context.7 Humanitarian border management aims to »ensure that 
humanitarian principles and accepted international legal standards are in-
creasingly applied by the security sector at times of migration crisis.«8 This 
chapter argues that the right to health can and must play a prominent role in 
this respect. Whether and how the right to health can contribute to clarify-
                                                                                                                          
already take place within the borders of a state (such as in transit zones, registra-
tion centres or immigration detention).  
4  Hence, the present study does not deal with nationals of a particular state who 
are crossing the border to return to their own country and whether the state has 
similar obligations in that respect. The current study is dealing only with the 
rights and obligations with regard to non-citizens. 
5  The boundaries and exact definition of forced migration is still issue to academ-
ic debate. See e.g. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (2014), 5–6. 
6 Paasi (2010), 13; Pottler (2014). 
7  Border management is understood in line with the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) guidelines on health and humanitarian border management to 
include four different pillars. The present study will focus particularly on the 
third pillar (the enhanced capacity of health systems and border management 
services), especially with regard to the points ›Health Screening and Referral 
System‹ and ›Health Management and Public Health Response‹. cf. IOM 
(2016), 5. 
8  Pottler (2014). Although not further explained in the quote cited, humanitarian 
principles in the context of this paper are understood as human rights principles, 
i.e. the rights and obligations derived from international human rights law trea-
ties. 
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ing the individual rights of and state obligations towards forced migrants in 
order to contribute to humanitarian border management is investigated 
through outlining the scope of two different aspects of the right to health: 
first, the rights and obligations with regard to medical care and emergency 
assistance and second, the rights and obligations with regard to medical 
screenings. Based on this analysis, the chapter discusses the added value of 
the right to health: does it indeed have to be viewed as an »empty promise« 
in the context of border management or does it provide valuable guidance, 
for instance, as a moral concept, as an advocacy framework and evaluation 
tool and/or as a legal principle?9 
In answering this question, Dembour’s distinction between four differ-
ent schools of thought in the field of human rights serves as a valuable 
guideline. She identifies a natural school, a deliberative school, a protest 
school and a discourse school of human rights.10 When simplifying Dem-
bour’s distinction into concrete purposes of human rights, it seems like the 
natural school sees human rights primarily as moral concept, the delib-
erative school sees them primarily as legal principles, the protest school 
sees them essentially as advocacy tools and the discourse school dismisses 
human rights altogether.11 As is outlined in more detail in the discussion 
section of this chapter, the present study most closely identifies with the 
protest school in finding the added value of the right to health primarily in 
the field of advocacy. 
In light of this framework and based on an analysis of the right to health 
at the border, the present study thus aims to highlight two contentious 
points in which the right to health of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) plays a prominent and clarify-
ing role. In so doing, the study hopes to show the limitations and potential 
of the right to health for clarifying individual rights and state obligations at 
the border. The aim of this chapter is not to build a comprehensive legal 
framework on health and border management but to point into two relevant 
directions which can serve as possible starting points for future inquiries.  
The chapter is structured as follows: It starts by clarifying the selection, 
interpretation and relevance of the applicable legal framework. The chapter 
                                                   
9  Flegar et al. (2016), 17. 
10  Dembour (2010), 11. 
11  Compare Dembour (2010); Flegar et al. (2016). 
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then provides an analysis of the individual rights and state obligations with 
regard to medical care and emergency assistance before, subsequently, 
scrutinizing the individual rights and state obligations for medical screen-
ings at the border. Lastly, the chapter discusses the findings in light of 
whether the right to health should be seen as an empty promise or not. 
 
 
2. SELECTION, INTERPRETATION AND  
RELEVANCE OF THE APPLICABLE  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The chapter is based on desk research conducted in the period of March un-
til June 2016. It provides a textual analysis of legal sources recognized un-
der Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. As such, 
the documents outlined below are international human rights law treaties as 
well as supplementary, non-binding but authoritative, General Comments 
and General Recommendations issued by the treaty bodies monitoring the 
implementation of these international human rights law treaties.12 The pri-
mary focus remains the right to health enshrined in Article 12 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as 
the most authoritative and widely applicable source. This selection is not 
necessarily complete but aims to highlight some articles and interpretations 
which might be of particular relevance in the border context. The traditional 
doctrinal analysis of these documents is supplemented by a more normative 
discussion at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                   
12  The study does not include the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as 
this treaty is primarily relevant for already recognized refugees. In the context of 
border management, however, the type of persons which fall within the scope of 
border management measures is much broader and includes many persons who 
are not protected under that convention. The study therefore focuses on the hu-
man rights treaties which are applicable to all persons, regardless of their migra-
tion status. 
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2.1  Territorial Scope  
 
Currently, there exists no clear legal framework that explicitly governs 
health rights in the border context. Nevertheless, international treaties such 
as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) can be 
considered to also explicitly apply at the border through holding that the 
rights entailed in the treaty apply within the state party’s jurisdiction.13 In 
line with the object and purpose of these treaties, it can be concluded that 
the border domain falls within the jurisdiction of a state. As such, the rights 
and obligations of these treaties apply.  
Other treaties, such as the International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) do not contain a specific terri-
torial limitation. However, Articles 3, 6 and 14 of the ICERD explicitly re-
fer to the scope of their application as within the jurisdiction of a state party 
and Article 4(5) CRPD holds that it »shall extend to all parts of federal 
states without any limitations or exceptions«. Moreover, General Recom-
mendation No. 28 on the CEDAW core obligations highlights the fact that 
the convention applies to »women within the jurisdiction of the state party 
(including non-citizen, migrant, refugee, asylum-seeking, and stateless 
women)«14 and CEDAW General Recommendation No. 32 explicitly as-
serts that the responsibilities of states towards »women during displace-
ment« does not only comprise »women within their territory« but also »un-
der their effective control or jurisdiction, even if not situated within their 
territory.«15 
Only the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Their Families (ICMWF) is explicit on the border context in stating 
in Article 1(2) that the convention applies  
                                                   
13  Compare e.g. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 12 and 51; Article 2(1) 
CRC. 
14  CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, para. 26.  
15  CEDAW/C/GC/32, 14 November 2014, para. 7. See also CEDAW/C/2009/ 
WP.1/R, 15 December 2008, para. 3 which refers to responsibilities during the 
full »migration cycle«. 
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»during the entire migration process of migrant workers and members of their fami-
lies, which comprises preparation for migration, departure, transit and the entire pe-
riod of stay and remunerated activity in the State of employment as well as return to 
the State of origin or the State of habitual residence.«  
 
However, it must be noted that, while all other treaties are widely accepted 
and ratified by a large number of states, this convention has only been rati-
fied by migrant sending rather than by migrant receiving states and by only 
a small number of 50 state parties.16  
 
2.2  Personal Scope 
 
International human rights law must be considered to apply without dis-
crimination and the personal scope in most treaties is clear in that respect.17 
Yet, as regards the personal scope of the international human rights law 
treaties discussed below, it should be noted that not all treaties explicitly re-
fer to non-citizens or to persons in the context of forced migration.  
The personal scope of the International Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Their Families (ICMWF) needs particular clarifica-
tion: Article 3 holds that the convention does not apply to refugees or state-
less persons. However, this cannot be interpreted to mean that they are enti-
tled to a lesser standard than the rest of persons covered by the convention 
as it is simply a different regime under which their rights are protected. 
Moreover, while the term »migrant workers« suggests that the convention 
does not apply to all border crossers, the treaty’s scope is, nevertheless, 
broad and, as Ryan and Mantouvalou assert, the fact that it covers everyone 
»who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated 
activity« as well as »both employees and the self-employed« and »immedi-
ate family members« suggests that this convention closely resembles a trea-
ty which is concerned with the rights of all migrants.18 
 
 
                                                   
16  UN Treaty Collection (2016). 
17  Compare Article 2 ICESCR, Article 2 CRC, Articles 1 and 2 CEDAW, Article 1 
CERD and Article 1 CRPD. 
18  Ryan/Mantouvalou (2014), 186. 
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2.3  Other Considerations 
 
Like most human rights, the right to health can be limited in certain circum-
stances and, being an economic, social and cultural right, is subject to pro-
gressive realization: Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) allows states to realize »pro-
gressively« the rights and obligations entailed in the convention and »to 
take steps […] to the maximum of its available resources«. It is this pro-
gressive realization which makes economic, social and cultural rights con-
troversial and which allows states a large margin of appreciation when not 
complying with the convention. In addition, General Comment No. 14 of 
the ICESCR’s treaty body, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, allows for limitations of the right to health if these measures are 
»strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic 
society«.19 While most other international human rights law treaties dis-
cussed below are less explicit on these issues, the convention is commonly 
considered the most authoritative standard and therefore also influences the 
interpretation of these other treaties. These two mentioned provisions which 
severely limit the applicability of the right to health thus indeed raise the 
question of whether the right to health is merely an empty promise. The fol-
lowing therefore analyses two aspects of the right to health at the border, 
first the requirements regarding medical care and emergency assistance 
and, subsequently, the requirements regarding medical screenings. 
 
 
3.  MEDICAL CARE AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
AT THE BORDER 
 
States usually grant emergency medical care as the very least requirement 
to everyone.20 However, the term which is used and the scope of what ex-
actly falls within any such definition vary between countries and are still 
debated. Moreover, the extent to which this treatment also requires any 
emergency assistance other than medical care is still controversial. 
                                                   
19  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 28; Flegar (2015), 92. 
20  Compare Spencer/Hughes (2015). 
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Previous research has outlined the rights and obligations under the right 
to health with regard to providing medical assistance to undocumented mi-
grants.21 Based on these studies it becomes evident that a number of inter-
national treaties and subsidiary documents require the provision of at least 
some sort of medical care to all persons and in all circumstances. It seems 
that at least some of these rights and obligations should also apply at the 
border. However, the exact extent and content of these rights and obliga-
tions under the right to health, particularly with regard to what medical care 
and emergency assistance should be provided at the very least, is less clear-
ly defined.  
The following therefore asks: To what extent is the provision of med-
ical care and emergency assistance at the border a State obligation under 
the right to health? Does the right to health clarify the exact content of what 
should be provided? This section outlines the relevant provisions and tries 
to identify a minimum level of medical care and emergency assistance 
which States should provide at the border in order to abide by their human 
rights obligations. It starts with the most relevant and ends with the least 
relevant international human rights law treaty in this context. 
 
3.1  International Covenant on Economic, Social  
and Cultural Rights 
 
The provision of medical care and emergency assistance is most promi-
nently required in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the relevant General Comment 
which outlines the concrete rights and obligations under the right to health.  
Article 12 holds »the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health«. Based on this general 
provision, the article is instructive for further outlining the rights and obli-
gations on the provision of medical care in the border context: States must 
create »conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness«.22 However, the extent to which this also 
refers to the border context and the exact scope of this medical service and 
attention can only be clarified by looking at the relevant General Comment.  
                                                   
21  Compare Biswas et al. (2012); Flegar (2015). 
22  Article 12(2)(d) ICESCR. 
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»States are under the obligation to respect the right to health by, inter alia, refraining 
from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners or detain-
ees, minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and 
palliative health services.«23  
 
This provision suggests that everyone at the border should be granted full 
access to medical care and that health services should not be limited to only 
providing emergency treatment. However, it is unlikely that states would 
recognize such a broad obligation at the border in the near future as these 
rights are not even granted to persons who have already crossed the border 
and are clearly on the state territory.24 It is therefore valuable to consider 
what states would have to provide as a very minimum standard. The 
so-labelled core obligations under the right to health can be insightful in 
that regard. 
The core obligations of the right to health which must be ensured »at 
the very least« comprise the duty to provide »essential primary 
healthcare«.25 This seems to suggest that states thus have an obligation to 
provide more than just emergency medical care and rather have to provide 
essential primary healthcare at the border. Primary healthcare is defined in a 
footnote as »typically« concerning »common and relatively minor illnesses 
and is provided by health professionals and/or generally trained doctors 
working within the community at relatively low cost«.26 However, the fact 
that this definition is only mentioned in a footnote and the fact that it in-
volves the term »typically« suggests that not too much weight should be 
placed on this definition and that other definitions are also possible and po-
tentially within the scope and meaning. No clear definition of essential pri-
mary care is included in the main text. In addition to the obligation of states 
to provide essential primary healthcare, the core obligations also require 
states to provide emergency assistance, which comprises the »right of ac-
cess to health facilities, goods and services« as well as a right to food, shel-
ter and essential drugs.27 While more clarity on the exact content of these 
                                                   
23  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 34.  
24  Compare Flegar et al. (2016). 
25  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43. 
26  Ibid., footnote 9.  
27  Ibid., para. 43. 
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provisions would have been desirable, it must nevertheless be noted that 
these are far-reaching and innovative core obligations that should not go 
unnoticed in the border context. 
Moving beyond the core obligations, General Comment further clarifies 
the state obligations with regard to the provision of emergency assistance as 
having »to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assis-
tance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced persons«. This suggests that states have to cooperate on both 
sides of the border in order to ensure the right to health of border crossers is 
not violated. Moreover, it holds that »each State should contribute to this 
task to the maximum of its capacities«. In addition, states should give prior-
ity to persons in vulnerable situations in the provision of »safe and potable 
water, food and medical supplies, and financial aid«. Although the phrase 
»to the maximum of its capacities« is always open to interpretation, the re-
sponsibility of states to provide emergency assistance at the border is clear-
ly established and especially outspoken with regard to the prioritization of 
persons in vulnerable situations.28  
Summing up, the General Comment is very clear on the state obliga-
tions under the right to health at the border. States should provide at the 
very least essential primary healthcare rather than only emergency medical 
care and, as regards emergency assistance, states must provide food, shelter 
and essential drugs. When considering the right to health beyond the core 
obligations, states should provide access to preventive, curative and pallia-
tive health services and, in the provision of emergency assistance, persons 
in vulnerable situations should be prioritized. While the content of emer-
gency assistance seems to be rather clear the relevant General Comment as 
comprising the provision of healthcare, food, shelter and essential drugs, 
the exact content of essential primary healthcare is left undefined in the 
main text of the convention. 
 
3.2  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
For children, the rights and obligations with regard to health at the border 
are similar but more extensive than Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The Convention on 
                                                   
28  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 40. 
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the Rights of the Child (CRC) itself is already a lot more specific on the ex-
act content of the right to health of children. Similar to Article 12 ICESCR, 
Article 24 CRC holds »the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health«. Moreover, according to the same article, 
states »shall pursue full implementation« (which suggests progressive reali-
zation) in the fields of infant and child mortality, primary healthcare, dis-
ease and malnutrition, health education and preventive healthcare. Addi-
tionally, Article 22 CRC is particularly relevant for the border context as it 
contains specific provisions on asylum-seeking and refugee children. 
Accordingly, states  
 
»shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status 
or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domes-
tic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her 
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian as-
sistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights«  
 
of international human rights law. Hence, as part of this emergency assis-
tance, states are obliged to help with family tracing for unaccompanied mi-
nors and to afford them the same assistance as national children without 
family. 
The relevant General Comment further clarifies the right to health in the 
border context in stating that, as a core obligation, states must ensure »uni-
versal coverage of quality primary health services, including prevention, 
health promotion, care and treatment services, and essential drugs«, provide 
»an adequate response to the underlying determinants of children’s health« 
and adopt a »human rights-based approach to fulfilling children’s right to 
health«.29 As a core minimum, this goes much further than the essential 
primary healthcare criterion of the core obligations under the ICESCR. 
Hence, for children, states have even broader obligations that stretch much 
further than only providing emergency medical care at the border.  
Regarding emergency assistance, the General Comment is clear in hold-
ing that states must also cooperate internationally to ensure the global im-
plementation of the right to health. Hence, also at the border, states on both 
sides must collaborate in providing the necessary medical care and emer-
                                                   
29  CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, para. 73. 
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gency assistance.30 The General Comment of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child is very similar to General Comment No. 14 of the Committee 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in clarifying that states must »co-
operate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency« and must pay particular attention to persons in vulnerable situ-
ations when distributing medical aid and supplies, food, water and shelter.31 
These provisions are of a similar scope and content as the emergency assis-
tance provisions under the ICESCR. 
Overall, the CRC contains much broader provisions regarding the med-
ical care that should be provided to children at all times and therefore also 
at the border. This contains not only a responsibility for the provision of es-
sential primary healthcare but also, among other aspects, an obligation to 
address the underlying determinants of health. Regarding the provision of 
emergency assistance, however, the convention does not go beyond the 
rights and obligations entailed in the ICESCR. 
 
3.3  Convention on the Elimination of  
Discrimination Against Women  
 
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) does not refer to anything border- or migration-related in its 
treaty. Nevertheless, the right to health is defined in Article 12 and a Gen-
eral Recommendation further clarifies a few aspects that are relevant for the 
border context. As such, it becomes clear that states have an obligation to 
pay special attention to the health needs of migrant and refugee women.32 
Moreover, states  
 
»should ensure that adequate protection and health services, including trauma treat-
ment and counselling, are provided for women in especially difficult circumstances, 
such as those trapped in situations of armed conflict and women refugees.«33 
 
                                                   
30  CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, para. 86. 
31  Ibid., para. 88. 
32  A/54/38/Rev. 1, chap. 1, 1999, para. 6. 
33  Ibid., para. 16. 
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No specific mention is made of emergency assistance except for the need to 
provide »emergency obstetric services«.34 However, this refers to an indi-
vidual emergency situation rather than to an external situation of humani-
tarian distress. Generally, states »should ensure that the special nutritional 
needs of all women within their jurisdiction are met«, which suggests that 
more than only medical care must be provided at the border.35 
The General Recommendation does not define any core obligations.36 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that it reinforces the right to health of 
women at the border. This General Recommendation should be read as 
supplementing the right to health under Article 12 of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and as simply 
specifying some aspects that are of particular relevance to women. Alt-
hough clearer definitions on the content are lacking, the document thus 
suggests that women in transit have a right to health beyond only essential 
primary healthcare which, instead, also includes psychological support and 
adequate nutrition. 
Summing up, this convention thus moves beyond the ICESCR in em-
phasizing the obligation to provide psychological support and adequate nu-
trition to women in transit. However, in clarifying any more specific state 
obligations at the border with regard to medical care and emergency assis-
tance, the convention is not very insightful. 
 
3.4  International Convention on the Rights  
of All Migrant Workers and Their Families  
 
Article 28 of the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Their Families (ICMWF) is particularly relevant when defin-
ing the right to health at the border as it refers to migrants in particular. 
However, unlike the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), it limits the essential primary healthcare standard of the Inter-
                                                   
34  A/54/38/Rev. 1, chap. 1, 1999, para. 27. 
35  Ibid., para. 7. 
36  Rather, General Recommendation No. 24 talks about key elements. However, 
these cannot be compared to core obligations as basically anything in this Gen-
eral Recommendation is part of the key elements. 
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national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to 
something even more narrowly defined:  
 
»Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to receive any 
medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoid-
ance of irreparable harm to their health on the basis of equality of treatment with na-
tionals of the State concerned. Such emergency medical care shall not be refused to 
them by reason of any irregularity with regard to stay or employment.«37  
 
This is the first and only clear definition of emergency medical care which 
everyone is entitled to. According to this article, border crossers explicitly 
have this right to emergency medical care where it is »urgently required for 
the preservation of their life or the avoidance of irreparable harm«. Alt-
hough this is the clearest standard so far, one can still ask what the exact 
definition and content of this phrase is as regards, for instance, the meaning 
of urgency or irreparable harm.  
The Committee on Migrant Workers’ General Comment No. 2 is also 
clear on the fact that access to health services should under no circum-
stances be used as an instrument of immigration control.38 It clarifies that, 
in circumstances of extreme poverty and vulnerability, emergency assis-
tance should be provided to irregular migrant workers and their families but 
any further definition or reference to emergency assistance in the context of 
immigration control, i.e. at the border, is lacking.39 However, this General 
Comment emphasizes that the provision of any medical care does not have 
to be free of charge but exemption rules should apply to migrants in the 
same way as they would apply for nationals and excessive fees or request-
ing proof of payment before the service is delivered should be prohibited. It 
is surprising that the convention as the treaty for migrant rights provides a 
more limited definition of the healthcare that should be provided to every-
one than other international human rights law had already established. In 
this respect, it should be noted that this General Comment clarifies that 
Article 28 is not to be understood narrowly but that, read in combination 
with other international human rights law instruments, broader obligations 
                                                   
37  Article 28 ICMWF. 
38  CMW/C/GC/2, 23 August 2013, para. 74. 
39  Ibid., para. 71. 
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are created.40 It then repeats the abovementioned state obligations under the 
ICESCR and CRC. Similar to the CEDAW, the convention or its General 
Comment do not define any core obligations. 
Overall, the ICMWF is insightful in providing a clear definition of ur-
gent medical care. However, any further clarification as regards medical 
care or emergency assistance at the border is lacking. It must be empha-
sized that the convention must not be read to limit any state obligations al-
ready entailed in other treaties but it is worrying that the convention at first 
glance provides a different and therefore rather confusing standard. This 
confusion is further enhanced by the distinction of non-citizens into differ-
ent groups which are suggested to have different rights.41 This clearly con-
tradicts the universality argument commonly implied in all other inter-
national human rights law treaties.  
 
3.5  Convention on the Elimination of  
Racial Discrimination  
 
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) does 
not mention anything border- or migration-related in the treaty itself but the 
relevant General Recommendation highlights the obligation of states to 
»respect the right of non-citizens to an adequate standard of physical and 
mental health by, inter alia, refraining from denying or limiting their access 
to preventive, curative and palliative health services«.42 As this entails a 
general reference to all non-citizens, it must be assumed that residence sta-
tus plays no role here and that this obligation therefore also applies at the 
border. 
Furthermore, although no reference is made to emergency assistance, 
states should »remove obstacles that prevent the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights by non-citizens« in the fields such as housing, ed-
ucation and employment.43 However, »removing obstacles« does not seem 
                                                   
40  CMW/C/GC/2, 23 August 2013, para. 72. 
41  As outlined above, the ICMWF excludes refugees, distinguishes between un-
documented and documented migrants and further limits the scope due to pri-
marily talking about migrant workers. 
42  A/59/18, 2004, 23 February - 12 March 2004, para. 36. 
43  Ibid., para. 29. 
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to require the active provision of these rights to non-citizens, which leaves 
this provision as a rather weak and insufficiently defined right. No further 
core obligations are defined and no reference is made to medical care or 
emergency assistance in a more profound manner. 
It can thus be concluded that the convention neither clarifies nor con-
tradicts the ICESCR provisions regarding rights and obligations in the field 
of medical care and emergency assistance at the border in any meaningful 
way. 
 
3.6  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) does 
not mention migrants, asylum seekers, refugees or any other non-citizens in 
its treaty or General Comments. Nevertheless, Article 11 refers to the obli-
gations of states for persons in humanitarian emergencies which seems to 
imply a certain responsibility at least towards asylum seekers and refugees. 
Moreover, as the scope of the convention extends to all persons with disa-
bilities, Article 25 is relevant in clarifying the scope of the right to health 
for citizens as well as non-citizens with disabilities as having to be at least 
of the same level as for all other persons – regardless of whether that person 
is at the border or within the territory of a state. However, no specific men-
tion is made of a minimum standard of medical care or emergency assis-
tance that should be provided. 
 
3.7  Concluding Remarks 
 
The above analysis revealed that none of the international human rights law 
treaties relevant for the right to health explicitly allow for any differential 
treatment at the border as compared to within a state. Additionally, it is 
clear that one does not have to be on the territory of a state for any partic-
ular amount of time before the obligations under international human rights 
law apply.  
Moreover, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) seems to still offer the clearest standard on what mini-
mum level of medical care and emergency assistance should be provided at 
the border. Accordingly, medical care should be understood as essential 
primary healthcare and emergency assistance as medical care, food, shelter 
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and access to essential drugs. It is clear that the obligation to provide emer-
gency assistance extends beyond the own border so even on the territory 
between two states both states would be responsible for providing emer-
gency assistance. However, the exact content of the medical care and emer-
gency assistance which should be provided remains unclear. The Interna-
tional Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families 
(ICMWF) suggests a definition for urgent medical care, which is any care 
that is »urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoidance 
of irreparable harm«. Yet, it must be emphasized that this approach seems 
more limited than the provision of essential primary healthcare and cannot 
be considered to overrule the ICESCR’s approach. More extensive rights 
seem to apply for persons in vulnerable situations – a finding which is also 
supported by the provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).  
Despite the diverging standards it is clear that, while progressive reali-
zation and derogation might be applicable with regard to more specific 
treatment at the international level, nothing allows states to not grant any 
medical care or emergency assistance at the border. It is an established in-
ternational standard that, as a core minimum, all persons must have access 
to essential primary healthcare. However, as its content is not further 
defined, this is left to the discretion of individual states which might harm 
the enjoyment of the right to health. Clear rules and legal certainty are es-
sential for effective human rights implementation, monitoring and protec-
tion. No matter whether rights are seen as legal standards, advocacy tools or 
moral claims, clarity on the content of the rights and obligations at the bor-
der as regards medical care and emergency assistance is favourable to all 
three purposes of human rights. In order to ensure that the right to health is 
not an empty promise, it is therefore crucial to clearly define the applicable 
standard and to give coherent content and meaning to the concepts which 
are propagated.  
Overall, the above section showed how the right to health does help to 
clarify the rights and obligations in terms of medical care and emergency 
assistance at the border. At the same time, it revealed that clear definitions 
and a coherent approach across the different treaties at the international and 
regional level could contribute to limit any existing allegations about the 
empty promise of the right to health. 
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4.  MEDICAL SCREENINGS AT THE BORDER 
 
Medical screenings include tests, examinations, or other procedures which 
can be applied rapidly in order to identify persons likely to have a disease. 
A screening test is not intended to be diagnostic.44 Border screenings, to-
gether with isolation and quarantine measures, are implemented to delay or 
prevent the entry of infected persons to a country or a geographic area or to 
prevent the global spread of a disease from a source country.45 In addition 
to border screenings, medical screenings can be imposed pre-departure (e.g. 
for a work or residence permit) and upon stay in the host country (e.g. for a 
change of visa status). Post-arrival screenings are also undertaken for refu-
gees, humanitarian entrants and undocumented migrants.46 The diseases 
screened for are mainly communicable diseases with a public relevance, 
such as tuberculosis, but also HIV/AIDS.47  
Border screenings are a complex matter: not only do infectious diseases 
affect the public health, but the right to health of migrants is equally at 
stake when they have to undergo a screening for these diseases. The follow-
ing section therefore focuses on the individual rights and state obligations 
under the right to health with regard to medical screenings at the border: To 
what extent are medical screenings upon entering a country a state obliga-
tion under the right to health? Does the right to health clarify the conditions 
for applying them? Based on international human rights law treaties and 
subsidiary documents, this section tries to delineate the state obligations 
under the right to health with regard to migration-related medical screen-
ings. This is done on the basis of the traditional understanding of medical 
screening of migrants as measures aimed at protecting the host population. 
The main focus is thus on infectious disease control upon arrival at the bor-
der rather than on any other types of screening, such as, for instance, psy-
                                                   
44  Porta (2014), 275. 
45  Selvey et al. (2015), 197. 
46  WHO et al. (2013), 33; Wickramage/Mosca (2014), 9955. 
47  For example, some EU countries screen migrants before, at or after entry for tu-
berculosis: van der Werf/Zellweger (2016), 2. According to UNAIDS some 
35 countries, territories and areas impose some form of restriction on the entry, 
stay and residence of people with HIV based on their HIV status: UNAIDS 
(2015). 
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chological screenings. When deemed relevant for humanitarian border 
management, other health assessments are included in the overview as 
some international human rights law treaties adopt a broader understanding 
of medical screenings. However, the denial to enter a country for the pro-
tection of public health goes beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
4.1  International Covenant on Economic, Social  
and Cultural Rights 
 
No explicit reference is made to medical screenings under the right to 
health in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). However, Article 12(2)(c) obliges states, in order to 
achieve the full realization of the right to health, to take steps »for the pre-
vention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and oth-
er diseases«.  
The relevant General Comment provides further clarification as to how 
the »control of diseases« has to be understood, namely as »States’ individ-
ual and joint efforts« which include, but are not limited to,  
 
»making available relevant technologies, using and improving epidemiological sur-
veillance and data collection on a disaggregated basis, implementing or enhancing of 
immunization programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control.«48 
 
It can be assumed that medical screenings are included in the term »other 
strategies of infectious disease control«. In this regard, it should be noted 
that the General Comment focuses on »infectious« disease control, whereas 
the wording in the convention is broader and also includes control measures 
for non-communicable diseases.49  
While not all obligations under the right to health are of immediate ef-
fect or enforceable, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights refers to the obligation »to take measures to prevent, treat and con-
trol epidemic and endemic diseases« as an obligation of »comparable prior-
                                                   
48  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 16. 
49  An infectious disease is »a disease due to an infectious agent. While some infec-
tious diseases are contagious, others are noncontagious. All infections and infes-
tations are communicable [Syn: transmissible] diseases.« Porta (2014), 148.  
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ity« to the core obligations.50 Furthermore, it calls not only for individual, 
but also for »joint efforts«, which is further explained as collective respon-
sibility of the international community to address the spread of transmissi-
ble diseases.51 This extends State obligations to the control of infectious 
diseases beyond their borders.  
In addition to providing at least this minimum of necessary measures at 
the border, states also have to respect the right to free and informed consent 
of border crossers when imposing medical screenings.52 As such, the Gen-
eral Comment states that »the right to control one’s health and body, […] 
the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from […] 
non-consensual medical treatment« and the right to privacy and information 
are integral components of the right to health.53 Yet, this does not automati-
cally mean that states cannot screen someone who is crossing a border and 
refuses to give his free and informed consent to a medical screening for an 
infectious disease: Article 4 of the convention only allows for limitations 
»for the purpose of general welfare«. Accordingly, restrictions for public 
health reasons must be legitimate, in the interest of »legitimate aims« and 
strictly necessary for the general welfare.54 In addition, Article 5(1) re-
quires that the limitation is »proportional«, this means that the least restric-
tive alternative must be adopted and they should be of limited duration and 
subject to review.55 General Comment No. 14 further clarifies that coercive 
treatment for the prevention and control of communicable diseases is al-
lowed »on an exceptional basis«.56 Nevertheless, this is no general permis-
sion as such exceptional coercive treatment should be »subject to specific 
and restrictive conditions, respecting best practices and applicable interna-
tional standards«.57  
In this context, it is also worth pointing out that, even where other 
screenings might be allowed without consent, General Comment No. 22 is 
                                                   
50  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 44.  
51  Ibid., paras. 16 and 40. 
52  Henrard (2008), 169. 
53  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 3 and 8. 
54  Ibid., para. 28. 
55  Ibid., para. 29. 
56  Ibid., para. 34. 
57  Ibid. 
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clear on prohibiting any »mandatory HIV/AIDS, virginity or pregnancy 
testing«.58 Moreover, it is a core obligation to ensure privacy, confiden-
tiality and free, informed consent for sexual and reproductive needs« and to 
»repeal or eliminate laws, policies and practices that criminalize, obstruct 
or undermine individual’s or particular group’s access to sexual and repro-
ductive health«.59 Thereby the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights excludes in its latest General Comment all mandatory screening 
related to sexual and reproductive health.  
To sum up, the ICESCR contributes significantly to the clarification of 
the obligation of states to control the spread of infectious diseases at the 
border. States should take at least a minimum of measures at their borders 
in order to control the spread of epidemic and endemic diseases. Screenings 
require a free and informed consent under the right to health. Nevertheless, 
medical screenings for other infectious diseases might be allowed for the 
protection of public health and in accordance with the conditions set forth 
in Article 4 and 5(1) of the convention. Yet, all sexual health-related man-
datory screening is prohibited.  
 
4.2  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The right to health as enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) contains no explicit reference to either medical screenings or 
to the control of diseases. However, under Article 24(2)(c) states have the 
obligation to take measures to combat diseases within the framework of 
primary healthcare.60 According to paragraph VII(3) of the Alma-Ata 
Declaration, such primary healthcare includes at least, inter alia, »the con-
trol of locally endemic diseases«. General Comment No. 15 lists ensuring 
»universal coverage of primary health services« among the core obliga-
tions, which suggests that, when read in combination with the Alma-Ata 
                                                   
58  E/C.12/GC/22, 14 March 2016, para. 57. 
59  Ibid., para. 49(d).  
60  The Committee on the Rights of the Child refers to the Alma-Ata Declaration 
where the approach to primary healthcare was defined to also include the control 
of infectious diseases. CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, para. 4. 
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Declaration, the control of locally endemic diseases falls within the mini-
mum a state should ensure at its border.61   
Similar to General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 clarifies that chil-
dren’s right to health includes the right »to control one’s health and 
body«.62 Children’s right to consent to certain medical treatments and in-
terventions might nevertheless be conditional on the permission or assis-
tance of a parent, caregiver or guardian, depending on the child’s age and 
maturity.63 However, with regard to HIV testing, states should consider to 
allow children to consent without the permission of a parent or caregiver.64 
State parties must thereby protect the confidentiality of HIV test results and 
information on the HIV status of children may not be disclosed without the 
child’s consent to third parties, including parents.65 In addition, states 
should ensure that girls can make autonomous and informed decisions on 
their reproductive health.66 Moreover, General Comment No. 3 is very clear 
in stating that mandatory HIV/AIDS testing of children is prohibited under 
all circumstances and that states should ensure protection against it.67  
In addition to the screening for infectious diseases, General Comment 
No. 6 requires states to conduct additional screenings in the border context: 
it calls upon states, with the best interests of the child as a guiding princi-
ple, to prioritize the identification of unaccompanied and separated children 
»upon arrival at ports of entry or as soon as their presence in the country 
becomes known to the authorities«.68 Subsequently, states are required to 
assess and record during the »necessary initial assessment process«, »par-
ticular vulnerabilities, including health, physical, psychosocial […] needs, 
including those deriving from domestic violence, trafficking or trauma«. 
The aim of this kind of assessment is to meet the specific needs of the 
                                                   
61  CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, para. 73. 
62  Ibid., para. 24. 
63  Ibid., para. 21. 
64  Ibid., para. 31. 
65  CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, para. 24. 
66  CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013, para. 56. 
67  CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, para. 23. 
68  CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 September 2005, para. 31. 
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child.69 Furthermore, in order to ensure their access to health services – 
which must be the same as for children who are nationals – states should 
»assess and address the particular plight and vulnerabilities of such chil-
dren«.70 States should pay particular attention to the psychological condi-
tion of unaccompanied and separated children and to specific gender-
related needs of girls.71 Hence, the convention focuses not only on infec-
tious disease control, but obligates states also to make health(-related) 
assessments in the interest of the child crossing the border.  
In conclusion, interesting new insights can be drawn from the analysis 
of this convention. In contrast to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the CRC does not explicitly mention 
the obligation to control diseases under the right to health. Rather, it incor-
porates it in primary healthcare and shifts the emphasis from control to 
care. Thus, voluntary and confidential testing is stressed as a means to pre-
vent diseases and to ensure children’s access to health services.72 Both the 
CRC and the ICESCR require a free and informed consent to medical 
screenings and explicitly prohibit mandatory HIV/AIDS testing. However, 
whereas the ICESCR leaves room in Article 4 and 5(1) for mandatory 
screenings – with the exception of screenings related to sexual health – the 
CRC does not. Finally, and particularly relevant, the CRC imposes a duty 
upon states to prioritize early identification of unaccompanied and separat-
ed children in order to guarantee their access to health services.  
 
4.3  Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women 
 
The right to health in Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) does not specify any obligation 
for the control of infectious diseases. However, the relevant General Rec-
ommendation states that »State parties should report on what they have 
done to address the magnitude of women's ill-health, in particular when it 
                                                   
69  CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 September 2005, para. 31. 
70  Ibid., para. 47. 
71  Ibid., paras. 46–47. 
72  See specifically about HIV/AIDS testing: CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, 
para. 22. 
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arises from preventable conditions, such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS«.73 
Notwithstanding that this General Recommendation is not explicit on the 
reach of this obligation, paragraph 6 highlights that special attention should 
be paid to inter alia the health needs and rights of migrant women and ref-
ugee women.74  
In addition, this General Recommendation prohibits coercive measures 
such as mandatory testing for sexually transmitted diseases.75 States are re-
quired to ensure women’s »right to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, in-
formed consent and choice« in all health services.76 However, it is unclear 
if border screenings would fall within the definition of a health service.  
General Recommendation No. 26 defines state obligations on pre-
departure health screenings of women migrant workers: where pre-
departure HIV/AIDS testing and pre-departure health examinations are re-
quired by the country of destination, they must be respectful of the human 
rights of women migrants. Here, special attention should be paid to volun-
tariness and to problems of stigmatization.77 In referring to the obligation to 
respect women’s human rights and voluntariness, this General Recommen-
dation provides a solution for the possibly conflicting interests of public 
health and the individual. Thus, even in cases of mandatory screenings, free 
and informed consent is required.  
Moreover, General Recommendation No. 32 urges states to establish 
adequate screening mechanisms for the early identification of women asy-
lum seekers »with specific protection and assistance needs, including wom-
en with disabilities, unaccompanied girls, victims of trauma, victims of traf-
ficking and/or forced prostitution, victims of sexual violence and victims of 
torture and/or ill-treatment«.78 However, the convention does not specifi-
cally link this requirement to the right to health.  
In conclusion, the convention provides significant clarification on mi-
gration-related screenings. Particularly remarkable is the fact that it also re-
quires free and informed consent for obligatory pre-departure medical 
                                                   
73  A/54/38/Rev. 1, chap. 1, 1999, para. 17. 
74  Ibid., para. 6. 
75  Ibid., para. 22.  
76  Ibid., para. 31(e). 
77  CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R, 15 December 2008, para. 24(d). 
78  Ibid., para. 46. 
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screenings. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is far less specific on this subject and even allows for forced medical 
interventions, with the exclusion of screenings related to sexual and repro-
ductive health. Similar to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
the CEDAW links medical screenings with the obligation to ensure access 
to care. Moreover, it also explicates that obligatory screenings have to be 
free of charge. Finally, the CEDAW, like the CRC, calls for early identifi-
cation of vulnerability at the border. 
 
4.4  The International Convention on the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Their Families 
 
The International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
their Families (ICMWF) provides no prima facie guidance on infectious 
disease control. As outlined above, Article 28 of the convention limits 
migrant workers and their families’ right to health to medical care which is 
urgently required.  
Although the Committee on Migrant Workers has not (yet) issued a 
General Comment on the right to health, General Comment No.1 is 
instructive on states’ limitations regarding medical screenings at the border. 
Thus, medical testing of female migrant domestic workers, including tests 
for pregnancy or HIV, is only allowed with their free and informed consent. 
Additionally, state parties should »repeal discriminatory laws, regulations 
and practices related to HIV«.79 Thus, the loss of work visas based on HIV 
status is prohibited. 80  
In summary, contrary to the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, but like the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW), the convention is not informative 
on the public health aspects of disease control. But, like the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the CEDAW, it explicitly demands free 
and informed consent for migration-related medical screenings. However, 
unlike the CEDAW, it gives no further clarification on the conditions and 
costs of screenings when required before or upon arrival or stay in a coun-
                                                   
79  CMW/C/GC/1, 3 February 2011, para. 61. 
80  Ibid. 
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try. In contrast to the CRC and the CEDAW, no reference is made to any 
obligation to identify particular vulnerabilities of migrants. 
 
4.5  Convention about the Rights of Persons  
with Disabilities 
 
The Convention about the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) does 
not add anything specific with regard to the border-related control of dis-
eases. However, Article 25(b) requires another kind of assessment. Accord-
ingly, states are obliged to provide disability-related health services, includ-
ing early identification. Its wording resembles the calls by General Com-
ment No. 6 of the Committee of the Rights of the Child and General Rec-
ommendation No. 24 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women to identify vulnerable women and children at the 
border in order to ensure their access to health services. By comparison, the 
obligation under Article 25(b) might imply that states should also actively 
screen for persons with disabilities at their borders in case they would be in 
need of access to health services.   
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Article 25(d) prescribes states to 
»[r]equire health professionals to provide care of the same quality to per-
sons with disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and in-
formed consent«. This is the first treaty which contains an explicit reference 
to the right to free and informed consent. The Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’s General Comment No. 1 outlines the extent of 
this obligation as applying to all health and medical professsionals.81 More-
over, this General Comment recognizes the right to free and informed con-
sent »everywhere« and »on an equal basis with others«.82 However, con-
sidering the wording of Article 25(d) of the convention, the question re-
mains whether medical screenings at the border would fall within the defi-
nition of »care” or whether any compulsory screening would not be consid-
ered to constitute a provision of care within the meaning of this article. 
To summarize, the convention highlights two aspects of the right to 
health relevant for border medical screenings. First, like General Comment 
No. 6 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and General Recommen-
                                                   
81  CRPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014, para. 41. 
82  Ibid., paras. 5, 8 and 41. 
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dation No. 32 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, it calls for the early identification of persons with specific 
needs, i.e. disability. Second, it is the first treaty to explicitly guarantee the 
right to free and informed consent. However, it remains questionable 
whether the scope of this provision would also extend to border screenings. 
In this regard, General Recommendation No. 26 of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Committee on Mi-
grant Workers’ General Comment No. 2 provide stronger guidelines as they 
require free and informed consent even for obligatory migration-related 
medical screenings.  
 
4.6  International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination 
 
Article 5(e)(iv) of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) stipulates that States should guarantee the 
right of everyone to »public health«. General Recommendation No. 20 ex-
plains that Article 5(e)(iv) does not create »new« rights, as their existence 
and recognition is presumed by listing them.83 Upon first reflection, this 
seems disappointing, as no clarification of the content of »the right to pub-
lic health« is provided. Nevertheless, it is not an empty concept, as it refers 
to all the other treaties incorporating it.  
In addition, General Recommendation No. 30 stipulates under which 
conditions different treatment based on citizenship or immigration status 
constitutes discrimination.84 Accordingly, medical screenings of (certain 
groups of) migrants crossing the border, is a discrimination if it is not in 
accordance with a »legitimate aim« and not »proportional to the achieve-
ment of this aim«. These criteria are similar to the criteria that allow for 
limitations of rights under Article 4 and 5(1) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Altogether, the ICERD does not shed light on the content of »the right 
to public health« as such. It only provides general criteria to discern dis-
criminating measures. 
 
                                                   
83  A/51/18, annex VIII, sect. A, 1996, 26 February - 15 March 1996, para. 1. 
84  A/59/18, 2004, 23 February - 12 March 2004, para. 4. 
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4.7  Concluding Remarks 
 
Overall, international human rights law provides fragmentary clarifications 
about medical border screenings for infectious diseases. Nevertheless, some 
important conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis.  
The clearest reference to medical screenings is found in Article 12(2)(2) 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) that enshrines the obligation »to control diseases«. Surprisingly, 
this obligation is much broader than its literal meaning, including avail-
ability of technological measures, data collection and surveillance, immuni-
zation and other strategies. This description is trend-setting for an overall 
approach in international human rights law that consider screenings as an 
obligation that does not come solely. Thus, the link between medical 
screenings and ensuring access to care is made under the ICESCR, the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Only the CEDAW 
and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
their Families (ICMWF) specifically state that migration-related health as-
sessments should be free of costs. Moving away from screenings related to 
(infectious) diseases, the CRC, CEDAW and the Convention about the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) require the identification of cer-
tain categories of vulnerable people at the border in order to assess their 
health needs and ensure their access at the border.   
Altogether, the treaties highlight different aspects of the conditions that 
should accompany medical border screenings. However, only the Commit-
tee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has given a – rather 
blurred – explanation regarding the enforceability of the obligation »to con-
trol endemic and epidemic diseases« by calling it an obligation of »compa-
rable priority« to a core obligation. In order to ensure that the right to health 
in relation to border screenings does not become an empty promise, it 
would therefore be useful to be crystal-clear about the exact extent (core 
obligation or not) and the exact content of the obligation to control diseases 
(in relation to the obligation to ensure access to care).  
A second important conclusion is that the right to free and informed 
consent is implied as a general obligation in all treaties under the right to 
health. It is, nevertheless, only expressly stated in the newest treaty, the 
CRPD. The extent to which states can derogate from the right to free and 
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informed consent is therefore difficult to determine. This might also point 
to the fact that some international human rights law standards are getting 
outdated and, in light of the CRPD and the General Comments and General 
Recommendations of other treaty bodies, a new and authoritative interpre-
tation of the limitation clause in CESCR General Comment No. 14 regard-
ing forced medical interventions could prove to be useful.85 Ideally, this in-
terpretation would take into account the criteria already set forth in other 
treaty bodies.  
More generally, it is also worth to consider in more depth in the future 
to what extent and how human rights should relate to so-called public 
health evidence and to the recommendations or even enforceable regula-
tions from specialized agencies such as WHO.86 
 
 
5.  DISCUSSION  
 
Based on the above analysis of the rights and obligations in international 
human rights law with regard to medical care and emergency assistance as 
well as medical screenings at the border, the following pinpoints four as-
pects of particular relevance when discussing whether the right to health is 
an empty promise. These aspects are: clarity and consistency, the margin of 
appreciation, vulnerability and human rights as advocacy tools. 
 
5.1 Clarity and Consistency 
 
States are generally reluctant to accept international human rights law obli-
gations, particularly in the field of economic, social and cultural rights, and 
enforcement mechanisms for human rights are generally weak. For the right 
to health to constitute more than an empty promise, it is therefore necessary 
to establish clear guidelines. Preferably, the guidelines should be consistent 
across different treaties in order to build one single comprehensive frame-
work and avoid confusion about the applicable standard. The example of 
                                                   
85  See also Minkowitz (2007), 407. 
86  See e.g. Article 32 of the International Health Regulations (2005) which balanc-
es the right to informed consent against public health interests. 
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the rights and obligations under the right to health has shown that such a 
clear standard does not yet exist in the border context.  
There is a clear obligation to provide some sort of medical care and 
emergency assistance to everyone, regardless of their legal status. However, 
the exact content of these two terms differs depending on the treaty that is 
considered. It currently seems to be left to the discretion of the medical 
practitioner – or even to a border agent – to judge what treatment or assis-
tance is necessary. If international human rights law treaty bodies were to 
adopt a coherent definition of the content of medical care and emergency 
assistance, this certainly could contribute to the right to health not becom-
ing an empty promise. 
With regard to medical border screenings, it is clear that States are al-
lowed – and even required – to conduct medical screenings at the border. 
However, it is unclear to what extend States can screen a person who has 
not given her/his informed consent. Moreover, some international human 
rights law treaty bodies relate medical screening to access to healthcare but 
this is not yet highlighted consistently across the different international hu-
man rights law treaties. Connecting medical screenings more prominently 
to the access to healthcare would be pivotal to ensure the effective realiza-
tion of the right to health.  
 
5.2  The Margin of Appreciation 
 
Whether the provisions of the right to health are an empty promise also de-
pends on the margin of appreciation granted to member states to diverge 
from the treaty obligations and to interpret the treaty in their own terms. 
The right to health remains a right which is not absolute and, in accordance 
with the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ General 
Comment No. 14, can thus be limited in the general public interest. This 
means that limitations to the rights to medical care and emergency assis-
tance are not completely ruled out under all circumstances. However, any 
such measures must be »in accordance with the law”, for a legitimate aim 
and »strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare”.87 Also in 
the context of medical screenings, coercive medical treatment is allowed in 
»exceptional cases« for »the prevention and control of communicable dis-
                                                   
87  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 28. 
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eases«.88 Such measures must be »proportional«, »of limited duration« and 
»subject to review«.89 The right to health thus offers a rather clear guide on 
the conditions which have to be met by states in order to allow for any limi-
tation of the right to health. Nevertheless, states can thus potentially limit 
the scope and possible impact of the right to health in the context of human-
itarian border management. 
 
5.3   Vulnerability  
 
In light of insufficient clarity and the margin of appreciation granted to 
states in the field of health, the question remains whether there are any 
additional safeguards which could help to ensure the right to health is not 
an empty promise. This is even more so the case in contexts such as at the 
border where states are particularly reluctant to grant extensive rights 
because of state sovereignty concerns. Particular consideration for persons 
in vulnerable situations seems to provide a helpful additional safeguard in 
that respect. 
Many of the treaties discussed above recognize that states have a spe-
cial responsibility for persons who might be in a situation of vulnerability 
and that, due to that vulnerability, these persons should be treated on a 
preferential basis. Moreover, most of the specialized treaties such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women even exist because of this very under-
standing of the need of particular attention to these vulnerable groups. Gen-
erally, the scope of the right to health thus seems to be more easily accepta-
ble for states with regard to particular vulnerable groups, such as women or 
children. However, such a group-based approach has often been criticized 
as »paternalistic«, »stigmatizing« and static.90 Moreover, although treaties 
which deal with particular vulnerable groups might sometimes go beyond 
the standard of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, the question for future research remains whether this also leads to a 
higher level of protection in practice.  
                                                   
88  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 34. 
89  Ibid., para. 29. 
90  Brown (2011), 316; Peroni/Timmer (2013), 1057; Flegar (2016). 
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The extent to which the conditions at the border or during a migratory 
journey may put persons in a vulnerable position is not (yet) explicitly rec-
ognized in most treaties.  
While concern for particular vulnerable groups can thus certainly be 
considered to constitute a first step towards the realization of the right to 
health of those persons who are most needy of protection, the lack of a 
more nuanced understanding of vulnerability currently increases the argu-
ments in favour of the right to health as an empty promise in the border 
context. 
 
5.4  Human Rights as Advocacy Tools 
 
The above analysis showed the difficulties in defining any clear standard. 
Wherever the state sovereignty to control its territory is (perceived as) 
threatened, it is less likely that extensive rights are granted. Despite the 
above critique and limitations of the right to health, the present analysis 
tried to show some of the potential the right to health still has. 
Returning to Dembour’s four schools of human rights, the present anal-
ysis suggests that human rights can generally be perceived as a legal tool, 
advocacy framework or moral claim. Although the four types Dembour 
identifies are ideal types and the present study cannot solely be ascribed to 
one of the four schools, the study considers the right to health within the 
protest school paradigm. The above analysis revealed that the right to 
health is more than just a moral principle (as the natural school would sug-
gest). However, it is not yet an enforceable legal claim (as the deliberative 
school would suggest). Framing the right to health within the protest school 
thus best underlines the current effectiveness of the right to health in view-
ing it as a constantly fought for principle which is valuable because of its 
expression of far-reaching claims and aspirations.91 Following this ap-
proach would lead to the conclusion that the right to health is more than just 
an empty promise. It is a guideline which clarifies states’ human rights ob-
ligations in the field of health. Even if these are in many cases not (yet) 
enforceable, this guideline provides useful principles to strive for in policy 
and practice. 
                                                   
91  Compare Dembour (2010). 
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In lack of sufficiently clear legal guidelines or enforcement mecha-
nisms, the right to health can thus be understood as deriving particular val-
ue from being an advocacy tool that can support the fight for human rights 
not only in the context of humanitarian border management but also in 
more general terms. While the legal enforceability of human rights is often 
problematic and especially the progressive realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights feeds criticism on the right to health, certain aspects are 
clearly defined and can provide strong arguments when, for instance, moni-
toring compliance with or promoting the right to health.  
This is not to say that there are no possibilities to further improve the 
role of the right to health in order to counter any criticism of it being an 
empty promise: the issues of clarity, proportionality and vulnerability as 
well as other limitations which were not addressed in this chapter might 
still have to be considered in more depth for the right to health to become a 
stronger legal rule. Overall, however, the right to health should be acknowl-
edged for providing valuable arguments and concrete suggestions that can 
contribute to improving the health of every individual human being. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The present chapter tried to highlight the scope and content of the rights 
and obligations under the right to health at the border. It focused, first, on 
medical care and emergency assistance before clarifying the issue of medi-
cal screenings. In so doing, it tried to answer the question of whether the 
right to health does indeed have to be viewed as an empty promise in the 
context of border management or whether it provides valuable guidance. 
Three problematic issues were highlighted which should be addressed if the 
right to health is to be strengthened: clarity and consistency, the margin of 
appreciation and vulnerability. Placing the right to health into the context of 
a broader debate on the added value of human rights, the present study fol-
lows Dembour’s protest school and would argue that the right to health is 
certainly not an empty promise if understood as advocacy tool. The present 
study revealed that, even if the right to health is not yet a reality, it is cer-
tainly valuable and an essential factor for clarifying individual rights and 
state obligations at the border – if not (yet) as purely legal criteria, then at 
least as claims and aspirations worth fighting for.  
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Prevention of Torture and Cruel 
or Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment in Healthcare 
ADRIAAN VAN ES 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Torture and healthcare are – at first sight – contradictory realities. In 
healthcare sick, wounded and vulnerable people are given attention, treat-
ment and safety, while in torture human beings are intentionally submitted 
to cruelties and methods to destroy their integrity.  
However, over and over in time, healthcare professionals have been 
complicit in grave human rights violations voluntarily or under pressure, 
for instance by lending their expertise to torture methods. This was and is a 
gruesome reality, especially since health professionals are in positions, 
where they are often the first, or even only one to notice and witness torture 
or maltreatment, being in the position to document these human rights vio-
lations authoritatively. 
Increasingly medical expertise has been developed and made available 
for the investigation of human rights violations. Internationally accepted 
authoritative protocols have been developed for the investigation and doc-
umentation of extra-judiciary killings (Minnesota Protocol)1 and the inves-
tigation and documentation of torture (Istanbul Protocol)2. Medical expert 
                                                   
1  »Minnesota Protocol«, ST/CSDHA/12, 1991.  
2  »Istanbul Protocol«, HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1, 9 August 1999. Frewer et al. (2009). 
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opinion in human rights court rulings have increasingly proven to be in-
strumental in establishing the body of evidence. 
Recent research, documentation and developments in international hu-
man rights law have shown that torture and/or cruel and inhuman treatment 
in (within the context of) healthcare occur on a daily basis and at a disquiet-
ing level. The human rights debate, stimulated by research, jurisprudence 
and reports of Special Rapporteurs have made it clear that application of the 
definition of torture and/or cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment on 
healthcare is appropriate and expedient. And this is a huge challenge to 
health professionals: How can they make sure to be part of the solution ra-
ther than to be part of the problem?  
This paper discusses the 2011 campaign »Stop Torture in Health Care«, 
focusing on the denial of access to adequate pain treatment, forced and co-
erced sterilization of women and the detention of drug-users in lieu of ade-
quate treatment. A number of examples is described where medical knowl-
edge is abused, leading to large-scale ill-treatment or torture, and an exam-
ple is given how medical knowledge can be decisive in human rights court 
cases to prove torture and/or ill-treatment. The paper then discusses the 
2013 report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment »Torture in healthcare settings« and 
the reactions this report aroused (mainly from organizations of health pro-
fessionals). The problem of »torture language« in healthcare is discussed 
and the »dual loyalty concept« is presented. The paper ends with a chal-
lenging question: In what extent (and how) does the problem of torture in 
healthcare setting apply in healthcare settings at home (outside institutions), 
where volunteers and family members are involved? 
 
 
2. CAMPAIGN »STOP TORTURE IN HEALTH CARE« 
 
In 2011 a coalition of organizations, including the International Federation 
of Health and Human Rights Organizations (IFHHRO)3 launched the cam-
paign »Stop Torture in Health Care«. Although aware of the fact that tor-
ture and/or cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment may occur in all sec-
tors of healthcare, the campaign highlighted three areas: (1) inaccessibility 
                                                   
3  See Homepage: www.ifhhro.org.  
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of adequate pain treatment, (2) forced/coerced sterilization of women and 
(3) detention of drug users in lieu of adequate treatment.  
 
2.1  The Right to Access to Adequate Pain Treatment 
 
The International Association for the Study of Pain started to frame the 
problem of unrelieved pain as an ethical and legal problem in 2004,4 and 
formulated its »Montreal Declaration«5 in 2010:  
 
»[…] recognizing the intrinsic dignity of all persons and that withholding of pain 
treatment is profoundly wrong, leading to unnecessary suffering which is harmful; 
we declare that the following human rights must be recognized throughout the 
world: 
Article 1. The right of all people to have access to pain management without dis-
crimination. 
Article 2. The right of people in pain to acknowledgment of their pain and to be in-
formed about how it can be assessed and managed. 
Article 3. The right of all people with pain to have access to appropriate assessment 
and treatment of the pain by adequately trained health care professionals.« 
 
The problem of inaccessibility of adequate pain treatment was extensively 
researched and mapped by Human Rights Watch. Their global research 
showed that in the vast majority of countries worldwide, access to adequate 
pain treatment is totally inadequate. In its report »Please do not make us 
suffer anymore«, Human Rights Watch describes the »pain treatment gap«, 
with the following background figures:  
 
»[…] approximately 80 percent of the world population has either no or insufficient 
access to treatment for moderate to severe pain and tens of millions of people around 
the world […]. Approximately 89 percent of the total world consumption of mor-
phine occurs in countries in North America and Europe. Low and middle income 
countries consume only 6 percent of the morphine used worldwide – while having 
about half of all cancer patients and 95 percent of new HIV infections. Thirty-two 
                                                   
4  Brennan et al. (2007).  
5  IASP (2010).  
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countries in Africa have almost no morphine distribution at all, and only fourteen 
have oral morphine.«6 
 
The Human Rights Watch report shows that in 2009 the number of patients 
in need of opioid treatment was in many countries extremely low, in many 
cases below 1%. The figures are based on an estimate by Foley et al. that 
80% of terminal cancer patients and 50% of terminal AIDS patients will re-
quire an average of 90 days of pain treatment with 60 mg to 75 mg of mor-
phine per day These figures, applied on country estimates obtained from 
website of the International Narcotic Control Board and projections for an-
nual cancer and AIDS deaths based on cancer and AIDS mortality figures 
reported by the WHO, provide horrific figures of the extreme »pain treat-
ment gap« in many countries.7   
 
Table 1: Morphine estimates, mortality and pain treatment need 
Country 
Cancer 
Deaths 
2002 
Estimate 
AIDS 
Deaths 
2005  
Estimate 
# of       
Individuals 
expected to 
need Pain 
Treatment 
in 2009 
Estimate 
total    
morphine 
need in 
2009 (kgs) 
Estimate of 
morphine 
need     
provided 
by country 
to INCB 
for 2009 
(kgs) 
# of       
Individuals 
estimate is 
sufficient 
for 
% of those 
needing 
treatment 
who would 
be covered 
by estimate 
Benin  13,490 9,986 15,786 96 0.5 83 0.50 
Senegal  17,625 5,432 16,816 102 0.6 99 0.60 
Rwanda  14,196 21,956 22,335 136 0.8 132 0.60 
Gambia  2,395 1,430 2,631 16 0.18 31 1.20 
Bhutan  727 
>10 per 
100,000 
582 3.5 0.08 14 2.30 
                                                   
6  Human Rights Watch (2009).  
7  Lohman et al. (2010).  
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Burkina 
Faso  
23,262 13,067 25,143 153 0.05 8 0.03 
Eritrea  6,240 5,959 7,972 48 0.075 12 0.15 
Gabon  2,071 4,457 3,886 24 0.088 14 0.40 
Swazi 
Land  
1,837 17,577 10,258 62 0.5 82 0.80 
        
Egypt  62,299 
>10 per 
100,000 
49,840 303 10 1,646 3 
Philip-
pines  
78,500 
>10 per 
100,000 
62,800 382 31 5,103 8 
Kenya  50,809 149,502 115,398 701 30 4,938 4 
Russian 
Federa-
tion  
21,7696 N/A 174,157 1,058 200 32,922 15 
Mexico  92,701 6,321 77,321 470 180 29,630 38 
Source: Lohman et al. (2010) 
 
2.2 Non-accessibility of Adequate Pain Treatment:  
Violation of the Right to the Highest Attainable  
Standard of Health (»the Right to Health«) 
 
The human right to health is recognized in numerous international instru-
ments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25: 
 
»Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and 
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary so-
cial services […]«. 
 
The relevant General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights elaborates extensively on Article 12 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
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which provides the most comprehensive article on the right to health in in-
ternational human rights law:  
 
»States parties recognize ›the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of physical and mental health‹«, and »enumerates […] a number of 
›steps to be taken by the States parties ... to achieve the full realization of this 
right‹.«8 
 
Besides the General Comment, the right to health is also based on Arti-
cle 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Article 12 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW); Article 5 of the International Covenant on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Article 25 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and Article 28 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (ICRMW). In addition to the international 
standards, the right to health is recognized in various regional human rights 
treaties. 
The right to health includes freedoms (e.g. from torture and cruel or in-
human and degrading treatment) and entitlements and ascertains in the »tri-
ple A« (availability, affordability, accessibility) and »Q« (quality): the 
availability of functioning public health and healthcare facilities, goods and 
services, as well as programmes, the accessibility (non-discrimination, 
physical accessibility, economic accessibility or affordability, and infor-
mation accessibility), and accessibility (cultural and gender), as well as 
quality. 
The State (the accountable party) has specific legal obligations (trias: 
the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil), and the obligation to 
immediately implement the core obligations and ensure the progressive re-
alization of the right to health. 
Among the core obligations is the provision of essential drugs, as de-
fined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.9 This »essen-
tial medicines list« includes opioids and other pain medication. Non-accessi- 
                                                   
8  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 2. 
9  WHO (1998). 
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bility of opioids is therefore a violation of a core obligation under the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health. 
 
2.3 Denial of Access to Pain Treatment: Violation of the 
Right to be Free from Torture and/or Cruel or Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment 
 
In January 2009, the then Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment or punishment Manfred Nowak, wrote in 
his report to the Human Rights Council that: »the de facto denial of access 
to pain relief, if it causes severe pain and suffering, constitutes cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.«10 This first time application of 
the torture framework on healthcare settings by the Special Rapporteur was 
a major step forward in international law. The present Special Rapporteur 
on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment Juan Mendez reiter-
ated this position is his report to the General Assembly of the UN of Febru-
ary 2013:  
 
»failure to ensure access to controlled medicines for the relief of pain and suffering 
threatens fundamental rights to health and to protection against cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.«11 
 
Denial of access to adequate pain treatment and failure to ensure access to 
controlled medicines for the relief of pain are thus a two-sided or two-level 
violation of international law (the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights. The jus cogens character of the right to be free from torture 
and/or cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment gives the struggle for the 
right to access to adequate pain treatment urgency and high profile. 
A major cause of the inaccessibility of adequate pain treatment is the 
dominant »war on drugs« component in the control of illicit drugs and sub-
stances. The International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) controls the 
amount of »illicit substance« that individual countries are allowed to use 
for the procurement of opioids. The same agency is also the world body 
                                                   
10  A/HRC/10/44, 14 January 2009, para. 72. 
11  A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013, para. 56. 
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controlling »illicit substances« that are used for the illegal trade in drugs 
(the »war on drugs«). This dual responsibility, namely to wage the »war on 
drugs« and at the same time to make sure that opioids are available in suffi-
cient quantity for every person in need of pain control, has proven to be a 
very difficult, if not impossible combination. The Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health has repeatedly criticized this mechanism for the provision 
and control of opioids.12 
During the campaign »Stop Torture in Healthcare« a conference was 
held in the Netherlands, co-hosted by the International Federation of Health 
and Human Rights Organizations, the International Association for the 
Study of Pain and facilitated by the Open Society Foundation, where inter-
national pain and palliative organizations, human rights organizations and 
organizations of health professionals discussed on the right to access to ad-
equate pain treatment and prepared a draft resolution for the World Medical 
Association (WMA). The resolution was adopted by the WMA on 11 Octo-
ber 2011 during its 62th session in Montevideo, Uruguay. The WMA is the 
world body of physicians, and represents almost all doctors in the world. 
The resolution recognizes the right to  
 
»[…] access to pain treatment for all people without discrimination«, emphasizes 
that »[…] physicians and other health care professionals have an ethical duty to offer 
proper clinical assessments to patients with pain and to offer appropriate treatment« 
and recommends that »[…] instruction on pain management, including clinical train-
ing lectures and practical cases, should be included in mandatory curricula and con-
tinuing education for physicians and other health professionals« and that »[…] gov-
ernment should provide the necessary resources for the development and implemen-
tation of a national pain treatment plan, including a responsive monitoring mecha-
nism and process for receiving complaints when pain is inadequately treated.«13 
 
2.4 Forced/Coerced Sterilization of Women 
 
Not only in history, but still today women are undergoing forced or coerced 
sterilization. Some are forcibly sterilised, not knowing the procedure, not 
having been given the opportunity to consent. Others were coerced into 
                                                   
12  Grover (2012).  
13  WMA (2011).  
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sterilisation by financial or other incentives, denial of medical services, or 
by being misinformed or otherwise compelled to undergo the procedure. 
The case of A.S. v. Hungary is a clear illustration of this issue:  
 
»Upon going into labor, Ms. A.S., a member of the Roma community, needed an 
emergency Caesarian section. Immediately before the surgery, a doctor asked Ms. 
A.S. to sign consent forms on which the doctor had hand-written a statement that 
Ms. A.S. consented to a sterilization procedure. Ms. A.S. did not understand the 
statement or that she had been sterilized until after the operation took place. Her 
claim of civil rights violations and negligent sterilization was rejected at the local 
level. In her communication to the CEDAW Committee, it found that the Ms. A.S. 
exhausted her domestic remedies because under Hungarian law she was unable to 
appeal this decision to the Constitutional Court given the nature and facts of her 
case. Hungary was found to have violated Ms. A.S.’s rights to (1) fully informed 
consent to medical procedures; (2) right to information on family planning; (3) right 
to appropriate services in connection with pregnancy and the post-natal period; and 
(4) right to determine the number and spacing of her children, under Articles 10(h), 
12 and 16(1)(e) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women.«14 
 
This significant ruling of 2006 on behalf of a victim of forced sterilization 
before an international body (the Committee on Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW) hold the State responsible for 
»failing to provide a woman with necessary information and obtain full 
consent for reproductive health procedures«. The ruling was a milestone 
and a strong stimulus in the struggle against this form of torture or cruel or 
inhuman and degrading treatment in healthcare.  
In its Position Statement on Forced and/or Coerced Sterilization of 
2011, the International Federation of Health and Human Rights Organiza-
tions describes the background of the problem:  
 
»A sterilisation procedure performed safely, complying with medical and ethical 
standards after the full informed choice of the patient is an acceptable option of con-
traception for people who wish to have no more children.  
                                                   
14  CEDAW/C/36/D/2004, Communication No. 4/2004, 12 February 2004. 
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However in recent years, cases of coerced and forced sterilization have been report-
ed in countries across the globe. […] In Africa, recent cases of forced sterilization 
were documented by the International Community of Women Living with 
HIV/AIDS. The organisation found that since 2008 women living with HIV/AIDS 
had undergone forced or coerced sterilization by tubal ligation. Practices of forced 
and coerced sterilization performed on women living with HIV/AIDS have also been 
recently documented in Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, South-Africa and Ven-
ezuela.  
In Europe cases of forced and coerced sterilization have been documented against 
women of ethnic minorities. In 2005, the Czech Ombudsman issued a report in 
which he reviewed more than 80 allegations of forced and coerced sterilization of 
women, most of whom are members of the Roma minority.«15  
 
In October 2012, the World Medical Association adopted a similar position 
statement in its Statement on forced and coerced sterilization in Bangkok.16 
The International Organization of Gynaecologists and Obstetrics also 
adopted ethical guidelines in accordance with human rights provisions.17  
 
2.5 Detention of Drug Users in Lieu of Adequate Treatment 
 
»A new report from UNAIDS,18 the United Nations program on HIV/AIDS, esti-
mates that in 2014 – the last year for which the agency has data – about 450,000 
people were being held in centers in China and other countries in Southeast Asia. 
These centers are supposed to provide treatment for people who use drugs, although 
their ›treatment‹ consists primarily of arduous physical exercises and military-like 
drills. Former detainees also describe sadistic violence – being shocked with electric 
batons, whipped with twisted electrical wire, beaten, and being chained while stand-
ing in the sun.«19  
 
Stigmatization and criminalization of drug-users has led in many countries 
to inhuman treatment of drug-users. Instead of providing state-of-the-arts 
                                                   
15  IFHHRO (2011), 2. 
16  WMA (2012).  
17  FIGO (2012).  
18  UNAIDS (2016).  
19  Pearshouse (2016). 
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treatment, they are committed to detention facilities where they are forced 
to slavery-like working conditions, and where adequate medical treatment 
is withheld or absent.  
Such practices are deeply in contradiction with medical ethics and in-
ternational guidelines. In the International Federation of Health and Human 
Rights Organization’s position statement:  
 
»The medical community has recognized that ›treatment of addiction, like treatment 
for any disease or condition, should be undertaken in the best interests of the patient 
and according to established principles of medical ethics.‹ Drug therapy should be 
administered according to professional guidelines and supervised by specially 
trained physicians. Community-based services such as substitution therapy are rec-
ognized as effective, evidence-based rehabilitation and treatment strategies. Such 
services also decrease the risk of HIV transmission.  
The human rights of individuals who use or are addicted to controlled substances 
should always be respected, including the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health and freedom from discrimination, arbitrary detention, torture and cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment. They have a right to equitable access to medical treat-
ment and allied rehabilitation services in accordance with generally approved medi-
cal principles.« 20 
 
2.6 Abuse of Medical Expertise 
 
Medical skills and knowledge has been (and is being) abused on a large 
scale (see also the chapter on Dual Loyalty). Participation in torture is per-
haps the most pervasive and disturbing practice. The UN Principles of 
Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physi-
cians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Oth-
er Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment are very explicit 
in the prohibition of such participation, even under pressure. This is men-
tioned in principle 6: »There may be no derogation from the foregoing 
principles on any ground whatsoever, including public emergency.«21  
Doctor’s complicity in torture and ill-treatment has been described 
many times, for example in the USA, where Iacopino et al. found that 
                                                   
20  IFHHRO (2011), 2.  
21  A/RES/37/194, 18 December 1982.  
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»medical personnel neglected and/or concealed medical evidence of inten-
tional harm«.22 Physicians for Human Rights investigated and documented 
complicity of psychologists in interrogation techniques amounting to tor-
ture.23 
This article does not allow to mention all examples of medical complic-
ity in torture and/or ill-treatment. However, I will mention two examples of 
initiatives from »medical side« that help to expose abuses of »medical ex-
pertise« which are completely unfounded and amount to torture: virginity 
testing and rectal examination to »prove homosexual intercourse«.  
The International Forensic Expert Group published a statement on vir-
ginity testing:  
 
»The practice of forcibly conducting virginity testing to determine whether a woman 
is still a virgin is a clear human rights violation that is likely to leave the victim with 
significant physical and psychological scars, and constitutes ill-treatment and possi-
bly torture says the Independent Forensic Expert Group (IFEG).«24  
 
Despite the illegality of the practice in many states and the clear violation 
of international human rights standards, women around the world are still 
forced to undergo virginity examinations. Recent cases in Indonesia, Egypt 
and Afghanistan confirm the continuing use of this practice.  
 
»The expert opinion concludes that ›forcibly conducted virginity examinations have 
no clinical or scientific value and constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and may amount to torture depending on the individual circumstances‹. ›Virginity 
examinations are medically unreliable and inherently discriminatory‹, states the 
IFEG. […] According to the experts, due to its invasive and sexual nature, forcibly 
conducted virginity testing is likely to cause severe and lasting psychological symp-
toms and disabilities that remain over time.«25 
 
                                                   
22  Iacopino/Xenakis (2011).  
23  See http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/torture/us-torture/ [27.03.2017]. 
24  IRCT (2012).   
25  Ibid.  
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The same International Forensic Expert Group published an expert state-
ment on forced rectal examination with suspects of homosexuality in coun-
tries where homosexuality is criminalized. The statement 
 
»strongly condemns the practice of anal examinations in cases of alleged homosexu-
al activity. The statement categorically asserts that forcibly conducted anal examina-
tions are medically and scientifically worthless in establishing whether consensual 
anal intercourse has occurred and that the practice constitutes cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and possibly torture […] anal examinations to ›detect homosex-
uality‹ have no scientific value, are unethical, and constitute cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment and possibly torture. Sexual identity and orientation is not a dis-
ease or a crime and health professionals have no business diagnosing it or aiding 
State officials in policing and punishing people on the basis of their sexuality.«26 
 
2.7 Forensic Evidence in Exposing Ill-treatment 
 
The opposite of the above mentioned examples is the use of medical 
knowledge in court cases where human rights violations have to be estab-
lished. Perhaps the best known examples are those where the Istanbul Pro-
tocol has been used. This UN Manual on the Effective Investigation and 
Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment27 was written by medical and legal experts in 1999 and 
has been an authoritative instrument in numerous court cases. 
Medical expert opinions can make a substantive and decisive difference 
in human rights court cases. An illustrative example of a court case where a 
State has been held accountable for gross medical negligence is the case of 
Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania.  
 
»On 17th July, 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held the Roma-
nian government accountable for violating the human rights of Valentin Câmpeanu, 
a youth with severe mental disabilities and HIV positive, who died in 2004. Aban-
doned at birth, he lived in public institutions all his life. When he turned eighteen, he 
was shifted to a social care home for adults, and afterwards, to a mental hospital. 
Here, left in isolation, and in the cold, without necessary health care and treatment, 
                                                   
26  IRCT (2016).   
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and deprived also of food and proper clothing, he died within seven days. […] This 
case is a groundbreaking disability rights case concerning both access to justice for 
individuals with disabilities and also, their ill-treatment in long-term stay institu-
tions. The decision shines a light on the plight of people with disabilities who face 
institutional abuse and are particularly vulnerable since due to their disability they 
are often unable to complain or seek judicial remedies to ameliorate their situation.  
The decision will impact legal systems across Europe as the ECHR has held that 
NGOs can represent people with disabilities who died due to violations of their 
rights, when there was no one else to seek justice on their behalf.«28  
 
The European Court of Human Rights ruling29 extensively quoted the ex-
pert opinion end relied on the medical expert’s conclusion of gross medical 
negligence.30  
 
 
3. THE 2013 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR 
ON TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN AND  
DEGRADING TREATMENT AND PUNISHMENT 
 
This report to the General Assembly in January 2013 by the Special Rap-
porteur on Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and pun-
ishment31 Juan Mendez is generally viewed as a most comprehensive and 
authoritative »milestone« report on torture and cruel or inhuman and de-
grading treatment in healthcare setting. The report applies the torture 
framework systematically on healthcare settings and provides clear and 
far-reaching recommendations. It has also raised questions and reserva-
tions, notably from the health sector and organizations of health profession-
als, and has raised fierce debate on some crucial elements in the report such 
as the absolute ban on seclusion and restraint. Mendez has  
 
                                                   
28  ECHR: »Case of Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu 
v. Romania« (GC), Judgement 17 July 2014, No. 47848/08.  
29  Ibid.  
30  IRCT (2014).  
31  A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013.  
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»[…] examined the key elements of the definition of torture and ill-treatment and its 
applicability to the abuses in health-care settings« and found that »[…] the applica-
tion of the criteria of severe pain or suffering, intent, and involvement of a public of-
ficial or other person acting in an official capacity, by consent or acquiescence to 
abuses in health-care settings, is relatively straightforward and that the criterion of 
the specific purpose warrants some analysis.«32 
 
3.1 Concerns and Criticism from the Medical Community 
 
Some of the recommendations in Mendez’ report that raised fundamental 
discussions are under the paragraphs 85(e) and 89(b):  
 
»Safeguard free and informed consent on an equal basis for all individuals without 
any exception, through legal framework and judicial and administrative mecha-
nisms, including through policies and practices to protect against abuses. Any legal 
provisions to the contrary, such as provisions allowing confinement or compulsory 
treatment in mental health settings, including through guardianship and other substi-
tuted decision-making, must be revised […] [and] [p]aragraph 89 (b)[:] Impose an 
absolute ban on all forced and non-consensual medical interventions against persons 
with disabilities, including the non-consensual administration of psychosurgery, 
electroshock and mind-altering drugs such as neuroleptics, the use of restraint and 
solitary confinement, for both long- and short-term application. The obligation to 
end forced psychiatric interventions based solely on grounds of disability is of im-
mediate application and scarce financial resources cannot justify postponement of its 
implementation […].«33  
 
Criticism from the medical community focused on the absolute ban on se-
clusion and surrogate consent without any exception. In his response of 
May 2013 to the report of Mendez, the secretary-general of the World 
Medical Association, Dr. Otmar Kloiber, referring to Recommendation 
No. 85(e):  
 
»[...] provisions allowing confinement or compulsory treatment in mental health set-
tings, including through guardianship and other substituted decision-making, must 
                                                   
32  Centre for Human Rights & Humantarian Law (2014), XVI.  
33  Ibid., 145.  
278 | ADRIAAN VAN ES 
be revised.«34 Furthermore, he emphasizes: »The patient’s judgment should be re-
spected in areas where he/she is legally capable of making decisions, unless they 
present a risk of serious harm to themselves or others. […] If the patient lacks the 
capacity to make a decision as to his/her medical care, surrogate consent should be 
sought from an authorized representative in accordance with applicable law.«35  
 
In exceptional circumstances, surrogate consent can constitute a medical 
necessity for the safety of the patient and/or the society. And on the abso-
lute ban on the use of restraint and solitary confinement Kloiber writes: 
 
»[H]ere again, in exceptional circumstances […] restraining the movement of the 
patients can constitute a medical necessity. Medical ethics principles require the fol-
lowing conditions: ›(a) a severe mental disorder that prevents the individual from 
making his/her own treatment decisions; and/or (b) the likelihood that the patient 
may harm him/her self or others‹«. He continues: »[…] the recommendations of the 
report advocate that measures restricting movements of ›persons with psychosocial 
disabilities‹ should be prohibited. According to us, this affirmation is invalid and 
risky, in suggesting that the medical necessity never justifies coercive measures. It 
reflects clear unawareness of the degree of illness of some patients, and an alarming 
negligence likely to endanger the patient him/herself and others. It also misinterprets 
the function of doctors as backbone of the health care system and indirectly under-
mines the expected privileged relationship between physicians and patients based on 
trust, professionalism and confidentiality. […] More generally, we are concerned 
that your report generates prejudice and distress on psychiatric services, while sup-
porting the current trend to consider mental disorders, not anymore as real diseases 
to be treated by psychiatrists, but rather as social deviation or just psychological suf-
fering to be treated by psychologists and other mental health professionals. […] 
Health professionals work often under very precarious situations. Blaming them for 
these abuses is unfair and inappropriate.«36 
 
In response to the report of the Special Rapporteur, the World Psychiatric 
Association and the American Psychiatric Association also expressed con-
cern that  
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»the adoption of these perspectives and recommendations may be detrimental to the 
interests of individuals with serious mental disorders, and likely to cause serious 
harm to the very groups it intends to protect.«37  
 
Mendez responded to these concerns in January 2014:  
 
»[…] I did not mean to propose an absolute ban on non-consensual interventions 
(including institutionalization and restraints) under any and all circumstances.  
I meant to restrict my condemnation to non-consensual treatment based exclusively 
on discrimination against persons with disabilities. In other words, the fact that a 
person is diagnosed as having a psychosocial disability should not by itself be 
enough to justify non-consensual treatment. Unfortunately, in many countries that is 
standard practice, often validated by domestic courts and even by international tri-
bunals (in some decisions that my report criticizes). As you point out, elsewhere in 
my report (paragraphs 68 and 69) I do mention that involuntary detention and treat-
ment is legitimate if its purpose is to prevent the patient harming him or herself or 
causing serious harm to others, and then for the limited time and scope necessary to 
prevent such harm. I firmly believe, however, that legislation should be revised to 
place the burden on the State to justify each decision to apply non-consensual treat-
ment under such narrow grounds.  
I do not doubt that my proposal coincides – in large part, at least – with the highest 
professional standards of your profession as reflected in the policy statements rele-
vant to this topic that you have attached. My concern is with the many parts of the 
world where those professional standards are not applied.«38 
 
The milestone 2013 thematic report of the Special Rapporteur and the sub-
sequent concerns of and communications with (organizations of) health 
professionals illustrate the existing and potentially continuing gap between 
evolving international law (focussed on healthcare) and perceptions and 
convictions of health professionals. In my opinion, it is of utmost im-
portance to bridge this gap, because of the necessity to have health profes-
sionals »on board« in the struggle against torture and cruel or inhuman and 
degrading treatment in healthcare. Health professionals should be part of 
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and be perceived as part of the solution rather than (only) be seen as part of 
the problem. 
 
3.2 The Problem of »Torture Language« 
 
In a substantive and principal contribution »Torture in Health Care Set-
tings: Urgent Issues and Challenging Questions« in the »Reflections on the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture’s 2013 Thematic Report« Yuval Ginbar and 
James Welsh argue that  
 
»the torture/other ill-treatment legal framework must be applied carefully and pre-
cisely, taking into account that the human rights of persons, other than those being 
treated, may be involved. This requires maintaining openness to the possibility that 
other legal frameworks for the protection of human rights may at times be better 
equipped to address certain issues within healthcare settings. It also requires consid-
ering the far-reaching legal consequences of a finding of any ill-treatment, particu-
larly torture, in cases where law and professional regulations are being followed. 
Whereas international law obviously prohibits torture and ill-treatment absolutely 
and in all circumstances, we are concerned that framing positions on certain 
measures which are not inherently torturous in absolute terms would not serve the 
rights of persons with disabilities; nor would linking such sweeping positions to the 
prohibition on torture and other ill-treatment encourage observance of that prohibi-
tion, which is indeed absolute.«39 
 
The problem of »torture language« is also acknowledged by Tamar Ezer, 
Jonathan Cohen and Ryan Quinn in their contribution »The Problem of 
Torture in Healthcare«, discussing the application of the »torture frame-
work« on healthcare settings: Before applying the norms against torture and 
cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment systematically to the field of 
healthcare, it is necessary to review them and consider the similarities and 
differences between (1) torture; (2) cruel and inhuman treatment; and 
(3) degrading treatment. This is particularly important because the stigma 
that results from applying the label of »torture« to acts involving medical 
professionals can be counterproductive if applied carelessly. Moreover, it is 
important to recognize that applying a human rights approach focuses atten-
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tion on state responsibility and systemic violations and not on penalizing 
individual healthcare providers. A useful concept when considering the ap-
plication of anti-torture norms to the healthcare context is that of dual loyal-
ty, defined as  
 
»simultaneous obligations, express or implied, to a patient and a third party, often 
the state. Where the interests of the patient and the state are aligned, dual loyalty im-
poses little risk. Where they conflict, however, this creates potential for abuse, in-
cluding torture.«40 
 
 
4. THE DUAL LOYALTY CONCEPT 
 
The International Dual Loyalty Working Group, convened by Physicians 
for Human Rights and the University of Cape Town in 2002, has identified 
common situations where dual loyalty conflicts arise and has provided rec-
ommendations for preventing them. 
This working group on dual loyalty was formed after the hearings of the 
health sector by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa, 
where the dual loyalty problem had become extremely evident.41 
 
»This project grew out of a disturbing trend: Governments and other third parties of-
ten demand that health professionals put allegiance to their patients aside, in defer-
ence to the demands of these powerful actors […]. The report of South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) documenting the complicity of health 
professionals in the apartheid regime, provides a particularly compelling illustration 
of the problem. […] The report urged the adoption of effective standards of conduct 
in situations of potential dual loyalty, as well as institutional arrangements and edu-
cational programs to ameliorate the problem.«42  
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The project focussed on areas where human rights violations out of dual 
loyalty are most likely to happen: settings of forensic medicine, prisons, 
refugees and asylum seekers, the work floor and the military.  
The working group identified a variety of situations where medical eth-
ics and human rights were violated in the context of dual loyalty conflicts: 
using medical skills or expertise on behalf of the State to inflict pain, physi-
cal or psychological harm on an individual that is not a legitimate part of 
medical treatment, participating in torture and punishment, participation of 
health professionals in administration of the death penalty, participation in 
forced abortion, sterilization and contraception and other violations of re-
productive health rights relating to bodily integrity, degrading physical ex-
aminations that violate human rights, such as virginity testing, female geni-
tal mutilation, use of chemical and physical restraints and intrusive exami-
nations to enhance security interests of a prison, detention centre, or other 
institutions, subordinating independent medical judgment, in therapeutic or 
evaluative settings, to support medical conclusions favourable to the State, 
limiting or denying medical treatment or information related to treatment to 
an individual to effectuate policy of the State in a manner that violates the 
patient’s human rights, denial of or restrictions on care based on gender, 
ethnic or racial discrimination, sexual orientation or immigration status, de-
nial of care for political reasons and during armed conflicts, denial of ap-
propriate care to prisoners, detainees, and institutionalized people, with-
holding information about health or health services, the special problem of 
hunger strikers, denial of care because of inequities in healthcare in society, 
disclosing confidential patient information to state authorities or powerful 
non-state actor, performing evaluations for legal or administrative purposes 
in a manner that implicate human rights, remaining silent in the face of hu-
man rights abuses committed against individuals and groups in the care of 
healthcare professionals. The working group has proposed a large number 
of general guidelines and guidelines tailored to the five fields mentioned 
above. The size of this article does not allow detailed mention of all guide-
lines. The working groups also provided institutional mechanisms, varying 
from national and international legal mechanisms, participation of health 
professionals in monitoring mechanisms such as shadow reporting to su-
pervising bodies of international covenants, and stressing the importance of 
a well-functioning, independent, human rights oriented professional organi-
zation or association.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 The Problem of Domain:  
What is the Definition of a »Healthcare Setting«? 
 
There is a number of questions in the struggle to end torture and ill-
treatment in healthcare settings, namely the definition of »healthcare set-
tings« and »health worker«. In my view, the report of the Special Rappor-
teur seems to limit healthcare settings to »institutions«, while in reality 
many healthcare settings can be identified in the community and in private 
homes. The Special Rapporteur recommends replacement of institu-
tion-based care to community based care, but does not extend the preven-
tion of torture and/or ill-treatment to the »non-institution« domain.  
In his focus on torture and/or ill-treatment in healthcare settings, the 
Special Rapporteur writes:  
 
»each State party should prohibit, prevent and redress torture and ill-treatment in all 
contexts of custody or control, for example, in prisons, hospitals, schools, institu-
tions that engage in the care of children, the aged, the mentally ill or disabled, in 
military service, and other institutions as well as contexts where the failure of the 
State to intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted 
harm.«43 [emphasis added, A.v.E.] 
 
What these »contexts« are, is not further elaborated. And on potential per-
petrators of torture and/or ill-treatment, the Special Rapporteur writes:  
 
»Indeed, the States obligation to prevent torture applies not only to public officials, 
such as law enforcement agents, but also to doctors, healthcare professionals and so-
cial workers, including those working in private hospitals, other institutions and de-
tention centres […]. Here too, there is no elaboration as to whether volunteers and 
family members involved in healthcare are included in these categories.«44 
 
                                                   
43  A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013, para. 23.  
44  Ibid., 24.  
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In his recommendations, the Special Rapporteur views a shift from »institu-
tions« to »community« as a desirable goal. On compulsory drug detention 
centres, his recommendation is: »Close compulsory drug detention and ›re-
habilitation‹ centres without delay and implement voluntary, evidence-
based and rights-based health and social services in the community«.45 For 
people with disabilities he recommends:  
 
»Replace forced treatment and commitment by services in the community. Such ser-
vices must meet needs expressed by persons with disabilities and respect the auton-
omy, choices, dignity and privacy of the person concerned, with an emphasis on al-
ternatives to the medical model of mental health, including peer support, awareness-
raising and training of mental health-care and law enforcement personnel and oth-
ers.«46 
 
I welcome this recommendation wholeheartedly. However, I miss the next 
step: How to prevent torture and/or cruel or inhuman and degrading treat-
ment in the recommended services in the community? If not specified pre-
cisely, the mention of »community services« may well be an empty phrase 
or a romantic irreality. Obviously, the recommended replacement is not in 
itself a guarantee for freedom from torture. In many countries such re-
placements from institutions to community are taking place, not in the least 
for financial reasons. The result is often home-based care, where healthcare 
professionals, but also volunteers and relatives are responsible for the 
(health)care. The question is: Can the torture and ill-treatment concept be 
applied in those situations as well?  
Ill-treatment is often taking place »behind the front-door« of this home-
based care. In my own experience as family doctor I have witnesses many 
cases of ill-treatment »at home« (some of which may even amount to tor-
ture) and I have been involved in training courses on awareness-raising of 
ill-treatment of the (frail) elderly is a prominent issue. I found that even 
among experienced health workers there is a huge under-estimation of ill-
treatment. Estimates in the Netherlands indicate that there are at least 
160,000–200,000 cases of ill-treatment of elderly people. Ill-treatment may 
                                                   
45  A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013, para. 87(a).  
46  Ibid., para. 89(c).  
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be physical, psychological, sexual and financial by negligence and/or by 
deprivation of rights. Ill-treatment of the elderly is defined as  
 
»treatment or neglect of by all persons having (repeated) a personal and/or profes-
sional relation with an elderly person, with the result of physical, psychological 
and/or material damage, and where the elderly is in a state of partial or total depend-
ency«.47 [translation A.v.E.] 
 
The problem of ill-treatment is severely compounded by the fact that care is 
often informal (by family or volunteers). When it is a volunteer, or a family 
member who takes care (at home) of a person with a psychosocial disabil-
ity, or (notably problematic) dementia, is overburdened and at a time loses 
his or her temper, this may be a form of »derailed care«, but is it also tor-
ture? In its appearance and/or outcome it may well be ill-treatment or even 
torture. The question then is whether the carer is a torturer, and if so, only 
in case of intent, or also in case of derailed care?  
Is the torture and/or cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment frame-
work applicable to this kind of situations? Does the Convention against 
Torture extend to the private homes of vulnerable, frail person, of persons 
with disabilities living at home? How does the urgently needed prevention 
of torture and ill-treatment relate to the right to privacy? These are, in my 
view, issues that warrant discussion urgently; they have largely been un-
touched by the report of the Special Rapporteur and the subsequent discus-
sions.  
 
5.2 Prevention of Torture in Healthcare 
 
The report of the Dual Loyalty working group has published an extensive 
list of (institutional) mechanisms that can help to promote human rights in 
healthcare, and monitor human rights violations in healthcare. The mech-
anisms mentioned are (i.a.): employment relationships structured to avoid 
role conflicts and reduce interference with professional independence, ad-
ministrative and legal arrangements to preserve professional independence, 
establishment of an ethos of peer review, professional credibility, support 
and inclusiveness in the profession that addresses the problem of dual loy-
                                                   
47  Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport.  
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alty, monitoring, education and training, accountability, collective action by 
the profession. On monitoring mechanisms, the report stresses that: 
 
»Independent oversight and reporting structures must be established to monitor and 
respond to practices in the health sector that threaten human rights. These structures 
should support audit activities undertaken by health professionals and should enable 
professionals to make independent reports of potential or actual violations of the 
human rights of patients or other victims. These structures would also have the ca-
pacity to refer appropriate cases to professional disciplinary structures […]«.48 
 
Monitoring the complicity of health professionals in human rights abuses 
 
»[…] should also be linked to monitoring the underlying human rights violations. 
Monitoring can take place at the local or national level (by national professional as-
sociations, statutory bodies, or human rights organizations) and may often be done 
as well by international bodies, including United Nations agencies, professional bod-
ies, and human rights organizations.«49  
 
In order to make sure that health professionals are part of the struggle 
against torture and/or ill-treatment in healthcare setting, rather than (only) 
part of the problem, it is of utmost importance that national (and interna-
tional) professional organizations are strong and independent, and have a 
high profile human rights agenda in place. Licensing bodies must also be 
independent and have human rights provision included in their program and 
mandate. The organized profession should be part of a larger coalition of 
organizations that monitors the defense and promotion of human rights. 
Such coalitions of organizations should provide input to and cooperate with 
UN Special Rapporteurs (e.g. on Torture and cruel or inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, and on the right to the highest attainable standard of health), 
cooperate on the production and publication of parallel or shadow reporting 
to the supervising committees of UN Covenants.  
                                                   
48  Physicians for Human Rights/School of Public Health and Primary Health Care 
(2002), 88. 
49  Ibid.  
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An important role for monitoring human rights violations (in Europe) is 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. In numerous reports 
the Committee has listed human rights violations. 
Also the visits of the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture under 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture have contributed 
to identifying human rights violations. The National Preventive Mecha-
nisms, required under Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, 
and which have been formed in OPCAT countries in different manners, 
play (or are supposed to play) an important role. A research project in the 
Netherlands by the University of Groningen with support of the Interna-
tional Federation of Health and Human Rights Organizations indicated that 
the National Preventive Mechanisms are still to be improved:  
 
»In terms of mandate, the National Preventive Mechanisms appear to fulfil the re-
quirements, however there are doubts about the independence. In addition, the Na-
tional Preventive Mechanisms assignment to existing monitoring bodies have not 
(yet) led to organizational accommodation or change.«50 [translation A.v.E.] 
 
My conclusion is that the prevention of torture in healthcare settings needs 
ongoing debate and elaboration both in international human rights law and 
in the health professional’s domain. The application of medical expertise in 
the defence and promotion of human rights has achieved much, and should 
continue to be developed further. Existing mechanisms for monitoring hu-
man rights violations, including torture in healthcare setting should be uti-
lized much more extensively, notably by health professionals. 
 
 
  
                                                   
50  University of Groningen (2013).   
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III.  IMPLEMENTATION IN  
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
 
The Right to Health and the Post-2015 
Health and Sustainable Development 
Goal Agenda 
Jonathan Mann’s 1997 Call for a Paradigm Shift 
Remains Imperative  
CLAIRE E. BROLAN  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Emerging Fields Initiative (EFI) Conference, »The right to health – an 
empty promise?«, held 14–16 September 2015 in Berlin, Germany, oc-
curred one week before the General Assembly gathered together at United 
Nations (UN) headquarters in New York to vote on the post-2015 Sustaina-
ble Development Goal (SDG) agenda. At that high-level General Assembly 
plenary meeting, the »UN Sustainable Development Summit« of 25–27 
September 2015, the UN member states collectively endorsed the General 
Assembly resolution, »Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development«.1 This formative UN resolution on the post – 2015 
SDG agenda will be the global community’s blueprint for development – 
the »plan of action for people, planet and prosperity«2 – for the next 15 
years. Consisting of a 35-page, 91-paragraph document, this important 
                                                   
1  A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015. 
2  Ibid.  
294 | CLAIRE E. BROLAN 
resolution contains much of the »unfinished business« of its precursor, the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda.  
Expiring on 31 December 2015, the eight MDGs were originally intro-
duced to the world by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 
»Road map towards the implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration 
report« (Road map report) of September 2001.3 Indeed, the MDGs have 
been described as the new global »super-norm« for poverty reduction.4 
Much has been written on their rise, their benefits and deficits – including a 
myriad of critiques by global health analysts. Notwithstanding these, the 
MDGs have played a historic and transformative role in streamlining global 
attention, resource, and programmatic action onto three health and devel-
opment priorities: the reduction of child mortality (MDG 4); the improve-
ment of maternal health (MDG 5); and combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases (MDG 6).  
The 17 SDGs outlined in the September 2015 resolution extend the 
MDG agenda.5 This is mainly because the UN resolution on the post-2015 
SDGs shifts the world’s development focus from poverty eradication (as 
emphasised by the MDGs) to poverty eradication and sustainable develop-
ment, while also reinforcing the inclusive nature of the new goals through 
its central principle, »that no one will be left behind«.6 Of added signifi-
cance, the post-2015 agenda is a »new Universal Agenda«;7 applicable to 
all, everywhere, in low-, middle- and high-income countries alike. As pa-
ra. 5 of the post-2015 UN resolution powerfully states:  
 
»This is an Agenda of unprecedented scope and significance. It is accepted by all 
countries and is applicable to all, taking into account different national realities, ca-
pacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. 
These are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed and 
                                                   
3  Annan (2001).  
4  Fukuda-Parr/Hulme (2009).  
5  Full list of the 17 SDGs under http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ 
sustainabledevelopment-goals/ [24.02.2017]. 
6  Brolan (2016).  
7  A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015. 
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developing countries alike. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three 
dimensions of sustainable development.«8 
 
Global health was represented in the 17 SDGs in a single goal, SDG 3: En-
sure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages (table 1). 
While health was prominently featured in three of the eight MDGs (MDGs 
4–6), the lone post-2015 global health and development goal, SDG 3, is no 
less »a win« for post-2015 health advocates. This is because SDG 3 and its 
nine targets and four means of implementation not only progress the unfin-
ished business of the MDG health agenda through SDGs 3.1–3.3, but con-
siderably expand this agenda to also include global prioritisation of non-
communicable diseases (SDG 3.4), the achievement of Universal Health 
Coverage (SDG 3.8) that explicitly includes universal access to sexual and 
reproductive healthcare services (SDG 3.7), the prevention and treatment of 
substance abuse (SDG 3.5), and reduction of global morbidity and mortality 
due to road traffic accidents (SDG 3.6) as well as poor ecological and envi-
ronmental health (SDG 3.9).  
 
Table 1: Post-2015 global health and development goal (SDG 3) 
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all  
at all ages 
 
Targets  
 
3.1 By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 
70 per 100,000 live births 
 
3.2 By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 
5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at 
least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as 
low as 25 per 1,000 live births 
 
 
                                                   
8  UN General Assembly (2015a). 
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3.3 By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases 
and other communicable diseases 
 
3.4 By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from 
non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and 
promote mental health and well-being 
 
3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, 
including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol 
 
3.6 By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road 
traffic accidents 
 
3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive 
healthcare services, including for family planning, information and 
education, and the integration of reproductive health into national 
strategies and programmes 
 
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk 
protection, access to quality essential healthcare services and access to 
safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines 
for all 
 
3.9 By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses 
from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and 
contamination 
 
 
Means of Implementation  
 
3.a Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as 
appropriate 
 
3.b Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for 
the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect 
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developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines 
and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing 
countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding  
flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to 
medicines for all 
 
3.c Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, 
development, training and retention of the health workforce in 
developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small 
island developing States 
 
3.d Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing 
countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national 
and global health risks 
Source: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainabledevelopm ent-goals/ 
[24.02.2017] 
What is curious about the content of SDG 3, however, is that despite the 
UN member states having ratified one or more binding treaties that include 
»the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health« (the right to health),9 and this right otherwise 
expressed in over 100 national constitutions,10 these same countries in Sep-
tember 2015 unanimously voted for a single health goal bereft of clear and 
cogent right to health language. In other words, SDG 3 did not explicitly 
contain or reference the right to health originally introduced in the World 
Health Organization’s constitution in 1946 and then codified in internation-
al law particularly by way of Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. Since that time, 
the right to health has been recognised in a wide array of other international 
and regional human rights instruments.11  
Yet if the right to health in international law is the normative gold 
standard for global health that all UN member states have adopted (in some 
                                                   
9  Backman et al. (2008).  
10  Kinney/Clark (2004); Perehudoff (2008).  
11  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000. 
SDG
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form) to respect, protect and fulfil, it is only right to ask why this human 
right did not translate into the overarching post-2015 global health umbrella 
goal, or was not sewn into one of the nine targets or, at very least, one of 
SDG 3’s four means of implementation. In fact, close inspection of the con-
tent of the 17 SDGs and their 169 associated targets and means of imple-
mentation contained between pages 14 to 27 of the UN General Assembly 
resolution on the post-2015 SDG agenda highlights human rights’ marginal 
presence. For instance, human rights’ shortened version, »rights«, is explic-
itly found in six locations in the SDG metrics framework: in four targets 
and two means of implementation (Table 2). This ensures »rights« are ex-
pressed in only five of the 17 goals; less than a third of the SDGs. Further, 
where »rights« are referred to as »human rights« in the one standalone tar-
get, Target 4.7 (see Table 2), this phrase is inserted to affirm that the learn-
ing of human rights in educational settings is to be promoted. Of course, the 
learning and generation of human rights awareness is important; but in 
many ways this alone is insufficient to adequately and incrementally 
achieve the larger human right to education.12 
 
Table 2: Rights in the post-2015 SDG framework 
Post-2015 Goal Target 
Means of 
Implementation 
Goal 1: End 
poverty in all its 
forms everywhere 
1.4: By 2030, ensure 
that all men and 
women, in particular 
the poor and the 
vulnerable, have equal 
rights to economic 
resources, as well as 
access to basic 
services, ownership 
and control over land 
and other forms of 
property, inheritance, 
natural resources, 
appropriate new 
 
                                                   
12  Unterhalter (2014).  
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technology and 
financial services, 
including 
microfinance.  
Goal 3: Ensure 
healthy lives and 
promote wellbeing 
for all at all ages  
 3.b Support the research 
and development of 
vaccines and medicines 
for the communicable 
and non-communicable 
diseases that primarily 
affect developing 
countries, provide 
access to affordable 
essential medicines and 
vaccines, in accordance 
with the Doha 
Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, which 
affirms the right of 
developing countries to 
use to the full the 
provisions in the 
Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property 
Rights regarding 
flexibilities to protect 
public health, and, in 
particular, provide 
access to medicines.  
Goal 4: Ensure 
inclusive and 
equitable quality 
education and 
promote lifelong 
learning 
4.7: By 2030, ensure 
that all learners acquire 
the knowledge and 
skills needed to 
promote sustainable 
development and 
 
SDG
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opportunities for 
all 
sustainable lifestyles, 
human rights, gender 
equality, promotion of 
a culture of peace and 
non-violence, global 
citizenship and 
appreciation of cultural 
diversity and of 
culture’s contribution 
to sustainable 
development.  
Goal 5: Achieve 
gender equality 
and empower all 
women and girls  
5.6: Ensure universal 
access to sexual and 
reproductive health 
and reproductive rights 
as agreed in accord-
ance with the Pro-
gramme of Action of 
the International Con-
ference on Population 
and Development and 
the Beijing Platform 
for Action and the out-
come documents of 
their review confer-
ences.  
5.a Undertake reforms 
to give women equal 
rights to economic 
resources, as well as 
access to ownership and 
control over land and 
other forms of property, 
financial services, 
inheritance and natural 
resources, in accordance 
with national laws.  
Goal 8: Promote 
sustained, 
inclusive and 
sustainable 
economic growth, 
full and productive 
employment and 
decent work for all 
8.8: Protect labour 
rights and promote 
safe and secure 
working environments 
for all workers, 
including migrant 
workers in particular 
women migrants, and 
those in precarious 
employment.  
 
Source: Brolan (2016) 
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But there is an alternative argument that could be mounted that would sub-
mit the post-2015 SDG metrics framework is, or presents or is founded up-
on, a veritable human rights agenda. This is in light of the UN General As-
sembly’s emphasis in the post-2015 outcome document’s preamble and 
declaration on the interconnect between international human rights law and 
the post-2015 development action plan. This is notably expressed in both 
the content of the UN resolution’s preamble and in paras. 8, 10, 19 and 20. 
Indeed, the post-2015 declaration envisages a world »of universal respect 
for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and 
non-discrimination«.13 It outlines the new SDG agenda as: 
 
»[g]uided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, including full re-
spect for international law. It is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, international human rights treaties, the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 
World Summit Outcome. It is informed by other instruments such as the Declaration 
of the Right to Development.«14 
 
Despite such strong rhetoric for the integration of international human 
rights law in the post-2015 development goal agenda, in many respects 
these words on paper must be approached with caution. This is because, 
and if over ten years of MDG implementation by the global community is 
the litmus test, it is likely member state (and their development partners) 
focus will narrow to fixate on implementation of the SDG metrics frame-
work; on achieving the 17 goals, their associated targets and means of im-
plementation, and country-specific indicators only. This aligns with the po-
tent adage in international development circles – ›what gets measured gets 
done‹ – and human rights are conspicuously absent from the language of 
SDG measurement. This includes not only the right to health in its express 
form, but also sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).  
It follows that SRHR as sexual and reproductive health and rights did 
not survive the political sieve of post-2015 negotiations. While access to 
universal sexual and reproductive healthcare services is sought to be 
achieved in SDG 3.7, this is not coherently framed as a matter of SRHR. 
                                                   
13  A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015. 
14  Ibid., para. 10.  
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Furthermore, although Target 6 of SDG 5, »Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls«, appears laudable in its aim,  
 
»[to] [e]nsure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive 
rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the 
outcome documents of their review conferences«,15 
 
when the text is in fact examined in its minutiae it is evident SDG 5.6 is 
paradoxical, claiming these rights but implicitly diminishing them. SDG 5.6 
cannot be »in accordance with the Programme of Action of the Inter-
national Conference on Population Development […]« as that document 
states sexual health is unequivocally part of reproductive health rights, 
whereas SDG 5.6 cleverly splits SRHR into »sexual and reproductive 
health and reproductive rights«.  
This chapter will consequently examine potential reasons why the ex-
press right to health – including SRHR – did not translate into the headline 
post-2015 global health goal for health, SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages, nor explicitly form part of the con-
tent of SDG 3’s nine targets and four means of implementation.16  
This chapter will now turn to examine the key post-2015 reports that in-
formed the post-2015 SDG decision-making landscape and whether the 
right to health was explicitly present in SDG metrics proposals (i.e. the 
goals, targets and indicators). Six reasons as to why the right to health ap-
peared marginal in emergent high-level post-2015 negotiations will be ex-
amined. This will be followed by reflection on what this all means for right 
to health advocates in a post-2015 world. By thinking about the future we 
                                                   
15 A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015, SDG 5.6, 18.  
16  This chapter’s exploration will be based on the presentation at the EFI Confer-
ence in Berlin in September 2015, »Everywhere but not specifically some-
where«: Why is the right to health not explicit in post-2015 negotiations? A 
Qualitative Study. This presentation itself was grounded on the content of a 
peer-reviewed paper of the same name published in the scientific-journal, BMC 
International Health and Human Rights in 2015, co-authored by Dr. Claire E. 
Brolan, Dr. Peter S. Hill and Dr. Gorik Ooms, cf. Brolan et al. (2015). 
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will then return to the past, and allow Jonathan Mann’s inspirational words 
to echo through to the present. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE FORMULATION OF  
THE SINGLE POST-2015 HEALTH GOAL  
 
Despite activism encouraging a right to health goal, particularly driven by 
the post-2015 Go4Health research consortium (among others),17 an explicit 
post-2015 health rights narrative did not gain effective traction in key 
post-2015 health goal proposals. Here, reference is made to four post-2015 
goal proposals in particular, which incrementally emerged from 
UN-initiated and intergovernmental post-2015 forums. The first was the 
outcome report of April 2013 of the post-2015 Global Thematic Consul-
tation on Health.18 This report synthesised the vast input into the post-2015 
Global Thematic Consultation on Health (one of eleven global thematic 
consultations overseen by the UN Development Group) held between Sep-
tember 2012 and March 2013, and co-ordinated by UNICEF and the WHO 
with support from the governments of Sweden and Botswana. The consul-
tation’s objective was threefold: to stimulate broad discussion at all levels 
(global, regional, national) on MDG progress and lessons learnt from the 
health MDGs; to develop a shared understanding among key stakeholders 
(member states, UN agencies, civil society, and others) on health’s posi-
tioning in the post-2015 development framework; and to propose health 
goals and associated targets and indicators for the post-2015 development 
agenda. The post-2015 Global Thematic Consultation on Health was far-
reaching and included 14 international meetings drawing over 1,600 peo-
ple, submission of over 100 papers by an array of authors and organiza-
tions, as well as attracting more than 150,000 people to its respective web-
site.  
The post-2015 Global Thematic Consultation on Health culminated in a 
High-Level meeting in Botswana in early March 2013 to flesh out the con-
tent of the post-2015 Global Thematic Consultation on Health’s final syn-
thesis report. This latter document, released in April 2013, proposed one 
                                                   
17  Ooms et al. (2013).  
18  UN System Task Team (2013). 
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post-2015 health and development goal – »Maximising Healthy Lives« – 
with three underlying interventions: accelerate the MDG agenda, reduce the 
non-communicable disease burden; and ensure Universal Health Coverage 
and access.19 The following month, May 2013, the second key post-2015 
health goal proposal was released by the UN’s post-2015 High-Level Panel 
of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (High-Level 
Panel), which was originally launched by UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon in July 2012 and co-chaired by the Presidents of Liberia and In-
donesia, and the Prime-Minister of the United Kingdom.20 Similar to the 
post-2015 Global Thematic Consultation on Health’s April 2013 report, the 
High-Level Panel presented one »illustrative« global health goal to the 
world, Goal 4: Ensure Healthy Lives, with five targets, which also included 
the unfinished business of the MDG health agenda, as well as reducing the 
disease burden of »priority« non-communicable diseases and neglected 
tropical diseases. In a departure from the post-2015 Global Thematic Con-
sultation on Health, Universal Health Coverage was not identified by the 
High-Level Panel as an express target, though ensuring SRHR was. The 
right to health was not proposed in either report as a (or the) post-2015 
headline health goal, nor progressive achievement of the right to health as 
an underlying global health goal target. 
A week after the High-Level Panel released its report, in June 2013 an-
other report proposing a framework for the post-2015 development agenda 
was offered by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network led by Pro-
fessor Jeffrey Sachs. Similar to the High-Level Panel, UN Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon also launched the Sustainable Development So-
lutions Network in August 2012, which comprised scientific and technical 
expertise from academia and non-UN agencies. In contrast to the High-
Level Panel’s twelve illustrative goals, the Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network suggested ten sustainable development priorities, the fifth of 
which was for global health (Goal 5: Achieve Health and Wellbeing at All 
Ages).21 Again, no express mention of progressively achieving the right to 
                                                   
19  UN System Task Team (2013). 
20  UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda (High-Level Panel) (2013).  
21  Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2013).  
RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE POST-2015 HEALTH AND AGENDA | 305 
health as a possible headline post-2015 global health goal, or underlying 
target, was made.  
Following the release of these three post-2015 reports between May and 
June 2013, leadership of the post-MDG discussion formally shifted from 
UN to member state auspice. This shift had already begun in early 2013 
when the UN General Assembly proclaimed that Rio+20 Conference’s 
Open Working Group would transform into the »Open Working Group on 
the Sustainable Development Goals«.22 In May-June 2014, the Open Work-
ing Group proposed a »zero draft« of 17 SDGs to be attained by the year 
2030, with the proposed global health goal, SDG 3: Attain healthy life for 
all at all ages, with nine associated targets.23 The Open Working Group’s 
final SDG proposal was then released over twelve months later in August 
2015 in a draft UN General Assembly resolution.24  
It was the content of this draft resolution that was finally voted on by 
UN member states at the September 2015 high-level summit in New York, 
where UN member states unanimously endorsed the draft resolution’s con-
tent of 17 SDGs and 169 targets and means of implementation.25 However, 
the global health goal’s content had altered from the Open Working 
Group’s mid-2014 proposal: now, the global health SDG was titled, »En-
sure health lives and promote well-being for all at all ages«. Thus the goal’s 
language had changed from attaining to ensuring healthy lives and the 
promotion of well-being for all at all ages. Nine targets and four means of 
implementation were now incorporated (again, see Figure 2). When these 
nine targets and four means of implementation are placed under the norma-
tive-legal analytic microscope, the right to health in its express form ap-
pears absent.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
22  A/67/L.48/Rev.1, 15 January 2013.  
23  Open Working Group for Sustainable Development Goals (2014).  
24  A/69/L.85, 12 August 2015. 
25  A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015.  
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3.  WHY THE RIGHT TO HEALTH WAS NOT EXPLICIT 
IN THE FINAL POST-2015 HEALTH GOAL (SDG 3)  
 
The BMC International Health and Human Rights article, upon which the 
EFI conference presentation was based, provides six reasons that may ex-
plain the right to health’s marginalisation from the final post-2015 health 
and development goal framework.26 These reasons have an empirical base: 
they are founded on interview data collected in 2013 and 2014 by members 
of the Go4Health research team on the right to health’s location in the un-
folding post-2015 health goal negotiations. The team from the School of 
Public Health at The University of Queensland (Dr. Claire E. Brolan and 
Dr. Peter S. Hill), over a two year period, interviewed key informants from 
the multilaterals and inter-related agencies responsible for health in the 
post-2015 SDG agenda (or the formulation of the SDG agenda more broad-
ly), whom were mainly based in New York, Washington DC, Paris and 
Geneva.27 Key informants frequently sat at the interface of UN and member 
state, as well as civil society, post-2015 discussion. Applying qualitative 
analytic techniques and aided by NVIVO 9 software, the interview data was 
subject to a discourse analysis and thematic analysis. The methodology is 
detailed not only in the BMC International Health and Human Rights arti-
cle,28 but elsewhere.29 The remainder of the chapter will hence focus on the 
                                                   
26  Brolan et al. (2015). 
27  Forty interviews were held in June-July 2013; 33 face-to-face interviews and 
seven by Skype with 57 participants, and two additional participants provided 
email responses. Participants were from a total of 31 agencies: 17 multilaterals, 
four academic institutes, three foundations, three non-government organisations 
(NGOs), two government agencies, and two development banks. In the second 
interview round held almost 12 months later in April-May 2014, the research 
team narrowed the second round interview question guide and participant sam-
ple; only interviewing participants working exclusively on the post-2015 health 
and development agenda in health related multilaterals or Global Health initia-
tives, and specialists from NGOs and academic institutes. Second round inter-
views comprised 14 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 18 participants 
from a total of eight agencies (five multilaterals, two academics and one founda-
tion). Nine participants had been interviewed in the first round. 
28  Brolan et al. (2015).  
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six cumulative reasons given by the high-level study participants as to why 
the right to health, in their view, lay at the periphery of post-2015 health 
goal negotiations.  
 
3.1 Reason 1: The Right to Health is on the  
Fringes of High-Level Post-2015 Health and  
Development Negotiation 
 
Key informants highlighted that, in short, the right to health (in its express 
form) was on the sidelines of post-2015 health and development negotia-
tions; especially high-level discussion between the UN and member states. 
The right to health’s lack of prominence on the post-2015 negotiation radar 
is reinforced by its lack of visibility in the key post-2015 reports that 
emerged in 2013 and 2014, which put forth to the global community poten-
tial health and sustainable development goals (and targets) for in-depth dis-
cussion. The marginalisation of the right to health in these formative reports 
is evidenced in our overview of the same above in Section 2.  
 
3.2 Reason 2: The Right to Health’s Sidelining is  
Part of a Broader Human Rights Marginalisation   
 
Participants, however, considered the right to health was not alone being 
singled out and marginalised by high-level actors in emergent post-2015 
global health dialogue. Rather, many key informants were of the view the 
right to health’s relegation was part of the broader sidelining of human 
rights in wider post-2015 discussions. In fact, some key informants per-
ceived human rights a potential and very real »fault line« to UN member 
state decision-making consensus on the SDG metrics. Therefore, many felt 
»pragmatics« would »prevail«. That is, that explicit inclusion of human 
rights would be effectively forfeited by governments worldwide so as to 
ensure the General Assembly could reach a collective decision on the post-
2015 goal framework.  
Alternatively, some key informants considered that should human rights 
rhetoric indeed prevail in the final post-2015 SDGs, then this would be be-
                                                   
29  Brolan/Hill (2014).  
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cause UN member states had »compromised« on a post-2015 SDG frame-
work that was weak or, in the words of one participant, »watered down«; or 
that the UN member states had opted for symbolism over much needed ac-
tion. Most participants, however, considered human rights inclusion wholly 
unlikely. Several reasoned this was due to the alignment of an alliance of 
otherwise heterogeneous member states with a cultural relativist argument 
against human rights, related to deep and divisive geopolitical power-plays. 
As one key-informant stated:  
 
»Some nations […] are allergic to the term ›human rights‹. They feel […] it is the 
Western countries beating them around the head trying to impose Western cultures 
on them.«  
 
3.3 Reason 3: Member State Anxiety Around  
Potential Inclusion of SRHR  
 
In both interview rounds in 2013 and 2014, key informants were concerned 
that SRHR, as an express matter of rights, was in and of itself another very 
real »fault line« to post-2015 SDG decision-making consensus among 
member states. Indeed, this was in addition to »human rights« being per-
ceived as a »fault line« threatening member state decision-making consen-
sus. In the first interview round in mid-2013, participants predicted »an al-
mighty fight« would likely arise over SRHR’s incorporation in the post-
2015 SDG metrics framework. These participants anticipated this »fight« 
against SRHR’s inclusion would be led by strong Catholic and Islamic na-
tions.  
However, when the second round of interviews were conducted almost 
one year later in April-May 2014, the discourse around SRHR had substan-
tially migrated. By 2014, key informants now spoke of their concern that 
SRHR were being increasingly connected by countries to debate around 
post-2015 lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, transgender, queer and inter-sex 
(LGBTQI) rights. For these participants, government linkage of SRHR with 
advancement of LGBTQI rights only made the argument for SRHR’s inclu-
sion in the post-2015 SDGs, as one participant explained, »more and more 
difficult«. This seems to be the origins of the splitting of SRHR into Sexual 
and Reproductive Health and Reproductive Health Rights in the final SDG 
5.6 wording, retaining reference to Reproductive Rights while precluding 
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the inclusion of Sexual Rights and their potential to provide a platform for 
further, more inclusive, redefinition. Yet one participant from a UN agency 
suggested unfolding arguments for and against SRHR’s inclusion among 
member states were not actually, at a de facto level, about sexual and re-
productive health as a matter of rights. In this participant’s view, this point 
of contention could not (again) be divorced from larger, deep-seated geopo-
litical power-plays:  
 
»It’s mostly a power play between the North and South, if I can put it crudely. For 
instance, the African Group has gone very conservative and that might be the use of 
SRHR as a bargaining chip within the North/South debates […].« 
 
3.4 Reason 4: An Overarching Post-2015 Right to Health 
Goal is too Big to be Defined  
 
Despite a handful of participants acknowledging the right to health is artic-
ulated in Article 12 of the ICESCR, from immersion in the data it became 
clear that this definition of the right to health was unknown by a sizeable 
cluster of key informants. Many participants were vague with regards to the 
meaning of the right to health, and the source of this meaning; a number 
considered the »aspirational« right to health to be a »fuzzy«, broad impera-
tive that was »too big« to be pragmatically condensed into a single, over-
arching post-2015 global health goal. Many considered that confusion 
around the right to health’s definition was subsequently a key reason that 
precluded a serious and focused discussion on the right to health’s potential 
to translate into the headline post-2015 health and development goal among 
the UN member states.  
 
3.5 Reason 5: Even If a Headline Right to Health Goal is 
Coherently Defined, it is too Difficult to Implement  
 
Participants in the second interview round were particularly emphatic that 
even if the right to health could be translated cogently into the post-2015 
health and development goal, its broad elements were nonetheless too diffi-
cult to implement, to »measure«. This concern was best captured in the fol-
lowing statement by one participant:  
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»For me, it’s a very good principle, the right to health, but we need to materialise 
[it], really carry it out, how it spells out in different programs and different indica-
tors. Because […] it’s very hard to conceptualise what exactly we should do to get 
there. […] So people really want targets […] if we don’t have a target how do we 
manage our program?« 
 
3.6 Reason 6: The Right to Health would be Implicitly  
Captured in a Post-2015 Health and Development Goal  
 
Paradoxically, while many participants were unable to identify what the 
right to health’s content included per Article 12 of the ICESCR, they none-
theless associated the aspirational nature of the right to health with the more 
tangible concepts of Universal Health Coverage, or health equity, or a 
›Healthy Lives across the Life Course‹ approach. And, what is more, all 
three concepts appeared to obtain more discursive coverage in the post-
2015 global health and development goal debate than the prima facie right 
to health in international law. In fact, seven participants in the second inter-
view round viewed Universal Health Coverage as the tangible expression of 
the right to health, while others spoke of how the right to health would be 
inherently represented in the final health goal framework if words such as 
»equity« or »equality« were inserted into the text of the final SDG metrics:  
 
»When you unpack equity […] you’re talking about everyone having a right […] it’s 
often a presentation thing rather than a principle thing if you like.« 
»The right to health, as far as I can see – it all seems to come down to how you ad-
dress the inequalities in health in the world.«  
 
 
4. REFLECTION 
 
As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the final SDG framework was 
voted on by the UN General Assembly in September 2015. And, as has 
been further contended, the right to health in its express form did not trans-
late into the overarching post-2015 health and development goal, nor ex-
plicitly appear in the content of this goal’s nine targets and four means of 
implementation (Figure 2). Through reviewing the six reasons given by this 
study’s key informants as to why the right to health seemed to be on the 
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fringes of evolving post-2015 health goal negotiations, the marginal pres-
ence of the right to health in the final post-2015 outcome document is un-
surprising; and certainly anticipated by the majority of this study’s partici-
pants. Moreover, participants’ general prediction that broader human rights 
would likely be kept separate from final SDG metrics, in the interests of 
UN member state decision-making consensus, materialised. Thus, while the 
SDG framework that finally emerged was indeed a most broad and com-
prehensive plan of action for »people, planet and prosperity«,30 it appears 
this was at the expense of the member states affirming human rights’ rich 
and intrinsic connect with development.31  
It is therefore submitted that through the post-2015 SDGs of September 
2015, the UN member states have perpetuated the schismatic relationship 
between international human rights law and global development policy and 
planning, which had been progressed in 2001 by the SDGs predecessor, the 
MDGs.32 Indeed, the high-level technocrats responsible for configuring the 
eight MDGs in the spring and summer of 2001 have been most forthright 
that rights and measureable goals and targets were not to intermingle; in 
their view, »development« and »rights« were incompatible.33 According to 
Jan Vandemoortele who was tasked by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
to lead the small interagency team to devise those goals: 
 
»The [MDGs] express targets that are feasible at the global level. They should not be 
seen as a normative statement of what is desirable in an ideal world, which is al-
ready embedded in the various human rights treaties that have been ratified by 
member states to varying degrees. There is no need to repeat or overlap with these 
instruments.«34 
 
As a number of participants in our study advised, and as with the MDG 
formulation process, metrics mattered foremost in post-2015 high-level ne-
gotiations (in addition to politics!). Thus if the respective post-2015 health 
goal and/or target being advocated for inclusion could be pragmatically de-
                                                   
30  A/Res/70/1, 25 September 2015.  
31  Alston (2005); Darrow (2012). 
32  Alston (2005). 
33  Murphy (2012). 
34  Vandemoortele (2011), 14. 
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fined, dissected and measured ideally through quantitative means, then it 
stood good chance of at least vying for member state attention in post-2015 
negotiations. And, if the conceptual framing stood good chance of attract-
ing member state (as well as multilateral and other) attention and discourse, 
then it stood some chance of being up-taken and included in the final post-
2015 health goal framework. Following this line of reasoning, it is of little 
wonder that during the recent post-2015 SDG formulation period the World 
Health Organization, in partnership with the World Bank, was ensconced in 
demonstrating how Universal Health Coverage could be measured at a 
country and global level.35 
Nevertheless, it follows that this finding above points to a number of 
larger challenges for right to health advocates moving forward. The first is 
that even if the right to health had been successfully quantified and pitched 
to the post-2015 decision-makers, the conglomerate of member states, this 
still might not have been enough to ensure member state inclusion of the 
right to health expressly in the post-2015 health and development goal 
framework. This is because, as anticipated by the findings in our study, par-
ticipants generally perceived it unlikely that a broader human rights agenda 
would be incorporated in post-2015 SDG metrics. Therefore, even if the 
right to health in its explicit form had been successfully repackaged and ad-
vocated to member states as a potential measurable goal and/or target, it 
would nonetheless arguably have been sacrificed in member states’ broader 
sidelining of human rights language (and thus a human rights agenda) in the 
SDG goals, targets and indicators. 
The second challenge for right to health advocates arising from this 
study is that it appears many high-level personnel in influential global 
health policy roles (and health and development policy roles more broadly), 
might not actually understand what the right to health means or, in other 
words, how the right to health is defined in international human rights law. 
It follows an array of these individuals (at least in our study) were uncom-
fortable with outright support of an explicit post-2015 right to health goal, 
and certainly not with lending such support directly on behalf of their re-
spective organizations. However, this conservatism is inherently tied to the 
perceptible lack of prima facie knowledge among this study’s key inform-
ants on what the right to health in fact is; and thus why its express incorpo-
                                                   
35  WHO/World Bank (2014) and (2015). 
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ration in the new development goal framework truly matters. In the view of 
many participants in our study, whatever the content of the right to health 
might be, it is for them aspirational and not pragmatically or tangibly appli-
cable, nor measurable or politically palatable, so as to warrant prominence 
in the metrics of this formative global health policy endeavour.  
Here, it is timely to remind why the right to health’s incorporation in 
the post-2015 health goal framework is important. Among the mix of rea-
sons, three will be highlighted. First, the right to health underpins global 
development policy, planning and implementation with a normative basis, 
allowing development to become a process by which people can progres-
sively realise their human rights. Second, the right to health in international 
law, although not without its sceptics,36 is the normative gold standard for 
global health that all UN member states have adopted (in some form) to re-
spect, protect and fulfil.37 Third, if the post-2015 health goal is to have any 
bite, it needs legal teeth: »Rights remove discretion from development and 
provide a framework of accountability«.38 Thus progressive and contextual 
achievement of the health SDG’s content by the international community of 
states (and their array of partners) between 2016 and 2030 should not be 
based solely on state commitments engendered by a post-2015 global health 
policy. Rather, UN member state commitment must be combined with 
states’ obligations under international human rights law, and the conse-
quential government accountability mechanisms and legal remedies that 
surround this.39 
 
4.1 Refocusing and Moving Forward in 2017 and Beyond  
 
Right to health advocates must return to the words of Jonathan Mann, the 
founder of the modern health and human rights movement,40 in their reflec-
tion on the liminal presence of the right to health in the post-2015 health 
goal framework: 
 
                                                   
36  Baumrin (2012). 
37  Backman et al. (2008); Kinney/Clark (2004); Perehudoff (2008).  
38  Sidibe/Buse (2013). 
39  Yamin (2008). 
40  Tarantola et al. (2006). 
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»[…] Similarly, contemporary human rights, seeking to understand how to advance 
human well-being in diverse real-life settings, needs to draw upon a more sophisti-
cated understanding of health, health status, and health realities […]. Action is liber-
ating: it can teach what cannot be learned nor imagined in the abstract. As much as 
we believe in the power of rhetoric […] we need to see how and to what extent real-
ising human rights and increasing respect for dignity can operate to diminish the so-
cietal contribution to disease, disability and death. While this work can draw upon 
traditional and well-developed modes of public health and human rights work, it will 
require innovation, experiment, and risk-taking.«41 
 
To this end, »the innovation, experiment, and risk-taking« must occur in 
multiple ways if it is to progress the right to health as »value added«42 in 
the global health and development policy-making landscape.  
Firstly, it is recommended that a serious conversation begins involving 
not only right to health advocates, but inter-sectoral human rights advo-
cates, equally disappointed with the disconnect between human rights and 
the final post-2015 SDG metrics. This is because an urgent discussion must 
be initiated around how the bridge can be more effectively built between 
human rights and development in the post-2015 world. Insight from right to 
development advocates also needs to be elicited in this discussion. A con-
ference or meeting of sorts might be a good starting point in facilitating 
such discourse.  
Secondly, if the onus in contemporary, high-level development policy 
and planning is ›all about the numbers‹ and results based management, then 
right to health advocates need to strategically ›play the game‹. Certainly, 
political realists would support this notion. It is therefore recommended 
right to health advocates consider how to insert more of the normative into 
the empirical, and more of the empirical into the normative. Working in 
partnership with communities, civil society, policy-makers, and global 
health colleagues from different disciplinary backgrounds, a flexible coher-
ent framework with corresponding measures and targets for implementation 
for the right to health as espoused in international human rights law – par-
ticularly as elucidated and framed by the UN Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights in its General Comment No. 14 of 2000 – could be 
                                                   
41  Mann (1997), 118–119. 
42  Darrow (2012). 
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developed. In collaboratively configuring such a tool, the right to health’s 
content need not be detracted from or compromised. Here, right to health 
advocates can draw inspiration from related and already-developed scientif-
ically-informed matrixes such as the EquiFrame.43 On this point, it is fur-
ther recommended that right to health country-reporting matrixes are then 
linked to states’ reporting obligations on the right to health with regards to 
UN treaty documents. In this way, the one innovative matrix (and its data) 
can be used by governments to serve two significant reporting purposes.  
Thirdly, while a number of scholars from various disciplines consider 
the tension between cultural relativism and human rights an old and irrele-
vant debate, the findings from our study suggest otherwise. Indeed, our re-
search indicates this tension remains an ongoing and real point of conten-
tion influencing and impacting member state decision-making consensus in 
the development field. Hence part of the serious conversation that must be 
had around the disconnect of the right to health from the post-2015 metrics 
framework, needs to examine this point. Health policy and related practi-
tioners, especially in developing countries, are familiar with cultural rela-
tivist critique and related claims for regional exceptionalism:44 universality-
relativist tension emerges in a range of health issues particularly relating to 
women’s and girls’ health, and the health of LGBTQI individuals and 
communities.45  
Finally, right to health advocates need to work hard in a plethora of fo-
rums, explaining in plain, simple, and persuasive language what the right to 
health is and why and how this human right (as with all human rights) are 
necessarily part of sustainable development, and should therefore be clearly 
linked as such to development metrics. Of course, such efforts would be as-
sisted if a right to health reporting matrix or measurement tool can be 
pointed to.  
The four tasks identified above are enormous. At their heart, they im-
plicate several paradigm shifts. One of these shifts involves repeatedly ex-
posing those in elite positions who make decisions in the global health poli-
cy landscape, and who are frequently trained and educated in approaching 
that landscape through bio-medical and/or quantitative scientific methods 
                                                   
43  Amin et al. (2011).  
44  Kirby (2011). 
45  Murphy (2012); Tong (2012). 
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and/or through an economic (neo-liberal) lens, to reframe their wholesale 
response to global health challenges by applying (and prioritising) norma-
tive health and human rights law. While human rights is not the only fram-
ing for the complex that is global health and foreign policy,46 more work 
needs to be invested in having human rights law not only merely under-
stood and acknowledged, but prioritised by our rich diversity of global 
health and development peers. Of course, this fundamental reframing of 
what must be prioritised and respected in global health and development 
policy — that is, international human rights law, and member states obliga-
tions toward the same — must also be a message facilitated in tertiary edu-
cational settings, and especially directed toward public health, global 
health, international public health, public policy and social policy, and in-
ternational development graduates. 
Of course, the task before right to health advocates (who are in no way 
homogenous in their outlook and interpretation of the right to health), 
seems all too overwhelming: a lifetime of work is clearly on the horizon. 
However, commitment to the right to health vocation finds home in the 
words of Jonathan Mann:  
 
»The health and human rights linkage, as seen from the public health side […] pro-
vides a better guide for identifying, analysing and responding directly to critical so-
cietal conditions than any framework inherited from the biomedical or recent public 
health tradition. Thus, promoting and protecting health is proposed to depend upon 
the promotion and protection of human rights and dignity. The consequences of this 
line of thinking are nothing short of revolutionary for public health practice […]. We 
share a confidence in the future – and in our ability to contribute – each in our own 
ways and yet together to the healing of the world […]. This is our modesty, also our 
boldness, also our aspiration – and together we form a multitude.«47  
 
And, in working to slowly but incrementally achieve the above, Mann fur-
ther cautions us to be reflexive, collegial and collaborative in so doing:  
 
                                                   
46  Labonte/Gagnon (2010); Stuckler/McKee (2008).  
47  Mann (1997), 114 and 120.  
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»Avoid creating, inadvertently, an oppressive orthodoxy […]. The fields of public 
health and human rights can learn much from each other […]. A multiplicity of ap-
proaches, selected and designed locally by people directly concerned, is best.«48 
 
Mann’s above words were published in 1997. Twenty-years on, and in light 
of the side-lining of the right to health and international human rights law 
from the final post-2015 global health and development goal metrics, there 
is considerable work to be done by right to health advocates. We must con-
tinue to let Mann’s words guide and inspire us.  
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Mapping Constitutional Commitments 
on Sexual and Reproductive Health  
and Rights?
A Global Survey  
LUCÍA BERRO PIZZAROSSA, KATRINA S. PEREHUDOFF 1 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE ?
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) have been increasingly 
recognized and developed in international human rights law. The UN hu-
man rights system has repeatedly confirmed that SRHR are human rights 
established in the core human rights conventions. Reproductive health was 
first enshrined under the right to health in the International Convention on 
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR)2 and – according to Gen-
eral Comment No. 14 – bestows on individuals the freedom to choose if, 
when, how, and with whom to engage in sexual activity, as well as the right 
to access to contraceptive methods, information, goods such as contracep-
tive devices, and sexual and reproductive healthcare. General Comment 
                                                             
1  Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank Ms. Annabel Weijer for her 
research assistance. 
2  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) in 1979 also made major contributions to protecting and 
promoting reproductive health and rights.  
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No. 22 (GC) by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) builds on these developments and states that the right to repro-
ductive health entails both »the right to make free and responsible decisions 
and choices, free of violence, coercion and discrimination, over matters 
concerning one’s body and sexual and reproductive health«, and the »un-
hindered access to a whole range of health facilities, goods, services and 
information, which ensure all people full enjoyment of the right to sexual 
and reproductive health«.3 Closely linked is the concept of sexual health, 
defined as »a state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-being in 
relation to sexuality«.4 
In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development 
(the Conference) transformed the discourse at the time from reproductive 
health and rights as a strategy to meet demographic targets and control 
population growth to a more comprehensive and positive approach to sexu-
ality and reproduction, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.5 
The Conference forged the link between sexuality and health as human 
rights, where women's agency over their own bodies and sexuality was now 
intrinsically linked to their sexual and reproductive health.6 In 1995, the 
Beijing Platform for Action7 was the first declaration to embody the con-
cept of sexual rights and expanded the definition to cover both sexuality 
and reproduction by upholding the right to exercise control over and make 
decisions about one’s sexuality.  
Furthermore, the Conference’s Program of developed the notion of re-
productive rights as embracing certain human rights that are already recog-
nized in national laws, international human rights documents and other 
relevant UN consensus documents. Building on the notion that all human 
rights are indivisible, universal and interdependent – as noted at the World 
                                                             
3  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, Context (I).  
4  Ibid.  
5  See generally Garita (2014), 1; Zampas/Gher (2008), 252. 
6  Reichenbach/Roseman (2009), 11.   
7  A/CONF.177/20 and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1, 1995. 189 governments at the 
Beijing Platform for Action recognized that social and cultural discriminations, 
gender inequalities, and the lack of information and services contribute to sexual 
and reproductive ill health. 
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Conference on Human Rights in Vienna8 – the definition grounds these 
rights in binding international treaties that protect the right to life, liberty, 
security, health, self-determination, equality and non-discrimination, access 
to information, and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. 
Another of the many achievements of the Conference is the recognition of 
the responsibility of governments to legislate on the matter translating 
international commitments into national laws and policies.9  
Earlier in the year 2016, the Committee of Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (CESCR) extensively addressed states’ legal duties to the right 
to sexual and reproductive health in its General Comment No. 22 in re-
sponse to the continuing grave violations in practice and adopting a clear 
human rights based approach to matters of sexuality and reproduction. The 
General Comment affirms that the right to reproductive health is an integral 
part of the right to health10 that has enjoyed longstanding recognition based 
on already existing international human rights instruments.11 Among other 
issues, General Comment No. 22 recognizes abortions services as an inte-
gral part of the right to health (paras. 56–57) and notes that states have an 
obligation to repeal, eliminate laws, policies and practices that criminalize, 
obstruct or undermine an individual’s or a particular group’s access to 
health facilities, services, goods and information, including abortion (pa-
ra. 35).   
The legal obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to sexual 
and reproductive health offered in General Comment No. 22 provide clear 
guidance to state parties using standardized terminology. According to the 
comment, the duty to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with 
individuals’ right to exercise their sexual or reproductive health. Examples 
                                                             
8  A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993. 
9  Cottingham et al. (2010), 551. 
10  See also E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 2, 8, 11, 16, 21, 23, 34 and 36.  
11  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016 the following documents as examples: Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
1979, Article 12; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989, Articles 
17, 23–25 and 27; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), 2006, Articles 23 and 25; See also A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. 1, 
19 January–5 February 1999 and 7–25 June 1999, paras 11, 14, 18, 23, 26, 29, 
31(b); CRC/C/GC/15, 17 April 2013.  
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include limiting or denying access to health services and information, such 
as laws or practices that criminalize abortion, limiting consensual sexual 
activities between adults, requiring third-party authorization for access to 
abortion or contraception, or excluding certain health services from public-
ly- or donor-funded programmes.12  
Under the obligation to protect, states must protect individuals’ right to 
sexual and reproductive health from interference by third parties.13 Exam-
ples include protecting against private health clinics, insurance or pharma-
ceutical companies that impose practical or procedural barriers to health 
services.14 States must introduce laws and policies that prohibit third parties 
from acting in a way that harms integrity or undermines the enjoyment of 
rights, such as ensuring adolescents have access to information about sexu-
al and reproductive health, including family planning, that is appropriate for 
their age and regardless of their marital status.15 
The responsibility to fulfil mandates states »to adopt appropriate legis-
lative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures 
to ensure the full realization of the right to sexual and reproductive 
health«.16 States must take steps to ensure universal access to sexual and 
reproductive healthcare, and to guarantee care for survivors of sexual and 
domestic violence, including emergency contraception and access to safe 
abortion services. States are required to provide comprehensive education 
about sexual and reproductive health for all and to take measures to eradi-
cate social barriers that prevent individuals from autonomously exercising 
their right to sexual and reproductive health.17 
In spite of the development of the legal framework much progress must 
be made to realize SRHR in practice.18 One important step in this direction 
                                                             
12  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, para. 40–41. 
13  Ibid., para. 42. 
14  Ibid., para. 42–43. 
15  Ibid., para. 43–44. 
16  Ibid., para. 45. 
17  Ibid., para. 47–48. 
18  The Lancet Commission on Women and Health asserts that an estimated 
225 million women have an unmet need for family planning, and every year, an 
estimated 75 million unintended pregnancies put women at risk of unsafe abor-
tion. Furthermore, unsafe abortion is estimated to cause 47,000 maternal deaths 
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is the removal of the legal barriers19 and to this end Gruskin demands »their 
identification, careful analysis and their subsequent modification – through 
laws, policies and regulations that are consonant with human rights«.20 
Showcasing the importance of the legal arrangements, the Lancet Commis-
sion on Women and Health emphasizes the need for »an enabling social, 
legal, and regulatory environment« to respond to women and girls’ health 
needs and rights,21 and the Commission on the Status of Women continues 
to demand that states strengthen their normative, legal and policy frame-
works.22 Both the removal of laws that obstruct the full realization of 
SRHR and the introduction of positive legal guarantees for these rights are 
needed. 
Adopting domestic laws consistent with international standards is a 
demonstration of the government’s commitment to realize SRHR. As a 
recognized indicator of such political will, legal codification may be the 
first step in improving the respect, protection and fulfilment of these rights 
in practice. Domestic constitutions are the most vital expressions of gov-
ernment responsibility and individual entitlements, and therefore one of the 
most deserving channels to endorse states’ commitments to human rights. 
Constitutional law offers a frame for subsequent policies, programmes and 
services to be executed. In many jurisdictions, constitutional law supports 
enforcement and redress in case of violations, and is a key success factor in 
strategic litigation for reproductive health.23 Legal recognition in constitu-
                                                                                                                          
and 5 million maternal disabilities annually. Maternal mortality claims the lives 
of 289,000 women annually while complications during childbirth result in 5.8 
million serious injuries every year. See generally Langer et al. (2015).  
19  Gruskin et al. (2008), 591; E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, para. 49(a). See general-
ly Kismödi et al. (2015). 
20  Gruskin et al. (2008), 591. 
21  Langer et al. (2015), 1178. 
22  E/2016/27–E/CN.6/2016/22, 14–24 March 2016. 
23  See generally Roa/Klugman (2014). See generally Hogerzeil et al. (2006). 
Pivotal cases such as the Treatment Access Campaign vs. the South African 
Ministry of Health seeking access to essential medicines to prevent the trans-
mission of HIV from mother to child during childbirth, illustrate how forceful a 
constitutional right to reproductive health can be.  
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tions can endure changes in government administrations and survive eco-
nomic or social strife and ensure a certain degree of consistency over time.  
An estimated 20 nations replace or amend their constitution annually 
presenting the opportunity to strengthen state commitments to SRHR24 and, 
in this process, constitutional framers often seek inspiration from other 
jurisdictions or international law.25 Our objective is to survey the language 
and concepts used to describe SRHR in the domestic constitutions from 
around the globe.  
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Our study investigates whether and how SRHR are introduced into domes-
tic constitutional law. In March 2015 (updated in April 2016) we searched 
the constitutions of 195 WHO member states on the Comparative Constitu-
tions Project webpage for the key words: ›reproductive‹, ›reproduction‹, 
›sexual‹, ›family planning‹, and ›abortion‹.26  
After retrieving constitutional provisions, we excluded provisions con-
cerning the use of genetic or reproductive material; the economy and repro-
duction of material and immaterial conditions; the reproduction of art, 
culture, or sound; the protection and reproduction of the (natural) environ-
ment; the delegation of competences or jurisdiction of authority; and pro-
ceedings for sexual harassment or crimes. 
                                                             
24  Ginsburg et al. (2009), 201. 
25  See generally ibid. 
26  One potential limitation of our study concerns the search scope. Although our 
search terms could be considered narrow by some, we intentionally chose SRHR 
terms clearly articulated in international law. With this approach, it is possible 
our search did not detect constitutions that implicitly govern or ‘catch’ SRHR in 
provisions for other, related rights. For example, constitutions enshrining a right 
to health could include reproductive health in their scope; however, our study 
did not include any related rights that are not expressly framed around SRHR. 
This is because the scope of our study was to understand how domestic constitu-
tions address SRHR concepts elucidated under international law and recently af-
firmed by the CESCR in GC No. 22 (E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016). 
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As mentioned above, the international legal framework underpinning 
SRHR is complex and grounded in different instruments. We use the defini-
tions and notions outlined in the Introduction and apply the tripartite typol-
ogy of states’ obligations (respect, protect and fulfil) to categorize constitu-
tional provisions for SRHR. In addition, we report the constitutional provi-
sions mentioning specific concepts in SRHR namely family planning, abor-
tion, access to education and other interlinked human rights. Melton et al. 
suggest that the scope of the constitutional text, such as whether it is fo-
cused by topic rather than using complex cross-referencing, and the use of 
once-only words for clarity and brevity, are of most importance for clear 
interpretation.27 Therefore, we identify well-defined terminology and con-
cepts in constitutional commitments in order to maximize their clarity and 
comparability between jurisdictions.28 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
We retrieved 32 constitutions that met our inclusion criteria. 28 domestic 
constitutions enabled at least one aspect of SRH; these laws were most 
often found in the pan-American (n=9 constitutions) and African (n=8) 
regions. Seven constitutions restricted SRHR and these were found in the 
African (n=3 constitutions), Western Pacific (n=2), European (n=1) and 
South-East Asian (n=1) regions. 
 
3.1 Sexual Health and Rights 
 
The state duty to respect the right to sexual health and sexual rights is con-
ceptualized in a positive sense as the right to make decisions about one’s 
sexual life and orientation (Ecuador) and the right to exercise sexual rights 
(Bolivia), and in a negative sense as the right to sexual integrity (Belgium, 
Bolivia) or a right to sexual safety (Ecuador). Bolivia’s constitutions states 
                                                             
27  Melton et al. (2013).  
28  Constitutional law scholars Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton note that a lack of 
conceptual clarity in constitutional language can impair comparisons across ju-
risdictions. We minimized this risk by using standard concepts in SRH and ap-
plying the tripartite typology. Elkins et al. (2011).  
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»Women and men are guaranteed the exercise of sexual rights and their 
reproductive rights«.29 
The most frequent state duty is the protection against sexual exploita-
tion (Ecuador, Egypt, Brazil, Cambodia, Zimbabwe), sexual abuse (Colom-
bia, DRC, Guinea, Timor-Leste, Malawi, Somalia), and sexual violence 
(DRC, Dominican Republic, Ecuador) or an obligation to punish such acts 
(Bolivia, Brazil, DRC, Malawi). Guinea’s constitution protects youth from 
sexual exploitation or abuse.  
Notably, in terms of the state’s duty to respect and protect sexual and 
reproductive rights, Ecuador’s constitution recognizes and guarantees the  
 
»right to freely take informed, voluntary, and responsible decisions on one’s sexuali-
ty and one's sexual life and orientation. The State shall promote access to the neces-
sary means so that these decisions take place in safe conditions.«30 [emphasis added, 
L.B.P./S.K.P.]  
 
This provision in Ecuador’s constitution respects the right of individuals to 
make decisions about their sexuality‚ freely and voluntarily, implying with-
out coercion. It obliges the government to fulfil this right by promoting 
access to safe conditions in which these decisions can be made. Finally, the 
constitution of Ecuador was the only constitution to protect confidentiality 
about one’s sexual life. 
 
3.2 Reproductive Health and Rights 
 
Four constitutions require the state to respect the right to reproductive 
health through the right to make decisions concerning reproduction (Ecua-
dor, South Africa, Zimbabwe), or the right to reproductive health (Nepal). 
Ecuador’s constitution specifies the right to take free, responsible and in-
formed decisions about one’s health and reproductive life and to decide 
how many children to have and also guarantees respect for the reproductive 
health of all workers. 
The constitutions of Ecuador and Nicaragua provide for the protection 
of sexual and reproductive health. Ecuador’s law mandates the »elimination 
                                                             
29  Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia of 2009, Article 66. 
30  Constitution of Ecuador of 2008 (amended 2011), Article 66. 
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of labour risks affecting reproductive health« and Nicaragua’s law »grants 
special protection to the process of human reproduction«.  
Eight constitutions include the explicit state duty to provide for repro-
ductive healthcare. The constitutions of Fiji, Kenya, and South Africa indi-
cate that everyone is entitled to access reproductive healthcare. In contrast, 
reproductive healthcare is limited in two instances to services and facilities 
»during reproductive phase«31 (Nepal) or to »citizens and permanent resi-
dents«32 (Zimbabwe). Paraguay’s constitution requires special plans for 
reproductive health care for people with scarce resources. 
 
3.3 »Family Planning« and Contraception 
 
Five constitutions address family planning in terms of individual rights and 
three constitutions approach family planning as an individual responsibility 
in relation to population control.  
The constitution of Paraguay determines the obligation to respect the 
right to reproductive health referring specifically to family planning in an 
article with the same title, by stating »the right of persons to freely and 
responsibly decide on the number and frequency of the birth of their chil-
dren«.33 The Brazilian constitution respects the right of couples to decide 
on family planning and prohibits »any coercion on the part of official or 
private institutions«.34 In the same line, the constitution of Venezuela also 
emphasizes the decision of the ›couple‹.  
No constitution addresses the protection of the right to family planning. 
A state duty to fulfil family planning is described as a »right to access 
family planning education, information and capacity«35 (Ethiopia), and 
state guarantee of »full family planning services based on ethical and scien-
tific values«36 (Venezuela). Portugal’s constitution offers a clear example 
                                                             
31  Constitution of Nepal of 2015, Article 51(j)3. 
32  Constitution of Zimbabwe of 2013, Article 76(1). 
33  Constitution of Portugal of 1976 (amended 2005), Article 67(2)d. 
34  Constitution of Brazil of 1988 (amended 2015), Articles 226 and 7. 
35  Constitution of Ethiopia of 1994, Article 35. 
36  Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 1999 (amended 2009), 
Article 76. 
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of state responsibility to fulfil access to family planning information and 
methods:  
 
»In order to protect the family, the state shall particularly be charged with: (d) with 
respect for individual freedom, guaranteeing the right to family planning by promot-
ing the information and access to the methods and means required therefore, and 
organizing such legal and technical arrangements as are needed for motherhood and 
fatherhood to be consciously planned«.37 [emphasis added, L.B.P./S.K.P.] 
 
Portugal’s constitution charges the state with guaranteeing family planning 
through access to information and the means to act on that information. 
Family planning resembles an individual obligation or duty in relation to 
national population control objectives in the constitutions of China,  
Vietnam, and Turkey.  
 
3.4 Abortion 
 
Three countries have specific constitutional provisions about abortion: 
Kenya, Swaziland and Somalia. Although the provisions frame abortion 
primarily in negative terms as ›unlawful‹,38 ›illegal‹39 or ›not permitted‹,40 
all laws recognise various grounds on which abortion may be allowed. The 
Swazi Constitution provides exceptions for abortions performed on medical 
or therapeutic grounds to preserve life, physical health or mental health, in 
the case of rape, in the case of incest, or in the case of foetal impairment. 
Moreover, this is not an exhaustive list as the provision leaves room for the 
parliament to incorporate new grounds in which abortion would be allowed. 
The Kenyan constitution also contains similar grounds in which abortion is 
permitted when there is need for emergency treatment, or the life or health 
of the mother is in danger, or if permitted by any other written law. In the 
same line – but with a more restrictive approach – the Somalian Constitu-
tion states that abortion will be permitted in cases of necessity, especially to 
save the life of the mother. 
                                                             
37  Constitution of Portugal of 1976 (amended 2005), Article 67, para. 2. 
38  Constitution of Swaziland of 2005, Article 15(5). 
39  Constitution of Somalia of 2012, Article 15(5). 
40  Constitution of Kenya of 2010, Article 26(4). 
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3.5 Indivisibility and Interdependence with ?
other Human Rights 
 
The UN bodies have noted that SRHR are intimately linked to civil and 
political rights underpinning the physical and mental integrity of individu-
als and their autonomy, such as the rights to life; liberty and security of 
person; freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment; privacy and respect for family life; and non-discrimination and equal-
ity.41 In this regard, we mapped the constitutional commitments on SRHR 
looking for the explicit interlinkages between these rights and other human 
rights. 
 
3.5.1 Autonomy and Freedom from Coercion 
The Brazilian constitution recognizes that »couples are free to decide on 
family planning« and prohibits »any coercion on the part of official or 
private institutions«.42 In the context of choices about family planning, 
Portugal’s constitution introduces the duty to respect individual freedom 
when it comes to decisions on SRHR: »In order to protect the family, the 
state shall particularly be charged with: […] respect for individual free-
dom«.43 Ecuador has included the provisions on SRHR in Chapter 6 of the 
Constitution that enshrines »Rights to freedom« and recognizes both the 
right to decide freely and voluntary on matters of sexuality and sexual life 
and orientation and about one’s health and reproductive life and to decide 
how many children to have. The Constitution of Paraguay and Venezuela 
also place emphasis on this element. 
 
3.5.2 Right to Benefit from Scientific Progress 
In this regard, three of the constitutions analysed contain provisions reflect-
ing the importance of this element. The Brazilian constitution clearly man-
dates that the state must provide educational and scientific resources for the 
exercise of SRHR. Paraguay formulates in its constitution that the state 
recognizes the right of persons to receive »education, scientific orientation, 
                                                             
41  For a more extensive analysis see United Nations Population Fund et al. (2014); 
Center for Reproductive Rights (2008), (2009), (2010) and (2013).  
42  Constitution of Brazil of 1988 (amended 2015), Article 226, para. 7. 
43  Constitution of Portugal of 1976 (amended 2005), Article 67, para. 2. 
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and adequate services«.44 The Venezuelan constitution notes that it is in-
cumbent to the state to guarantee full family planning services based on 
ethical and scientific values. Furthermore, the constitutions of South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, and Ecuador enshrine the right of individuals not to be subject-
ed to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent. 
 
3.5.3 Right to Access to Information and Education on SRHR  
Several of the national constitutions have considered this element. The 
Brazilian constitution states that it is incumbent upon the state to provide 
educational and scientific resources for the exercise of these rights. The 
constitutions from Ecuador, Ethiopia, Paraguay, Portugal, and Venezuela 
recognize that education and information are sine qua non requisites for the 
effective enjoyment of SRHR. Notably, the constitution of Ethiopia inno-
vates incorporating capacity. 
 
3.5.4 Budget Allocation 
Four of the constitutions have specific provisions related to budget alloca-
tion and all of them refer to reproductive healthcare. The Brazilian constitu-
tion states that the »government shall promote full health assistance pro-
grams for children, adolescents« and in order to do that there will be an 
allocation of a percentage of public health funds to assist mothers and in-
fants.45 The Constitutions of Fiji, South Africa, and Zimbabwe establish 
that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
the limits of the resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realiza-
tion of the rights set out in this section (right to health including reproduc-
tive health). It should be noted that the constitution of Fiji demands that if 
the state claims that it does not have the resources to implement the rights, 
it is the responsibility of the state to show that the resources are not availa-
ble. 
 
                                                             
44  Constitution of Paraguay of 1992 (amended 2011), para. 61. »The State recog-
nizes the right of persons to freely and responsibly decide the number and the 
frequency of the birth of their children, as well as to receive, in coordination 
with the pertinent organs[,] education, scientific orientation, and adequate ser-
vices in the matter«. 
45  Constitution of Brazil of 1988 (amended 2015), Article 227, para. 1. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  Introducing the Sexual into Sexual and ?
Reproductive Health and Rights 
 
Although our results suggest that, compared to other SRHR concepts, sexu-
al rights/health were widely enshrined in 24 constitutions, the majority of 
these references are negative prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
sexuality and/or recognizing a negative right to sexual health (i.e. to be 
protected from sexual offences). Most references to sexual health were 
found in constitutions from the Americas and Africa.  
As noted by the literature on the topic, prior to 199346 sexuality – or the 
forbidden ›s‹ word – of any sort or manifestation was absent from human 
rights discourse. The Declaration of the World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna and the Declaration on Violence against Women repre-
sented a major turning point not only because they gained recognition of 
sexual violence as a human rights violation but also because they finally 
initiated ›the sexual‹ into human rights language.47 The term ›sexual health‹ 
has now been given equal recognition as ›reproductive health‹ by the 
CESCR. 
Only two constitutions in our study embody positive references to sexu-
al rights, such as to freely make decisions about one’s sexual life or to have 
access to sexual healthcare. We use the term ›negative‹ following 
Petchesky’s observation that the emergence of the concept of sexual rights 
has only occurred from a negative approach, i.e. the abovementioned provi-
sions expressing the right not to be the object of abuse or exploitation, in 
the corrective sense of combating violations. We concur with this opinion 
considering that the development of sexual rights needs to expand and 
move towards an affirmative concept. In this line, the WHO definition of 
                                                             
46  See generally Petchesky (2000); Girard (2007), Davis (2008). Petchesky pon-
ders »why is it so much easier to assert sexual freedom in a negative way, and 
not in an affirmative, emancipatory sense? Why is it easier to reach a consensus 
on the right not to be abused, exploited, raped, trafficked or mutilated in one’s 
body, but not the right to fully enjoy one’s own body?« See Petchesky (2000), 
88. 
47  Petchesky (2000), 83.  
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sexual health – adopted by General Comment No. 22 – that requires a posi-
tive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships can pro-
vide a good starting point.48  
 
4.2  »Couples« or »Individuals«?  
Universality and SRHR Right Holders 
 
Determining the holders of SRHR proved to be a controversial undertaking. 
Debates about the right holders have evolved from the first reference to the 
›family‹49  in the Declaration on Population, to »all couples and individu-
als« by the World Population Plan of Action following the Bucharest Con-
ference, in 1974.50 Now, General Comment No. 22 clearly signals that »all 
                                                             
48  The WHO defines sexual health as »a state of physical, emotional, mental and 
social well-being in relation to sexuality; it is not merely the absence of disease, 
dysfunction or infirmity«. It also states that »Sexual health requires a positive 
and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the pos-
sibility of having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, dis-
crimination and violence.« And recognises that sexual health cannot be achieved 
and maintained without respect for, and protection of, certain human rights, that 
is, sexual rights. See WHO (2002).  
49  One year later 18 more countries signed the declaration signalling the political 
acceptability of governmental policies to influence population control. This fo-
cus on restraining population growth grew out of widespread concern that the 
unprecedented pace and volume of population growth after 1950 was a serious 
threat to economic development, public health, and the environment. See gener-
ally Ashford (2001), 3. 
50  The phrasing ›couples and individuals‹ was not in the original draft but was 
inserted as a new principle in the working group of the WPPA. See United Na-
tions World Population Conference, PN-AAH-494, 1974. Furthermore, in global 
debates, the Holy See has voiced its disagreement with the term ›couples and 
individuals‹ and stated its own interpretation of the phrase as »married couples 
and the individual man and woman who constitute the couple«. According to the 
Holy See’s position, no sexual and reproductive rights should be recognized and 
guaranteed to those outside the traditional heterosexual monogamous marriage. 
See for example Statement of the Holy See at the International Conference on 
Population and Development, A/CONF.171/13/ Rev.1, 5–13 September 1994.   
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individuals and groups should be able […] to exercise their rights to sexual 
and reproductive health without experiencing any discrimination«.51  
The constitutions of Brazil and Venezuela afford the right to decide 
about family planning to ›couples‹, which restrict these to control procrea-
tion to two people in a heterosexual monogamous relationship.52 This con-
cept fundamentally clashes with the universality of human rights as it 
makes exclusions based on marital status and sexual orientation. 
 
4.3  Decisional Autonomy and Freedom from ?
Coercion in SRHR 
 
Furthermore, despite substantial international traction for the legal recogni-
tion of women’s agency over their own sexuality and reproductive function, 
China and Vietnam continue to apply a controlling constitutional provision 
to procreation. Moreover, the constitution from Turkey states that  
 
»the State shall take the necessary measures and establish the necessary organization 
to protect peace and welfare of the family, especially mother and children, and to 
ensure the instruction of family planning and its practice.«53 [emphasis added, 
L.B.P./S.K.P.].  
                                                             
51  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, para. 22. Where reproductive health is defined as 
including »access to a range of reproductive health information, goods, facili-
ties, and services to enable individuals to make informed, free and responsible 
decisions about their reproductive behaviour« (ibid., para. 6). 
52  The Brazilian constitution only affords protection to couples when it comes to 
their reproductive rights: »Based upon the principles of human dignity and re-
sponsible parenthood, couples are free to decide on family planning« and the 
constitutional definition of family specifically refers to the »stable union be-
tween a man and a woman«. Constitution of Brazil of 1988 (amended 2015), 
Article 226. In the same line, the Venezuelan constitution states that »Couples 
have the right to decide freely and responsibly how many children they wish to 
conceive«. Constitution of Venezuela of 1999 (amended 2009), Article 76.  
53  Constitution of Turkey of 1982 (amended 2002), Article 41. 
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Provisions that subject the recognition of SRHR to its exercise in accord-
ance with the government's demographic goals or in a manner that the 
government considers ›responsible‹, instrumentalizes human beings and 
their reproductive capacity as an object of population control. This ap-
proach has been widely criticized.54 Greater emphasis on the individual 
right to decide on contraception in national constitutions may help curb 
discriminatory practices in which, for example, male partners must give 
express permission for a women to obtain contraception.55 
 
4.4  Provision of Healthcare 
 
Ecuador’s constitution is notable as it includes several provisions for the 
state’s duty to fulfil access to both sexual and reproductive healthcare:  
 
»The State shall guarantee this right by means of economic, social, cultural, educa-
tional, and environmental policies; and the permanent, timely and non-exclusive 
access to programs, actions and services promoting and providing integral 
healthcare, sexual health, and reproductive health. The provision of healthcare 
services shall be governed by the principles of equity, universality, solidarity, inter-
culturalism, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, prevention, and bioethics, with a 
gender and generational approach.«56 [emphasis added, L.B.P./S.K.P.] 
 
This language is a positive innovation for the provision of healthcare for 
several reasons. First, numerous commentators from the both the legal and 
health disciplines maintain that the phrase ›maternal health‹ is insufficient 
to adequately address the core issue of healthcare tailored to women’s 
health and needs.57 Instead, these commentators call for a holistic, lifecycle 
approach that addresses sexual and reproductive health – just as this provi-
sion in the Ecuadorian constitution has done – in order to capture the health 
needs of women at all life stages and regardless of whether they have born 
                                                             
54  Shalev (2000) 40. See also Aguirre/Wolfgram (2002). 
55  See examples by Langer et al. (2015), 1173. 
56  Constitution of Ecuador of 2008 (amended 2011), Article 32. 
57  See generally Yamin/Boulanger (2013); Bustreo et al. (2013). 
MAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS ON SRHR | 337 
 
children.58 Second, this provision considers the human rights elements of 
availability (›permanent, timely‹), accessibility (›non-exclusive‹, ›univer-
sality‹), acceptability (›interculturalism‹, ›with a gender and generational 
approach‹), and quality (›quality‹, ›effectiveness‹, ›bioethics‹) in relation to 
sexual and reproductive health programs and services. 
 
4.5  Reflections on Abortion 
 
Bearing in mind that restrictions on abortion were codified in three African 
constitutions, it is interesting to note that the African human rights system 
was the first to regulate explicitly on the issue of abortion in a binding 
instrument. The »Maputo Protocol« is the very first treaty to recognize 
abortion, under certain conditions, as women’s human right which they 
should enjoy without restriction or fear of being prosecuted.59 Under Article 
14 (2) (c) of the Maputo Protocol, states parties are called upon to take all 
appropriate measures to »protect the reproductive rights of women by au-
thorizing medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and 
where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of 
the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus«.60 
Both the constitutions from Kenya and Swaziland have placed such 
provisions in the Chapter that guarantees the right to life as a fundamental 
right. In Swaziland the provision on abortion is under Chapter III on Pro-
tection and Promotion of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Title15 on 
Protection of the Right to Life and in the Kenyan constitution it is regulated 
in Part 2 concerning Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 26 on the 
right to life. This might be a reflection of the UN monitoring bodies’ argu-
ments that ground the discussion on abortion on the high rates of maternal 
mortality and a growing concern for the preventable deaths caused by un-
safe abortions.61 Differently, the constitution of Somalia has placed the 
                                                             
58  See generally Yamin/Boulanger (2013); Bustreo et al. (2013); Langer et al. 
(2015). 
59  Zampas/Gher (2008), 250. See also African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights (2014). 
60  »Maputo Protocol« or Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
61  See more generally van Leeuwen (2007), 109–113.  
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article regulating abortion under Title II on Rights, Basic Personal Liberties 
And Limitations, Article 15 Liberty and Security of the Person. 
 
4.6  Interdependence and Indivisibility  
 
This survey shows that various constitutions have drafted clear interlinkag-
es between SRHR and other human rights. In 1993 in the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in Vienna62 states agreed on the principles of indi-
visibility and interdependence among the different kinds of rights and their 
respective international conventions. The approach of the International 
Conference on Population and Development tying health outcomes to rights 
promotion and protection – is considered very innovative because it built 
on previously enshrined and widely accepted human rights, articulating 
›reproductive rights‹ as already existing human rights applied to experienc-
es related to reproduction.63 General Comment No. 22 has also insisted on 
these characteristics noting that »[t]he realization of the right to sexual and 
reproductive health requires that states parties also meet their obligations 
under other provisions of the Covenant«.64  
It has been noted that no government argued the right to health should 
not constitute a right during the drafting of the WHO Constitution, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.65 However, the criticism stemmed 
from the fact that neither was it clear whose responsibility it was to realise 
the right to health, how this right would be realised, nor when this right had 
been satisfied.66 Undoubtedly, issues of budget availability and allocation 
of resources are crucial for the achievement of the right to health in general 
and particularly SRHR. The inability of countries to carry out the Interna-
tional Conference on Population and Development Program has been ham-
pered by developing countries’ financial constrains to meet their obliga-
tions but also by developed states not meeting theirs.67 Amnesty Interna-
                                                             
62  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993). 
63  Reichenbach/Roseman (2009), 9. 
64  E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, paras. 9–10.  
65  Davies (2010), 390.  
66  Taylor (1992), 327.  
67  Davies (2010), 394. 
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tional reports that in the ICPD+5 many countries and civil society organiza-
tions stressed their concerns about the impact of the financial crisis on 
implementation at the national level because of budget limitations in devel-
oping countries and reduced development assistance from donor coun-
tries.68 Furthermore, it has been noted that funding shortfalls are a key 
factor explaining why most developing countries were unable to meet the 
health-related MDGs by 2015.69 However, the international community met 
in July 2015 to developed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing 
for Development (AAAA) that should guide governments in their decision 
making processes around guide wide range of development issues.70 Fur-
thermore, the monitoring tools developed by the UNFPA and Centre for 
Reproductive Rights consider that an essential element to assess state com-
pliance is the allocation of adequate budgetary resources.71  
Furthermore, when austerity measures are adopted and states implement 
cuts in their budgets, evidence seems to indicate that SRHR – particularly 
SRHR of women – are the first ones to be adversely effected.72 Shalev cites 
the example of Croatia in which the first type of medication to be cut off 
from state funding was contraception and abortion was the first medical act 
to be removed from the free health care services.73 Legal recognition of 
SRHR and specific provisions regarding budget allocation contributes to 
these rights, endure changes in government administrations and survive 
economic or social strife and ensure a certain degree of consistency over 
time. 
 
                                                             
68  Amnesty International (2012), 9.  
69  Singh et al. (2009), 7.  
70  For a general overview of the financial aspects of SRHR see International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (2015).  
71  See generally Centre for Reproductive Rights/United Nations Population Fund 
(2013). 
72  Shalev (2000), 50.  
73  Ibid. 
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4.7  A Gender Sensitive Approach 
 
General Comment No. 22 demands a gender sensitive approach to SRHR, 
specifically where »[g]ender equality requires that the health needs of 
women, different from those of men, be taken into account and appropriate 
services provided for women in accordance with their life cycles«.74 The 
Bolivian constitution states that both »women and men are guaranteed the 
exercise of sexual and reproductive rights«75 and that »everyone, in particu-
lar women«76 have the right to be free from sexual violence. The Ecuadori-
an constitution states that the state bears the responsibility to ensure SRHR 
actions and services, especially during pregnancy, childbirth and postpar-
tum. Motherhood and maternal health are afforded special protection under 
the constitutions of Paraguay and Venezuela. The Constitution of Nicara-
gua provides for special protection to women during pregnancy and paid 
maternity leave. 
The Ethiopian constitution places the regulation of SRHR under the 
›Rights of women‹.77 The provision acknowledges a historical legacy of 
inequality and discrimination in the country and provides for affirmative 
measures to counter this. In this regard, it provides that »to prevent harm 
arising from pregnancy and childbirth and in order to safeguard their health 
women have the right of access to family planning, education information 
and capacity«.78  
Nepal’s Constitution also adopts a similar approach and is notable in 
that it states: »Every woman shall have the right relating to safe mother-
hood and reproductive health«.79 Among one of the most inclusive constitu-
tions, Nepal’s law does not limit the right to reproductive health to women 
of a certain age, reproductive capacity, marital or citizenship status as other 
constitutions have done. However, the abovementioned constitutional pro-
visions fail to include men’s right to reproductive health.  
                                                             
74  E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 25. 
75  Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia of 2009, Article 66. 
76  Ibid., Article 15. 
77  Constitution of Ethiopia of 1994, Article 35. 
78  Ibid., Article 35(6). 
79  Nepal, PART 338, Rights of Women, para. 2.  
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It’s important to clarify that the adoption of a gender sensitive approach 
does not entail the recognition of rights exclusively for a particular group of 
individual, but to recognise the unavoidable gender specific challenges.  
 
4.8  Future Steps 
 
Although the global community has endorsed the interrelationship between 
sexual rights and health and rights in the Conference and Beijing Plan of 
Action, the development agenda has historically skirted around the issue of 
SRHR until now.80 Currently, considerable attention is given to reframing 
women’s health around sexual and reproductive rights that consider a life-
cycle approach independent of reproductive capacity.81 The most recently 
adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also includes goals and 
targets to be achieved in the area of sexual and reproductive health.82 In a 
broader development perspective, SRHR is also among the key objectives 
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
 
and direct references to 
human rights treaties on SRHR are found in the targets themselves. The 
Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s, and Adolescents’ health  
(2016–2030) has as a key objective to »expand enabling environment« 
where the right to health and wellbeing can be achieved, specifically by 
removing barriers to the enjoyment of rights and by promoting gender 
equality.83 
 
                                                             
80  The MDGs have been criticized for failing to address women's rights as a fun-
damental determinant of women's health, and deliberately focusing on maternal 
health rather than sexuality and reproduction. Yamin/Boulanger (2013) empha-
size that initiatives inclusive of sexuality and reproduction are needed to address 
the core issue women's empowerment needed if sustainable progress is to be 
made in women's health. 
81  See generally Langer et al. (2015). 
82  A/Res/70/1, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, which 
contains Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 
and Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.  
83  See generally Kuruvilla et al. (2016).  
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4.9  Key Recommendations for Future ?
Constitution Builders 
 
Constitutional law, as all domestic law, should conform to a human rights 
approach to protect and promote SRHR. Specifically, committed govern-
ments should expressly respect, protect, and fulfil SRHR for all individuals 
without discrimination. 
First, barriers to the full enjoyment of SRHR should be removed from 
constitutional law. In line with General Comment No. 22, governments 
should end the codification of coercive practices in family planning and 
restrictive approaches to abortion in constitutional law. Second, the right to 
SHR should be framed in a manner that is sensitive to the different needs of 
men and women, and to their needs at different stages in their life cycles. 
Both sexual health and reproductive health deserve equal protection and 
promotion under constitutional law. This includes the right to make in-
formed decisions free from coercion about one’s sexuality and one’s repro-
duction, and the right to access healthcare for sexual and reproductive 
needs, including contraception and safe abortion services. Furthermore, it is 
crucial to incorporate the paradigm of rights enshrining sexual and repro-
ductive rights. This article provides examples of existing constitutional text 
that may be considered by future constitutional framers and governments 
truly committed to SRHR. 
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Emergency Treatment  
after Potential HIV-Exposure 
A Neglected Right to Healthcare? 
MATHIAS WIRTH 
 
 
 
In Western countries it is commonly assumed that quick emergency treat-
ment is absolutely guaranteed. This, however, does not hold true for cases 
of possible acute HIV infection, particularly for men and transgender wom-
en who have sex with men. This is because an overwhelming majority of 
people are still unaware of the option of HIV post-exposure prophylaxis 
(HIV-PEP). Consequently, those who could have been infected with HIV 
through high-risk sex behaviours often do not consider their situation a 
medical emergency. As such, patients who could otherwise have begun a 
course of PEP after risk assessment fail to visit a clinic within the recom-
mended 2 to 48 hours after exposure. Patients who do take the antiretroviral 
drugs for one month reduce their risk of HIV infection by around 80%.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: A DISTURBING OBSERVATION 
IN THE »WESTERN WORLD« 
 
It is difficult to understand that in the so-called »Western World«, a severe 
medical emergency may arise that can result in a life-threatening situation 
if not treated, or in the chronic infection of a virus, without affected indi-
viduals and those around them recognizing it as an emergency and obtain-
ing access to immediate medication that could prevent the individual from 
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becoming infected.1 This scenario, however, reflects the possible failure to 
obtain the HIV post exposure prophylaxis (HIV-PEP).2 This paper discuss-
es the problem of the ignorance surrounding HIV-PEP as a serious issue 
concerning the right to healthcare. The reasons for the low distribution of 
PEP will be investigated and ethically classified. 
The available statistical data reveals a fairly poor adherence among pa-
tients to an initiated HIV-PEP3 due to possible side-effects. No further re-
search upon the question of HIV-PEP-knowledge in the population in gen-
eral has been conducted. We have some results from specific research into 
particular target groups, such as men who have sex with men (MSM).4 
These results do not, however, extend to trans and inter individuals who 
may also belong to specific risk groups. However, there is reason to believe 
that with the exception of medical students, the younger generation of phy-
sicians, and doctors of infectiology, most people, at least in Germany, are 
not aware that there is a medication that can be used to prevent HIV-infec-
tion immediately after exposure. 
My intention here is not primarily to focus on the question of who is re-
sponsible for the lack of knowledge regarding PEP amongst the majority of 
individuals. A mixture of medical, political, and economic reasons are be-
hind the current state of general ignorance. The most disturbing explanation 
concerns the idea that certain actors could have a vested economic interest 
in avoiding HIV-PEP in order to benefit from the profit of lifelong drug 
therapy for HIV-infected individuals. What is for sure, however, is that 
»[t]he fight against HIV/AIDS is, above all, an economic issue.«5 
An important preliminary mark must be made when discussing strate-
gies to prevent HIV and AIDS. This severe virus and disease requires a life-
                                                   
1 Doyal/Doyal (2013). 
2 Whelehan (2009). 
3 Ford et al. (2014). 
4 The survey by Jochen Drewes and Martin Kruspe on behalf of the Deutsche 
AIDS-Hilfe of homosexual men and their sexual behaviour includes also a chap-
ter on HIV-PEP. Although one special risk group, younger men, are underrepre-
sented, the study collects and summarizes useful statistical data about the 
knowledge and use of HIV-PEP amongst MSM and detects fairly poor knowl-
edge and usage of the treatment. See Drewes/Kruspe (2013). 
5 Leoni (2010), ix. 
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long regimen of drugs while imposing a higher risk of contracting other 
diseases, such as Leukoencephalopathy or AIDS-related lymphomas.6 In 
this connection, it must be stressed that the severity of the disease does not 
mean that already infected people are judged to be in a deficient state of 
human life. The struggle against sickness does not necessarily entail 
fighting against sick people, although the history of medicine provides 
plenty of examples to the contrary.7 A sharp distinction between ethically 
permissible efforts against sickness and ethically not permissible efforts 
against sick people stems from the following philosophical observation: 
Diseases, according to traditional philosophy, are considered to be a natural 
evil (malum physicum). This is to say that diseases cause a »too much«, 
which occurs in pain, for instance, that individuals desire to overcome.8 
Thus, launching programmes against diseases does not constitute an assault 
against those infected, because the programmes seek to obtain the same sit-
uation for both groups (infected and non-infected). The goal is to prevent 
both groups from having to suffer from the »too much« of severe sickness 
through a) avoiding infection or b) through medication enabling a person to 
live like someone who is not infected. The »not being infected«, notably, 
applies to both groups. The human right to healthcare means both: Prevent-
ing people from being infected9 and treating the infected, in the best scenar-
io, so that they can live as if they had not been infected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
6  Wyen et al. (2004) and (2012). 
7 Schmiedebach (2012). 
8 Wirth (2015a); Wirth/Hurwitz (2016). 
9  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 25 that not only 
health care in the sense of treatment, but also in the wider sense, which includes 
prevention as the means of a certain standard of living, is a human right: »Eve-
ryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care 
[…]«. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF HIV POST  
EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS 
 
HIV-PEP is an antiretroviral treatment that reduces the risk of HIV-infec-
tion after potential exposure, both occupational and through sexual inter-
course, by approximately 80% when treatment with drugs is initiated within 
48 hours after potential exposition to the HI-virus.10 A 28-day-treatment is 
recommended. Medication may be necessary to manage side-effects that 
occur among a number of users and include nausea, fatigue, diarrhea, and 
headache and that are often an issue affecting adherence.11 These side-
effects and possible effects on liver and kidney are usually reversible. All 
guidelines agree that HIV-PEP is indicated in cases of anal or vaginal sexu-
al intercourse when one partner is HIV-positive and not on sufficient an-
tiretroviral-medication or when men have unprotected anal sex with men, 
because this specific group is considered to have a higher prevalence of 
HIV than individuals exclusively practicing heterosexual sex.12 Compara-
ble use of antiretroviral medication occurs with pre-exposure prophylaxis 
and prevention of mother-to-child-transmission.13 
The World Health Organizations’ (WHO) Guidelines on HIV-PEP 
begin with mentioning the astonishing fact that since 1989, HIV-PEP has 
been prescribed after occupational exposure to HIV.14 This guideline also 
mentions the failures of HIV-PEP and stresses that complete protection is 
                                                   
10 Jensen (2011). 
11 Jones, S. G. (2009). 
12 Benn et al. (2011); Deutsch Aids-Gesellschaft (2013). It is rather unclear how 
women who may have sexual risk contact with the one-fifth of MSM who also 
have heterosexual contact can be protected. Their number seems to be on the 
rise, cf. Drewes/Kruspe (2013). Concerning those 11% of MSM who have sexu-
al relations with a woman, newer empirical work stresses the unlikelihood that 
these men are a bridge for HIV; although such studies admit that a closing result 
cannot be given on the question, cf. Sekuler et al. (2014). This is especially in-
teresting, insofar as only a minority of women who have sexual relations with a 
bisexual man, as indicated by a German survey, are aware of their situation, cf. 
Drewes/Kruspe (2013).  
13 Baggaley et al. (2015). 
14 Drewes/Kruspe (2013). 
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impossible, and that therefore, sexual intercourse involving a high risk fac-
tor is still to be avoided. The WHO explicitly states that HIV-PEP should 
be easily accessible to all those who have been exposed to potential 
HIV-transmission, and also mentions children and their specific need for 
HIV-PEP, especially following incidents of rape. The WHO’s guideline on 
HIV-PEP suggests training teachers, counsellors, police officers, and front-
line healthcare workers on this topic.15 The overall evaluation of HIV-PEP 
by the WHO is very positive: »Post-exposure prophylaxis […] is currently 
the only way to reduce the risk of the development of HIV infection in an 
individual who has been exposed to the virus«.16 In addition, newer studies 
on the early use of antiretroviral therapy stress the overall benefit for the 
individual and society.17 All in all, the WHO adheres to »strong ethical ar-
guments support providing PEP for HIV infections«18 and the guidelines’ 
overall assumption puts HIV-PEP explicitly in the area of human rights by 
generally stating that »HIV-PEP can preserve life and health«.19 Unfortu-
nately, the strategy of a widened distribution of knowledge about HIV-PEP 
has not been successful, although a major goal of HIV-prevention is to in-
form about means of prevention.20 This strategy should include the topic of 
HIV-PEP as well, which is not the case in all current works on HIV-preven-
tion.21 One of the most significant findings to emerge from the study by 
                                                   
15 World Health Organization (2007). 
16 Ibid.,2. 
17 Cohen et al. (2011). 
18 World Health Organization (2007), 2. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Corsten/von Rüden (2013). 
21 One example is the work of Rolf Rosenbrock, a prominent voice in the 
academic approach to the HIV challenge during the last decades in Germany. In 
his work, HIV-PEP plays no crucial part. In a recent paper on societal and medi-
cal challenges surrounding AIDS prevention, HIV-PEP is not mentioned at all, 
although he quotes a campaign in Germany (»Ich weiß, was ich tu«), which fo-
cuses on PEP and other gay-related health issues, cf. Rosenbrock/Schmidt 
(2012). This is especially astonishing as Rosenbrock has dedicated much of his 
work to the politics and prevention of HIV and one of his first, still fundamental 
works is about how AIDS can be overcome more efficiently, cf. Rosenbrock 
(1987). Although his book was written before HIV-PEP, it is still unclear why 
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Drewes and Kruspe is that even special risk groups for HIV, such as MSM, 
either do not know about PEP at all or do not feel well informed about it.22 
Younger people are especially prone to being unaware that after a risk con-
tact an HIV infection can be prevented,23 while younger MSM show an in-
creased vulnerability for HIV infection (see chapter 4). More broadly, an 
important implication of this is that so far, HIV prevention has failed to es-
tablish HIV-PEP widely, and consequently the right to healthcare of MSM 
and other risk groups is not fully taken into account. Thus, there is a defi-
nite need for tackling this issue as a serious human rights issue. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
HIV-PEP never became a crucial topic in the prevention strategies of the last 
decades.  
22 Drewes/Kruspe (2013). In 2007, only 17% of MSM knew about the option of a 
combination therapy – see Cohen et al. (2011) – that helps to prevent HIV infec-
tion after risky behaviour. Though the weakness of that study was that the term 
PEP was not mentioned, follow-up studies also revealed poor knowledge of 
HIV-PEP. These findings suggest in general that information politics since the 
beginning of HIV-PEP in 1989 have failed to reach the intended audience. 
Drewes and Krusper summarize the German situation and the knowledge about 
HIV-PEP as being differentiated and rather deflated: »Only a minority of the 
participants [of the survey] feel well informed about PEP, and amongst those 
participants who know about PEP, only a minority say that they know where to 
obtain PEP in case of an emergency. Although the probability of being familiar 
with PEP increases with the probability of needing it, gay men and other MSM 
who have sex with risky partners or with a high number of partners are, as a 
whole, rather poorly informed about PEP and where to find it. […] Although the 
number of gay men and MSM with PEP-knowledge is visibly increasing in 
Germany, knowledge about PEP must be judged as bad overall.« Drewes/ 
Kruspe (2013), 241–242. This observation throws up many questions in need of 
further investigation, including the question of the need for general knowledge 
in society about HIV-PEP, which would not only be a support for MSM health 
but also for the currently rarer HIV risk for heterosexual individuals.    
23 Drewes/Kruspe (2013).  
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3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HIV-PEP  
 
Access to healthcare is the bare minimum of the human right to health, as 
expressed in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.24 
This is especially true in cases of medical emergency.25 However, access to 
healthcare is dependent on knowledge of one’s personal situation, of possi-
ble treatment and where to go when needed. In the case of HIV-PEP this is 
more easily said than done. The situation amounts to an offence under Arti-
cle 27 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which is dedicated to »sharing 
[…] scientific advancement and its benefits.«26 
Another relevant international document concerning human rights and 
healthcare is the United Nation’s Committee on Economics, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) document entitled The right to the highest at-
tainable standard of health. General Comment No. 14 (GC No. 14) and its 
para. 2 include what is known as the triple »A« and »Q«.27 This AAAQ 
stands for availability, acceptability, accessibility, and quality of healthcare. 
Concerning accessibility for the purpose of evaluating HIV-PEP leads to a 
complete failure. According to GC No. 14, accessibility means, in detail, 
non-discrimination, accessibility of information, and physical and eco-
nomic accessibility.28 None of these fourth goals are reached, an observa-
tion which in some aspects also holds true for general HIV treatment.29 
HIV-PEP regulations tend to discriminate against people who are possibly 
infected but who are not in target groups. Access to information is also 
poorly managed. It is necessary to be aware that PEP exists in order to be 
able to search for further information in cases of HIV emergency. Since 
many people probably have a rather vague idea that a certain period of time 
is required before HIV can be detected in the blood, they would not see the 
need for immediate action. Physical access is also not sufficient because 
only specialized hospitals are able to offer expertise and treatment with 
                                                   
24 Farmer (2003); Lisk (2010). 
25 Asher (2010). 
26 Farmer (2003), 215–216. 
27 Jones, P. S. (2009). 
28 E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000. 
29 Jones, P. S. (2009); Lisk (2009). 
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HIV-PEP. In addition, economic accessibility is insecure where there is un-
certainty as to whether health insurance covers treatment with HIV-PEP. 
What is worth mentioning is that GC No. 14 puts special emphasis on 
vulnerable groups. Men who have sex with men might be considered a vul-
nerable group in the sense of GC No. 14 and need to be addressed specifi-
cally.30 The General Comment also states that providing education and ac-
cess to information is a core obligation in healthcare (GC No. 14, pa-
ra. 44).31 This again makes HIV-PEP-policies appear in rather a negative 
light. 
Health is one of the unachievable but undeniable values people desire. 
It is a very fragile state that will be weakened over time and that can be lost 
in the case of chronic and severe sickness. Therefore, healthcare is a basic 
human right and implementing the right to healthcare is a political act. 
Thus, the human right to healthcare implies the right to timely and appro-
priate professional help. It is clear that if an individual does not know about 
the existence of HIV-PEP, recognizing the individual’s need for timely and 
appropriate medicine is impossible and thus a human rights issue.32 
 
 
4. ETHICALLY DEBATING HIV-PEP 
 
The desirability of a widespread administration of HIV-PEP is medically 
and ethically debatable. The aim of this contribution is to stress the funda-
mental right to information regarding one’s health and the means to prevent 
diseases. Having discovered that there is a lack of knowledge concerning 
HIV-PEP – which, as indicated, needs further statistical evaluation – medi-
cal ethics can participate in overcoming a hesitancy to promote the only ex-
isting and therefore ultimate therapy to prevent the HI-virus from infecting 
an individual after potential exposure.   
When examining the ethical debate on the withholding of HIV-PEP in 
some parts, which can also, in this specific HIV-context, be understood as 
»structural violence«, as Paul Farmer did explicitly,33 two items should be 
                                                   
30 Doyal/Doyal (2013). 
31 Santelli et al. (2010). 
32 White (2009). 
33 Farmer (2003), 230; White (2009). 
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considered in more detail: First, the quest for medical paternalism or mater-
nalism in the debate over HIV-PEP; secondly, the question of proportion-
ality between risk and administering drugs. 
First and foremost, the argument is that the knowledge of HIV-PEP 
could promote high-risk sexual behaviour. This has not only been emphati-
cally refuted, it also seems to be a paternalistic argument exhibiting low re-
gard for an individual’s autonomy. Medical paternalism or maternalism 
more generally alludes to the conviction that individuals without academic 
medical education are unable to entirely understand their circumstances and 
therefore need professional guidance. A recurring theme of implicit pater-
nalism is the conviction that popular knowledge about HIV-PEP could 
weaken behavioural discipline in terms of sexual intercourse, which is con-
sidered to be the best strategy to prevent HIV or any sexually transmitted 
infection. The efficacy of the entire abstinence strategy is highly debata-
ble;34 even in a theological perspective, since control over one’s behaviour 
appears to be a never entirely accomplishable good. Religions and ethics 
deal with the torment of always being unable to overcome the juxtaposition 
of will and deed.35 Humans are known for notoriously failing to realize 
possible moral convictions, while other people do not have any moral con-
victions (regarding their sexual practice) at all. Hence the »rational choice 
paradigm« in HIV-prevention36 appears to be a fairly weak approach due to 
the weakness of rational choices, especially in the area of sexual desire. If 
HIV-prevention is to become more successful, medical aid without pater-
nalistic or maternalistic judgment about patients is highly required, as these 
judgments are not a medical task in any way. Any cultural or sublime reli-
gious reason for hindering wide access of PEP therefore needs further and 
critical inspection.37 Hence, the learning strategy aspect in HIV-
prevention38 should incorporate the issue of HIV-PEP, especially in terms 
of risk group-oriented approaches,39 also because the gap between that 
                                                   
34 Altman (2010); Kovara (2012). 
35 Wirth (2015b). 
36 White (2009); Vollmann (1991). 
37 Doyal/Doyal (2013); Lisk (2010); Jones, P. S. (2009). 
38 Corsten/von Rüden (2013); Rosenbrock/Schmidt (2012). 
39 Herrn (1999); Herrn et al. (2002). 
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which has been learned and that which is performed is especially evident in 
the domain of sexual pleasure. 
Another core issue regarding HIV-PEP and medical ethics is the ques-
tion of proportionality. The ethical means of appreciation of conflicting 
values (»Güterabwägung«) must also be conducted for the usage of HIV-
PEP.40 Since HIV is still an incurable and severely chronic disease,41 much 
effort has been put into the attempt to find vaccines or medication that not 
only helps infected people to survive, but also seeks to cure HIV-infected 
individuals in the future.42 Until such a cure is found, HIV-PEP should be 
administered widely, as side-effects are reversible and not as intolerable as 
they used to be. The cost of approximately 1.500 Euros for the 28 days of 
therapy with antiretroviral medicine is not astronomical, as well as being in 
line with the human right to basic good healthcare. Due to the severity of an 
HIV infection and the physician’s mandate to cure, HIV-PEP should be 
prescribed whenever there is any danger of HIV-infection.  
At least in Germany, one reason for the observable hesitancy on both 
the physician’s and the patient’s side is the unclear financial situation, as 
insurance companies could possibly refuse to cover the cost for HIV-PEP. 
Experiences seem to differ depending on the state and the concrete practice 
within the institution where PEP is administered. Although an unclear sit-
uation is likely to hinder patients from receiving adequate treatment, it 
seems as if compulsory insurance companies (»Gesetzliche Kranken-
kassen«) do generally cover costs for HIV-PEP, when the treatment is ad-
ministered according to the aforementioned German-Austrian Guidelines. 
These differentiate between circumstances in which HIV-PEP should be 
»suggested« (e.g. anal or vaginal intercourse with a person with a known 
HIV-infection) and circumstances in which it should be »offered« (e.g. re-
ceptive or inserting anal sexual intercourse amongst men, especially when 
occurring in places visited by MSM seeking sexual intercourse). Although 
the likelihood of transmission is different, both indication groups are in 
what German insurance companies consider to be situations where an infec-
tion is very likely and thus cost should be covered.43 There are other medi-
                                                   
40 Whelehan (2009). 
41 DiClemente et al. (2009); Whelehan (2009). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Marcus/Stellbrink (2013). 
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cal circumstances where there is no hesitancy to administer medication to 
potential patients without knowing beyond all reasonable doubt that they 
are needed. An example is meningoencephalitis. If a young child is sus-
pected to have contracted the virus, acyclovir is immediately administered. 
Side effects are tolerated since avoiding a disease would be worth the mild 
discomfort occasioned by them.  
Another aspect that might arise from the argument from proportion is 
that of the rather low risk of HIV infection and the relatively low number of 
new infections each year. For example, there were 3.525 registered HIV 
cases in 2014 in Germany,44 and the argument claims that new PEP politics 
in medicine is too much effort for such a small amount of people, though 
infected people do not know their status early (late presenter).45 Although it 
may be of minor importance compared to other diseases, the HIV preva-
lence amongst MSM in Germany is around 4,9–6,7%.46 Moreover, HIV is 
still so severe that is it important to be prepared for every eventuality, also 
because the disease can affect any social group in society.47 To underline 
this with an analogy: Anyone who boards a plane will be confronted with 
safety instructions pertaining to the well-known »unlikely event« of an ac-
cident. What’s striking is that less than 30 individuals in Germany were in-
volved in serious plane accidents in 2016. In other words, there is a notion 
that possible extremely harmful but rather unlikely situations need constant 
preparation through the distribution of information. A similar requirement 
should be in place for information on HIV-PEP, since contracting HIV in 
the territory of Germany is more likely than being involved in a plane 
crash.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The ethical debate about HIV-PEP indicates that much more information 
about HIV-PEP should be provided. Key players are policy makers, teach-
ers, and healthcare professionals. A new HIV-PEP-strategy could begin 
                                                   
44 Robert Koch Institute (2015). 
45 Whelehan (2009); Rosenbrock/Schmidt (2012). 
46 Drewes/Kruspe (2013). 
47 Whelehan (2009). 
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with the revision of biology books that are used in schools and would fall 
under the General Comment (GC No. 14, para. 44).48 At present, the sexual 
education sections of biology books in Western countries generally contain 
detailed information regarding the prevention of unwanted pregnancies and 
emergency contraception, but there is no information about emergency 
post-exposure prophylaxis. This is despite the fact that the information on 
HIV prevention would appear to be the most important amongst other kinds 
of prophylaxis, for instance against hepatitis. The strategy of communi-
cating the possibility of HIV-PEP in biology classes and sexual education 
would be especially important to the group of young men who have or will 
have sex with other men.49 Perhaps surprisingly, the rates of infection and 
unprotected sexual intercourse among young men who have sex with men 
seem to be relatively high compared to those among older men,50 whereas 
studies also show that about one third of MSM usually do not practice risky 
sexual interaction.51 However, an open and unpretentious introduction to 
                                                   
48 Santelli et al. (2010). It is worth mentioning, that letter »b« of GC No. 14, pa-
ra. 44 stresses the need to spread information when it is understood as an obliga-
tion »to provide education and access to information« 
49 Newer infection rates in East Europe, however, indicate that heterosexuality 
may not necessarily provide protection against HIV. Statistical data indicates 
that there has been a slow but constant increase in HIV infection rates amongst 
the heterosexual general public in the last decade, cf. Rosenbrock/Schmidt 
(2012). The question regarding to what extent bisexual men are a bridge for 
transmission is not fully resolved, but on the basis of the available data, they do 
not seem to play a key part in transmitting HIV. 
50 DiClemente et al. (2009); Vollmann (2001). Admittedly, it must also be consi-
dered that in actuality, men who have sex with men who are HIV-positive tend 
to be older, live in urban or metropolitan surroundings, more often define them-
selves as homosexual and judge their general health condition to be poorer than 
that of general populations, cf. Drewes/Kruspe (2013). However, 90% of those 
who know about their HIV-infection undergo antiretroviral therapy and 80% are 
not infectious any more, as the HI-virus in their blood is below the limit of de-
termination, cf. ibid.; Cohen et al. (2013). Amongst older HIV-positive men, the 
tendency that they undergo successful treatment is higher than amongst younger 
MSM, as implied by the quoted study by Drewes and Kruspe.  
51 Rosenbrock/Schmidt (2012). 
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the specific healthcare issues of MSM within school education, including 
information about HIV-PEP, could also help to normalize the self-
awareness of young men who have or will have sexual relationships with 
other men. This is especially urgent as internalized homo-negativity is still 
widespread. Internalized homo-negativity refers to taking negative assump-
tions about homosexuality held by parts of society to be true, which leads to 
an (unconscious) negative self-picture. This again increases the susceptibil-
ity of MSM to healthcare issues.52 The fear of informing one’s general 
practitioner (GP) or another physician about same-sex intercourse will hin-
der a homosexual or bisexual man from obtaining adequate healthcare, in-
cluding means of prevention.53 There is also evidence that family and peer 
support help MSM to deal constructively with idiosyncratic needs, includ-
ing a higher adherence to HIV-testing.54 Treating special healthcare issues 
covering not only heterosexual concerns during school education is of par-
amount importance and can lead to a more open handling of specific needs 
that may otherwise be hindered by internalized homo-negativity. Discrimi-
nation and stigmatization not only lead to psychological harm but can also 
cause, apart from direct violence, severe physiological conditions, especial-
ly when MSM are too afraid to take sufficient care of themselves.55 
Not only men who have sex with men, along with their friends and fam-
ilies, need to be informed about HIV-PEP. Women can also be exposed to 
situations where it is important that they be informed about HIV-PEP, as 
currently one heterosexual person in every 10.000 has tested positive for 
HIV. The number is increasing, especially in Eastern Europe.56 Although 
bisexual men don’t appear to be a »bridge« for HIV-transmission,57 their 
role cannot be entirely disregarded.   
                                                   
52 Drewes/Kruspe (2013). 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. Also due to the stigma of an HIV infection or expressed anxiety, the major-
ity of MSM generally have a weak adherence to HIV testing. A recent German 
study revealed that only one third of MSM test their status regularly, although 
amongst the group of MSM who do it only once a year or never, many state that 
they engage in risky behaviour (ibid.). 
55 Drewes/Kruspe (2013). 
56 Rosenbrock/Schmidt (2012). 
57 Sekuler et al. (2014). 
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Finally, in order to draw a more general lesson from the debates con-
cerning HIV-PEP, the stereotype that in highly developed countries highly 
undeveloped areas in high-tech and medicine domains would not persist has 
been proven to be incorrect. The need for further developing HIV prophy-
laxis is obvious and should be addressed.       
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The Case Law on the Right to Health 
as an Example and as a Problem  
The Distortive Effects of Litigation Reconsidered 
LAURA CLÉRICO, LETICIA VITA 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE CASE LAW  
ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS AN  
EXAMPLE AND AS A PROBLEM 
 
One of the aims of this book is to discuss the question of whether the right 
to health is an empty promise or not. More precisely it is alleged that  
 
»while even highly developed countries have come to realize that expensive health 
technologies may not be affordable for everyone under all circumstances, the ab-
sence of an adequate healthcare infrastructure in some developing countries renders 
the universal right to health hopelessly utopian – or so it may seem.«1  
 
The answer is: the right to health is not an empty promise. The evidence of 
the case law demonstrates that the right to health is justiciable. Empirical 
studies show that the right to health is not any more a matter of concern 
because of the lack of constitutional recognition: approximately 70% of 
constitutions worldwide contain health-related guarantees, and the right to 
                                                             
1 See: http://archiv.efi.fau.de/projekte/human-rights-in-healthcare/stand-150715_ 
efi-conference-programm_the-right-to-health-berlin.pdf [19.06.2017]. 
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health is justiciable in approximately 40%.2 Accordingly, it is more than a 
promise. It entails a normative aspiration that imposes negative and positive 
obligations for the states. The case law shows in general that these obliga-
tions enable the individuals to bring a claim against the state or other agen-
cies of the healthcare system before a court.3  
What lessons can be learned from the case law on the right to health? 
To address the question, we highlight two uses4 of the case law on the right 
to health: 1) the case law as an example to analyse the structure of the right 
to health and to address some objections regarding the determination of the 
content of the right and 2) the case law as a problem of inequality.  
The first use is found in different types of documents (articles, books, 
handbooks, factsheet No. 31 of the UN about the right to healthcare, gen-
eral comments and general recommendations), in which the content of the 
right to healthcare is developed. The case law helps to sustain an idea with 
an example.5 In these documents the case law is not a problem. It is a mat-
ter of inspiration or illustration. The authors of these works do not pick up 
some examples while excluding others. The case law is used to illustrate: 
type of obligations (positive-negative obligations; definitive-principle obli-
gations; core obligations, »obligations of comparable priority«6), type of 
defendant (state, social security agencies, private pre-pay healthcare com-
                                                             
2 Jung et al. (2015), 1043–1094. 
3 Abramovich/Pautassi (2008), 53–65 and 261–282. 
4 The case law can also be used as indicator. Although it exceeds the objective of 
our work, we have to point out that case law can be analyzed as an expression of 
factual and judicial issues that those entitled to the right to health have to deal 
with when they need to enforce their right. The importance of the information 
extracted from case law is highlighted to evaluate the compliance of the state as 
regards the right to medical care, as outlined by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) of the United Nations on its Final Consid-
erations on the Third State Report of Argentina: E/C.12/ARG/CO/3, 14.12.2011, 
para. 6, 7; especially when the lack of inclusion of case law on social rights is 
observed. See Abramovich (2005), about the use of courts to monitor public pol-
icies in Argentina. 
5 About the uses of examples and illustrations in the practical argumentation see 
Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), 350–362. 
6 Forman (2015), 43. 
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panies), type of plaintiff (individuals, individuals, NGOs, consortiums of 
NGOs, public defenders, indigenous communities), subject of the claims 
(access to medicaments and treatments covered by the law or plan or basket 
and not-covered by the law, these include claims to have access to expen-
sive new drugs or the use of expensive health technologies; lack of social 
determinants of the right to healthcare like access to clean water, sanitation, 
housing, education, protection of the environment), standards to evaluate 
the violation of the right to health (minimal core obligations, procedural 
review, reasonableness, proportionality review, equality review, multidi-
mensional equality test), type of reparative measures (material, symbolic; 
individual, collective), among others.7 To sum up: case law presents power-
ful examples of the right to health and is rich enough to promote further re-
construction on the rationality of legal argumentation on the right to health. 
The second use of the case law supposes that the great majority of indi-
vidual health rights actions are successful. Then it asks whether this can 
reinforce or produce inequality, »if limited public resources are diverted to 
those with the means and ability to litigate their right to health, as has been 
argued is the case in, for example, Colombia and Brazil«.8 In the debate on 
the distortive effects of litigation in the healthcare sector in Latin America, 
a considerable portion of the literature assumes that both actors and the 
requested services represent the middle and upper classes of the population, 
whereas vulnerable, low-income sectors would be left out of this litigation 
universe.9 However, recently it has also been pointed out that these effects 
depend on the concrete context in which litigation is brought about, and the 
importance of this tool is highlighted as guarantee the right to health of the 
most vulnerable.10 Our work aims to analyse this theme concerning Argen-
tina, based on the studies on local litigation in healthcare issues of the Prov-
ince of Buenos Aires.11 The question is simple: Does litigation favour and 
protect the wealthy ones at the expense of the most vulnerable population in 
                                                             
7 See, for example, in general, Langford (2011).  
8 Flood/Gross (2014), 62–72. 
9 Ferraz (2011), 1643–1668; Da Silva Virgilio et al. (2011), 825–853; Yamin et 
al. (2011); Reveiz et al. (2013), 213–222. 
10 Biehl et al. (2016).  
11  As we explain in the next section, the local case law is not object of inquiry of 
the mainstream of the research about the right to health. See Biehl et al. (2016). 
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countries with high inequalities in healthcare systems? The results of the 
analysis challenge the distorting effects thesis and points out case law that 
may enable a more robust debate on equitable access to health.  
While the first use of the case law promotes jurisdiction on the right to 
health, the second one claims to use the litigation of the right to health with 
caution. The second one challenges the legitimacy of judicialization as a 
whole. If it is right, then it could undermine the legitimacy of the first one. 
This cannot be the case for two reasons. On the one hand, the first use is 
vital for developing the doctrine of fundamental social rights, which is un-
derdeveloped in comparison to the »traditional civil and political rights«.12 
On the other hand, in countries with high inequalities in healthcare systems, 
litigation is one way »to advance health equity, although this too requires a 
judiciary willing to enforce it effectively«.13 
 
 
2. THE DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION 
RECONSIDERED FROM A BOTTOM UP  
PERSPECTIVE: THE INCLUSION OF THE  
LOCAL DIMENSION  
 
One of the recurring diagnoses of specialized literature regarding litigation 
in the healthcare sector in Latin America is its distorting or unfair effects.  
It has been suggested that litigation in healthcare brings about more ine-
quality, due to the fact that the people who go into litigation generally come 
from the middle and upper classes and have healthcare plans, and at the 
same time judges tend to grant any type of claims, even those that are not 
covered by law and irrespective of its appropriateness.14 We name this 
                                                             
12 See Ferrajoli (2002), 13. 
13 Forman/Singh (2015), 317; Flood/Gross (2014), 62–72; and related to Colom-
bia: »tutela actions [judicial claim] have been central to a constitutional trans-
formation that has permeated every sphere of state activity to include the con-
cern with human rights, and to put courts at the reach of ordinary citizens. Tute-
las have thus produced unprecedented implications for the redistribution of 
goods and services in this dramatically unequal society.« Young/Lemaitre 
(2013), 186 [emphasis added, L.C./L.V.] . 
14 See a systematization of the literature by Reveiz et al. (2013), 213–222. 
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diagnosis the »distorting effect thesis«, it has also been used to describe 
Argentina’s case.15 
However, according to parts of the specialized literature, although there 
actually are specific contexts, institutional designs16 and types of decisions 
that allow us to predict the regressive and unfair effects of judicial health 
protection, it is also possible to identify other factors that would provide 
this judicial protection with democratic and redistributive potential.17 In 
other words, the distorting effect thesis does not necessarily materialize in 
all cases. But then, which are the factors that could facilitate this inclusive 
and redistributive effect? 
This question is the starting point of this chapter. Our aim is to find out 
whether the distorting effect thesis is applicable when considered in the 
local sphere of litigation rather than in the higher sphere of the judicial 
branches and supreme courts. For instance, in Argentina most publications 
on the issue take as a starting point the analysis of decisions made by Ar-
gentina’s Supreme Court.18 Therefore, it is also relevant to include studies 
on local cases, due to the health systems’ particular functioning in a federal 
state.19 This line of research is not the mainstream on the right to health. 
However, there are pioneering studies such as the one from Biehl, Sokal 
and Amon. They used a systematic sample of 1,262 lawsuits for access to 
                                                             
15 Gotlieb et al. (2016).  
16 In this sense, our work inscribed in the recent line of work that analyzes litiga-
tion in relation to the particularities of national health system: »[T]he right to 
health plays different roles in different types of health systems […] in middle-
income countries with big gaps between a poor public health system and a rich 
private one […] In some of these countries, constitutional rights were included 
as […] an attempt to address huge inequities within society. Here the scale of 
health inequities suggests that courts need to be bolder in their interpretation of 
healthcare rights. We conclude that in adjudicating health rights, courts should 
scrutinize decision-making through the lens of health equity and equality to bet-
ter achieve the inherent values of health human rights«. Flood/Gross (2014), 62.  
17 Uprimny/Durán (2014), 60; Krennerich (2013); Suárez Franco (2009). 
18 For instance, the work of Abramovich/Pautassi (2008), 261–282; Bergallo 
(2005); Cano (2005), 111–120. 
19 On federalism and the right to health in Argentina see, among others: Arballo 
(2013), 1621–1652; Vita (2013), 17–63. 
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medicines filed against the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
and showed that  
 
»the majority of patient-litigants are in fact poor and older individuals who do not 
live in major metropolitan areas and who depend on the state to provide their legal 
representation, and that the majority of medicines requested were already on gov-
ernmental formularies.«20  
 
They concluded that judicialization »may serve as a grassroots instrument 
for the poor to hold the state accountable«.21 
In our work we choose as case study the cases filed in local courts of 
the Buenos Aires province, for two reasons. Firstly, Buenos Aires has a 
socioeconomically heterogeneous population. In Buenos Aires, considera-
ble proportion of the population from low-income homes and neighbour-
hoods coexist with people from middle income and high income homes and 
neighbourhoods.22 Therefore, it is best suited to analyse the access of peo-
ple in situation of poverty to the Courts. Secondly, as explained above, 
because we are interested in highlighting the local case law to the special-
ized debate on the healthcare sector. 
For our research we focused on a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
concerning litigation in the healthcare sector. There is no official infor-
mation as regards the total amount of claims (generally injunctions) about 
the sector in the province, but we managed to get databases published by 
the courts (especially the province’s Supreme Court), the Argentine System 
of Judicial Information (Sistema Argentino de Información Jurídica) and 
judicial reviews to make our sample.23 Likewise, our research focuses on 
                                                             
20 Biehl et al. (2016), 1; Clérico/Vita (2015), 70–85. 
21 Biehl et al. (2016),1. 
22 According to the Permanent Homes Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares) 
and the Basic Food Basket calculated by INDEC in 2010.  
23 The sample consists of 172 solved cases between 1995 and 2014 found search-
ing in the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires’ database 
(www.scba.gov.ar), the Argentine System of Judicial Information (Sistema Ar-
gentino de Información Jurídica) (www.infojus.gov.ar) and La Ley’s database 
(www.laleyonline.com.ar). In all cases the keywords »derecho a la salud« 
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the actors, claims and decisions taken in the rulings, which include first 
district courts, courts of appeal and the province’s Supreme Court. We 
make some references to Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina’s case law 
(from now on, the »National Supreme Court«), but only to the claims initi-
ated in the province. 
The results, as we will see, show that litigation in the healthcare sector 
in Argentina confirms only partially the distorting effect thesis. It is possi-
ble to identify several rulings, some of them in leading cases, in which the 
plaintiffs belong to vulnerable groups, such as women, children, people 
with disabilities and the elderly people. In several occasions these are not 
only individual claims,24 but rather seek a collective impact, because not-
withstanding the fact that they were initiated by one plaintiff, they involve 
groups of affected people or also seek the implementation of a health care 
program or agenda or the adoption of public policies for a group of people. 
There is also a significant tendency in jurisprudence to use a wider concep-
tion of the right to health that includes »social determinants of health«. 
We will lay out herein below a brief outline of the healthcare mecha-
nism in the province and the different factors that must be taken into ac-
count to understand its dynamics and the context in which the local cases 
are set. Then we will outline the main results of our research on litigation in 
the province’s healthcare sector. Lastly, we will discuss those results in the 
light of the ongoing debate on litigation and lay out some hypothesis on the 
possible factors that allow a certain degree of redistributive or democratic 
effect of litigation in this specific case. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
(»right to health«) were used as search criteria, providing as a result approxi-
mately 200 files, which in some instances referred to the same cases. 
24 Most of the claims are from individuals. Nonetheless, evidence shows that 
decisions in individual cases are used to solve similar cases. For instance, this is 
the case of Campodónico de Beviacqua, the Supreme Court in Argentina or-
dered the State to ensure the continued provision free of charge of a drug against 
bone disease in the case of a child with disability. Abramovich/Pautassi (2008) 
sustained that the case of Campodónico de Beviacqua impact direct in the ruling 
on several cases about medical coverage to persons with disabilities, among oth-
ers. 
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3. THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IN THE PROVINCE 
OF BUENOS AIRES: THE LOCAL CONTEXT 
 
Health as a human right issue enjoys robust constitutional and legislative 
protection in the province. Indeed, the provincial Constitution, as amended 
in 1994, recognizes the right to health in Article 36.25 
Nevertheless, the real functioning of the healthcare system replicates 
that of its national counterpart. The health system in Argentina is one of the 
most fragmented systems.26 For instance, such as the national healthcare 
system, the province’s is made up of three subsectors (public,27 private28 
and social security or social insurance system29) that, due to the govern-
                                                             
25 These constitution can be interpreted as part of the trend highlighted – for ex-
ample by Flood/Gross (2014) – that includes countries in Latin America and 
Southern Africa, which have created (or reform) constitutions to include health 
and other social rights »as part of a strategy to accelerate an equity and equality 
agenda in the aftermath of legacies of dictatorship and apartheid resulting in 
enormous disparities between rich and poor.« (Ibid., 64) 
26 Health System in Argentine is one of the most fragmented system, »with more 
than 500 private health-care insurers, national social insurance organizations, 
and provincial health insurance organizations regulated by provinces, which are 
responsible for health service provision. Argentina has almost 16,000 health-
care providers, including 3000 with inpatient facilities«. Atun (2014), 1230–
1247.  
27 Public subsystem, under public administration – national, provincial, and munic-
ipal – is formed by the network of free-access healthcare providers across the 
country (hospitals).  
28 Private agencies are composed of a complex network of commercial diagnostic 
institutions, clinics, and pre-pay healthcare systems. This subsystem is funded 
by private contributions, paid from the users. 
29 Social Security, composed of the »obras sociales«, compulsory-membership 
healthcare plans for salaried workers. The most number of the social security in-
surances are organized and administrated by labor unions. »Both the most vul-
nerable groups and salaried workers, are precisely those who are most affected, 
with these groups demonstrating greater heterogeneity, segmentation, and em-
ployment conditions that do not ensure health care equity.« Abramovich/ 
Pautassi (2008), 274. 
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ment’s federal scheme, coexist in the province with the federal subsystems. 
That is to say, we can be dealing with a national or provincial public sub-
system, a private national or provincial subsystem and provincial or nation-
al social security systems. 
Buenos Aires has 15,625,084 inhabitants. According to official data re-
sulting from census 2010 almost half of them (47.7%) has social security 
coverage, approximately 15% has private health insurance (5% of them can 
access it through their social security coverage)30 and only a 1.28% has 
some type of state health plan coverage. This means that the rest (35.37%) 
can only count on the national or provincial public subsystem.31 
The significance of social security coverage in the province is clear. Its 
origins are both at the national and provincial level.32 Within the provincial 
social security medical coverage, I.O.M.A.33 is the most important. Its 
beneficiaries are divided in two groups: members and voluntaries. The first 
group includes provincial state personnel and public administration em-
ployees, teachers, retirees and pensioners from the province’s Institute of 
Social Prevision as well as other state departments. Voluntaries can be 
individuals, groups, relatives of deceased members, transitory agents, offi-
cials with elected posts, judges from the Judicial Branch and state personnel 
under unpaid leave rights. Also, Malvinas War ex-combatants residing in 
the province have been incorporated. Nowadays, the total amount of bene-
ficiaries is approximately two million. 
The public subsystem includes the network of provincial and municipal 
hospitals with the main headquarters in the province as well as the provin-
                                                             
30 On the complex link between private providers and unions’ medical care see, 
among others, Fidalgo (2008).  
31 Source: Table P12-P. Buenos Aires Province. Population in private homes by 
type of medical coverage, according to sex and age, year 2010. Online: 
http://www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/resultadosdefinitivos.asp [17.02.2016]. 
32 Conference given by I.O.M.A.’s President, Antonio La Scaleia, in »Presente y 
futuro de las obras sociales provinciales«, Asociación de Magistrados del Depar-
tamento Judicial de La Matanza. Online: http://www.ioma.gba.gov.ar/archivos/ 
futuro_obras_sociales.html [12.06.2017]. 
33  Instituto de Obra Médico Asistencial de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (provin-
cial social security medical coverage), see Online: http://www.ioma.gba.gov.ar/ 
index.html [12.06.2017]. 
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cial health programs.34 Also, the province has a Public Health Insurance 
(Seguro Público de Salud, SPS) created in 2005. This insurance aims to 
provide health care for »scarce economic resources population that has got 
no other type of coverage« (Section 2, Law No. 13.413) and in practice has 
widened the subsystem’s coverage in real terms, with a tendency towards a 
sanitary model based in the essential concepts of primary health attention, 
promotion and prevention.35 Nevertheless, the option of public insurance 
does not seem to have strengthened the provincial public system. As the 
Institute of Statistics and Census’s (INDEC) statistics show, more than 35% 
of the population depends exclusively on the public health system. The SPS 
has had positive effects, but it still benefits a low portion of the population 
when compared to resources destined to free medical attention in hospitals 
and regional medical attention centers.36 
Finally, a last factor to be taken into account is the decentralization pro-
cess undergone by first level health care services (the primary health atten-
tion centers, »CAPS«37), now under municipal orbit. While this process has 
had a positive impact on the primary attention at the national level, several 
                                                             
34 On the province’s critical situation of public hospitals see Crojethovich (2013), 
2411–2433. 
35 Maceira (2008).  
36 Yavich et al. (2013), 26–34. This research’s objective is to evaluate whether the 
Province’s Public Health Insurance had strengthened its first level medical at-
tention and enhanced the access and integrity of the attention. Towards that ob-
jective home surveys were made in eight municipalities (2,413 individuals in 
all). This allowed them to access information on the use of services among ben-
eficiaries of the Public Health Insurance in individuals younger than eight years. 
According to the results, more than 95% of beneficiaries received medical care 
using the insurance and other services. They affirm that the insurance varied 
among municipalities. They point out that beneficiaries that used the insurance 
and other services achieved higher attention integrity and access to medical con-
sults than those who used the Insurance exclusively. In the same way, the use of 
hospitals was significantly lower among users of the insurance. They conclude 
that the insurance »was more effective while being articulated with the network 
of municipal services«. And as regards accessibility to health attention in Bahía 
Blanca through the SPS, see Moscoso Nebel et al. (2010).  
37  Centros de Atención Primaria de la Salud. 
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investigations show that it has had specific negative consequences in terms 
of equality in the region. Inequality is present among municipalities in the 
province, due to the disparities in the levels of public spending in the health 
sector per uncovered inhabitant, which are especially detrimental to resi-
dents from the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.38 
 
 
4. LITIGATION IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
BEFORE PROVINCIAL COURTS AND  
THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT 
 
The results of the analysis of the decisions taken at the provincial first 
circuit courts, courts of appeals, the Supreme Court of the Province of 
Buenos Aires and some cases taken by the National Supreme Court can be 
read from different angles: the content of the claim, the profile of the de-
fendant or the profile of the plaintiff. 
As to the content of the claim, most of them are related to medical 
treatments and the delivery of medicines. As to medicines, most part of the 
claims focus on different cancer39 and HIV treatments.40 Therefore, diseas-
es for which treatments are included in the Mandatory Medical Plan (Plan 
Médico Obligatorio, PMO), and therefore guaranteed by law. In only one 
case we found a request for a high-cost medicine to treat a low-incidence 
                                                             
38 Lago et al. (2012), 263–274. In the same sense: Chiara et al. (2009), 97–128; 
Lago et al. (2013), 40–54. 
39 For instance: »A.B.M. c/I.O.M.A.«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo Nro. 1 de La Plata, 20/02/2004; »García, Juan Adolfo c/Medi-
cus S.A.«, Juzgado en lo Correccional Nro. 4 de Mar del Plata, 26/03/2008; 
»Beccaceci, Mónica Noemi c/MANO SALUD S.A. s/amparo«, Cámara de 
Apelaciones de Morón, 21/03/2006 y »Alba Eduardo Vicente c/O.S.P.R.E.R.A. 
s/amparo«, Cámara de Apelación de San Nicolás, 19/6/2007. 
40 For instance: »G., E. L. c/I.O.M.A.«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Conten-
cioso Administrativo Nro. 1 de La Plata, 06/09/2004; »B., G. S. c/I.O.M.A.«, 
Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1 de La Plata, 
12/12/2005; »P., C. H. c/P. d. B. A. y o. s/Demanda contencioso administra-
tiva«, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 22/08/2012. 
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disease.41 In this same line, in addition to specific treatments and medi-
cines, we found claims to request hearing aid objects, wheelchairs and 
different kinds of prosthetics.42 
The second place in terms of amount of requests is connected in one 
way or the other to what is called »social determinants of health«. This 
means, the right to health includes an ample variety of socioeconomic 
factors that promote the conditions through which people can access it, 
including feeding and nutrition, housing, access to drinking water and 
adequate sanitary conditions, safe and healthy working conditions and a 
healthy environment.43 
In this way, in some cases the State is compelled to guarantee not only 
medical coverage for individuals or a family but also to address housing 
emergency situations44 and the lack of a monthly income.45 The accessi-
                                                             
41 »A., A. A. c/M. S. d. A. M. y C. s/Amparo«, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires, 19/02/2015. 
42 For instance in: »González de Ricci, María Cristina c/I.O.M.A.«, Cámara 1a de 
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de Bahía Blanca, sala II, 12/04/2007; 
»Divita, Virginia Daniela c/I.O.M.A. s/amparo«, Cámara de Apelación en lo 
Contencioso Administrativo con asiento en San Martín, octubre de 2010; »H., E. 
c. Instituto de Obra Médico Asistencial«, Juzgado en lo Correccional Nro. 4 de 
Mar del Plata, 22/12/2008 y »Ferrari, María L. c. Instituto de Obra Médico Asis-
tencial (I.O.M.A.)«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo 
de San Martín, 18/06/2004. 
43 See E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, par. 11; Berlinguer (2007), 1; Lema Añón 
(2009). 
44 About the judicialization of the right to housing at the local level to advance 
equality in favor of the most vulnerable people, see Cardinaux et al. (2013), 33–
74.  
45 »A., G. C. c/Fisco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires y otra s/amparo«, Cámara de 
Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo con asiento en La Plata, marzo de 
2011; »M. A. C. c/Provincia de Buenos Aires«, Juzgado Contencioso Ad-
ministrativo Nº1, La Plata, 05/2006; »R., J. O. c/Municipalidad de San Fernando 
s/amparo«, Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo con asiento 
en San Martín, 12/2010; »Correa, Sandra Dolores c/Ministerio de Infraestructura 
viv. y serv. s/amparo«, Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo 
con asiento en La Plata, 11/2011; »Duarte, Iris Paola c/Fisco de la Provincia de 
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bility to a home as a precondition to physical access to medical establish-
ments46 and families’ socioeconomic conditions have also been laid out as a 
protection in a context of high vulnerability and exposition to epidemics 
such as Hantavirus.47 
All referred cases detailed descriptions of the individuals’ states of vul-
nerability and the clear correlation between this situation and access to 
health. In this same regard we need to mention certain cases taken by the 
National Supreme Court, mostly close to the December 2001 Argentine 
crisis,48 where the right to adequate food is directly connected to health. We 
refer to the rulings in cases such as »Ramos«49, »Rodríquez«50, 
»Quiñone«51 and »Esquivel«52, all of them families with young children 
living in Buenos Aires Province and women, mothers, who are either the 
sole or primary breadwinners for the family.53  
The connection between access to health and social determinants of 
health appear also in several cases which deal with environmental pollution 
                                                                                                                          
Buenos Aires s/amparo«, Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Nº1, La Plata, 
12/2008; »A., G.C. Amparo. R.E.N.-R.I.L.«, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires, 30/10/2013. 
46 For instance in »M. A. C. c/Prov. De Bs As.«, Juzgado Contencioso Admi-
nistrativo Nº1, La Plata, 5-2006. 
47 »García, Juan C. y otra c/Municipalidad de Zárate«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en 
lo Contencioso administrativo Nro. 1 de Zárate-Campana, 28-5-2004. 
48 See Maurino/Nino (2014), 299–333. 
49 National Supreme Court (from now on CSJN), »Ramos, Marta R. y otros 
c/Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Medio Ambiente y otros«, 12/03/2002. 
50 CJSN, »Rodríguez, Karina Verónica c/Estado Nacional y otros s/acción de am-
paro«, 7/3/2006. 
51 CSJN, »Quiñone, Alberto Juan c/Buenos Aires, Provincia de s/amparo«, 
11/07/06. 
52 CSJN, »Esquivel, Roberto y otro c/Buenos Aires, Provincia de y otros s/am-
paro«, 07/03/2006. 
53 The other significant case relating to the violation of right of housing and health-
care is »Q. C.« decided by the National Supreme Court, 24/04/2012, see Clérico 
et al. (2015). 
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connected to construction54 and industrial activities.55 There are also sever-
al cases that dealt with access to drinking water and sanitation.56 In some of 
them, the Provincial Supreme Court ordered a municipality to adjust the 
supply of water to legally established quality standards,57 also ordering the 
provider to adjust to such standards for the provision of drinking water in 
homes.58 
We found some cases linked to the prevention of affection of health 
through social determinants of health, such as in a case in which the court 
                                                             
54 »Carrasco, Juan A. y otros c. Delegación Puerto Paraná Inferior, Dirección Pro-
vincial de Actividades Portuarias y otros«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Con-
tencioso administrativo de San Nicolás, 16/06/2004; »Guzmán, Juan José c/ 
Telecom Personal S.A. y Otra s/Interdicto de obra nueva«, Suprema Corte de 
Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 07/05/2014. 
55 »Fundación Ecosur, Ecología, Cultura y Educación para los Pueblos del Sur 
c/Municipalidad de Vicente López y otro, s/Recurso extraordinario de in-
aplicabilidad de ley«, Suprema Corte de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 
28/12/2010. 
56 Asociación para la Protección del Medio Ambiente y Educación Ecológica ‘18 
de Octubre’ c/Aguas Argentinas SA y Otros, Cámara Federal de Apelaciones 
(La Plata) 3156/02, RDAmb 2004-0-193, Online: http://www.ecolex.org:8984/ 
server2neu.php/libcat/docs/COU/Full/En/COU-143728S.pdf [13.06.2017]: col-
lective claim about the violation of the right to health and a healthy environment 
of the inhabitants who live near the coast of the River Plate in Quilmes, because 
of the rise of the groundwater level produced by the activities undertaken by a 
private water company (under a public concession contract), that were not moni-
tored by the competent public authorities. 
57 »Boragina, Juan Carlos, Miano, Marcelo Fabián y Iudica, Juan Ignacio c/ 
Municipalidad de Junín. Amparo«, Suprema Corte de Justicia de Buenos Aires, 
15/07/2009. 
58 »Conde, Alberto J.L. c/Aguas Bonaerenses S.A. (A.B.S.A.). Amparo-Recurso 
extraordinario de inaplicabilidad de ley«, Suprema Corte de Justicia de Buenos 
Aires, 11/2011. In the same sense in »Florit, Carlos Ariel y otro c/Provincia de 
Buenos Aires y Aguas Bonaerenses S.A. (A.B.S.A. S.A.). s/Amparo. Recurso 
extraordinario de inaplicabilidad de ley«, Cámara de Apelación en lo Con-
tencioso Administrativo con asiento en La Plata, abril 2011. See Faierstein/ 
Levenzon (2013), 1233–1275. 
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ordered a provincial road to be repaired so as to prevent accidents,59 or 
another in which the court ordered the restriction of gambling games legal-
ly promoted by the province, highlighting its link to the promotion of 
health.60 
In the same line of claims that contemplate the link among conditioning 
factors and access to health there finally appears an interesting set of con-
siderations in which some of the structural flaws of the Province’s system 
are highlighted: cases which concern the discussion of public hospitals’ 
conditions, either because the demands focus in the conditions of the build-
ings’ infrastructure61 or because they focus in the appointment of doctors or 
nurses in one of the province’s pediatric hospital,62 or also because what is 
demanded is the cancellation of an x-ray service until the security measures 
to protect hospital personnel and patients’ are met.63 A common character-
istic of these judicial claims is that they do not necessarily respond to the 
individualistic feature that is predominant in the distorting effect thesis. 
Indeed, although several of these claims do not reach the level of a structur-
al litigation questioning the inequality of the whole healthcare system, they 
do present a claim that exceeds the problem of a particular individual or 
family and that needs a broad type of answer from the State.64 
                                                             
59 »O., H. G. c/Dirección de Vialidad de la Provincia de Buenos Aires y otros«, 
Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1 de Mercedes, 
10-8-2009, see also: WaterLex/Wash United (2014); Winkler (2008).  
60 »Juzgado de Faltas 2º (Juzgado de Defensa del Consumidor)«, Juzgado de Fal-
tas Nro. 2 Defensa del Consumidor de la Municipalidad de La Plata, 
04/05/2010. 
61 »Gutierrez Griselda Margarita y otro/a c/Hospital Zonal A. Korn y otro/a«, 
Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo con asiento en La Plata, 
september 2010. 
62 »Gaviot, María Cecilia y otros c/Fisco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires«, 
Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1 de La Plata, 
29/5/2008. 
63 »Espolsin, Miryam E. y otros c. Hospital Bocalandro y otra«, Juzgado de 1ra. 
Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo de San Martín, 14/06/2004. 
64 »Florit, Carlos Ariel y otro c/Provincia de Buenos Aires y Aguas Bonaerenses 
S.A. (A.B.S.A. S.A.). s/Amparo«, Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo, La Plata, April 2011; »Asesoría N°1 c. Fiscalía de Estado – 
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In the third place, by amount of claims according to their object, appear 
cases linked to membership to social security coverage or private health 
care providers. In most of these claims the discussions focus on waiting 
periods before the patient can request a service65 or also the admission of a 
spouse or partner in an equal set of conditions as those of the actor.66 
Fourthly, we find a set of judicial decisions that address the lack of exe-
cution of certain provincial health programs. For instance, regarding the 
provincial system of haemotherapy, which had not been implemented in the 
province for more than eight years,67 the Provincial Growth Hormone Defi-
cit Program68 suspended without any reason the delivery of medicines for 
the year 2007. Likewise, a similar situation occurred with the delivery of 
medicines in connection with the »PROFE« provincial programme,69 which 
                                                                                                                          
Prov. de Buenos Aires s/Art. 250 del CPCC«, Cámara de Apelaciones en lo 
Contencioso Administrativo de Mar del Plata, 30/09/2014; Asociación para la 
Protección del Medio Ambiente y Educación Ecológica ‘18 de Octubre’ c/ 
Aguas Argentinas SA y Otros [2003] Cámara Federal de Apelaciones (La Plata) 
3156/02, RDAmb2004-0-193. Online: http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/ 
libcat/docs/COU/Full/En/COU-143728S.pdf [13.06.2017]. 
65 Por ejemplo en »González Bonorino M. c/Ministerio de Salud – I.O.M.A. 
s/amparo«, Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo con asiento 
en Mar del Plata, junio 2012; »Benigni Maria Luisa c/I.O.M.A. s/amparo«, 
Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo con asiento en La Plata, 
octubre 2011. 
66 »S.L.N. c/I.O.M.A.«, Juzgado en lo Criminal y Correccional Nro. 1 de Tran-
sición de Mar del Plata, 12/03/2002; »M, A. G. c. Instituto de Obra Médico 
Asistencial«, Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo con 
asiento en La Plata, 26/11/2004 y »Benítez Roque c/I.O.M.A.«, Juzgado en lo 
Criminal y Correccional Nro. 1 de Transición de Mar del Plata, 12/9/2005. 
67 »Fundación Hematológica Sarmiento c/Instituto de Hemoterapia de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires. Hospital Interzonal Especializado s/Amparo«, Suprema Corte 
de Justicia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 03/2005. 
68 »Asociación Civil Creciendo c. Ministerio de Salud«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia 
en lo Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1, La Plata, 14/05/2007. 
69 See, for example, »Ramírez Susana c/Ministerio de Salud y otro/a s. amparo«, 
Cámara de Apelación en lo Contencioso Administrativo de Mar del Plata, 
12/2012 and National Supreme Court, »González Fabiana Lucía«, 26/06/2012 y 
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aims to guarantee access to the right to health for persons with disabilities. 
What is interesting in this group of cases is that, as in other cases which 
center on health social conditioning factors, these are not always individual 
claims that demand the implementation of the provincial programme for a 
singular person. Rather, in some of these cases, we find collective injunc-
tions (amparos colectivos) referring to the Province’s lack of compliance 
and the corresponding impairment of the population’s health. 
Finally, we could identify a fifth group of cases linked to reproductive 
and sexual health. In some of them the plaintiffs request abortion of an 
anencephalic foetus,70 artificial insemination currently treatments not cov-
ered by the law,71 and two cases in which women with low-income back-
grounds request tubal ligation medical procedures, both cases initiated 
before the passing of Law No. 26.862 of surgical contraception. In one of 
the cases the focus is put on the severe health consequences undergone by a 
person after having a not-safe abortion.72 Neither in these nor in other cases 
have we found an approximation to the right to health from a gender per-
spective. 
Additionally, it is important to mention that not many cases have risen 
in which the object of the claim is the non-intervention of the state. For 
instance, the one case on blood transfusions to children belonging to a 
religious group that prohibits them,73 a case in which parents of a child in 
its first years deny its right to vaccination74 and another in which an 84 
                                                                                                                          
CSJN, »Insfrán, Alberto – en representación de su hija P. M. I. F. –/c PRO-
FEBA Ministerio de Salud de la Provincia de Buenos Aires«, 11/09/2012. 
70 »Parisotti, Fátima Viviana s/Amparo«, Suprema Corte de la Justicia de la Pro-
vincia de Buenos Aires, 05/05/2004. 
71 Ronconi (2010), 17–28. 
72 »N. d. Z., M. V. c/F. S. S. p. l. F. s/Reclamo contra actos de particulares«, 
Suprema Corte de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 8/8/2007, see Bergallo (2014), 
143–165. 
73 »Hospital Interzonal General de Agudos Dr. Oscar Alende (HIGA)«, Juzgado en 
lo Criminal y Correccional Nro. 1 de Transición de Mar del Plata, 09/05/2005. 
74 CSJN, »N.N. o U.,V. s/Protección y guarda de personas«, 12/06/2012; Suprema 
Corte de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 6/10/2011. 
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years old woman requests that her right to a death with dignity be respect-
ed.75 
Now, as regards the profile of the defendants, I.O.M.A. is the defendant 
with most cases against it. To a much lesser extent appear other agen-
cies/providers of the social security coverage system, »mutuals« or medical 
insurance providers. After I.O.M.A., the provincial state and municipalities 
occupy the second place, most times with demands initiated concurrently. It 
can be identified as a case-law rule that the state providers' heterogeneity 
(national state, province or municipality; social security agencies) does not 
matter at all when facing the disease’s diagnosis severity or the person’s 
state of need; in general terms the most effective provider is the one which 
was already bound to render the services and threatens to interrupt them. 
This means that the complexity and fragmentation of the system is no ex-
cuse for the provider not to render the services it should provide under the 
light of the right to health. A transversal analysis of this case-law allows us 
to affirm that it is not the person affected with a health problem the one 
who should bear the burden of the lack of effective coordination among the 
different subsystems. 
One of the most interesting results of this research can be seen in the 
plaintiffs’ profiles. Contrary to what the distorting effect thesis postulates, 
the predominant profile is not that of high-income individuals. In effect, in 
several cases the plaintiffs’ social and economic vulnerability is highlight-
ed.76 Plaintiffs are mostly I.O.M.A. members, what means that for the most 
part they are state employees of the province or volunteers, which implies a 
wide variety of profiles. A considerable portion of these plaintiffs belong to 
vulnerable socioeconomic sectors: the elderly, persons with disabilities, 
                                                             
75 »B., I. N. Causa nº 4033«, Juzgado en lo Correccional Nro. 4 de Mar del Plata, 
3/10/2014. 
76 For instance in: »Torres, Leonardo E.«, Juzgado en lo Criminal y Correccional 
Nro. 1 de Transición de Mar del Plata, 02/04/2004; »Álvarez, Cristian A. 
c/Ministerio de Salud«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Admini-
strativo Nro. 1 de La Plata, 20/02/2004; »E., C. E. c/Provincia de Buenos Aires 
y otros«, Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1 de 
La Plata, 11/10/2005, apart from the cases already mentioned and many other in 
which it is mentioned that the plaintiff has the »right to litigate for free«, which 
means that it cannot afford to pay for the legal services rendered. 
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women and children living in a state of poverty. Generally speaking, the 
claimants bringing up a case against I.O.M.A. (or the provincial State) is 
not a wealthy individual nor do they request expensive or high-tech treat-
ments. As we said before, for the most part requests focus on simple treat-
ments, mainly covered by law. 
 
 
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The main aim of our chapter was to challenge the distorting effect thesis 
taking seriously the bottom up perspective, the analysis of case law initiated 
and produced at the local level, not the high court’s federal level.  
Firstly, the content of the claims is not focused on complex judicial 
matters or unusual medical treatments not covered by the law. The claims 
are related to medicaments or treatments covered in general by the law. 
This confirms what evidence shows, that  
 
»[…] the legal structure of the health care system itself – with its emphasis on a 
defined package of benefits that are part of contract insurance – frequently provides 
the conditions conductive to litigation of health care rights.«77  
 
There are clear cases, where the defendant’s breach is obvious and in which 
the obligation to perform and provide cannot be put off. If the provider does 
not fulfil its obligations, it is not only impairing the effective right to medi-
cal care but also – in a great amount of cases – the survival of the individu-
al. 
Secondly, we have observed that do not exclusively arise from an indi-
vidualistic pattern of violation of the right to health. In several cases these 
health demands are linked to access to social conditions that enable the 
exercise of the right, like sanitation and clean water, or to the critical situa-
tion of provincial hospitals. They may not be the most numerous, but their 
existence and variety force us to seek more complex diagnoses. 
Thirdly, most cases are against the agency of the provincial social secu-
rity system I.O.M.A. In regard to the plaintiffs’ profiles, the results of our 
inquiry show that they are not part of the better-off sector of society. In 
                                                             
77 Flood/Gross (2014), 460. 
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several cases there also appear individuals that belong to the most vulnera-
ble population of society. And while they directly demand the province, 
they are not only requesting access to healthcare in a restricted way, but 
also in an ample one, that contemplates social conditions that make the 
exercise of the right to health possible, such as access to housing, food and 
education. 
In all, these conclusions do not imply that at the provincial level we do 
not find cases in which middle and high-income individuals demand a 
private medical company to access some high-complexity treatment that the 
provider refuses to provide.78 Or demands granted by judges without taking 
into account the impact it may have on the state budget. These cases exist, 
but they are neither the rule nor the most part of case law related to the right 
to health in the province of Buenos Aires. 
That is the reason why we do not take the distorting effect thesis for this 
local research as an unquestionable truth. Therefore, we present some hy-
pothesis on the factors that contribute to the result that this thesis does not 
completely materialize in the province of Buenos Aires. Evidently, public 
law defender services play an important role in specific cases in which the 
plaintiff could have not otherwise have brought a judicial case.79 This ac-
cess to justice is undoubtedly insufficient and requires to be widened with 
structural claims that addressed the right to health violation from an overall 
health system perspective.  
                                                             
78 See a. o., Clérico et al. (2013), 1417–1495. 
79 Evidence shows that the access to right health litigation for poor people in-
creased when the cases are litigated by the public defense office (Defensoría 
Pública, publicly funded legal services), which offers legal services for free to 
people who cannot afford lawyers. Informal interviews with professionals from 
the public defense office from the City of Buenos Aires revealed the existence 
of case law at the local level to access to housing as a material condition for the 
right to health. The plaintiffs are homeless women with children with severe 
disabilities. Regarding the judicialization of the right to housing at the local lev-
el to advance equality in favour of people in vulnerable situation, see Cardinaux 
et al. (2013), 33–74; Aisenstein (2013), 1845–1869; Pucciarello (2013), 2455–
2475; and in connection with judicialization the right to education, Blanck 
(2013), 40–87. 
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A second hypothesis deals with a case-law tradition that has been long 
present as regards the right to medical care in Argentina. Already in the 
nineties and in a context of a state structural adjustment, the National Su-
preme Court advanced in consolidating a clear line of guarantees regarding 
the right to medical care that establishes that if the omission or insufficient 
action on the part of the state affects the individual’s subsistence, then we 
are clearly in front of a violation against the right to medical care.80 This 
line of reasoning follows a case-law sequence from the National Supreme 
Court that starts with the »Campodónico«81 case and partially consolidates 
with »Orlando«82, »Sánchez«83, »Passero«84, »Floreancig«85 and »Reyes 
Aguilera«86 cases, and which we see reflected in the province’s courts’ 
analysed decisions. 
It is true that the Supreme Court’s rulings have not even questioned 
structural factors87 of Argentina’s healthcare system.88 There are no cases 
in which the existence of three coverage subsystems or the forced inequali-
ty brought about by the national variable and the resource distribution 
among the provinces has been questioned. It may be possible that such 
demand is not something that the argentine society (better said, the privi-
                                                             
80 It is the urgency argument, which among others was dealt with by Arango 
(2005).  
81 CSJN, »Campodónico de Beviacqua, Ana Carina«, ruling dated 24/10/00. 
82 CSJN, »Orlando, Susana Beatriz c. Provincia de Buenos Aires y otros s/am-
paro«, ruling dated 24/05/2005. 
83 CSJN, »Sánchez, Norma Rosa c/Estado Nacional y otro s/amparo«, ruling dated 
20/12/2005. 
84 CSJN, »Passero de Barriera, Graciela Noemí c/Estado Nacional s/amparo«, 
ruling dated 18/09/2007. 
85 CSJN, »Floreacing, Andrea C. y otro por sí y en representación de su hijo menor 
H., L. E. c. Estado Nacional«, ruling dated 11/07/2006. 
86 CSJN, »Reyes Aguilera, Daniela c/Estado Nacional«, ruling dated 04/09/2007. 
87 See this hypothesis in Abramovich/Pautassi (2008); Clérico (2010), 93–118, 
among others, and confirmed in Gotlieb et al. (2016). 
88 In contrast to the Colombian Constitutional Court’s ruling T-760 of 2008 that 
ordered government to address the systemic factors driving right to health litiga-
tion. See Yamin et al. (2011). 
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leged part of it89 that can push the political agenda) is actually willing to 
put forward. Therefore, for people living in situation of vulnerability, litiga-
tion is the only way they could raise their voices to demand their rights to 
access to healthcare. 
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IV.  THERAPISTS AS ADVOCATES 
THE EXAMPLE OF  
HELEN BAMBER 
 
Human Rights in Practice  
The Life and Work of Helen Bamber 
RACHEL WITKIN 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
From 1945 until her death in 2014, Helen Bamber worked therapeutically 
with thousands of displaced and traumatised people who had suffered tor-
ture, human trafficking, slavery and war. She learned from the individual 
circumstances of each person, adapting her unique Model of Integrated 
Care to meet their needs. Her approach to her work and methods of practice 
are discussed in the lecture paper: ›Therapists as Advocates: A Conversa-
tion with Helen Bamber‹1 which is taken from an interview conducted in 
2002 by Freihart Regner. 
I first met Freihart Regner at the Memorial for Helen Bamber at St Mar-
tin-in-the-Fields Church in London on the 26th of January 2015.  We dis-
cussed working together on the transcript of the interview to create a lecture 
from her words. This was an exciting opportunity to capture Helen Bam-
ber’s own voice in some detail on the practice of her work. As a charis-
matic speaker and campaigner she had fought tirelessly for recognition of 
the rights of people who are traumatised and also forced to seek asylum. 
Most of her own writing about her work is contained in thousands of confi-
dential reports and letters and therefore remains unpublished. These reports 
and letters intricately document the histories, injuries, health and circum-
stances of individual survivors she worked with. She was well known for 
                                                             
1  See the contribution by Freihart Regner and Rachel Witkin in this volume. 
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her persuasive eloquence in describing her clients‹ needs to people who 
could help them, and for her calm, determined persistence in cases that 
were initially met with refusal. 
Those who worked with Helen Bamber knew she was always to be 
found in her office, sitting at a small, circular table with refugees who were 
struggling to cope with the uncertainty of their daily lives. Each of her cli-
ents was met with the same warm welcome. Her room, set out with flowers, 
photographs and pebbles, provided a quiet place of safety for people who 
had lost everything that was familiar to them. Despite the intense daily ac-
tivity of Helen Bamber and her team, there was always a sense of stillness 
there, and time enough to be given. In the year before her death she said: 
»It is the continuation of this work that matters, not remembering the per-
sonality.« However, for all those who knew Helen, her work was infused 
with her character, her strength, her wisdom and often mischievous sense of 
humour. Her example demonstrated to professionals of all fields who come 
into contact with survivors, that they should not be afraid of extending a 
personal level of kindness and connectedness to their work.  
 
Overview: Helen Bamber’s life and work is illustrated on a wall at the Hel-
en Bamber Foundation, which maps her work with survivors of atrocity 
throughout the last century: 
Soviet Union 1930–1960; World War II 1939-–1945; Palestine 1948–
present; Korea 1950–1953; Kenya 1950–1962; China 1951; Tibet 1950–
present; Algeria 1954–1962; Eritrea 1961–1999; Brazil 1964–1977; Gua-
temala 1968–1996; Northern Ireland 1968–1998; Bangladesh  1971; Bu-
rundi 1972–1993; Chile 1973–1990; Cambodia 1975–1979; East Timor 
1975–1999; Angola 1972–2002; Argentina 1976–1983; Ethiopia 1977–
1978; El Salvador 1979–1992; Iran 1979–present; Iraq 1979–present; 
Nicaragua 1981–1990; Sri Lanka 1983–present; Turkey 1984–present; 
Uganda 1986; Tiananmen Square 1989; Liberia 1989–1996; Somalia 
1991; Sierra Leone 1991–2002; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991–1995; 
Rwanda 1994; Kosovo 1998–1999; Congo 1998–2003; Chechnya 1999–
2009; Zimbabwe 2000; Afghanistan 2001–present; Guantanamo Bay 
2002–present; Nigeria 2005–present 
 
As these events move into history, they are documented and obtain a level 
of international recognition. However, at the time when Helen Bamber was 
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working with survivors, their recent experiences were often not widely 
known or cared about. She supported people from all political and cultural 
backgrounds, often years before their causes had gained a fuller under-
standing in law and practice. These included survivors of violence because 
of their gender or sexual identity, people who had been trafficked and held 
in slavery, women who had suffered female genital mutilation (FGM),2 
child soldiers, people subjugated through the use of Juju ceremonies,3 vic-
tims of local community violence, and those who were persecuted for their 
political or religious beliefs.  
Even in cases where the plight of survivors is better understood, there 
will always be a clamour against asylum seekers and refugees from politi-
cians, the media and the general public. One of the greatest challenges they 
face is being viewed as a general category or ›type‹ of person because of 
their ›foreignness‹ and their uncertain immigration status. As we see from 
                                                             
2  Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is an illegal, extremely harmful practice. It is 
a form of child abuse and violence against women and girls. It describes all pro-
cedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or oth-
er injury to the genital organs for cultural or other non-medical reasons. There 
are estimated to be 100 – 140 million women in Africa alone who have experi-
enced FGM, and three million girls who are at risk of the procedure in Africa. 
Although it is mainly an African phenomenon it is also prevalent in parts of the 
Middle East and Asia, and is seen in Western countries (e.g. Somalia, Guinea, 
Dijbouti, Egypt: >90% women with FGM). Different regions perform FGM at 
different parts of a woman’s life cycle varying from birth through to marriage. 
Girls born within practising communities are at risk of FGM both abroad and in 
the UK, cf. WHO (2017). 
3  The Helen Bamber Foundation works with victims of human trafficking from 
West Africa who have been subjected to ritualised violence in ‚Juju‘ ceremonies 
which are performed by traffickers. These ceremonies utilise cultural beliefs in 
the ancient and omnipotent power of Juju to terrorise victims, instilling deep 
fears in order to subjugate them in preparation for exploitation and to prevent 
them from telling anyone about their experiences. Rituals which threaten victims 
and their loved ones with illness and death are an effective form of long-term 
coercion. An enduring psychological bond is formed between the trafficker and 
the victim that is not dependent upon their physical proximity. See Witkin on 
behalf of the Helen Bamber Foundation (2013). 
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events currently and throughout history, terms like ›asylum seeker‹, ›illegal 
immigrant‹ and ›refugee‹ can swiftly become negative in the public mind 
and stereotypes may be applied to all the many and various individuals who 
are categorised in this way. This is one reason why Helen Bamber worked 
collaboratively with each client to consider their own specific circumstanc-
es, needs and opinions and importantly, to rediscover their individuality, re-
silience and creativity. In ›Therapists as Advocates‹ she explains that the 
need to protect traumatised and exiled people in practical ways is of equal 
significance to the intricate, therapeutic work which is required for their 
sustained recovery.  
 
 
2. HELEN BAMBER’S CAREER 
 
Helen Bamber began her career working with the Jewish Relief Unit at the 
Bergen Belsen Concentration Camp in Germany from 1945–1947. There, 
she learned that ›compassion has a short life‹ even when human rights vio-
lations are fully recognised. There was international condemnation of the 
crimes committed during the holocaust, which caused shock and outrage. 
She saw the immediate outpouring of sympathy for camp inmates who 
were left barely alive having been tortured, starved and enslaved. Despite 
their suffering, thousands of these survivors were forced to remain in camps 
until the early 1950s, because no country was willing to accept them. Helen 
said of this time: 
 
»They began to be referred to differently, no longer known as ›victims‹ or ›survi-
vors‹ but ›displaced persons‹. As time went on this was shortened simply to ›DPs‹.   
I learned that given certain circumstances, quite ordinary people can become perpe-
trators. Caring organisations can bend under criticism and hostility directed against 
the people they are there to help. It was at Bergen-Belsen that I vowed never to be a 
bystander.« 
 
In 1947 she was appointed to the Committee for the Care of Children from 
Concentration Camps. This was a scheme sponsored by the British Gov-
ernment to bring 732 orphaned child survivors to the UK and introduce 
them to a new life. 
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»The children had been forced into the torments of the ghettos, concentration camps, 
slave labour camps and death marches, often witnessing at first-hand the death of 
their parents and siblings.« 
 
In contrast to the rather authoritative and disciplinarian response to these 
children at the time, Helen Bamber offered them a sympathetic, listening 
ear. She was able to tolerate and understand their anger, and to allow them 
space to talk about their memories and dreams. She understood why the 
boys wanted to be physically tough in order to reclaim their bodies after 
they had been so brutally abused. She did not expect them to forget about 
the past as so many survivors are urged to do, and this insight would inform 
her later work with torture victims. In her interview with Freihart Regner 
she said that, »Justice comes in many forms of acknowledgement, not only 
›forgiveness‹, or ›moving on‹«. 
Helen Bamber continued to work with people who had suffered torture 
throughout ongoing world crises, campaigning consistently for the princi-
ples of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1961, she began 
working with Amnesty International to publicise cases of disappearances in 
Chile and other countries, focusing on the complicity of some doctors and 
other medics in torture. This work led to her to chairing the first Amnesty 
International Medical Group, where dedicated GPs, surgeons, psycho-
logists and psychiatrists collated individual testimony and documented evi-
dence of state torture for submission to the UN Rapporteur on Torture. 
Speaking at her Memorial in 2013, Jim Welsh of Amnesty International 
said:   
 
»Half a century ago in the 1960s, human rights may have been universal but they 
were not universally known, and were regarded with suspicion in some sectors in 
society, including the medical profession. Few organizations systematically moni-
tored human rights.  Helen Bamber came to believe that a fusion of ethical medicine 
and political change was desperately needed; the Amnesty Medical Group was the 
result.« 
 
Helen Bamber knew that doctors, who were trying to treat torture survivors 
arriving in the UK, experienced serious difficulties because of the special-
ised nature of this work.  She recognised the need to provide multi-faceted 
practical support and advocacy. 
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»One GP4 said to me, ›I have a group of exiles from Chile living in South London. 
They have all been tortured. I do not have the time to address their physical and psy-
chological problems, I do not have the time to look at marriages which have been 
broken by torture, the sexuality which has been compromised, to listen to the chil-
dren because no-one can hear them – I do not have time to listen to their silences‹«. 
 
In 1985 she founded the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
Torture, which began its life in two rooms of an abandoned hospital in 
London and grew into a world-renowned organisation.  Helen Bamber re-
mained at the Medical Foundation as its Clinical Director for the next twen-
ty years.  Her human rights work was recognised with many awards, in-
cluding the OBE in 1997, and honorary degrees from 11 universities. 
Throughout her life Helen Bamber was concerned to help all survivors 
of human rights violations, not only those who had suffered state torture. In 
2005 she established the Helen Bamber Foundation in order to provide the 
Model of Integrated Care to a wider remit of clients including survivors of 
war, torture, human trafficking/slavery, identity-based violence, community 
and familial violence. 
 
»I believe that all people who have suffered extreme inter-personal violence, experi-
ence the same psychological and physical symptoms and enduring trauma. The indi-
vidual should not be defined by the identity of the perpetrator, but, instead by the 
deprivation, loss and damage suffered. I have learned that victims of extreme human 
cruelty remain vulnerable to further harm and trauma. We need to think in terms of 
sustained recovery rather than cure.« 
 
Today, HBF’s multi-disciplinary team of clinicians, therapists and other 
specialists continue to deliver the Model of Integrated Care which is based 
on Helen Bamber’s pioneering work.  It is continuously developed, moni-
tored and evaluated to ensure that clinical methods and therapeutic tech-
niques are evidence-based, effective for each individual client, and shared 
as widely as possible through HBF’s training and publications.  
In an ever-changing landscape of world events and crises, Helen Bam-
ber’s words resonate, never more so than now: »I find heroism in our cli-
                                                             
4  This refers to a General Practitioner (medical doctor). 
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ents[’]: despite all they have been through they find the remnants of resilience 
and courage to face continuing adversity.«  
At the end of her life her main concern was, »There is so much left to 
do.« 
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Therapists as Advocates  
A Conversation with Helen Bamber1 
FREIHART REGNER, RACHEL WITKIN 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Helen Bamber began her career in 1945 at the age of 20, working with 
survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in the former concentration camp of 
Bergen Belsen. She dedicated the rest of her life to people who have 
experienced torture, human trafficking, slavery and other forms of extreme 
human cruelty. She was renowned for her energetic compassion, helping 
thousands of men, women and children to confront the horror and brutality 
of their experiences, and supporting them in their pursuit of dignity and 
human rights.  
Helen Bamber’s intricate focus on the individual needs of each person 
she worked with gave her the ability to navigate the complexity of trauma 
and human responses to it. She pioneered methods to enable her clients to 
achieve what she termed ›Creative Survival‹ which is delivered within an 
individually tailored Model of Integrated Care. This includes psychological 
therapy, medico-legal documentation of injuries, medical advice and access 
to healthcare services, legal, welfare and housing support, a therapeutic 
community for parents and children and a creative arts and skills 
programme to support the challenges of integration through further 
education. These methods are in practice today at the Helen Bamber 
                                                             
1 First published in »Menschenrechte und Gesundheit«, see www.amnesty-
gesundheit.de (16.06.2017). The version in this paper has been re-edited. 
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Foundation (HBF), the London human rights charity which she founded in 
2005. 
An interview with Helen Bamber was conducted by Freihart Regner as 
part of his doctoral thesis on »normative empowerment«.2 The interview 
took place at the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture in 
London on 18 September 2002 and at the Evangelische Akademie, Bad 
Boll, Germany on 2 October 2002.3 The lecture paper ‘Therapists As 
Advocates’ was presented at the International EFI Conference in Berlin at 
the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences in September 2015 together 
with a retrospective on the life and work of Helen Bamber and the ongoing 
work of the Helen Bamber Foundation.4 Here, the conversation from 
Regner’s interview has been organised to form a lecture which is in keeping 
with Helen Bamber’s spoken words. 
 
 
2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THROUGH DOCUMENTATION 
OF SURVIVORS’ EXPERIENCES 
 
»An important task for a therapist is to recognise what a person has 
suffered through the careful documentation of their experiences, as well as 
verbal affirmation. There is no acceptance by perpetrators that torture has 
been inflicted, so there is a climate of denial. It is such a shameful and 
difficult subject for people that they repress their feelings about what has 
happened to them. Therefore the first thing that I do is talk to them about 
                                                             
2  »Normative Empowerment describes a basic conceptual attitude for 
psychosocial and therapeutic practice with politically traumatised persons based 
on the values of human rights. The main theme is that of empowering people 
who have experienced traumatogenic powerlessness and injustice and 
supporting them in claiming their rights. Therapeutic efforts should be made 
within the framework of and permeated by this political and legal 
conceptualisation.« cf. Regner (2006).  
3 Client cases that are described in the course of this interview have been adjusted 
where necessary to ensure that confidentiality is protected. 
4 By invitation from the Germany Health Professional Network of Amnesty Inter-
national. 
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their experience, acknowledge it and document their story, their injuries 
and their psychological difficulties.  
The taking of history, the taking of testimony, the documentation of a 
person’s suffering by doctors, therapists and others, whether there are 
physical signs of injury or not, is significant. It provides acknowledgement 
and validation of survivors’ experiences. It can support their claim for 
asylum, and it also becomes a historical document which could eventually 
be used in the International Criminal Court at The Hague or other legal 
forums where perpetrators are brought to justice.« 
 
 
3. THE THERAPIST AS ADVOCATE 
 
»I am talking about the therapist as an advocate, not solely as a therapist. 
When a person sees that the therapist is part of their search for justice, and 
is not only working with their internal world, a different relationship is 
formed. As therapists who work with survivors of human rights violations 
we are operating within a political arena, so it is important that we declare 
this through our work and through documentation of our clients’ 
experiences.  
Survivors present to us with many physical and practical problems that 
need to be addressed. As an advocate the therapist will take up the practical 
and legal issues of a client’s case, as well as looking at the clinical 
treatment that they need. I recommend a combination of therapy, practical 
skills and adaptations. You cannot begin to treat a person appropriately if 
they are desperately concerned about their future, about the past, and about 
the present. What your client brings to you from the refugee world are the 
practical things: lack of housing, lack of money, not being able to work or 
study, being separated from their families. I help them to register with good 
NHS (National Health Service) doctors and we will take up the case at 
various levels: housing, welfare, health, asylum, education, occupation and 
the legal procedures for family reunion.  
The question of justice then becomes one for your own society: do they 
have, for example, the right to access appropriate medical care? Will they 
be treated with the same respect as other people? If not, their sense of 
injustice may be carried on from the country of origin to the country in 
which they find themselves. Many of them have a sense of injustice not 
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only about what has happened to them and the political dilemma from 
which they came, but also about their situation now. Their backgrounds are 
often disbelieved by government officials, and they may be refused 
registration at NHS medical practices due to a reluctance to accept them, 
and the challenges integral to working with them, for example the need to 
use interpreting services.  
Then of course there is their claim for asylum. They usually have to 
face many legal obstacles before they can, if they are lucky, be granted 
leave to remain in the UK. Many are initially refused protection by the 
Government due to a stated disbelief about their case, so their sense of 
injustice becomes magnified. They feel that they have come to a country in 
hope of receiving justice and recognition and have found that there is none. 
I am sure it is the same in Germany and throughout Europe.«  
 
 
4. THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE OF POLITICAL 
ACTIVISTS IN EXILE: THE CHILEAN GROUP  
 
»I am working with a group of middle-aged Chileans who took part in the 
political struggle against Pinochet’s regime in the 1970s. They lost that 
struggle, they were tortured and some of their relatives were ›disappeared‹. 
When they arrived in the UK, I was working on Chile for Amnesty 
International and we documented their cases at the Amnesty International 
Medical Group.  
Many of them had been university students or trade union leaders in 
Chile, but they had not found a rightful place for their skills in our society. 
They said they wanted me to run a group for them because they were 
finding it difficult. They still had one foot in Chile, one foot in this country 
and their children did not always understand what had happened to them 
and why they had come to the UK. When I first went to the community 
centre that they had set up in the North of England, they sat me down at a 
table with a pen and paper. Everyone had bits of paper and it was like a tra-
de union or a political meeting. I went along with this and I didn’t change 
it. We just talked about what was worrying them. So I think the group I ran 
was a mixture of a political meeting and a therapeutic group, although they 
never saw themselves as a therapeutic group at first. They just wanted an 
understanding of how to go forward. 
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When Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998,5 these Chileans had 
been living in the UK for over 20 years and about one year before his 
arrest, I had begun to work with the group once again, this time as a 
therapist.  
I found that they had crushed and submerged a great deal of their 
longing for justice. They had not acknowledged it, they did not know it 
existed anymore. They were struggling in a fairly hostile society to find a 
way to bring up their children, to battle with the schools about remarks 
made about their children, to keep alive something that was very special in 
their own culture. They cried a lot, they were grieving, and I said to them, 
›Do you understand that you have never really grieved? This is why you are 
finding it so difficult. You have never cried, you have never grieved for all 
your losses and you have never grieved communally. You have fought each 
other about your political views and your different political positions in 
Chile, but you haven’t grieved‹.  So the group had re-started in this way.  
We had kept the group going over a period of a year and one day a man 
said, ›This is a therapeutic group!‹ He said it, I didn’t say it. So one aspect 
of the process was their grief, and saying goodbye to Chile, realising that 
they would not go back, that there was no place for them there. They knew 
that they would now be called ›gringos‹ in Chile and they would not feel at 
home there. They did not feel at home in England really either. I think 
therapy is always about reality and here it was about coming to terms with 
who they were, what they had, and how to speak to their children. The main 
problems that they brought to me were about their children. What they 
often say is ›I live only for the children‹, and that is dangerous.  
                                                             
5 »General Augusto Pinochet was indicted for human rights violations committed 
in his native Chile by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón on 10 October 1998. 
He was arrested in London six days later and held for a year and a half before 
finally being released by the British government in March 2000. His arrest in 
London made the frontpage of newspapers worldwide as not only did it involve 
the head of the military dictatorship that ruled Chile between 1973 and 1990, but 
it was the first time that several European judges applied the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction, declaring themselves competent to judge crimes committed 
by former heads of state, despite local amnesty laws.« See 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki//Indictment_and_arrest_of_Augusto_Pinochet [08.04.2015]; 
Amnesty International (2013).  
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Another aspect of this process was to give them back a sense of their 
resilience and to reflect upon whether they could accept their situation. One 
woman who was teaching Spanish part-time at the university, cried a lot 
about her child. She said ›I can’t even speak English as well as my child 
does‹. I asked her, ›But how many languages does your child speak?‹ She 
said, ›Well she speaks English‹. I said, ›And how many languages do you 
speak?‹ She spoke about four! I didn’t say anything else but everybody 
laughed of course, and she laughed. There were tears and laughter. So you 
can do quite small interventions in a group, it was charming, she is actually 
a very intellectual woman.  
The man who had first called it a therapeutic group had realised that 
they were dealing with their feelings rather than their political concepts. He 
understood this because he had cried a lot in the group, and it was 
something that I have rarely seen in a communal setting, except at a cata-
strophic event where you get sobbing and screaming and crying. Here you 
got sustained, uncontrollable sobbing by everybody there, and it was a 
releasing process. All of this happened before Pinochet was arrested, it was 
nothing to do with him, it was to do with the beginning of the therapeutic 
group. It was not easy to run that group because of their political positions. 
Just imagine starting a group with everybody with pens and papers, to a 
point where it became understood that we were dealing with our feelings.« 
 
 
5. PINOCHET’S ARREST IN LONDON,  
1998–2000 
 
»When Pinochet was arrested in London, the Chileans mobilised. They had 
always maintained a community centre where they put on Chilean 
activities, taught their children Spanish and so forth. Now they formed 
themselves into a committee with computers and telephones. I managed 
this situation from the therapeutic point of view by being very open with 
them. I had known them first when they were on hunger strike, when they 
had been tortured and needed our help. Now, instead of being victims upon 
whom we called for assistance, they became active in trying to bring Pino-
chet to justice.  
The early documentation of their cases had become highly significant: 
if we had not documented the cases of these Chilean exiles when they first 
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came to the UK, we would not have been in a position to take part in the 
legal case against Pinochet. The group gathered new information from 
Chile and asked Chileans who were living in other countries to come to us 
so that we could document their cases. 
Our aim has always been to advocate using evidence that we have 
produced. In other words, we do not just speak, we speak only if we have 
the evidence, and we had a good deal of evidence against Pinochet. We had 
many documented cases of torture and we had people with us who had been 
tortured. I think that sometimes therapists lose the capacity to see their cli-
ent as a person who has potency and strengths and resilience, and we have 
to work with that, as well as with victimhood. I had worked for a long time 
with the victimhood in this Chilean community, and I saw the possibility of 
something else. We began to work together, joining with Amnesty Interna-
tional and human rights lawyers in order to provide evidence. 
The Chilean group was invigorated by this event. Although Pinochet 
was not brought to full trial, their sense of injustice was alleviated to some 
extent because they were able to see him appear in a magistrates’ court in 
London to hear the allegations against him. They felt he had been shamed 
and reduced, and that was very important for them. The whole world, and 
the world’s media, was speaking and writing about Pinochet’s crimes. 
People do not generally use the word ›justice‹, but they did in the Pinochet 
context because the word ›justice‹ was being used publicly all over the 
place: ›Bring Pinochet to justice, bring the torturers to justice‹ and it is still 
being used because torturers are being pursued now in Chile. Suddenly 
Chilean people who had submerged their feelings in order to survive within 
family and work settings in the UK began to feel potent.  
I asked those who felt able to speak if they were prepared to take part in 
interviews. I think that one has to use people’s own sense of advocacy 
when it is appropriate and if they feel able to do it. You have to be open 
with them about what an interview means though: it has expectations, you 
want change to come from it and change does not always come. You have 
to be very honest, but you are also speaking to people who have been 
politically active and have not lost their capacity to be realistic and 
understand the limitations. I accompanied them to all the interviews that 
took place – CNN, BBC, the World Service. For them, being able to speak 
to the media was empowering. I was with them during the interviews and I 
was interviewed many times myself. 
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It was a very difficult thing for them to do. They spoke about their 
dreams, their shattered dreams and their torture. I am not keen on the word 
›healing‹ any more but it was a healing process for them. This is where the 
therapeutic aspect came in, because it was upsetting and it brought back 
many memories and a lot of pain. It was important that we had the time and 
space to talk about what it was doing to them and to be open about whether 
they’d had enough, and if they felt that what they had done was sufficient.  
I accompanied the group in the role of therapist and advocate. I have 
never been able to separate the two because I find that advocacy is part of 
the therapeutic process. Whilst I dealt with a lot of their tears, their pain and 
their anger, I was also able to accompany them to speak publicly, to go to 
the House of Lords, to go out on the streets and see the public interest in the 
case. So there had been preparation for Pinochet, and I suppose, I have to 
be honest, I am a political activist as well as a therapist. It is a double act 
which you have to be very careful about and you have to be honest about it. 
In any case, everybody was prepared for the interviews, and the whole 
group did very well.« 
 
 
6. THE PINOCHET EVENT IN RETROSPECT  
 
»The dynamics of the group changed after the Pinochet event: immediately 
afterwards there was a sense of realism. They were politically aware 
enough to know that there was not going to be a full trial in the UK despite 
enormous efforts. However, they felt that something of a victory had been 
obtained because they had been acknowledged and they now felt there was 
a future for justice. They knew that some torturers in Chile had become 
frightened and fled South, and Pinochet had been humiliated. 
After Pinochet left the UK the group still had many of the same pro-
blems that they had before. But had there been a change? We looked 
afterwards at what had happened: did they have more sense of justice? I 
think they did. They personally had more sense of justice and recognition. 
They had been able to speak publicly about being tortured and persecuted, 
they had been interviewed in the media, they had spoken and been heard, 
acknowledged by politicians on all sides. It’s true they had to go back to 
being cleaners, or teaching Spanish or living off benefits – and many had 
been seriously damaged physically and psychologically by the torture they 
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had suffered.6 However, there is something about political and legal justice 
that recognises what has happened to you. This is what we see refugees 
suffer every day: a total lack of acknowledgement. So it is to do with 
justice in emotional terms. 
Speaking to their children had formed the essence of the therapeutic 
group from its beginning, because they felt they had lost contact with them. 
They were keeping many of their Chilean characteristics going, but the 
children were not so interested in what their parents had to say: they wanted 
to integrate, to be like every other child, to play football. This changed 
when Pinochet was arrested in the UK, because the children saw their 
parents in a different light, and we were able to work with the issues that 
emerged.  
I suppose what also came out of the group concerned their differences 
from each other. Some were originally from very simple backgrounds and 
others from far more sophisticated backgrounds. Their politics had varied 
depending on which political organisation they had belonged to, which 
always matters terribly to them of course. So they had other difficulties in 
being thrown together as a community, which we ought to understand. Had 
they remained in their own environment they would have kept within their 
own social structure, whereas this group, because they were Chilean exiles, 
stayed together. They had enormous differences, so this was something else 
we needed to think about in the group: the differences between them which 
they had never thought about because they had always seen themselves 
collectively as Chilean politicos. This also touches on the question of 
justice, because there was envy in the group, and we had to acknowledge it. 
As we got deeper into the therapeutic content, we began to talk about the 
anger and envy that existed within the group and the feelings that members 
had towards each other. There was also a ›hierarchy of suffering‹, as to who 
had suffered the most. So there was injustice within the group and we were 
able to resolve some of this together.« 
 
»I do not think that we could have achieved all that we did without the 
opportunity presented by Pinochet coming to London. It was such an 
extraordinary event, Pinochet being arrested by policemen in London, 
                                                             
6 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki//Indictment_and_arrest_of_Augusto_Pinochet 
[08.04.2015]; Amnesty International (2013). 
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which is crazy, which is wonderful! I do believe that the work we did in the 
group – hard, grinding work – was good preparation. They had become 
more mature, I would say. Who knows how they would have reacted if his 
arrest had happened earlier? It could have been a negative experience with 
the group and their difficult feelings with each other.  
We spoke a lot in the group about being defeated and what ›defeat‹ 
means. One day a man said, ›I’m not going to be able to go back to Chile to 
live. I will visit, I will be called a ‘gringo’ and I will come back again. My 
dream of Chile has gone.‹ So they were able to let go of a dream. However, 
he said something interesting: ›There was a defeat but it wasn’t ‘mine’ or 
‘our’ defeat‹. He meant that in losing them, Chile had lost something good, 
but they had each kept their integrity. This is what the group really 
achieved: the sense that there was integrity in the group and within each 
individual. It had not been lost and this helped them in quite a profound 
way.« 
 
 
7. RECOGNISING LACK OF JUSTICE:  
TURKISH-KURDS 
 
»Of course we see many people in this country who have not had the 
opportunity of the Chilean group. Sometimes you need to recognise with a 
client that they may never get the justice they want, and that their country 
may not move towards the progress that they wanted to see happen. It is a 
difficult job for the therapist but it is important. I see Turkish-Kurdish 
people who have been persecuted since they were children. Their villages 
were ransacked, their cattle were killed, they were persecuted in the schools 
and not allowed to speak their Kurdish language. They have a long history 
of persecution and tragedy and they find living in exile very difficult. Some 
go on hunger strike when there is a protest in Turkey or when people are 
killed. It is a collective sense of injustice and they carry it with them like a 
flag, a kind of emblem.  
Many of them make a living here. Once they are established, they set up 
their workshops and their kebab shops and they become quite competitive. 
They do very well sometimes, although not always. We are also working 
with impoverished Turkish-Kurds, many of whom face enforced return to 
Turkey. I am fighting their cases.  
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I think that the people I work with carry a sense of loss and injustice 
that they will always carry. It is not the only thing that they bring to the 
therapy room, but it’s an inevitable part of it. Having their histories 
acknowledged means a great deal to them. They are impressed that there is 
a file with their history – not only their injuries, not just their suffering and 
the medication that their doctor prescribes for them, but their history, their 
story. They know that there may be a time when this can be used, when 
torturers from Turkey are brought to trial. We cannot be sure of that, but we 
have to work for it together.« 
 
 
8. MOVING FROM A POLITICAL STRUGGLE  
TO A HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLE:  
A WOMAN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
»Making an issue of the sense of injustice is, in a way, therapeutic too.  
It can be quite empowering. I am working with a woman from a Middle 
Eastern country who was very political and had joined a hardline, militant 
opposition group. She was tortured, raped, all of it. She is now beginning to 
realise that their way of trying to fight while they are here in exile is not 
changing anything in her home country, it is just hurting them a great deal. 
I think many people move from a more militant political struggle to a 
human rights struggle once they are living in exile. They need to think in 
terms of establishing their rights under the various UN Conventions. I 
believe it is our job to help them to do this, to understand that there are 
international Conventions that are there to protect them. 
It is not that she is giving up her political beliefs – I would be the last 
person to expect that – but we have looked at how she can empower her 
community here to get what they need; to be able to speak their original 
language, to teach the children that language so they do not lose it, to have 
a community that keeps alive many of the things that are important to them. 
These are not just the political issues, but can be food, music, fun, anything. 
We helped this woman to get asylum eventually, and now she is taking up a 
childcare course so that she can empower fellow women here to do other 
things while their children are being taken care of. They do not have to just 
be a servant in their home, but they too can learn English, go and study, or 
engage in other activities. 
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It has given her a tremendous sense of justice for women. She does not 
use the word justice, and I am not sure she considers it that way, but she 
thinks about women becoming more creative, and having a place and a 
voice in their society. It is not just about women being able to join a 
political struggle anymore, because many women of her ethnic group have 
played a strong role in that. She will always feel part of that struggle, but 
she is doing something now which is giving her the courage to see herself 
in a much broader way, continuing with her studies and doing challenging 
things on her course. At the moment it is the men who go to the coffee 
house and into the community and the women who stay at home. This way 
she is doing something quite imaginative for the future of her community 
here, which is actually about justice.« 
 
 
9. INJUSTICE IN FAMILY, CULTURE AND POLITICS: 
A WOMAN FROM EUROPE 
 
»I think it is a mistake to only consider the political arena. I have clients 
who bring a sense of injustice which originates from their home life, so the 
therapist needs to consider their childhood, to go through the experience of 
their family home, their school and – only then – their political life. I am 
not sure you can simply separate each of these out, or look only at political 
injustice.  
I am working with a European woman who was abducted and raped by 
soldiers during a war in her home country. Such was the tragedy of her 
experience of the war that she has never been able to disclose it to anyone. 
She says that because of her community‘s patriarchal culture she could be 
rejected, or possibly even killed. Now there are two areas of injustice here: 
one is the terrible tragedy of war, in which innocent people can be taken 
and abused. Another is the fact that, after having experienced this tragedy, 
she cannot receive the normal sympathy, care and understanding from her 
community that one would hope for, quite the contrary. We must look at 
this as well, and explore it with our client.  
This woman also experienced injustice in her family home from 
childhood: she was not allowed to do the things she wanted, not permitted 
to study, and she was treated as a kind of servant in the household. She had 
to be extremely obedient, any sign of deviation from expected behaviour 
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would result in a beating. Dancing, singing, all the things that young people 
like to enjoy were denied to her. Then there was an arranged marriage 
imposed upon her. So it would be a mistake to look only at the political 
scene and the tragedy that happened to her. Did she think that it was unjust 
that because she is a woman she had to be obedient, that she had to take off 
her father’s coat and serve him? She just said to me ›This is how it is in my 
home country‹.  
My work then was in finding out how she felt about it. Without using 
the word ›injustice‹, how did this make her feel as a young person? What 
did she feel then about her parents, about her home, about her society? I 
think she feels that the situation for women in her country and in other 
countries is terrible, but she is not looking for political justice for herself. 
She has grown up in a system which was imposed upon her by her own 
community, quite apart from the brutality of the war. She had felt that there 
was no one to help her in her predicament. I find that people do not use the 
word ›justice‹ very much, there is not always an expectation of justice in 
the region that they were brought up in, but they do seek it in different 
ways. I would use the word ›right‹ in my discussions with her: did she feel 
it was right? What was wrong in that situation, for her?  
I wanted her to be able to express her feelings, because she has two 
children and she does not believe that she can be a good role model for 
them. My great concern is about generational perpetuation of trauma, so  
I explored with her how she felt when her needs were not acknowledged by 
her family members, and how we can begin to change how she reacts to her 
own children; how she feels about herself and about them. She loves her 
children very much, but she would shrug and say, ›Well that’s how it is‹.  
I might then say to her, ›Well do you think we can change that, and if so, 
how?‹ ›Do you want to change things for your children or do you want to 
go on in the same way that you knew before?‹ I would not rush to look at 
how we can make changes, but rather allow her to express herself, and 
enable her to do it herself, without guilt feelings. Every person has feelings 
for their parents, no matter how questionable their actions may be. I always 
work with clients who have suffered this kind of injustice within their 
communities on the understanding that their parents did not know anything 
else. They were born into a situation in which everything they did was 
simply what everyone else did, and it was acceptable. There is no need to 
blame her parents or even her community, that is just ›how it is.‹ However 
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now she is in a different situation, in a new country, how does she feel 
about what she wants to do?  
She is an extremely bright woman, very clever. It would give her a 
tremendous sense – whether it is justice, it may be – to fulfil her dream to 
go to university. This is possible for a mother in a Western society. I do not 
know whether her husband would allow it, but I believe it would be 
recognition of all that she lost in the course of her early childhood when she 
was forbidden to study. I hope that by working with both the husband and 
the wife there may eventually be recognition on his part that she should go 
to university. This does not put right the early injustice in her family or the 
terrible injustice of the war which assaulted her so badly, but it is one way 
of looking at how she can achieve something that was absolutely denied to 
her. She was told by her community and by the events of the war itself that 
she was nothing, deserved nothing. So in this case working with the inner 
world is not enough, certain practical things need to be put in place. It is 
worth considering that there is an Open University7 which enables people 
to study at home. There are many other things that are needed for her, but 
being able to pursue her education would give her a sense of recognition.  
Change – and this is a political word really – change can be made. She 
is excited by the idea of change. Although she does not feel she can get 
justice for herself, she might be able to provide more justice for her 
children. She is interested in looking at the ways I have been able to work 
with her in relation to her husband. When she married him she was very 
young and she wasn’t able to assert herself. Now she has told him - not 
asked him, but told him – that she is coming to see me because she thinks it 
will help her with her asylum claim, her poor health and her future. She 
also believes that it helps her to manage her children better. This did not 
happen overnight, it took time. I go very slowly and it’s difficult. You 
could not put on paper what you have achieved in one session because it is 
so small. However, there are little areas of change, and recently she has 
brought her children to a session with me for the first time.« 
 
                                                             
7 The Open University is a public distance learning and research university, and 
one of the biggest universities in the UK for undergraduate education: 
www.open.ac.uk. 
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10. THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 
 
»I think my irritation towards the concept of justice when we started with 
this interview was really to do with the fact that as therapists working in 
Europe with people who have been tortured, abused, who have been war 
victims, misused as slaves – we are ourselves working in an atmosphere of 
injustice towards our clients. I mean the injustice of the rhetoric that is used 
politically and publicly against them, the asylum legislation that becomes 
more and more punitive, the harsh decisions to send people back to their 
countries when we know perfectly well that they are likely to be tortured or 
›disappeared‹. So the question of justice applies to us as much as it does to 
our client, and it forces us into the role of being an advocate for them. It is 
irritating because it brings out the advocate in us, the sense of injustice on 
behalf of our client and on behalf of ourselves.  
I have never really been preoccupied with what my father called ›the 
enemy‹. He once said to me, ›Don’t waste your hatred and your time with 
the enemy. You’ll recognise the enemy, you’ll work against the enemy, so 
don’t waste your energy. Attend to the bystander, attend to the people who 
allow these things to happen!‹ I think that in a way my anger and my 
irritation about injustice is most definitely towards my own Government 
and government policy. What the client brings to me in many cases – not 
all, I am not going to generalise here – is the injustice of the system in 
which they now find themselves, and the final disappointment and 
disillusion from believing that the United Kingdom is a country where they 
will be given a full and fair hearing. This is a final piece of the destruction 
in their belief system.  
I believe that a sense of justice becomes applicable only when people 
are more settled and stabilised. They may have obtained their safety in the 
country, which is something, they may still be fighting for housing and the 
right to work and to be accepted, but they will be in a better position now to 
look back upon their original tragedy. It is then that you are able to unravel 
some of the most difficult feelings that people have about what is, very 
often, their lost political cause. Most refugees have lost the political battle, 
the change that they wanted to bring about in their country. This is a good 
point to talk and listen, to flush out and try to disentangle the complicated 
feelings that people have about lack of justice.  
418 | FREIHART REGNER, RACHEL WITKIN 
So justice is an essential component of therapy in such cases, perhaps 
the most important component, but we do not verbalise it very much.  
I think we should try to explore it more. […] We do not often see the 
original search for justice, but I believe that this search goes on with people 
in some way. With the Chilean group for instance, they do not expect to 
have justice in the way that they wanted it originally. They have had a suc-
cess with the Pinochet event, they saw him humiliated and they got a lot 
from that, above all a sense of recognition. However, justice is also about 
the public, the host community, about an understanding of who they are 
and what they are. For example, there is an ›Artists in Exile‹ group, which 
has exhibitions, music, art and theatre. This is one way of expressing to the 
public whatever they want to express. Public recognition is terribly 
important: it is the denial of public interest that accentuates the sense of 
injustice. It is difficult for some therapists to see themselves as advocates 
and it is important to recognise this. It goes against their training and it can 
cause a conflict. There is a jump to be made: you need to accept that we are 
working in a political and social environment which not only affects the 
lives of our clients, but our own lives as well. We can acknowledge their 
suffering but often we cannot bring the justice that would make the 
difference. We can be part of the pursuit of justice though. It is important 
for therapists not to feel powerless as they often do, but to think a little bit 
›side-laterally‹, to see whether there is a way in which they can use 
documented evidence of injuries and work more with the legal justice 
system for their client as well as working through feelings. This way we 
can be more powerful as therapists.« 
 
 
  
THERAPISTS AS ADVOCATES. A CONVERSATION WITH HELEN BAMBER | 419 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Amnesty International (2013): How General Pinochet's detention changed 
the meaning of justice, News, 16 October 2013, Online: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/how-general-pinochets-
detention-changed-meaning-justice/ [19.04.2015]. 
Regner, Freihart (2006): »Normatives Empowerment. Das Unrechtserleben 
bei politisch Traumatisierten aus der Sicht von Unterstützern im 
Therapieumfeld – Möglichkeiten psychosozialer und ›therapeutischer‹ 
Bearbeitung«, Online: http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/receive/ 
FUDISS_thesis_000000001964?lang=en [22.11.2016].  
 
Authors 
 
 
Lucía Berro Pizzarossa, LLM 
Global Health Law Groningen Research Centre 
Department of International Law, Faculty of Law 
University of Groningen  
Oude Kijk in't Jatstraat 26  
9712 EK Groningen (Netherlands) 
 
Prof. Dr. phil. Dr. h.c. Heiner Bielefeldt 
Chair in Human Rights and Human Rights Politics 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Kochstraße 4 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
Dr. Claire E. Brolan. MA, LLB, BA 
Dalla Lana School of Public Health 
155 College St, Toronto 
ON M5T 3M7 (Canada) 
 
PD Dr. med. Walter Bruchhausen, M.Phil., Dipl.-Theol. 
Department for History of Health/Global Health 
Institute for Hygiene and Public Health 
University of Bonn 
Sigmund-Freud-Str. 25 
53127 Bonn (Germany) 
 
  
422 | AUTHORS 
Luljeta Caraoshi 
Rr. Bilal Golemi 
Pall-33. H-5. Apt-7 
Njesia Bashkiake Nr-5 
Tirana 1060 (Albania) 
 
Audrey R. Chapman, Ph.D.  
UConn Health Center 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
55 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105-2290 (USA) 
 
Prof. Dr. phil. Laura Clérico 
Faculty of Law 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Bismarckstraße 12 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
Adriaan van Es, MD 
Regentesselaan 32 
3818 HJ Amersfoort (Netherlands) 
 
Veronika Flegar, LLM 
Faculty of Law 
University of Groningen 
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26  
9712 EK Groningen (Netherlands) 
 
Prof. Dr. med. Andreas Frewer, M.A. 
Professor for Medical Ethics 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Glückstraße 10 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
 
 
 
HEALTHCARE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE | 423 
Prof. Lisa Forman, BA, LLB, MA, SJD 
Canada Research Chair in Human Rights and Global Health Equity 
Dalla Lana School of Public Health 
155 College Street,  
Toronto, Ontario, M5T 3M7 (Canada) 
 
Tessy Huss, Ph.D. 
Centre for Global Health & School of Psychology 
Trinity College Dublin  
7-9 Leinster Street South  
Dublin 2 (Ireland) 
 
Dipl.-Pol. Sabine Klotz  
Chair in Human Rights and Human Rights Politics 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Kochstraße 4 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
PD Dr. phil. Michael Krennerich 
Chair in Human Rights and Human Rights Politics 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
Kochstraße 4 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
Everaldo Lamprea 
Los Andes Law School 
Los Andes University,  
Carrera 1 No. 18A-12 
Bogotá (Colombia) 
 
Prof. Malcolm MacLachlan, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
National University of Ireland Maynooth 
Newtown Road, Kilcock,  
Maynooth Co. Kildare (Ireland) 
 
 
424 | AUTHORS 
Dr. phil. Amrei Müller  
School of Law 
Queen's University Belfast, 
University Road 
Belfast BT7 1NN (United Kingdom) 
 
Katrina Perehudoff  
Global Health Unit, Department of Health Sciences 
University Medical Centre 
University of Groningen 
Antonius Deusinglaan 1  
9713 AV Groningen (Netherlands) 
 
Dr. phil. Freihart Regner 
INTER HOMINES e.V.  
Stargarder Str. 47 
10437 Berlin (Germany) 
 
Prof. Brigit Toebes 
Associate Professor and Rosalind Franklin Fellow 
Faculty of Law, University of Groningen 
Oude Kijk in 't Jatstraat 26  
9712 EK Groningen (Netherlands) 
 
Dr. phil. fac. theol. Martina Schmidhuber  
Institute for History of Medicine und Medical Ethics  
University of Erlangen- Nuremberg 
Glückstraße 10 
91054 Erlangen (Germany) 
 
Marie-Noëlle Veys, LLM 
Mechelsesteenweg 103  
2018 Antwerpen (Belgium) 
 
 
 
 
| 425 
Leticia Vita  
Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas y Sociales  Ambrosio Lucas Gioja  
Av. Figueroa Alcorta 2263 
Primer Piso (C1425CKB) 
Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires (Argentina) 
 
Dr. phil. Mathias Wirth 
Feodor Lynen Postdoc 
Yale Divinity School 
409 Prospect St 
New Haven, CT 06511 (USA) 
 
Rachel Witkin 
Helen Bamber Foundation, 
Bruges Place  
15-20 Baynes Street 
Camden, London, NW1 0TF (England) 
HEALTHCARE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 

